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Although traditional Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) has achieved many clinical 
successes, approximately 30 50% of patients are resistant to this form of treatment. This 
trans diagnostic group of treatment resistant patients typically have chronic, co morbid, 
and/or personality disordered symptoms and often engage in a range of maladaptive 
behaviours (e.g., substance abuse, deliberate self harm). Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT) is a relatively modern psychological treatment which proposes that the 
formally dissimilar symptoms this group present result from a common cause; namely, 
excessive entanglement with, and a need to escape from or avoid, unwanted private 
events such as thoughts, feelings, and memories (experiential avoidance). Preliminary 
evidence from clinical trials suggest that ACT may prove efficacious with treatment 
resistant patients.  
In this thesis, four studies were designed to examine the theoretical underpinnings and 
clinical utility of ACT. Studies 1 and 2 tested the ACT derived prediction that diverse 
maladaptive behaviours serve a common experiential avoidance function. In support of 
this hypothesis, structural equation modelling showed that experiential avoidance 
predicted significant maladaptive behaviour covariance. Moreover, using the same 
method, a cross sectional design showed that experiential avoidance partially mediated 
the effect of Negative Affect Intensity and Childhood Trauma on the tendency to engage 
in maladaptive behaviours. Studies 3 and 4 extended these theoretically based 
investigations into the applied domain, pilot testing ACT for a sample of patients whose 
symptoms had been resistant to, or relapsed following, standard care. Study 3, a pre post 
uncontrolled trial, revealed significant reductions in psychological distress with gains 
maintained at 6 and 12 month follow up. Study 4, a randomised control trial comparing 
ACT to a CBT treatment as usual (CBT TAU) condition, showed that ACT achieved 
more enduring effects than CBT TAU. Furthermore, exploratory analyses suggested that, 
for the ACT group alone, reductions in experiential avoidance during treatment predicted 
follow up outcomes. These findings support the use of ACT for treatment resistant 
patients. i 
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CHAPTER I 
A Short History of Behaviour Therapy 
 
For many decades, experimental psychologists have worked to discover the basic 
mechanisms underlying human action. Often these endeavours have involved analogue 
research either investigating animal behaviour in laboratory conditions, or human 
behaviour in carefully controlled and artificial test situations. One aim of these efforts 
has always been to generate knowledge that can be applied to human behaviour in real 
world settings and, in particular, to the understanding and treatment of human clinical 
disorders. The purpose of this chapter is to describe how this goal has been realised 
through the development of psychological therapies, which have largely focused on 
addressing the needs of certain clusters of psychological symptoms (e.g., symptoms of 
depression or of anxiety). The underlying position from which this chapter is written is 
radical behaviourism, the theoretical approach that informs empirical sections of this 
thesis.  
 
1.1  First Wave Behaviour Therapies: Behaviour Analysis and Intervention 
Early behaviourists used animal analogue research to study learning principles. This 
resulted in the detailed knowledge of two fundamental learning processes: classical 
conditioning (Pavlov, 1927) and operant conditioning (Skinner, 1938). In both 
instances, conditioning described the acquisition of distinct behaviour patterns whose 
occurrence was dependent on their relationship with environmental stimuli (Catania, 
1979). 
 
1.1.1 Respondent Conditioning and Behaviour Therapy 
Early behaviour therapy had firm scientific foundations in work pioneered by Russian 
physiologists at the turn of the 20
th Century. This work was committed to scientifically 
assessing the effect of the central nervous system on behaviour (e.g., Pavlov, Sechenov, 
& Bechterev; cited in Kazdin, 1978). The most famous of these endeavours was 
Pavlov’s work on conditioned reflexes in dogs, which was specifically concerned with 
conditioning salivation. Pavlov (1927) showed that pairing a stimulus that elicited a Chapter I     2 
reflex (an unconditioned stimulus; UCS) with a neutral stimulus (a conditioned 
stimulus; CS) established a conditioned reflex (CR); the previously neutral stimulus 
acquired the capacity to elicit the reflexive behaviour. For example, by repeatedly 
pairing a tone (CS) with food (UCS), the tone acquired the capacity to elicit salivation 
(CR) even in the absence of food (Pavlov, 1927). This process came to be known as 
respondent conditioning
1. 
Pavlov’s work was taken up by American psychologists as a possible mechanism for 
explaining human behaviour, informing an approach to psychology called 
methodological behaviourism. This approach upheld Pavlov’s scientific principles, 
banning introspection and insisting that overt and quantifiable behaviour was the only 
admissible form of data. Respondent conditioning provided a central theoretical and 
methodological model for a wealth of research on experimental neuroses; the 
production of behavioural disorders through laboratory based procedures. John B. 
Watson’s research was particularly influential, demonstrating how phobias (or 
conditioned emotional reactions) could be created using respondent conditioning 
methods in humans. For example, his famous “Little Albert” experiment (Watson & 
Rayner, 1920) showed that pairing the presentation of a white rat (CS) with an 
unexpected loud noise (UCS) resulted in experimentally induced fear (CR) on later 
exposures to that same rat. After seven CS and UCS pairings, the child who initially 
played freely with the rat was now reported to fall over, cry and crawl away when the 
rat was brought towards him. Although experimentally induced, Albert’s fear was 
similar to fears seen in clinical practice. For example, fear generalised to previously 
neutral stimuli and was durable over a 4 month period, despite the absence of further 
conditioning trials.  
Based on the understanding that clinical disorders were learnt reflexive behaviours, 
respondent conditioning became a theoretical wellspring for early behaviour therapies. 
These therapies shared the common principle that clinical disorders could be modified 
or eliminated using further conditioning. For example, laboratory evidence of counter 
conditioning and reciprocal inhibition (Wolpe, 1958, first documented in Watson’s 
                                                           
1 Pavlov initially used the phrase “conditioning” which later became known more specifically as 
“classical conditioning” for occasions where the behaviour was not instrumental. Skinner (1938), 
however, renamed classical conditioning “respondent” conditioning as a contrast term for operant or 
instrumental conditioning. For consistency, respondent conditioning will be used from this point forward. Chapter I     3 
laboratory in 1924; see Harris, 1979) revealed that if a response incompatible with the 
CR could be made to occur in the presence the CS that elicited it, the previously 
established CR would weaken or be eliminated. Based on this observation, Wolpe 
(1961) designed systematic desensitisation as a treatment for anxiety based disorders. 
This involved pairing relaxation (induced, for example, by using anxiolytic drugs or 
hypnosis) with graded exposure to anxiety eliciting stimuli. This technique proved 
particularly successful for the treatment of anxiety based disorders and lasting effects 
were often reported (see Bandura, 1969; Eysenck & Rachman, 1965). Although 
systematic desensitisation traditionally relied on exposure to physical stimuli, over time 
its application extended to include exposure to imagined hierarchies of anxiety 
provoking events. This broadened its range of applicability greatly, enabling the 
treatment of anxieties concerning CS that were not readily accessible to the clinical 
setting (e.g., the fear of flying).  
Systematic desensitisation was one of many first wave behaviour therapies, with 
others including (detailed in, and cited from, Eysenck & Rachman, 1965), for example, 
aversion therapy (Franks, 1958), conditioned inhibition (Walton, 1961), vocal inhibition 
(thoughts stopping; Wolpe, 1958), conditioned avoidance (Hilgard & Marquis, 1940), 
negative practice (Walton & Black, 1960) and implosion therapy (Page & Hall, 1953).  
 
1.1.2 Operant Conditioning and Behaviour Modification 
Although respondent conditioning provided the initial foundations for early behaviour 
therapy, it was somewhat limited by its focus on reflexive behaviours. Watson and 
colleagues regarded all learning as instances of respondent conditioning, but failed to 
provide a convincing account of more complex, non reflexive patterns of behaviour, or 
of clinical disorders that had no obvious learning based etiology (Rachman, 1977). 
Furthermore, incongruence between laboratory based and clinical based investigations 
began to emerge. For example, respondent conditioning failed to explain why 
experimentally induced CRs could be readily extinguished, whereas those seen in 
clinical practice were more resistant to change (Rachman, 1977).  
The work of B. F. Skinner, a radical behaviourist, broadened the field of behaviour 
therapy considerably. Skinner distinguished a different kind of behaviour—Operant 
Behaviour—behaviour that was a function of its consequences (Skinner, 1938). Unlike Chapter I     4 
respondent behaviour, which was “involuntarily” elicited by certain environmental 
stimuli, operant behaviour was said to be “voluntarily” emitted by the organism, and 
maintained by its effects on the environment (Catania, 1979)
 2. Operant behaviour was 
described in terms of two hierarchically nested contingencies. The elements of this 
contingency included (a) a discriminative stimulus (S
D), (b) an operant behaviour (or 
the response; R), and (c) a reinforcing stimulus (Rf). These were nested in the following 
way; the response to reinforcement contingency was first established (R →Rf) and any 
context reliably present during this pairing, over time, came to function as an S
D (S
D (R 
→Rf)). The S
D was said to have stimulus control over responding because it set the 
occasion for certain behaviours to be emitted. Skinner also emphasised that no 
behaviour is ever precisely replicated, and that the same consequence can be achieved 
by topographically dissimilar behaviour patterns. Skinner thus defined operant 
behaviour in terms of response classes. Responses belonged to an operant class if they 
shared the property required to obtain reinforcement (see Kazdin, 1978). 
Although Skinner’s research was almost exclusively analogue, restricted to the 
behaviour of non human organisms, it had a significant impact on behaviour therapy. 
Understanding behaviour in terms of response classes, rather than isolated reflexive 
behaviours, greatly broadened the range of behaviours that could be investigated and 
captured the complexity of human action more completely. Operant principles enriched 
models of clinical disorders by suggesting that behavioural problems could be 
established and maintained by reinforcement contingencies. This resulted in new 
theoretical models, most of which were hybrids of respondent and operant conditioning 
(Eysenck, 1960; Eysenck & Rachman, 1965; Mowrer, 1960). Mowrer, for example, 
developed a two stage account of avoidance in which respondent conditioning was the 
process responsible for establishing a fear, whereas operant conditioning maintained 
avoidance behaviour as a form of escape from conditioned fear. In this account, the CR 
was maintained because an operant class of escape behaviours prevented the natural 
extinction of fear through exposure to the CS alone. 
In clinical practice, Skinner’s theorising enhanced existing techniques and informed 
new ones. Treatments based on Skinner’s ideas were broadly described as behaviour 
modification techniques, which shared the common principle that disorders could be 
                                                           
2 Although the terms of voluntary and involuntary are useful heuristics for understanding the distinction 
between these two types of conditioning, they did not survive as defining characteristic. Chapter I     5 
treated by manipulating the consequences of behaviour. This could be done either by 
modifying the contingencies that maintained then or by introducing new contingencies 
to shape adaptive operant behaviour. For example, contingency management established 
behaviour change using selective reinforcement procedures with successive 
approximation; that is, positively reinforcing adaptive behaviour (or approximations to 
it) and extinguishing problem behaviour (e.g., Stitzer, Bigelow, & Liebson, 1979). 
Other techniques informed by Skinner’s theorising included (non exhaustively) 
extinction (e.g., Nawas & Braun, 1970), shaping (e.g., Wolff & Perkins, 1970), and the 
token economy (Ayllon & Azrin, 1968).  
 
1.1.3 Limitations of First Wave Behaviour Therapies 
Behaviour therapy techniques varied in their effectiveness when applied to the treatment 
of several disorders. These included phobias (Wolpe, 1953), hysteria (Brady & Lind, 
1961), enuresis (Mowrer, 1938), tics (Yates, 1958), substance abuse disorders (Azrin, 
1976) and childhood disorders (Rachman, 1962; see Eysenck & Rachman, 1965; 
Kazdin, 1978, for reviews). Despite several successes, however, these approaches were 
at their most effective when applied to individuals with developmental disorders and 
severe adult mental health problems (e.g., Lovaas, Koegel, Simmons, & Long, 1973; 
Lovaas, Schreibman, & Koegel, 1974; Ward, 1978). This unevenness of application 
stemmed from the fact that the behavioural therapies encountered several complications 
when dealing with less disturbed patients. Often it seemed as though treatments were 
only behavioural by virtue of analogy. For example, systematic desensitisation often 
employed techniques that involved exposure to imagined cues rather than to actual cues 
(e.g., Marks, 1976; see also behaviour therapy for depression, Lazarus, 1968). This was 
problematic for methodological behaviourists, who could not easily account for the 
effect of these non observable events.  
Additionally, patients often failed to respond to direct contingencies, responding 
instead to their verbal account of those contingencies (e.g., see Kazdin, 1978, p. 299). 
For example, clinical observations showed that patients tended to behave in accordance Chapter I     6 
with their perceptions or cognitions
 3 (i.e., expectations, beliefs, attitudes) regarding 
reinforcement contingencies, rather than with the actual contingencies (e.g., see 
Bandura, 1974; Kazdin, 1978). Alluding to these observations, the influential theorist 
Bandura (1974) wrote “Contrary to the mechanistic metaphors, outcomes change 
behaviour in humans through the intervening influence of thought... Our choices of 
action are largely under anticipatory control. The widely accepted dictum that man is 
ruled by response consequence… fares better for anticipated than for actual 
consequences…When belief differs from actuality, which is not uncommon, behaviour 
is weakly controlled by its actual consequence…” (p. 859 860).   
These ideas were reflected by many during the ’70s. Theorists argued that arranging 
reinforcement schedules to shape adaptive responding was not sufficient to promote 
behaviour change. Rather, they proposed concepts such as ‘self efficacy’, ‘schemas’ 
and more generally ‘cognitions' as mediators of contingency relations (Bandura, 1969, 
1974; Beck, 1970, described below). During this theoretical debate, human operant 
laboratory based research on behaviour emerged. This suggested that, unlike animal 
behaviour, human behaviour did not come under the direct control of operant schedules 
(e.g., Brewer, 1974) and thus, that the manipulation of behavioural consequences did 
not automatically affect behaviour (Dulany, 1968). These findings were interpreted by 
more cognitively minded theorists as supporting theories of cognitive mediation, 
contributing to the growing view that behavioural theorising was too simplistic an 
account of human action.  
It is worth noting that during this time, some behaviourists had already begun to 
formulate theories addressing the effect of cognition (verbal behaviour; VB) on action. 
For example, Skinner had spent over 10 years extending his ideas into the field of VB, 
which he considered to be a form of operant behaviour. Unlike cognitive psychologists, 
who looked to cognition as an explanation of action (i.e., cognitions as independent 
variables), Skinner suggested that cognitions were instances of VB that were in need of 
explanation (i.e., cognitions as dependent variables). Although his theorising (Skinner, 
1957, 1969) could have informed the problems that behaviour therapy was experiencing 
in the clinic, (e.g., rule governed behaviour, see section 1.2.2 & section 2.1.1) it failed 
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to engage non behavioural audiences and thus had limited clinical impact (Hunt, 1984; 
Scandura, 1984). Instead, the rise of cognitive psychology in the late ’50s and early ’60s 
fuelled a new approach to the treatment of clinical disorders. 
 
1.2 Second Wave Behaviour Therapies:  
Cognitive Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Interventions 
Despite the successes of early behaviour therapies, and emerging accounts of how 
language affected operant conditioning, behavioural approaches were rapidly 
superseded by a less constrained and a theoretically richer approach: cognitive 
experimental psychology. 
 
1.2.1 Cognitive Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Behaviour Therapy 
Profiting from novel methodologies, cognitive experimental psychology rapidly came to 
dominate experimental research, investigating higher order human activities such as 
memory (e.g., Hitch & Baddeley, 1976) and perception (e.g., Bruce & Young, 1986). 
Although theoretical accounts of these phenomena developed in a piecemeal fashion, 
the computer analogy was a common feature. The human mind was conceptualised as a 
limited capacity information processing system that operated on inputs (i.e., stimuli) to 
produce outputs (i.e., behaviour). The logic of this approach, known as cognitivism, was 
to reverse engineer the mind, studying patterns of inputs and outputs and hypothesising 
cognitive mechanisms that might account for regularities observed. To avoid the 
problem of tautology, convergent evidence was a necessary criterion for selecting 
amongst a range of possible causal mechanisms.  
The success of cognitivism in experimental psychology had an unexpected impact on 
behaviour therapy, in part because of the limited success that behaviour therapy had had 
with mature adult patients. The fact that patients responded to the world that they 
reported rather than the world as it was, was deemed to reflect the action of their 
cognitive system. Thus, cognitive experimental psychology provided an opportunity to 
introduce cognitive concepts into the clinical setting. One of the most influential 
theorists of this movement was Aaron Beck. Beck’s work began with the clinical 
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and negativity bias when processing and interpreting that information (see Leahy & 
Dowd, 2002). Within the broad cognitivism movement, Beck interpreted these 
observations as the actions of cognitive schema: “a cognitive structure for screening, 
coding and evaluating the stimuli that impinge on the organism” (Beck, 1967, p. 283). 
Schemas, thought to develop through experience, were seen as self perpetuating 
cognitive maps that prioritised attention to specific types of stimuli for encoding and 
processing.  
Because cognitive schemas were not directly accessible, Beck relied on abstraction 
and inference rather than direct observation (Leahy & Dowd, 2002). Inferences 
regarding the nature of cognitive schemas were made based on patients’ self statements 
or cognitions, referred to broadly as “inferred psychological states… thoughts, attitudes 
and the like” (Beck, 1970, p. 193). Because these were thought to provide a window of 
insight into internal cognitive structures, the “patient’s spontaneous experience and self 
reported thoughts” (Beck, 1970, p. 187), rather than their behaviour, became the object 
of clinical interest. According to Beck and fellow cognitivists of that time, cognitions 
caused behaviour; people behaved in certain ways because of the intervening role of 
thought. As such, cognitive interventions were based on the logic that modifying the 
patient’s cognitions would effect a change in behaviour (e.g., Beck, 1970). This 
approach to the treatment of clinical disorders came to be known as Cognitive 
Behaviour Therapy (CBT)
4.  
Techniques devised by Beck, such as cognitive restructuring and reality hypothesis 
testing, aimed to correct erroneous thinking styles by “substituting irrational thoughts 
with rational ones” (Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008, p. 4). CBT taught (and teaches) 
patients to identify automatic idiosyncratic misconceptions about themselves, their 
world, and their future, and trained them to evaluate and challenge the validity of those 
cognitions. For example, in reality hypothesis testing, the therapist and patient 
collaboratively devise experiments designed to test out the correspondence between 
anticipated and real outcomes. Such experiments are used to collect evidence for and 
against the validity of the patient’s core beliefs, with the intention of bringing those 
beliefs back into line with reality. The common principle to cognitive techniques, 
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therefore, was that correcting faulty cognitions was necessary for, and causal in the 
production of, behaviour change.  
Early research on cognitive techniques obtained noticeable success for the treatment 
of depression, a disorder not well treated by behavioural therapies. For example, in a 
randomised control trial (RCT; see chapter 3) Blackburn, Eunson, and Bishop (1986) 
showed that 24 months following treatment, depressed patients who had received CBT 
were 50% less likely to relapse than patients who had received medication (see also 
Rush, Beck, Kovacs, & Hollon, 1977; Rush, Hollon, Beck, & Kovacs, 1978). Moreover, 
although CBT was initially a treatment for depression, a range of disorder specific CBT 
manuals followed suit. This included, for example, the application of CBT to patients 
with Anxiety (e.g., Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985), Alcoholism (e.g., Marlatt, 1979) 
and Anorexia Nervosa (e.g., Garner & Bemis, 1982). These extensions also had many 
successes. Indeed, a large scale review of meta analyses published between 1967 and 
2004 showed that, compared to no treatment, CBT typically obtained medium to large 
effect sizes for many acute disorders (Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006). These 
included: uni polar and bi polar depression, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), 
anxiety, psychosis, panic disorder, and bulimia.  
But to what extent did the success of CBT reflect a more general success for 
cognitivism? Perhaps less than the common name implied. This is because the link 
between experimental cognitive psychology (cognitivism) and CBT was in some ways a 
tenuous one. Cognitivism, based on the computer analogy, had limited time for 
introspection. For experimental cognitive psychologists, the behaviour of participants 
reflected processes deemed inaccessible to conscious awareness. Thus, in keeping with 
the behavioural tradition, cognitivists banned introspection in favour of objective 
measures such as reaction times. Convergent evidence from multiple measures was 
necessary for inferring cognitive processes. In contrast, CBT relied heavily on 
introspection, with therapeutic procedures predominantly concerned with testing the 
validity of patients’ self reported thoughts and feelings. Indeed, CBT techniques did not 
actually target processes deemed critical to clinical disorders, but dealt almost 
exclusively with modifying self statements (Morris, 1987). Beck’s early ideas were thus 
tautological; patients were depressed because they had negative cognitions/schemas, but 
they had negative cognitions/schemas because they were depressed. Furthermore, at 
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and empirical base and failed even to define what techniques did and did not fall within 
the CBT framework (e.g., Wilson, 1978, cited in Clarke & Reinecke, 2003).  
Although cognitive techniques obtain some noticeable effects in clinical outcome 
trials, early cognitive models of clinical disorders were crude and general by 
comparison to their laboratory based cousins (Gaudiano, 2008). Indeed, despite their 
strong criticism of the behavioural approach, early cognitive treatments were criticised 
for doing little more than adding cognitions to the list of behaviours to be modified 
(Hayes, 2004; Morris, 1987). In his early theoretical papers, Beck highlighted a need 
that had been long recognised within behavioural psychology; the need to explicitly 
accommodate the effect of language on behaviour.  
 
1.2.2 Radical Behaviourism and “Cognition” 
Radical behaviourist accounts of cognition, including private events and self talk, were 
not well understood by second wave cognitive therapists (Hunt, 1984). For example, 
Skinner’s writing on private events (Skinner, 1945) and rule governed behaviour (RGB; 
Skinner, 1969), although not without criticism (e.g., Chomsky, 1959), has substantial 
power in terms of understanding human psychological problems (e.g., see Lowe, 1983; 
Zettle & Hayes, 1982). Skinner proposed that the verbal actions of a person could be 
understood as behaviours, established and maintained through operant conditioning. VB 
was simply defined as behaviour reinforced through the mediation of another person 
(Skinner, 1957). In a complementary fashion, Skinner (1969) argued that a speaker 
could provide verbal cues (rules) that had functional control of a listener’s subsequent 
behaviour. Moreover, in Skinner’s view, the speaker and the listener could be the same 
person (“inside the same skin”), so it was reasonable to think that individuals may talk 
to themselves (e.g., by self instructing, or self criticising). 
    Skinner’s ideas can be illustrated by considering how colour names are acquired. For 
example a child may learn say “green” in the presence of a variety of green objects if 
prompted and reinforced for doing so by a ‘teacher’. Subsequently, the probability of 
saying “green” when novel green stimuli are encountered will increase. According to 
Skinner (1945), the process of learning to name could still occur even when the stimuli 
impinging on the speaker are private events, occurring within the putative speaker’s 
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example, verbal responses to private events may be established and maintained through 
reinforcement contingent on related public stimuli or responses. Thus, a child may be 
taught to describe a private event as “a stabbing pain” if the ‘teacher’ sees it has been 
caused by a sharp object. This way of talking may subsequently generalise to similar 
pains with no external referents. Similarly, a child may be taught to name an internal 
event as “anxiety” by a ‘teacher’ who has observed her withdrawing from certain 
situations, speaking tremulously, or shaking involuntarily. According to Skinner, 
because speakers are conditioned to report private events by the verbal community, they 
have good reason to “turn this verbal behaviour upon themselves” (Skinner, 1957, p. 
192). Skinner suggested that individuals become aware of their own behaviour because 
the verbal community reinforces “verbal responses with respect to (their) behaviour as 
the source of discriminative stimuli” (Skinner, 1945, p. 379).  
A second key aspect of Skinner’s theorising was his distinction between 
contingency shaped and rule governed behaviour. Skinner argued that although much 
human behaviour is contingency shaped by direct contact with environmental 
contingencies, an important subset is under the control of contingency specifying 
stimuli. These words, signs, or signals provided by others describe the relationship 
between behaviour and its consequences. Actions under the control of such stimuli were 
said to be rule governed. New forms of behaviour could thus be established based on 
specifying contingencies (e.g., “If you exercise regularly, your health will improve”), 
rather than direct experience (Skinner, 1969). The tendency to follow rules was 
described as a generalised operant brought about as a result of the reinforcement of a 
number of specific instances of rule following. For example, a generalised tendency to 
follow parental instructions could be established if a child’s compliance with many 
requests such as “do your homework” or “tidy your room” was consistently reinforced 
(Zettle & Hayes, 1982, see section 2.1). Skinner’s conceptualisation suggested that, to 
the extent that rule following is a well developed generalised response class, it may be 
insensitive to the consequences experienced when a specific rule is followed. For 
example, an obedient child asked to “eat his vegetables” may do so despite the 
disagreeable taste sensations (which Zettle & Hayes called the collateral consequences) 
produced by complying with this particular request. 
 Recall that experiments by early cognitive researchers (e.g., Brewer, 1974; Dulany, 
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simple learning tasks. These data led them to argue against the generalisability of 
operant principles to human subjects. From a Skinnerian perspective, however, the data 
were not out of line with the principles of RGB. Ironically, radical behaviourists would 
have cited Skinner in agreeing that human behaviour differed from animal behaviour, 
adding that the differences resulted from the human capacity for VB. In fact, many 
behavioural experiments based on this interpretation have provided further evidence that 
using rules to guide action insulates those actions from direct contingencies (see section 
2.1.1; Catania, Shimoff, & Matthews, 1989; Kaufman, Baron, & Kopp, 1966; 
Matthews, Shimoff, Catania, & Sagvolden, 1977; Shimoff, Matthews, & Catania, 
1986). Thus, for example, Harzem, Lowe, and Bagshaw (1978) showed that, regardless 
of whether explicit instructions about how to perform simple laboratory operant button 
pressing tasks were provided, participants generated self rules. These findings were 
summarised in the “Language Hypothesis” (Hayes, Barnes Holmes, & Roche, 2001). In 
essence, inaccurate self rules produce rigid behaviour patterns that do not naturally 
change through contact with the reinforcement contingencies arranged by an 
experimenter (see section 2.1.1). This experimental evidence that verbal control 
overrides sensitivity to behavioural consequences bears notable similarity to the clinical 
observations of cognitive therapists. That is, patients responded to their perceptions and 
expectancies rather than direct experience. 
Although Skinner’s accounts of VB and RGB have been both criticised and 
developed by subsequent generations of behavioural researchers (see chapter 2), three 
key aspects of his theorising remain important. Firstly, according to Skinner, cognitions 
(e.g., attitudes, expectations, beliefs, thoughts, plans and so on) are best seen as verbal 
codifications of past experiences that approximate the actual contingencies experienced, 
at best, only crudely. Secondly, Skinner argued that VB should not be seen as the cause 
of action; rather, as behaviour that was itself in need of explanation. From this 
perspective, CBT’s argument that behaviour problems resulted from faulty cognitions 
was simply incomplete as an analysis of a causal chain. The third enduring feature of 
Skinner’s work is the possibility that RGB can provide a framework for understanding 
the development and maintenance of psychological disorders. Alluding to issues in 
relation to CBT theorising, Zettle and Hayes (1982) proposed  that cognitive distortions, 
depressive thinking styles, and faulty belief systems could alternatively be understood 
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Hayes and his colleagues’ have spent many years developing Skinner’s early work 
into the understanding and treatment of clinical disorders. These developments are the 
focus of chapter 2. For now, however, it is important to consider whether new 
theoretical models and treatment approaches were (and are) necessary, given CBT’s 
many clinical successes. With this question in mind, the following section describes two 
main criticisms of CBT. The first concerns the observation that the efficacy of CBT is 
limited when applied to patients with complex and entrenched disorders. The second 
concerns the observation that, although research into CBT’s mechanisms of change is 
fairly sparse (relative to the number of outcome trials), results are often not in keeping 
with predictions of the cognitive model. 
 
1.2.3 Limitations of Cognitive Interventions 
Despite many successes, the last 30 years of research have begun to define some of the 
limitations of CBT. It is interesting to note that “some of the most pointed criticisms 
against it have emerged from within the CBT community” (Gaudiano, 2008, p. 6). For 
example, the two limitations that are considered below were raised by Clarke and 
Reinecke (2003) as two of several “unresolved issues” (p. 519) that will determine the 
integrity and range of applicability of CBT.   
 
1.2.3.1 CBT for Complex Cases. The first limitation is that, as with behaviour therapy, 
CBT is not effective for all adult mental health patients. Approximately 30 50% of 
patients, often referred to as treatment resistant (e.g., Amsterdam, Hornig, & 
Nierenberg, 2001; Kenny & Williams, 2007), fail to improve, or relapse, following 
exposure to CBT techniques (e.g., DeRubeis et al., 2005; Westbrook & Kirk, 2004; 
Wilson, Fairburn, & Agras, 1997). This literature has identified several prognostic 
factors for poor outcomes. The most prominent of these include: (1) personality disorder 
symptomatology (PD; described below), (2) high levels of initial symptom severity, and 
(3) co morbid mental health problems (the simultaneous co occurrence of two or more 
clinical disorders). Patients with these characteristics are highly representative of 
patients seen in clinical practice (Persons & Silberschatz, 1998). However, because this 
type of patient tends to have been excluded from RCTs in favour of high internal 
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Westen, Novotny, and Thompson Brenner (2004) reviewed published RCTs on CBT 
and reported that between 40% and 70% of standard care patients are rejected from 
these clinical trials. This most often occurred because the patient presented with co 
morbid disorders and/or met diagnostic criteria for a PD (see also Zarin, Young, & 
West, 2005).  
Several studies have indicated that meeting diagnostic criteria for a PD is associated 
with poor treatment outcomes following CBT. PDs are characterised by long standing 
(at least 5 years and originating in adolescence), deeply ingrained patterns of social 
behaviour that are detrimental to those who display them and/or to others (Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders, Fourth ed., Text Revision (DSM IV 
TR), 2000). Turkat and Maisto (1985, cited in Bateman & Fonagy, 2000) conducted one 
of the first trials on CBT for a group of patients meeting PD diagnosis (N = 35). Of the 
16 cases for whom outcome data were available (mainly due to high attrition), they 
found that only 4 patients showed improvements. More recently, Tyrer et al. (1988) 
have completed a 12 year follow up RCT (N = 210) to compare CBT versus a self help 
treatment programme versus pharmacology. At 2 year follow up, they reported a 
differential effect of PD status on treatment outcome; participants meeting criteria for a 
PD showed less improvement following CBT and self help treatment as compared to 
medication (Tyrer, Seivewright, Ferguson, Murphy, & Johnson, 1993). Similar findings 
were also reported at 5  and 12 year follow up, indicating that initial PD status and 
baseline symptom severity were both predictive of poor treatment outcomes (Tyrer, 
Sievewright, & Johnson, 2004; see also Burns & Nolen Hoeksema, 1992; Greenberg, 
Craighead, Evans, & Craighead, 1995; Shea et al., 1990).  
Although poor prognosis is common to PDs in general, it is well recognised that 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is particularly treatment resistant (Lieb, 
Zanarini, Schmahl, Linehan, & Bohus, 2004). BPD is characterised by pervasive and 
recurrent patterns of affect instability, poor impulse control, and turbulent interpersonal 
relationships. Research suggests that the successful treatment of BPD is a challenge for 
traditional forms of CBT
5. For example, a large scale project assessing CBT+ Treatment 
as usual (TAU) versus TAU alone arguably failed to demonstrate any persuasive 
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evidence for the additional value of CBT techniques (Davidson et al., 2006). Despite the 
CBT condition receiving greater contact hours and exposure to a structured treatment, 
outcomes were largely comparable across conditions. CBT obtained greater reductions 
in suicidal acts than TAU, but the reverse trend was found for accident and emergency 
admissions. Although CBT+TAU further obtained significantly better outcomes than 
TAU for state anxiety at follow up testing, no differences were found for a range of 
other psychiatric outcomes (depression, trait anxiety, other psychiatric symptom 
indexes, interpersonal functioning, or on quality of life). It is worth noting that although 
27 CBT sessions were offered, patients only attended an average of 16. The treatment 
received was thus fairly brief. Giesen Bloo et al. (2006) have evaluated the use of 
schema focused CBT for BPD patients, reporting that this intervention was significantly 
more beneficial than a psychodynamic approach. Nonetheless, approximately 40% of 
the group still failed to show meaningful change despite the use of a particularly lengthy 
treatment protocol (two individual treatment sessions per week for three years). 
Meeting diagnostic criteria for a PD is not the only factor associated with poor 
outcomes. Many trials also show reduced efficacy of CBT when applied to the treatment 
of patients with more chronic clinical disorders (defined by the DSM IV as “Axis I” 
disorders, and including mood disorders such as depression and anxiety). For example, 
two comprehensive RCTs (Elkin et al., 1989; Elkin et al., 1995) found that 16 weeks of 
CBT for major depression was less effective than antidepressant medication and no 
more effective than no treatment (i.e., wait list control, WLC). In a replication and 
extension trial, Dimidjian et al. (2006) further reported that among severely depressed 
patients, CBT was less effective than both behavioural activation (discussed in section 
2.3.3) and antidepressants. Although there are a few anomalies to this trend (e.g., 
Westbrook & Kirk, 2005), many outcome trials concur with the findings of these 
authors (e.g., Rude & Rehm, 1991; Sotsky et al., 1991; Thase et al., 1992). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the impact of co morbidity (or ‘dual diagnosis’) on CBT 
efficacy tells a similar story. Although research is limited (in part because these groups 
tend to have been excluded from RCTs), patients who have two or more co morbid 
clinical disorders use the greatest proportion of mental health services (Kessler et al., 
1994) and are less likely to improve following CBT (e.g., Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 
1995; Conrod & Stewart, 2005; Thase, Simons, & Reynolds, 1993). Resistance to 
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PD diagnosis and/or co morbid maladaptive behaviours (e.g., substance abuse, 
dysfunctional eating, deliberate self harm). Although PD symptoms are particularly 
high in populations who engage in such behaviours (Grant, Stinson, Dason, Chou, Ruan, 
et al., 2004), thus making it difficult to understand the relative contribution of the 
behaviours per se, research suggests that when clinical disorders are co morbid with 
maladaptive behaviours, patients are less likely to stay in treatment and less likely to 
improve (e.g., see Conrod & Stewart, 2005; MacEwan & Remick, 1988; Randall, 
Thomas, & Thevos, 2001).  
 
1.2.3.2 Mechanisms of Change. The second concern regarding CBT is that, more often 
than not, treatment gains cannot be explained in accordance with CBT theorising (e.g., 
see Dimidjian & Dobson, 2003; Holt & Lee, 1989; King 1998; Longmore & Worrel, 
2007). Two strains of research have informed this observation. The first has used 
regression analysis to test whether CBT affects a change in outcome through changing 
the way patients think (i.e., cognitive change). The largest of these trials was a meta 
analysis conducted by Oei and Free (1995), who reviewed outcome and process studies 
published between 1977 and 1987. Oei and Free examined what they claimed to be 
three necessary criteria for causality: (a) cognitive change occurs during therapy, (b) is 
associated with outcome, and (c) is specific to CBT. (These criteria are in fact not 
sufficient, however, because one must also show that cognitive change precedes 
symptom change). They found that although cognitive change did occur (criterion a), 
and often related to outcome (criterion b), it was not CBT specific (criterion c), 
occurring in both active and inactive (i.e., control) conditions. Although a few trials 
(five) have provided data in keeping with the CBT model (see Hofmann & Asmundson, 
2008); most of this literature has been unable to support its predictions (e.g., Burns & 
Spangler, 2001; Dimidjian & Dobson, 2003; Imber et al., 1990; Morgenstern & 
Longabaugh, 2000).  
The second stream of research has used dismantling studies to test whether cognitive 
techniques have a unique effect on treatment gains. One of the most influential of these 
studies was conducted by Jacobson et al. (1996) investigating the treatment of major 
depression. Jacobson et al. randomised 150 patients to either (a) full CBT (behavioural 
activation (BA), identifying and modifying automatic thoughts and core schema), (b) 
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only. Interventions were matched for therapist contact and competence. Jacobson et al. 
found no significant between group differences following treatment or at 2 year follow 
up (Gortner, Gollan, Dobson, & Jacobson, 1998), thus suggesting that cognitive 
techniques had no added benefit above and beyond behavioural techniques. This 
challenged not only whether cognitive techniques were causal in symptom alleviation, 
but also implicated behavioural components as necessary and sufficient (see also 
Dimidjian et al., 2006; Wilson, Goldin, & Charbonneau, 1983).  
The implications of Jacobson et al.’s (1996) research have been reported by others 
(e.g., Berman, Miller, & Massman, 1985; Miller & Berman, 1983; Shapiro & Shapiro, 
1982). Additionally, several large meta analyses have shown no difference in efficacy 
between behavioural and cognitive techniques (e.g., Ekers, Richards, & Gibody, 2007; 
Gloaguen, Cottraux, Cucherat, & Blackburn, 1998). Finally, some CBT literature has 
also shown that clinically meaningful reductions in depression can occur prior to the 
delivery of cognitive techniques (‘sudden gains’; e.g., Ilardi & Craighead, 1994). These 
findings thus further suggest that cognitive techniques are not the main agent of change.  
One possible explanation of the effectiveness of CBT, which relates quite directly to 
new intervention trends (described below), is offered by Teasdale and colleagues (e.g., 
Segal, Teasdale, & Williams, 2002). These authors suggest that CBT obtains its effects 
by changing the patients’ relationship with their thoughts, rather than changing the 
thoughts directly. This process, referred to as decentring, describes the capacity to 
observe cognitions as transient events of the mind that are not permanent or 
characteristic of the self (Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2000). It has been speculated 
that decentring may be indirectly achieved in CBT through the process of monitoring 
and disputing core cognitions. For example, Teasdale et al. (2002) reported that 
cultivating a decentred perspective fully mediated treatment gains in a CBT trial. This 
finding tentatively suggests that CBT may benefit patients by indirectly altering the way 
they respond to their own private VB.  
To summarise: cognitive techniques were developed to addresses limitations of early 
behavioural treatments. The main way in which this was achieved was by making the 
patients’ cognitions (i.e., their thoughts and feelings) the target of intervention. 
Compared to early behaviour therapies, cognitive treatments were a breath of fresh air 
to clinical practice and obtained noticeable successes for a range of clinical disorders. 
Nevertheless, CBT is not effective for everyone. Furthermore, of those studies Chapter I     18 
investigating mechanisms of change, only a minority have found evidence in support of 
the cognitive model. This presents a conundrum that is yet to be fully resolved: CBT 
can be effective, but the way in which it achieves its effects is often unclear. The limited 
success of CBT for some patients, and unexplained issues regarding mechanisms of 
change, provided fertile ground for the development of a new set of therapies. 
 
1.3 Third Wave Behaviour Therapies:  
A Hybrid of Eastern Traditions and Radical Behaviourism? 
 
Although clinically orientated experimental psychology has begun to move in the 
direction of cognitive models that are based on the standard computer analogy (e.g., 
Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & Bono, 1999), often supplanted with neuroscientific 
insights (see Hofmann & Aunderson, 2008), it is not yet clear how these advances will 
drive new treatment. What is becoming increasingly apparent, however, is that as 
scientific advances are made, some of the central tenets of CBT have required notable 
modifications (Gaudiano, 2008). In the meantime, Eastern modes of thought have 
contributed to the gradual emergence of a “third wave of behaviour therapies” (Hayes, 
2004). These include treatments such as Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy 
(MBCT; Segal et al., 2002), Dialectical Behaviour Therapy
6 (DBT; Linehan, 1993); and 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Wilson, & Stroshal, 1999). These 
interventions have several distinguishing features, the most important of which is that 
they are less concerned with changing the patient’s private VB and more with teaching 
them to accept their self talk without being ruled by it. Stated differently, they aim to 
reduce the extent to which patients use VB to regulate action, by helping them to adopt 
the perspective of a non judgemental (or decentred) observer, more in contact with raw 
(or direct) experience (see chapter 2). 
Mindfulness meditation is a key feature of third wave treatments, which appears to 
be one of the processes through which the treatments have their effects (Baer, 2003; 
Kabat Zinn, 2005). Mindfulness has been a religious practice for many years, but only 
                                                           
6 Referring to DBT and MBCT as “third wave interventions” is frequently debated because it implies a 
categorical distinction between them and more traditional cognitive techniques. This has been resisted by 
some cognitively minded theorists (e.g., Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008). The categorisation is used in 
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recently have these techniques taken a role in psychotherapy. Many definitions of 
mindfulness have been proposed, with most identifying two key elements: (a) 
purposefully directing attention to whatever is present, and (b) doing this non 
judgementally, as opposed to relying on habitual judgement (see Bishop, 2002). Data 
already suggest that mindfulness based techniques are clinically efficacious (e.g., 
Kenny & Teasdale, 2007; Linehan et al. 2006; Ma & Teasdale, 2004; Teasdale, Segal, 
Ridgeway, & Soulby, 2000). For example, two RCTs suggest that MBCT is an effective 
treatment for patients with recurrent depression who are currently in remission (Ma & 
Teasdale, 2004; Teasdale et al., 2000). For example, no MBCT patients, but 64% WLC 
patients, had relapsed 1 year after treatment (Ma & Teasdale).  
Developments in clinical theorising and clinical practice have not gone unnoticed by 
radical behaviourists. Indeed two third wave interventions, DBT (Linehan, 1993) and 
ACT (Hayes et al., 1999), have evolved, to some extent, as hybrids of Skinnerian 
principles and Eastern traditions. DBT and ACT are particularly interesting because 
data suggests they may be effective for patients who have typically proven more 
resistant to first and second wave treatments (e.g., Hayes, Wilson, et al., 2004; Kenny & 
Williams, 2006; Linehan et al., 1999, 2006). Both interventions, albeit to varying 
degrees, aim to disrupt what are seen as the tyrannical effects of RGB by employing 
mindfulness and acceptance based strategies. DBT is an intensive treatment intervention 
that uses contingency management to contain maladaptive behaviours emitted by BPD 
patients. DBT employs mindfulness to balance tensions between the need for change 
and self acceptance (see Linehan, 1993).  
ACT, on the other hand, is a more generic treatment, intended for application across 
many diverse mental health disorders. ACT is based on the idea that many 
topographically distinct behaviour problems can be understood as forms of excessive 
verbal control over behaviour and subsequent insensitivity to the consequences of action 
(see chapter 2; Hayes et al., 1999). Research suggests that, when applied to 
homogeneous samples (i.e., patients presenting with the same symptoms), ACT can be 
effective for several acute disorders (see Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). 
Furthermore, research tentatively suggests that it may have utility for more hard to treat 
cases (e.g., Gratz & Gunderson, 2006; Hayes, Wilson, et al., 2004). ACT forms the 
basis of empirical work in this thesis and for that reason, ACT and its theoretical 
foundations are the subject of chapter 2.  Chapter I     20 
1.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter aimed to provide, from a radical behavioural perspective, a review of the 
historical development of behavioural therapies. To summarise, the main points will be 
reiterated. Firstly, despite best efforts, past correspondence between theory and therapy 
appears often to have been more analogous than direct. This criticism is valid for both 
behavioural and cognitive approaches. Secondly, although treatments continue to 
increase their range of applicability, a noticeable proportion of patients, often termed 
treatment resistant, fail to improve, or relapse, following CBT. These patients are 
symptomatically heterogeneous and typically present with more chronic, co occurring 
and/or PD symptoms. Thirdly, although cognitive techniques can obtain noticeable 
effects for many patients, the mechanisms through which these effects are achieved 
remains to be fully elucidated. Finally, an emerging cluster of new treatments may 
begin to address some of these limitations and tentatively hold promise for more hard 
to treat groups.  Chapter II     21 
 
CHAPTER II: 
Theoretical Underpinnings and Clinical Application of 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is a relatively modern psychological 
treatment designed to undermine the tyrannical effects that may arise from excessive 
verbal control over behaviour. As later sections of this review will show, some 
promising clinical effects have been found. Before reviewing this literature, however, 
this chapter will first describe the key principles upon which ACT is based. To this end, 
Hayes and colleagues’ extensions of Skinner’s early work will be described. First, Zettle 
and Hayes’ (1982) re conceptualisation of rule governed behaviour into a broader 
analysis of behaviour controlled by verbal antecedents will be presented. A detailed 
analysis of the functions of verbal stimuli necessitated by this reformulation will then be 
discussed (Hayes & Hayes, 1989). Next, a brief outline of Relational Frame Theory 
(RFT; Hayes et al., 2001), the product of these two earlier extensions of Skinnerian 
thought, will be presented. Following this, the role of verbal control in the development 
and maintenance of adult psychological disorders will be discussed. Finally, the 
principles underlying ACT and the literature on its therapeutic outcomes will be 
reviewed. This review will show that, although there is empirical support for the claim 
that ACT has obtained promising effects (Hayes et al., 2006), research is still in its 
infancy. Several critiques have questioned the extent to which ACT is a genuine 
departure from earlier cognitive approaches (e.g., Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008), 
disputed its theoretical coherence (e.g., Palmer, 2004), and raised questions regarding its 
true clinical impact (Ost, 2008).  
 
2.1. Behaviour Governed by Verbal Antecedent Stimuli 
Chapter 1 introduced Skinner’s (1969) suggestion that an important subset of behaviour 
is controlled by verbal contingency specifying stimuli that, functioning as 
discriminative stimuli (S
D), occasion certain actions. Skinner called such actions 
instances of rule governed behaviour (RGB), which he differentiated from contingency 
shaped behaviour (CSB); that is, behaviour under the direct control of reinforcement 
contingencies. In 1982, Zettle and Hayes suggested that RGB may provide a useful 
framework for understanding clinical disorders. In re examining RGB, however, they Chapter II     22 
 
identified a number of problems with Skinner’s account and thus subsequently 
developed a more comprehensive theory of their own. Their account suggested that 
RGB could be distinguished from more general instances of discriminative responding 
because such behaviour was concurrently “in contact with two sets of contingencies” 
(Zettle & Hayes, 1982, p. 78). According to this conceptualisation, one set of 
contingencies related to the direct consequences of the particular instance of rule 
following behaviour that was occasioned by the verbal antecedent. The second set 
related to the generalised act of following rules. 
This seemingly complex account can be clarified with a simple example. Imagine a 
mother tells her daughter to put her shoes on. One set of contingencies would be those 
related directly to the putting on of the shoes, and is independent of any verbal rule 
(e.g., wearing shoes keep one’s feet dry and protected). The second set of contingencies 
would be concerned with the daughter’s act of following the rules that her mother 
supplies (e.g., praise or the removal of threat). Thus, the tendency to follow rules was 
conceptualised as a generalised operant, established and maintained through its 
consequences. In other words, the consequences of following rules in general (e.g., 
parental praise) increase (or decrease) the probability of future rule following, even 
though the prescribed actions will vary topographically (e.g., wearing shoes, eating 
vegetables, or praying at bedtime).
  
 
2.1.1 Rule governed Behaviour (RGB) and Contingency Sensitivity 
Zettle and Hayes (1982) further suggested that the two sets of contingencies involved in 
RGB can be in competition as, for example, when a boy is told to come in and do his 
homework on a sunny evening. In such circumstances, the strength of one set of 
contingencies will determine sensitivity to the other. More specifically, and consistent 
with the contingency insensitivity literature (described below; see also section 1.2.2), if 
an action is predominantly governed by the contingency that includes the verbal 
antecedent, it will subsequently be less governed by the consequences of carrying out a 
particular prescribed act (i.e., its collateral consequences). Milgram’s (1963) seminal 
paper on compliance is helpful in clarifying these ideas. In Milgram’s study, 
participants (acting as “experimenters”) were requested to press a button to punish an 
unseen “subject” positioned in another room (in fact, Milgram’s confederate), every Chapter II     23 
 
time he appeared to make an error in a memory task. As far as participants were aware, 
their actions delivered electric shocks to the subject, and this was made salient by 
participants’ hearing sounds of apparent anguish. The act of depressing the button thus 
participated in two sets of contingencies. One contingency had the (collateral) punishing 
consequence of hurting a fellow human being. The second included a verbal antecedent 
(the request) and produced the consequence of social pressure cessation following 
button pressing. Probably because a history of negative reinforcement for compliance 
with an authoritative person’s instructions is so common, Milgram found that—despite 
being distressed by their actions—most participants continued to press the button. 
According to the dual contingency account, this happened because, for historical 
reasons, their behaviour was predominantly controlled by the contingency that included 
the verbal antecedent. They were thus insensitive to the direct consequences that would 
otherwise have exerted regulatory control over behaviour.  
Zettle and Hayes (1982) further defined three functional units of rule following. 
Each described a different type of contingency for generalised rule following. 
Milgram’s (1963) study illustrates pliance. Pliance is a form of RGB that is under the 
functional control of a history of speaker mediated consequences for following the rule 
(the rule is known as a ply). Alternatively, behaviour may be governed by the “apparent 
correspondence between the rule and the way that the world is arranged” (Zettle & 
Hayes, 1982, p. 81). If so, the rule would be a track and following it would be called 
tracking. Tracking develops based on a history of following rules that result in 
reinforcing collateral consequences that are not mediated by the rule giver. For example, 
a girl may follow her father’s instruction to “speak clearly” because, in the past, 
following her father’s rules resulted in reinforcing consequences that were independent 
of his behaviour (e.g., “smell this flower”, “taste that berry”). Finally, an augmental 
verbally modifies the effectiveness of non verbal reinforcers. For example, a mother 
may say, “Gentle children are happy children” to increase the likelihood of her son’s 
playing more gently with a younger sibling. To the extent that the reinforcing power of 
rough play is reduced, the boy’s behaviour has come under the control of the augmental.  
Rule following can be highly adaptive. This is especially the case when natural 
consequences are weak or delayed (e.g., telling a child to study hard) or when rule 
following prevents undesirable behaviour (e.g., warning against drug abuse). 
Nevertheless, a number of studies have shown that rule following can also lead to non Chapter II     24 
 
adaptive outcomes (e.g., Hayes, Brownstein, Zettle, Rosenfarb & Korn,1986; Horne & 
Lowe, 1993; Joyce & Chase, 1990; Kaufman et al., 1966; Kudadjie Gyamfi & Rachlin, 
2002; Lowe, Beasty, & Bentall, 1983). An early demonstration of this effect was 
reported by Kaufman et al. (1966), who exposed participants to a variable interval (VI) 
schedule with monetary reinforcement and varied the accuracy of a rule given to explain 
the contingency. One of the three groups was accurately told how to maximise 
reinforcement on a VI schedule. The remaining two groups were given inaccurate 
instructions that would have been relevant to a variable ratio (VR) or fixed interval (FI) 
schedule. Participants in the latter groups persevered with ineffective responding based 
on the false schedule information for the duration of the 3 hour experiment, their 
behaviour seemingly unaffected by the actual contingencies.  
More recently, research by Joyce and Chase (1990) has helped to elucidate why such 
effects may occur. In this study, participants were randomised to one of four groups. 
Group A and B received full instructions (“press the button 40 times for each point”) 
and groups C and D received none. Furthermore, group B and D were pre exposed to 
the fixed ratio 40 (FR40) schedule until their responding met a stability criterion. Thus, 
before testing the effect of instruction on behaviour, stable responding was established 
in one instructed (B) and one uninstructed (D) group. All participants then took part in 
an operant task that had four unsignalled changes between an FR40 and FI10 schedule. 
Unlike FR schedules, the FI10 schedule did not require the high rates of responding to 
maximise reinforcement. Sensitivity to change was measured by calculating behavioural 
efficiency during the last 5 minutes of the FI10 (i.e., dividing number of responses by 
the total number of reinforcers available). Behaviour variability was measured by 
calculating the distribution of inter response times at the end of the FR40 schedule (i.e., 
response variability as schedules switched). Consistent with previous research, Joyce 
and Chase found that instructed and trained to criterion groups (i.e., Group A, B and D) 
produced response patterns that were rigid (low in temporal variability) and insensitive 
to the changing contingencies. These patterns persisted despite low levels of 
reinforcement. In contrast, group C showed behavioural sensitivity because they 
engaged in more variable responding prior to the switch. This presumably occurred 
because—unlike group D—they had not had the opportunity to formulate self 
instructions (i.e., rules) to direct their own behaviour. Put simply, when behaviour was Chapter II     25 
 
controlled neither by external instructions nor self instructions, individuals could 
respond in a way that was flexible and sensitive to the changing environment. 
Zettle and Hayes (1982) noted that characteristic features of RGB—rigid, ineffective 
but nonetheless persistent behaviour that is seemingly unaffected by its consequences— 
bore a striking similarity to patterns of behaviour seen in clinical practice. This led them 
to suggest that clinical disorders may be understood as the excessive or improper use of 
VB to regulate action. This idea played a key role in the development and practice of 
ACT, discussed in greater detail in section 2.2. 
The Zettle and Hayes (1982) account of RGB took for granted that the language used 
to formulate rules was readily interpretable by listeners. Hayes and Hayes (1989), 
however, regarded this assumption as problematic. Skinner had not fully addressed the 
issue, simply asserting that a rule functioned as an S
D. This account is clearly 
inadequate because a S
D requires a history of differential reinforcement before it can 
exert stimulus control functions, whereas most humans are able to understand (and 
follow) novel rules heard for the first time (e.g., “If the banana ripens, open the 
umbrella”). Hayes and Hayes proposed that a behavioural explanation of how novel 
forms of verbal stimuli are interpretable by a listener was required. This is essentially a 
theory about the relationship between words (or other symbols) and things (or other 
environmental events). Two such theories have been developed. The first, Stimulus 
Equivalence Theory (SET), was developed by Sidman & Tailby (1982); the second, 
Relational Frame Theory (RFT), was proposed by Hayes & Hayes (see also Hayes et 
al., 2001). These theories will be discussed in turn. 
 
2.1.2 Stimulus Equivalence  
In everyday terms, Stimulus Equivalence (SE) describes the fact that, through learning, 
a variety of arbitrarily related objects can, in certain contexts, come to be treated as 
members of a single class of stimuli. For example, the varied faces of members of a 
sports team may, though learning, come to be regarded as equivalent for some purposes. 
Research on SE has been primarily based on the matching to sample (MTS) paradigm. 
In this paradigm, participants are trained to choose from a set of two or more 
comparison stimuli, the correct choice being determined by a sample stimulus. The 
discriminations trained are thus conditional (e.g., if A, choose X but if B, choose Y). Chapter II     26 
 
The key finding of the SE literature is that, after learning a limited series of conditional 
relations, novel untaught relations spontaneously emerge (Sidman & Tailby, 1982).  
For example, Sidman and Tailby (1982) reinforced participants (a) for selecting 
arbitrary comparison stimulus B1 (and not B2 or B3) when shown sample stimulus A1, 
and (b) for selecting comparison stimulus C1 (not C2 or C3), again when shown A1 
(see solid lines in Figure 2.1a). This training proved sufficient to give rise to a series of 
untrained relations (dotted lines in Figure 2.1a), each identified by a testing procedure in 
which no reinforcers were delivered. Thus, although participants had not been trained to 
do so, they were able spontaneously to select either comparison stimulus A1, given 
either B1 or C1 sample stimuli (symmetry) and to select B1 given C1, or vice versa 
(transitivity or equivalence). Furthermore, Sidman & Tailby also reported that the 
functional properties of all members of this equivalence class (see Figure 2.1a) may 
become modified if some change is made in the functionality of one class member (the 
transfer of stimulus functions). For example, if A1 was paired with an electric shock 
after equivalence had emerged, aversive functions would transfer to B1 and C1. 
Symmetry, transitivity, equivalence, and transformation of function—the key 
phenomena of SE—would not be expected on the basis of simple conditioning (see 
Hayes et al., 2001, p. 16). Moreover, SE excited behavioural researchers because of its 
apparent direct relevance to language and, in particular, to naming.  
To illustrate, suppose a child is taught to point to the written word S P I D E R on 
hearing his mother say “spider” (Figure 2.1b). According to SE, having learnt this 
trained unidirectional relation, an untrained symmetrical relationship would emerge 
(given S P I D E R, say “spider”). Now suppose that the mother utters “spider” and 
points to a real spider. Equivalence would be observed if the child spontaneously 
derived an untrained bidirectional relation between the actual spider and the word S P I 
D E R. Finally, imagine that the child becomes fearful in the presence of an actual 
spider. According to Sidman & Tailby (1982), transfer of stimulus functions would be 
observed such that the child will subsequently show fear on seeing the written word S 
P I D E R (e.g., a sign), or hearing the word “spider” spoken. According to Hayes et al. 
(2001), these fearful responses could be described as verbally governed, if the control of 
verbal (written or spoken) stimuli (and their derived function) predominates over the 
direct control of the current environment, in which no spider is present.  Chapter II     27 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Two Visual Representations of Stimulus Equivalence based on Arbitrary 
Relations 
Adapted from “Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: An Experiential Approach to Behaviour Change”, 
by S. Hayes, K. Stroshal, and K. Wilson, 1999, p. 37 38. 
 
The key phenomena of SE have been extensively investigated, often using complex 
protocols designed simultaneously to create multiple equivalence classes each with 
more than three members (e.g., Hayes, Kohlenberg, & Hayes, 1991). Functions may 
then be conditioned to class members and transfer tested. For example, Dougher, 
Auguston, Markham, Greenway, and Wulfert (1994) taught participants (N = 8) two 
equivalence classes, each of which had four members (random shapes). Class 1 
consisted of stimuli A1 D1 and class 2 of A2 D2. Phase 1 taught some critical relations 
and tested for the emergence of untrained relations that would indicate formation of 
these two equivalence classes (i.e., A1 = B1 = C1 = D1; A2 = B2 = C2 = D2). 
Following this, a respondent task was used to condition a member of class 1 to signal 
the onset of a shock (B1) and a member of class 2 to signal no shock (B2). After a 
resting period, all stimuli except B1 and B2 were presented during an operant task and 
change in skin conductance to stimulus presentation was observed. For six of the eight 
participants, skin conductance was elevated to class 1 but not class 2 stimuli, despite the 
fact that none of these stimuli had been directly conditioned. These findings suggested 
that aversive elicitation functions transferred to all members of an equivalence class, 
although most stimuli in the class have never been directly associated with a fear 
eliciting event. Again, according to Hayes’ theorising, behaviour predominantly under Chapter II     28 
 
the control of these derived functions, rather than direct environmental contingencies, 
would be described as verbally governed. 
The transfer of stimulus functions within equivalence classes has been documented 
across a range of functions (e.g., skin conductance responses (Roche & Barnes, 1997), 
rate of responding (Barnes & Keenan, 1993) and happy and sad moods (Barnes Holmes, 
Barnes Holmes, Smeets, & Luciano, 2004)). Once established, these classes can persist 
for months without further training (Saunders, Wachter, & Spradlin, 1973) and can be 
resistant to unlearning (Wilson & Hayes, 1996). Furthermore, testing for the transfer of 
fear in spider phobic versus non phobic counterparts, Smyth, Barnes Holmes, and 
Forsyth (2006) found that greater levels of fear transferred in participants with pre 
existing fear. This experiment thus captured the clinical observation that, once 
established, fear can quickly generalise to previously neutral stimuli.  
What is the relevance of these findings to behaviour therapy? According to Hayes 
and his colleagues (2001), the transfer of stimulus functions is important because it may 
provide an analogue, albeit a rather elementary one, for how verbal stimuli acquire 
novel psychological functions. For example, the earlier ‘spider’ example provided a 
feasible account of how a verbal stimulus may elicit fearful responses even when the 
immediate context is not dangerous. In other words, the fear is a property of the verbal 
stimulus and not of the environmental context.  
The observation that verbal stimuli can acquire the properties of other stimuli with 
which they have been associated only indirectly is also a cornerstone of Relational 
Frame Theory (RFT). Hayes et al. (2001) argue that the properties verbal stimuli can 
elicit are far more complex and dynamic than simple relations of equivalence may 
suggest. That is, the functions of verbal stimuli are not simply determined by 
equivalence relations. They may have different functions in different contexts and these 
may be determined by several other types of relations, such as comparison (Hayes et al., 
2001, see below). At its simplest, RFT uses SET as a theoretical springboard, extending 
its core ideas in an attempt to capture some of the additional complexities of verbal 
control. The section that follows describes the elements of RFT used by Hayes to 
understand psychological disorders (for a book length account, see Hayes et al., 2001).  
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2.1.3  Relational Frame Theory (RFT) 
The primary way in which RFT extends SE is by suggesting that equivalence (or 
“coordination” as it is termed in RFT) is just one of many possible dimensions along 
which stimuli can be related. According to Hayes et al. (2001), other stimulus relations 
may include, for example, relations of opposition, distinction, comparison, and 
hierarchy. Hayes further suggests that although the type of relation may vary (i.e., 
opposition, hierarchy, and so on) the fundamental, or overarching, process remains the 
same. This process is called relational framing. This term is used to convey the idea that 
one generic process may operate similarly, regardless of the particularities of any given 
relation (as a photo frame, which can fit many pictures).  
Although the idea of a relational frame implies an object of some kind, the second 
main tenet of RFT is that relational framing should be understood behaviourally, as a 
generalised operant (perhaps better conveyed as “framing relationally”). That is, 
following a reinforced training history with sufficient exemplars, the process of framing 
events relationally is abstracted as a functional response class. Thus, like imitation, 
Hayes et al. (2001) suggest that any form of relational framing has a potentially infinite 
range of topographies.  
This leads to the third main tenet of RFT, namely that regardless of the relational 
form (i.e., opposition, causation), a relational frame has three generic properties. As we 
shall see shortly, these properties correspond to the SE principles of symmetry, 
equivalence, and the transfer of stimulus functions. More general terms are required, 
however, to describe relations other than equivalence. The first property of events 
within a relational frame is mutual entailment. This means that if a relation exists 
between stimulus A and stimulus B in a given context, a relation between B and A will 
also be entailed in that context. For example, if Matthew is meaner than Sam, a relation 
between Sam and Matthew will be entailed (in this case that Sam is more generous than 
Matthew). Second, additional stimulus relations can be derived by combining two or 
more existing relations. For example, if A is related to B and B is related to C, then 
bidirectional relations between A and C will emerge (combinatorial mutual entailment). Chapter II     30 
 
So, if James is funnier than Mark, and Mark is funnier than Jon, a relation between 
James and Jon is derived (James is funnier)
7.  
Finally, perhaps the most important aspect of this theorising is that stimulus 
functions are transformed based on relational properties (transformation of stimulus 
functions). For example, if stimulus A is the opposite of B (relational frame of 
opposition) and A is reinforcing, B will function as a punisher even if it has never been 
paired with an aversive event (e.g., if Steve and Jon are opposites; interactions with 
Steve are rewarding). In this example, functions have transferred via mutual entailment. 
They may also, however, transfer via relational networks; that is, through combinatorial 
mutual entailment. For example, continuing with the previous example, if A is opposite 
to B and C is less than B, it can be derived that C will function as a punisher, but a less 
potent one than B.  
Before reviewing some of the evidence for these properties, the final aspect of RFT 
is that relations are arbitrarily applied. This simply means that the process of relating is 
not restricted to formal dimensions between two stimuli (e.g., bigger than, smaller 
than). Rather, stimuli can be framed according to non formal or socially constructed 
features (e.g., economic value or physical attractiveness). For example, a non human 
organism may be able to discriminate that a pound is formally smaller than a two pence 
piece, but only humans can discriminate that the pound has more economic value. 
According to RFT, this is an example of relational responding that has been brought 
under arbitrary contextual control. This is described as arbitrary because no formal 
features guide the discrimination. 
Thus, the key tenets of RFT as described by Hayes et al. (2001) may be summarised 
as follows. Relational frames constitute a class of generalised operants thought to be 
established based on a history of multiple exemplar training. From an early age, 
children are reinforced for engaging in derived relational responding which, according 
to Hayes et al. (2001), underpins language and drives cognition. Although an infinite 
number of relations can be drawn between stimuli, the defining features of relational 
framing are constant: mutual entailment, combinatorial mutual entailment and 
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Hayes, this absence of a derivable relation is itself entailed. For example, if Ann is more beautiful than 
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transformation of stimulus functions. Relational framing can deal in arbitrary 
relationships, based on convention in a verbal community (goodness, worthiness, etc) 
rather than simply physical properties (height, temperature, etc.). Finally, Hayes et al. 
(2001) imply that, once established as a generalised operant, relational framing occurs 
spontaneously and without conscious intentional effort.  
The procedures for testing RFT predictions stem from the SE research. First, MTS 
procedures are used to bring pre learnt discriminative responding (e.g., more than less 
than) under arbitrary control. For example, participants may be reinforced for choosing 
smaller lines than a sample line in the presence of one nonsense letter triplet “DRT” 
(thus signalling pick smaller) and longer lines in the presence of another (e.g., “FTY”, 
thus signalling pick larger). Second, these cues (“DRT” “FTY”) are used to train a 
limited number of arbitrary relations between novel nonsense triplets (e.g., “SUO” 
“FIM”). These relations are ‘arbitrary’ because no formal characteristics can be used to 
guide discriminations. Third, the emergence of untaught relations is tested.  Fourth, one 
member of the class is given functional properties through conditioning and the final 
stage then tests for patterns of transfer that would indicate the formation of the relational 
network.  
A study by Dymond, Roche, Forsyth, Whelan, & Rhoden (2007) demonstrates these 
procedures. Phase 1 used MTS procedures to bring ‘same’ and ‘opposite’ discriminative 
responding under arbitrary control. Participants viewed sample and comparison stimuli 
that related to one another along a non arbitrary dimension (e.g., circles differing in 
size). In the presence of the cue for opposite (e.g., “ABC”) participants were reinforced 
for choosing the comparison stimulus that was opposite to the sample stimulus. 
Conversely, in the presence of the cue for same (e.g., “XYZ”), participants were 
reinforced for choosing the comparison stimulus that was the same as the sample 
stimulus. Phase 2 tested the participants’ ability to apply these relational cues 
successfully to a novel stimulus set that differed along other non arbitrary dimensions 
(e.g., colour). Phase 3 introduced a new stimulus set in which sample and comparison 
stimuli could not be reliably discriminated between based on non arbitrary dimensions 
(arbitrary shapes). This phase used the relational cues for same and opposite to teach a 
limited set of critical relations that corresponded to a relational network that was pre 
determined by the experimenter (see Figure 2.2).  Phase 4 tested for the emergence of 
untrained relations that would indicate formation of the relational network.  Chapter II     32 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Pre determined Relational Network of Same (‘S’) and Opposite (‘O’) Relation  
From “Transformation of Avoidance Response Functions in Accordance with Same and Opposite Relational 
Frames,” by S. Dymond, B. Roche, J. Forsyth, R. Whelan, & J. Rhoden. Journal of Experimental Analysis of 
Behaviour, 88, p. 253. Copyright 1995 by the American Psychological Association  
 
Phase 5 involved avoidance conditioning. The presentation of stimulus B1 or B2 was 
quasi randomised across the trial. Seventy five percent of B1 presentations were 
followed by an aversive image and an aversive sound and 75% of B2 presentations were 
followed by a non aversive image (the remaining 25% were followed by a blank 
screen). Participants were trained to emit a simple avoidance response (press a computer 
space bar button) during the presentation of the B1 but not the B2 stimulus. This 
avoidance response replaced the stimulus with a blank screen, following which the next 
stimulus was presented. Conditioned avoidance was defined as: “the production of an 
avoidance response during each of the final 10 consecutive exposures to B1, and the 
absence of an avoidance response during all of the final 10 consecutive exposures to 
B2”. In phase 6, trained and control (non trained) participants were exposed to C1 and 
C2 stimuli and the transformation of avoidant conditioning was tested. That is, this trial 
measured the tendency for participants to avoid C1 and C2 stimuli (by pressing the 
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avoided C1 but not C2. This occurred despite the fact that neither C1 nor C2 had been 
directly conditioned. These findings, and those of others (e.g., Dymond & Barnes, 1994; 
Holmes, Holmes, Smeets, Strand, & Friman, 2004; Roche & Barnes, 1997), suggest that 
functions can transfer across arbitrarily related stimuli based on relations that are more 
complex than equivalence.    
 
2.1.4. Evaluation of SET and RFT 
Although the empirical data obtained though laboratory work on equivalence and 
relational framing is not in doubt, it is possible to question whether the research 
described is capable of supporting the conceptual load required of it. Recall that Hayes’ 
aim was to create a theory that would explain how novel rules could be understood and 
acted upon by linguistically competent speakers. Thus, the experimental programme for 
RFT (which incorporated SET) was designed to elucidate the processes involved. 
Whether they have done so, however, is open to debate. For example, Horne and Lowe 
(1996) have argued convincingly that SE research does not shed light upon the 
processes underlying the acquisition of naming because, although equivalence emerges 
following conditional discrimination training, it does so only in participants who 
already possess naming skills. Much evidence suggests that it is difficult or impossible 
to demonstrate SE in animals, infants, or people with profound intellectual disabilities 
(e.g., Devany, Hayes, & Nelson, 1986; Dugdale & Lowe, 2000), and most attempts to 
suppress naming in equivalence training are unconvincing (Randell & Remington, 
1999).  
A similar argument can be raised with regard to laboratory demonstrations of 
relational framing. The experiments designed to illustrate relational responding do show 
the spontaneous emergence of complex derived relations, but only after prolonged 
training and only in linguistically competent participants. It is tempting to conclude that 
the derived relations obtained in such studies are the hard won product of a laborious 
process involving private speech, namely verbal reasoning based on existing knowledge 
applied to the complex problems posed by RFT experiments (Palmer, 2004). In other 
words, like SE, successful demonstrations of relational responding could depend on the 
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responding cannot be considered to capture the processes underlying the acquisition of 
such skills. 
To summarise: although RFT has been the subject of many laboratory investigations, 
primarily by Hayes and his colleagues, it has not escaped criticism. Critics have 
questioned both its fitness for purpose and its clarity (e.g., see Palmer, 2004). The 
debate is as yet unresolved. What is important in the present context, however, is the 
proposed link between relational framing, rule governed behaviour, and psychological 
distress. Hayes et al. (1999) suggest that relational processes are fundamental to 
psychological problems. They have argued that many clinical disorders are 
characterised by the tendency to become excessively entangled with the functions of 
private verbal events (cognitive fusion), coupled with the motivation to attempt to 
escape from or avoid such unwanted private events (experiential avoidance). Because 
these processes only occur in verbally able beings, Hayes et al. (2001) suggests that 
they distinguish human from animal behaviour. Thus, “a non human shocked in a 
coloured box will be reminded of the pain by the coloured box, but not by self reports 
of being there. If a non human is trained to report whether or not it was shocked, it will 
do so without distress because such events followed the shock and thus do not contain 
the functions of the shock. For humans, it is different: reports of past events can 
themselves produce pain, because the two are mutually entailed (i.e., bi directionally 
related)” (Hayes et al., 2001, p. 215). 
 
2.1.5 Cognitive Fusion and Experiential Avoidance 
Cognitive fusion is described as the phenomena that occurs when “stimulus functions... 
dominate over other sources of behaviour regulation ... making an individual less in 
contact with the here and now experience and direct contingencies” (Hayes, 2004, 
p.650). In more general terms, this has been described as a state of merging with the 
content of one’s private experiences (thoughts, feelings, memories, sensations), and 
using those experiences as a predominant guide for action (Hayes et al., 1999). Fusion 
further conveys the quality of treating the content of one’s private VB as literal and 
accurate reflections of reality, as opposed to verbal codifications of experience, having 
behavioural functions (e.g., “that’s just a thought” or “that’s just an expectation”). 
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suggest that it is not a characteristic of a certain person or thought, but a process that 
everyone is susceptible to. This process is described as problematic when an individual 
is excessively entangled with the content of private VB and when this supports narrow, 
rigid and ineffective behaviour patterns. This theorising can be contrasted to more 
traditional cognitive theorising, therefore, because the literal presence or absence of 
certain cognitions is not thought to be problematic per se.  
Experiential avoidance describes the phenomenon that occurs when “a person is 
unwilling to remain in contact with particular private events and takes steps to alter their 
form or frequency” (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996, p. 1154). 
According to Hayes et al. (1999), because verbal stimuli can elicit the functions of other 
stimuli (such as their referents), aversive states cannot simply be avoided by avoiding 
certain contexts. This is because, in Hayes’ (2004) view, aversive states can occur via 
relational processes in almost any situation. Hayes suggests that because of this, 
verbally able individuals are not only motivated to avoid certain contexts, but certain 
private experiences also. Experiential avoidance thus describes all attempts to avoid, 
escape, control or alter unwanted private events even when doing so can be harmful 
(Hayes et al., 2006).  
Experiential avoidance is similar to earlier ideas such as emotional and cognitive 
avoidance and suppression (e.g., Roth & Cohen, 1986). Research on these concepts 
suggests that avoiding private events may be a futile endeavour. For example, research 
on thought suppression—deliberate attempts not think about something—has shown 
that the avoidance of internal events is not only unsustainable, but it can actually 
increase the salience, intensity, frequency, and functional importance of that thought 
post suppression (e.g., Wegner, 1994; Wegner & Gold, 1995; Dejonckheere, Braet, & 
Soetens, 2003). Hayes (2004) accounts for this observation by suggesting that learnt 
associations are extraordinarily resistant to unlearning. Furthermore, he suggests that 
because part of the avoidance rule will necessarily include the to be avoided stimuli (“I 
must not think about X”), following it will ultimately cue the very functions that the rule 
was designed to avoid.  
Unlike accounts of emotional and cognitive avoidance and suppression, which tend 
to consider avoidance of private events as a contributory factor in the development and 
maintenance of clinical disorders, Hayes et al. (1999) identify experiential avoidance as 
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that experiential avoidance may be usefully considered as a functional diagnostic 
dimension that underlies many formally dissimilar clinical disorders. From this 
perspective, clinical disorders (or at least many of them) are thought to constitute a 
functional response class whose shared property for negative reinforcement is the 
capacity to temporarily alleviate distress (see chapter 4). This theorising has included 
reference to, for example, OCD (Twohig, Hayes, & Masuda, 2006), trichotillomania 
(Norberg, Wetterneck, Woods, & Conelea, 2007), substance abuse (Forsyth, Parker, & 
Finlay, 2003; Hayes et al., 1996), DSH (Gratz, 2006; Najmi, Wegner, & Nock, 2007), 
panic disorder, borderline personality disorder (BPD), suicidality (Hayes et al. 1996), 
and disordered eating (Wilson & Roberts, 2002).  
Research on experiential avoidance predominantly relies on the Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes, Stroshal, et al., 2004), a self report inventory that 
was designed specifically for its measurement. The AAQ is a broad measure, however, 
with items described as tapping fusion with, attempts to control and avoid, and the 
predominant use of private experiences to regulate action. This has led to some debate 
regarding the precise nature of the AAQ (see Hayes et al., 2006; see also section 8.3.3), 
but it is apparent that it relates to other variables in ways that are consistent with the 
theoretical construct of experiential avoidance. For example, cross sectional research 
has found that the AAQ engages in moderate to large correlations with thought 
suppression, emotional escape and avoidance, and multiple indices of psychological 
distress (Hayes et al., 2006; Hayes, Stroshal, et al., 2004; Tull, Gratz, Salters, & 
Roemer, 2004).  
Using the AAQ, several cross sectional studies have also found evidence to suggest 
that experiential avoidance may play an important role in the development of clinical 
disorders. For example, the AAQ has been found to mediate the relationship between 
sexual abuse and psychological distress (Marx & Sloan, 2002), and between anxiety 
sensitivity and problem drinking (Stewart, Zvolensky, & Eifert, 2002). Although cross 
sectional, these findings suggest that the risk factors of sexual abuse and anxiety 
sensitivity affect distress through heightened levels of experiential avoidance. This 
implication is consistent with research showing that thought suppression mediates the 
relationship between intense experiences of negative affect and BPD symptoms 
(Cheavens et al., 2005), even when controlling for childhood abuse (Rosenthal, 
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tested whether experiential avoidance explains common variance (or covariance) across 
dissimilar clinical disorders. Similarly, few studies have tested for associations between 
the AAQ and the tendency to engage in maladaptive or risky behaviours (e.g., anorexia, 
substance abuse). Although thought suppression has been found to partially mediate the 
relationship between emotional intensity and DSH (Najmi et al., 2007), similar relations 
between the AAQ and DSH (Chapman et al., 2005) and substance abuse (Forsyth et al., 
2003; Polusny, Rosenthal, Aban, & Follette, 2004) were not found.  
Although these cross sectional studies are unable to determine the direction of 
causation, their implications are consistent with longitudinal and experimental research. 
For example, using a longitudinal design, Plumb, Orsillo, and Luterek (2004) found that 
for students experiencing negative lifetime events, the AAQ was a stronger predictor of 
future distress than baseline distress. This suggests that experiential avoidance played a 
causal role in maintaining distress. Similarly, experimental designs comparing 
participants with high and low AAQ scores (i.e., 1SD ± group norm) have found that 
participants high in experiential avoidance exhibit greater emotional arousal during 
exposure to emotion induction procedures (e.g., Sloan, 2004), and respond more rapidly 
to prevent exposure to aversive pictures (Cochrane, Barnes Holmes, Barnes Holmes, 
Stewart, & Luciano, 2007). Finally, linking the AAQ to the contingency insensitivity 
effect (see section 2.1.1), F. Bond and colleagues (personal communication, 19
th 
August, 2006) found that the AAQ was significantly, prospectively predictive of 
sensitivity to unsignalled contingency changes during an operant task. Although 
preliminary and unpublished, this finding is important because it supports the 
hypothesised link between experiential avoidance and contingency insensitivity.  
To summarise: Hayes and his colleagues’ account of verbally controlled behaviour 
has been reviewed, highlighting some of its strengths and limitations. This section has 
also described cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance, the two key vehicles that are 
used to link equivalence and relational theorising to clinical disorders. It is apparent that 
most conceptual extensions of relational laboratory studies to clinical phenomena are, as 
yet, more theoretical and analogous than empirical and direct. Nevertheless, research 
using the AAQ suggests that experiential avoidance may prove useful in understanding 
diverse clinical problems. Furthermore, it has become increasingly evident that ACT, 
whose core techniques are derived from this theorising, has produced some promising 
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therapeutic techniques, and stages of change. This is followed by a review of 
component analysis and outcome research. This review will show that, despite many 
theoretical and empirical gaps, the outcomes obtained when using ACT are impressive 
and worthy of continued investigation. 
 
2.2. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). 
ACT is firmly grounded in the functional proposition that a diverse range of 
psychological disorders can be characterised by excessive verbal control over behaviour 
and subsequent insensitivity to direct contingencies. In Hayes’ view, excessive verbal 
control leads to persistent behaviour patterns that do not naturally change with changing 
circumstances. Moreover, akin to many therapeutic interventions that predate it, ACT 
identifies experiential avoidance as a specific cause of psychological distress (Hayes, 
2004). Behaviour in the service of long term values—desired life qualities that have 
intrinsically fulfilling properties (see section 2.2.1)—become less frequent as 
behaviours maintained by the immediately reinforcing properties of experiential 
avoidance predominate in the repertoire (Hayes et al., 2006). As previously noted, in 
Hayes’ view, the content of verbal behaviour (e.g., thoughts, feelings) is not assumed to 
be a problem in and of itself; rather, the tendency to take that content literally (cognitive 
fusion) and excessive attempts to escape or otherwise reduce its impact (experiential 
avoidance), is thought to be psychologically harmful.  
ACT aims to disrupt verbal governance when that governance leads to behaviour 
problems, and to increase psychological flexibility (often used synonymously with 
behaviour flexibility). Psychological flexibility is the ability to adapt one’s behaviour in 
a manner that is sensitive to the here and now experience and direct contingencies 
(Hayes et al., 2006). Furthermore, ACT aims to construct a new repertoire for behaviour 
that allows increasing access to positive reinforcement. This is achieved by identifying 
the patients’ core values and shaping up behaviour patterns that are consistent with 
them. Disrupting excessive verbal regulation is challenging for many reasons; perhaps 
most specifically because therapists need to use VB in order to affect a change in verbal 
governance. Thus, ACT is more experiential that didactic, aiming to provide multiple 
contexts in which patients’ experiences, rather than their verbal codification of 
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The following section describes how ACT aims to achieve these goals. Therapeutic 
techniques, stages of change, and the therapeutic stance are outlined. This is followed 
by a review of the empirical literature. The effects of each ACT technique are first 
evaluated, followed by a review of outcome research on ACT as an integrated treatment 
package.   
 
2.2.1 Therapeutic Techniques and Stages of Change 
ACT has been described as employing six classes of therapeutic techniques (Hayes et 
al., 2006) and as involving six stages of change (Hayes et al., 1999). Although many 
authors refer to techniques and stages interchangeably, their correspondence is not 
exact. Therapeutic stages tend to have a temporal order (see Hayes et al., 1999), 
whereas techniques can be used throughout therapy (although their use is more or less 
probable in certain stages). Figure 2.3 suggests one way in which their correspondence 
may be conceptualised (parts of which are hinted to in Hayes et al., 2006). This Figure 
suggests that the first four stages of treatment (creative hopelessness, control as the 
problem, acceptance and defusion and defining the self; Hayes et al., 1999) 
predominantly involve four classes of techniques; acceptance, defusion, mindfulness 
and self as context. These techniques are described as classes, because the procedures 
used within them are similar by virtue of function but not form. For example, 
metaphors, poems, experiential exercises and meditation could all be used in any one of 
the four classes of techniques. Furthermore, because the aims of these techniques 
overlap conceptually (discussed below), they are depicted as belonging more broadly to 
a higher order class of ‘undermining verbal governance’ techniques. The last two stages, 
values and committed action, are differentiated from earlier stages because they deal 
specifically with constructing a new repertoire of effective action. However, because 
this stage is thought to be dependent on obtaining successful skills for undermining 
verbal governance, it is rarely pursued in the absence of further work on defusion, 
acceptance, self as context, self as process, and mindfulness
8.  
                                                           
8 Recent conceptualisations of ACT tend not to depict it as linearly as in the Hayes et al. (1999) treatment 
manual. For example, K. Wilson (personal communication, October, 2008) suggests a more flexible and 
pragmatic approach that is more principle, than protocol, driven. He suggests that when a patient is 
psychologically inflexible, the therapist should use techniques to undermine verbal governance. 
Conversely, when a patient is psychologically flexible, the therapist should focus on values and 
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Figure 2.3 Visual Conceptualisation of the Correspondence between ACT’s Therapeutic 
Techniques and Stages of Change 
 
 
According to Hayes et al. (1999), undermining verbal governance begins with 
creative hopelessness. ACT assumes that patients come to therapy with a surfeit of 
failed attempts to control, eliminate, or problem solve their difficulties. This stage aims 
to explore the patient’s key psychological difficulties and elicit the strategies that he/she 
have been using to manage and control those difficulties. This stage aims to disrupt this 
“control and eliminate agenda” (Hayes et al., 1999) by exposing verbally guided and 
logical problem solving strategies as futile when applied to private events. The patient 
is invited to consider the long and short term effectiveness of control strategies, helping 
them to arrive at the conclusion that the act of controlling private experience may 
paradoxically serve to maintain them. (Exemplar techniques are described in Appendix 
E, which reports the ACT protocol that was used in studies 3 and 4 of this thesis).  Chapter II     41 
 
This stage naturally extends into stage two, in which control is explicitly established 
as the problem. Experiential avoidance is introduced as a logical and natural 
consequence of language processes, but which can have substantial costs. These costs 
include the paradoxical amplification of unwanted experience and inhibited valued 
living. These ideas can be explored using thought controlling exercises and daily 
records to document the short and long term consequences of avoiding unwanted private 
experiences. Because this stage aims to undermine excessive experiential avoidance, it 
should end with the patient responsive to, perhaps even curious about, alternatives.  
One way to disrupt the avoidance of private events is to tolerate exposure to them. 
Stage two thus naturally extends into stage three, in which acceptance, defusion, and 
mindfulness are proposed as alternatives. Hayes et al. (1999) describe acceptance as 
engaging with habitually avoided events non judgementally and without attempting to 
change or escape them (Hayes et al., 1999). This differs from exposure in aiming to 
cultivate undefended contact with difficult internal events, rather than reducing the 
occurrence of them through habituation. Mindfulness/being present
9 also aims to 
cultivate non judgemental awareness of internal and external events (Hayes et al., 
2006). Mindfulness achieves this by increasing sensitivity to direct experience broadly, 
rather than targeting problematic forms of experiential avoidance specifically. For 
example, acceptance techniques may be used to help a socially anxious patient stay in 
contact with feelings of anxiety, rather than avoiding them. Mindfulness techniques, 
however, may be used to direct attention towards, and enhance awareness of, direct 
experience in day to day activities. Together, these techniques are thought to undermine 
experiential avoidance by creating a context in which the patient can begin to 
experience private VB for what it is (i.e., memories, thoughts, judgements); rather than 
being entangled with its functions (see Appendix E for treatment examples).  
Acceptance is also functionally similar to cognitive defusion. Defusion techniques 
create contexts in which the patient interacts with unwanted private events in novel and 
less threatening ways. Defusion can thus be conceptualised as a special type of exposure 
to internal events. For example, the therapist could use humour to help the patient to 
                                                           
9 Although Hayes uses the phrase “being present” this is, in terms of function, indistinguishable from 
mindfulness. Topographically, mindfulness describes a more formal and meditative approach to 
cultivating present moment living. Because more formal mindfulness practise was used in the current 
thesis, this phrase will be used throughout. Chapter II     42 
 
interact with private events in novel and more flexible ways, or draw on Gestalt 
techniques such as physicalising a psychological problem (e.g., describing it in terms of 
colour, size, and shape). Defusion thus differs formally from acceptance by intentionally 
manipulating the functions of private events. However, defusion does not simply aim to 
replace aversive functions with more tolerable ones. Instead, using multiple exemplar 
training, defusion aims to expose the process of transferring functions. That is, it aims to 
teach the patient that private verbal events have different functions in different contexts. 
The ultimate aim of defusion, therefore, is to undermine the perception that thoughts 
and feelings are literally true, by experiencing them as contextually determined, 
transient and changeable (Hayes et al., 1999). In this way, cognitive defusion is thought 
to create psychological distance between private VB and subsequent action. 
The fourth stage of treatment is called Defining the Self. ACT theorising suggests 
that there are at least three possible senses of self. First, self as content describes the 
self as defined by the content of VB (e.g., “I am ... kind, old, anxious, tall, and so on). 
Smith and Hayes (2005) refer to this as an integrated verbal summary of oneself. 
Secondly, self as process describes an observing self that is routed in present moment 
experiences and that can observe this verbal activity (e.g., “Now I am having the 
thought that I am kind...”). Finally, self as context describes the self as a context within 
which this VB occurs, but that is not defined by it. This transcendental sense of self is 
thought to be stable and consistent over time and context. Hayes et al. (1999) suggest 
that individuals predominantly experience self as content. ACT thus aims to cultivate, 
or make more salient, the other two senses of self. Self as process is facilitated by all of 
the ‘undermining verbal control’ techniques. For example, mindfulness cultivates a 
sense of self that has sensitivity to and awareness of the present moment. An exemplar 
self as context technique, on the other hand, could guide patients to recall an event from 
their past and to identify consistent and continuous aspects of the self that witnessed this 
event and that is present now. The main aim of this stage of treatment, therefore, is to 
develop a sense of self that is consistent and continuous over time but flexible and 
adaptive to changing circumstances (see Appendix E for example techniques).  
Once reliance on VB as a predominant guide for action has been disrupted, later 
stages of ACT aim to bring the patients’ behaviour into line with their values. Values 
are described as desired life qualities that have intrinsically fulfilling properties. ACT 
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specified, tangible actions (e.g., teaching my child to ride a bike). Values are also 
verbally specified, but they are molar and cannot be obtained in the literal sense (e.g., 
being a loving parent). Values are, however, verbally specified. ACT thus aims for the 
quality with which patients follow their values to be qualitatively different from RGB, 
exhibiting sensitivity to both sets of contingencies described by Zettle & Hayes (1982). 
For example, patients are taught to track values with sensitivity to the present moment 
and from the perspective of a non judgemental observing self (e.g., self as process). 
Furthermore, they are taught to use acceptance and de fusion skills to resist the pull 
towards verbally controlled behaviour patterns. The final stage, committed action, 
involves publicly committing (i.e., to the therapist and/or members of a therapeutic 
group) to verbally specified, value congruent goals and revisits earlier skills to 
overcome barriers to change. The main aim of these final two stages is to help the 
participant construct a new, value orientated repertoire for adaptive responding that 
provides access to natural reinforcers. 
Finally, the ACT therapeutic stance has several distinguishing features. Patients 
typically seek therapy in order to establish new rules for behaviour regulation, and thus 
perceive the therapist as the rule giver. The ACT therapist thus aims to balance tensions 
between giving required information (e.g., socialisation to the ACT model) and 
fastening experiential learning using the techniques of change described above. The 
therapist may thus seek to establish themselves as someone who, despite knowing more 
in a content sense, is equally susceptible to fusion, experiential avoidance, and so on. 
They may also undermine mindless derivation of new rules by using statements such as 
“don’t believe a word I am telling you, what does your experience tell you” and “I’ve 
been a clinician for years now and I still can’t get it right!”. Similarly, the therapist may 
resist explaining or justifying in session experiences so as not to model verbally 
codifying or intellectualising experience. The ACT clinician may also use tangible 
examples from their own lives to model ACT processes or use think aloud procedures in 
situ (e.g., “My mind’s says I’m a lousy therapist because I don’t know the answer to 
your question”).  
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2.2.2. Evidence for Therapeutic Techniques 
No known research has investigated ACT in terms of stages of change or therapeutic 
stance, but there is growing evidence, typically using analogue methods (see section 
3.3.1), to support the utility of each of ACT’s techniques.  
Analogue research on tolerance for physical discomfort and/or emotional distress 
supports the therapeutic utility of acceptance techniques. For example, using a variety of 
pain induction tasks and/or symptomatic patients (e.g., patients with lower back pain), 
acceptance has consistently been found to increase pain tolerance (e.g., Hayes, Bissett, 
et al., 1999; Vowles, McCracken, & Eccleston, 2007). For example, Takahashi, Muto, 
Tada, and Sugiyama (2002) randomized undergraduates to either (a) ACT rationale plus 
ACT exercise (‘Leaves on the Stream’ and physicalising techniques, see Appendix E) or 
(b) ACT rationale plus thought control exercise. Using hand submersion time in the cold 
pressor bath as a dependent variable, they found that participants in condition (a) 
demonstrated significantly greater pain tolerance than those in condition (b). This 
finding suggests that the exercise, rather than the rationale, improved pain tolerance. 
Similar findings have been reported for the reduction of affect (e.g., Karekla, Forsyth, & 
Kelly, 2004; Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004). For example, Eifert & Heffner 
(2003) found that an acceptance rational was significantly more effective than a thought 
control rationale or no instruction at reducing fear and catastophising in anxious females 
prior to the inhalation of CO2 enriched air. 
Perhaps because of the conceptual overlap between acceptance and defusion, 
dismantling research often fails to discriminate between these two techniques, referring 
both to acceptance and defusion in the methodology. One study has, however, 
investigated defusion per se (Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004). Using an 
alternative treatments design (N = 8), authors compared the effect of three brief 
techniques on the distress and believability of idiosyncratic negative self referents (e.g., 
“fat”). The techniques were (a) de fusion rationale plus technique (quickly repeating the 
word for 3 minutes), (b) thought control rational plus technique (try not to think about 
X), and (c) a control task (reading about Japan). Authors reported that technique (a) was 
more likely to reduce the distress elicited by, and believability of, the negative self 
referent (e.g., “fat”). Although this provides some preliminary support for defusion, 
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Mindfulness has received a large amount of empirical interest. Overall, this research 
indicates that mindfulness training can reduce physical and psychological distress in 
symptomatic and asymptomatic participants (e.g., Bowen et al., 2006; Kenny & 
Williams, 2007; Kingston, Chadwick, Meron, & Skinner, 2007; Ostafin et al., 2006). 
For example, Davidson et al., (2003) evaluated the effect of an 8 week mindfulness 
intervention on brain functioning and antibody immunity in asymptomatic participants. 
They found that, relative to a WLC group, mindfulness trained participants had 
significantly greater activation in brain regions associated with positive affect (left sided 
anterior). Furthermore, these participants had significantly greater antibody filters in 
response to an influenza vaccine. Research on DBT for BPD patients (e.g., Linehan et 
al., 2006), and MBCT for treatment resistant depression (e.g., Kenny & Williams, 
2008), further suggest that mindfulness based techniques may have specific utility for 
chronic disorders. Some preliminary research has also suggested that the effect of 
mindfulness on psychological distress is partially mediated by reductions in distractive 
and ruminative behaviours (Jain et al., 2007). 
No known research has tested the effect of self as context techniques per se. 
However, the utility of cultivating a sense of self that has present moment focus and that 
is not defined by VB may be derived from the mindfulness research. For example, Farb, 
et al., (2007) conducted research into the differentiation between two temporally distinct 
forms of self reference; a narrative self reference (akin to self as content) and a sense of 
self centred in the present moment (akin to self as process). Using fMRI, they 
demonstrated that although these two types of self were usually neurologically 
integrated, they were dissociated in mindfulness trained participants. Although this does 
not speak to self as context techniques, it suggests that a sense of self grounded in the 
present moment can (a) exist in a way that is distinct from a more verbal sense of self 
and (b) be cultivated by mindfulness training. Similarly, mindfulness literature has also 
found that cultivating a perspective that observes thinking as a process rather than a 
source of self definition (i.e., de centred perspective) is significantly predictive of 
positive treatment outcomes (e.g., Ma & Teasdale, 2004). 
Finally considering values and committed action, research from many schools of 
psychology suggests that values can play an important role in psychological well being. 
For example, Creswell et al. (2005) randomised undergraduates to either a value 
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(answering questions about their lower ranked value). This was followed by a 
laboratory stressor; a 5 minute public speaking task evaluated by two confederates. 
They found that relative to controls, value affirmation participants had significantly 
lower post stressor cortisol levels and rated the task as significantly less stressful and 
threatening. Similar research has also found that affirming one’s values reduces 
rumination after failure (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999) and 
defensiveness after receiving threatening information (Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 
2000). The literature on committed action is sparse; however, Amrhein, William, 
Yahne, Palmer, and Fulcher (2003) found that patients’ degree of commitment to 
abstinence significantly predicted outcomes in an alcoholic cohort. Similarly, Kulik and 
Carlino (1987) found that public commitment procedures improved compliance with 
behaviour change. 
 
2.2.3 Evidence for ACT as an Integrated Treatment Package 
Consistent with the idea that common processes underlie dissimilar clinical disorders, 
ACT has shown promising effects when applied to the treatment of several different 
patient groups. These include trichotillomania, social phobia, smoking, polysubstance 
abuse, agoraphobia, depression, anxiety, interpersonal problems, psychosis, social 
anxiety disorder, chronic pain, and BPD (see Hayes et al., 2006). When summarised 
statistically, this outcome research suggests that compared to WLC, TAU, and/or 
placebo control, ACT had a weighted average effect size (ES) of d = 0.99 (total N = 
284) at post test and d = 0.71 (N = 176) at follow up (average of 19.2 weeks; Hayes et 
al., 2006). Moreover, when compared to well specified, disorder specific treatment 
packages such as CBT and psychoeductaion, results showed a weighted average ES in 
favour of ACT at post test (d =0.48), which increased to d =0.63 at follow up (mean 26 
weeks). This rise in ES from post test to follow up reflects a trend often seen in ACT 
outcome trials (e.g., Gifford et al., 2004 (smoking cessation ACT vs. Nicotine 
replacement); Hayes, Bissett et al., 2004 (therapist burn out); Lundgren, Dahl, Melin, & 
Kies, 2006 (epileptic seizures and quality of life). That is, while comparison conditions 
tend to show, at best, gains that are sustained from post test to follow up, ACT often 
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These findings are promising and suggest that ACT may be at least as good as front 
line treatments (i.e., CBT).  However, ACT is a relatively modern intervention and 
because of this, research is predominantly in the pilot phase of investigation (see chapter 
3). Indeed, although a more recent meta analysis reported similar ESs for ACT, and 
argued for its clinical efficacy, Ost (2008) highlighted a number of key methodological 
weaknesses. The most pointed of these included the use of inactive (i.e., WLC) or ill 
defined TAU comparison groups, the failure to diagnose patients using standardised 
measures, insufficient sample sizes, and non standardised treatment protocols. These 
methodological features, and their place in research, are discussed in chapter 3. For 
now, however, it is important to note that ACT outcome research, although promising, 
is nevertheless preliminary. The following section reviews the main outcome trials, 
starting first with ACT for acute disorders, followed by tentative research on ACT for 
more treatment resistant patients.  
 
2.2.3.1 ACT for Acute Disorders. One of the largest ACT trials was conducted by 
Forman, Herbert, Moitra, Yeomans, and Geller (2007), who randomised treatment 
seeking university students (N = 101) to either ACT or CBT. Participants were 
described as having ‘moderate to severe’ mood and interpersonal problems, with a 
range of acute disorders reported (depressive disorder (34%), anxiety disorder (32%), 
adjustment disorder (11%), method of diagnosis not specified). Therapy was individual, 
self terminating (mean of 15 sessions), and delivered by CBT trained clinical graduates 
(N = 23) who had received additional ACT training. Clinicians delivered both ACT and 
CBT and treatment fidelity was tested and verified. Post treatment outcomes, measured 
using a range of patient and clinician ratings, indicated that both interventions obtained 
similar effects. Preliminary analyses of mechanisms of change were conducted by 
assessing whether changes in the hypothesised mediators (e.g., AAQ) co occurred with 
changes in symptom severity. These analyses suggested ACT and CBT obtained effects 
through different mechanisms. In the ACT group, changes in the AAQ, acting with 
awareness, and acceptance were all significantly related to symptom change. 
Conversely, in keeping with Teasdale et al.’s (2002) findings, the ability to observe 
private events was significantly related to change in CBT. These preliminary 
investigations are insightful; however, because measures were taken at the same point in 
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A similar trial has been conducted by Lappalainen et al. (2007) in Finland. These 
authors actively recruited community patients via newspaper advertisements and 
randomised them to either ACT or CBT. As in Forman et al.’s (2007) trial, patients 
presented with mood and/or interpersonal complaints (N = 28). Therapy sessions were 
individualised and interventions were delivered by CBT trained post doctoral trainees 
who had received additional ACT training. Unlike the former trial, however, this trial 
reported medium to large between group ES for reductions in global symptom severity 
that favoured ACT. Differential mechanisms of change were again implicated: CBT 
enhanced self confidence and ACT did not; ACT decreased AAQ scores and CBT did 
not. Lappalainen et al. also reported that post treatment symptom severity was 
significantly associated with self confidence in the CBT condition and AAQ scores in 
the ACT condition. These analyses simply involved correlating post treatment process 
and symptom scores and 6 month process and symptom scores (i.e., not assessing 
change or cross lagged correlations). Thus, because these measures were taken at the 
same point in time, and were not based on change scores, they are also unable to 
elucidate causal relations.  
Two trials have compared ACT versus TAU for psychosis (Bach & Hayes, 2002; N 
= 80; Gaudiano and Herbert, 2006; N = 40). Patients in both trials met diagnostic 
criteria for psychosis and approximately one third of patients in the first study and half 
of patients in the second study had co morbid PD and/or Substance Dependency 
Disorder. These more severe characteristics are typically excluded from RCTs on CBT 
for psychosis (see Gould, Mueser, Bolton, Mays, & Goff, 2002). Despite brief 
intervention periods (4 and 3 sessions respectively), both trials reported that re 
hospitalisation at 4 month follow up was 50% lower in the ACT condition than TAU. 
Furthermore, significant reductions in psychiatric symptoms and hallucination distress 
and believability were also reported. Comparing the ES reported by Gaudiano and 
Herbert to those reported in a meta review on CBT for psychosis (Gould et al.), showed 
that ESs were comparable (ACT d = 0.60, CBT d = 0.65). However, ACT obtained 
these effects using a briefer intervention period than CBT (mean 3.2 versus mean 13.6 
respectively) and by treating a more complex patient group. Finally, Gaudiano and 
Herbert conducted a comprehensive assessment of mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986; 
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mediated by reductions in hallucination believability. These mediational analyses are 
promising but were based on a small sample (N = 29) and thus require replication. 
Two trials have piloted ACT for social anxiety disorder. In a repeated measures 
within subjects design, Dalrymple and Herbert (2007) measured psychological distress 
and social functioning over a 4 week baseline control period. This was compared to 
post treatment measures following 12 weeks of individualised ACT. Multiple measures, 
including self report, clinician report, and behavioural tasks (e.g., public speaking task) 
were used to assess social functioning. Behavioural tasks were recorded and rated by 
assessors who were blind to the aims of the study and to the testing period of each 
recording they rated (i.e., pre treatment versus post treatment). Despite the small sample 
size (completers N = 12), patients rated themselves, and were rated by others (i.e., blind 
assessors), as significantly less anxious following treatment as compared to baseline. 
Preliminary analyses into mechanisms of change were again computed, indicating that 
changes in the AAQ during the first half of treatment preceded and predicted 
subsequent change in symptom severity. These findings are promising but, again, the 
sample size was particularly small.  
The second study applying ACT to social phobia was conducted by Ossman, Wilson, 
Storaasli, and McNeil (2006), who used an uncontrolled trial to obtain preliminary 
information on group based delivery of ACT for treatment seeking patients with Social 
Phobia (SP; 10 week intervention). They also found significant reductions in self 
reported SP symptoms and anxiety, and gains continued over the 3 month follow up. 
Exploratory investigations into mechanisms of change, using the same method adopted 
by Lappalainen et al. (2007), demonstrated a high correlation between symptoms and 
experiential avoidance. However, because variables were measured at the same time 
point, the direction of causation cannot be ascertained. 
A further two trials have assessed the relative effects of an early ACT protocol (then 
called ‘Cognitive Distancing’; CD) to CBT for patients with depression (Zettle & 
Hayes, 1986, N = 18; Zettle & Raines, 1989, N = 31). In both these trials, clinicians 
were described as primarily ‘Beck trained’ (see Hayes et al., 2006), receiving additional 
CD training. Both trials tested the relative effects of 12 weeks of CD versus CD+CBT 
or CBT alone. Results from the first trial showed that although there were significant 
reductions in all conditions, post treatment and 2 month follow up depression scores 
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changes in the believability of depressogenic thoughts mediated superior treatment 
gains for the CD condition (see Hayes et al., 2006). Unlike the first trial, results of the 
second trial showed equivalent gains across groups. These trials tentatively suggest that 
CD was clinically beneficial for depressed patients, but the extent to which CD reflects 
current ACT protocols is unclear.  
The ACT outcome trials that have been reviewed tentatively suggest that it may be as 
effective as CBT for some acute disorders. Findings have also been consistent with 
hypothesised mechanisms of change and some data suggests that ACT may achieve 
effects using shorter intervention periods than CBT (also see section 2.3.3.2). It is 
already clear from chapter 1, however, that CBT is usually quite effective for the 
treatment of acute disorders. A more pressing question, therefore, is how effective is 
ACT when applied to the treatment of patients typically more resistant to CBT (see 
section 1.2.4)? To date, research has not ventured into testing whether ACT may have 
utility for more chronic, co morbid and/or PD groups. Three trials tentatively support 
such an application, however.   
2.2.3.2 ACT for Hard to Treat Patients. The first of these trials was conducted by 
Hayes, Wilson et al. (2004), who investigated ACT versus methadone maintenance 
(MM) versus Intensive 12 Step Facilitation program (ITSF) for polysubstance abusing 
patients (N = 109). At baseline, most of this group had co morbid disorders: 40% were 
reported to have a mood disorder, 42% an anxiety disorder, and 52% were reported to 
meet criteria for at least one PD (N = 57). Furthermore, patients had attended a 
substantial number of previous residential or outpatient treatments (mean = 6.5). 
Participants received 32 individual and 16 group sessions. Using urine specimens as a 
measure of abstinence, comparable post treatment effects for ACT and IFTS were 
found, with both superior to MM. Moreover, although not significant, 6 month follow 
up data suggested that ACT obtained long term effects that exceeded ITSF (Figure 2.4). 
The AAQ was not, however, associated with change. This makes it difficult to elucidate 
how ACT affected outcomes.  
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Figure 2.4 Outcome Data for Percentage of Clear Urine Analysis Samples in an Opiate 
Using Clinical Sample Following ACT, IPSF and MM  
From “A Preliminary Trial of Twelve Step Facilitation and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy with 
Polysubstance Abusing Methadone Maintained Opiate Addicts,” by  S. Hayes, K. Wilson, E. Gifford, R. 
Bissett, M. Piasecki, S. Batten et al., 2004,  Behaviour Therapy, 35(4), p.  667 688. Note: ‘1’ = baseline, 
‘2’ = post test and ‘3’ = 6 month follow up. 
 
Results from a trial by Gratz and Gunderson (2006) also suggest that ACT may be 
useful for hard to treat patient groups. They randomised self harming BPD patients (N 
= 24) to either 16 weeks of an ‘ACT DBT hybrid’ plus TAU or TAU alone. The ACT 
DBT hybrid included approximately 70% ACT and 30% DBT. Significant between 
group differences were obtained; patients receiving ACT DBT+TAU were significantly 
less likely to self harm relative to TAU at post test. ACT DBT+TAU patients also 
showed a significant reduction in BPD symptom severity. This was accompanied by 
significant reductions in the AAQ, but Gratz and Gunderson did not report whether this 
was related to behaviour change. Although the intervention was brief relative to other 
BPD interventions (e.g., Giesen Bloo et al., 2006), approximately 50% of patients 
receiving ACT DBT+TAU experienced clinically reliable reductions in global 
psychiatric functioning (using Jacobson & Truax’s, 1991 criteria; see chapter 3). 
Because Gratz and Gunderson tested a hybrid of ACT and DBT, however, the specific 
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The final trial to implicate the effectiveness of ACT like techniques for chronic 
disorders was conducted by Dimidjian et al. (2006). Dimidjian et al. randomised 
treatment seeking depressed patients (N = 241) to CBT, Behavioural Activation (BA), 
or antidepressant medication. BA bore noticeable similarity to key ACT techniques: 
“(BA) highlights the centrality of patterns of avoidance and withdrawal (experiential 
avoidance)…and seeks to identify and promote engagement with an individual’s long 
term goals (values and committed action)... The model also includes an increased focus 
on the assessment and treatment of avoidance behaviours (experiential avoidance)... and 
on moving attention away from the content of thoughts (cognitive fusion) towards direct 
immediate experience (mindfulness)” (p. 672, brackets added). Dimidjian et al. found 
that although the effects of CBT and BA were comparable for less severely depressed 
patients, a significant difference emerged when considering the most severe subsample 
(N = 61). Patients with more severe depression experienced significant improvements 
following BA and medication but not following CBT. Similar findings have been 
reported by Elkin et al. (1995) and Ma and Teasdale (2004), and tentatively suggest that 
ACT like techniques may be effective for the treatment of patients with more severe 
symptoms. Again, however, ACT was not being directly assessed.  
To summarise: although the research is in its infancy, and the story is still unfolding, 
ACT appears to hold promise. It has produced notable effects for a range of clinical 
disorders, even when delivered as a brief and group based intervention. Furthermore, 
when compared to CBT for acute disorders, the data tentatively suggest that ACT could 
be as effective as this front line treatment. Also, preliminary indications suggest that 
ACT may achieve change using fewer treatment sessions and through theory consistent 
mechanisms. Perhaps more importantly, preliminary data further suggest that ACT and 
ACT like techniques may be useful for patients typically more resistant to traditional 
CBT. The key word, however, is tentative. ACT is a relatively new therapy and because 
of this, much of its research remains in a pilot phase of investigation (see chapter 3). For 
example, few trials have had sufficiently large samples to conduct powered analyses 
and only a small cluster has begun to investigate mechanisms of change. Furthermore, 
most of this research has been restricted to American samples. ACT is not yet an 
empirically supported treatment (Ost, 2008), and only with more rigorous and replicable 
investigations can its effects be thoroughly tested.  
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2.3 Chapter Summary and Global Aims of the Thesis 
This chapter aimed to provide a thorough account of ACT by reviewing its theoretical 
underpinnings, therapeutic techniques, and outcome data. It will conclude by reiterating 
a few main points that will lead into the broad aims of the thesis. Firstly, not anomalous 
to the first and second wave treatments that pre date it, the congruence between RFT 
theorising and ACT treatment techniques are arguably more analogous than empirical. 
As with these previous treatments, it is also likely that the clinical successes of ACT 
will not rest on the laboratory successes or failures of RFT. Secondly, although the 
applied work is largely supportive of ACT’s effectiveness (Hayes et al., 2006), the full 
range of its applicability and the mechanisms through which it obtains effects are yet to 
be thoroughly tested. Investigations which compare ACT and CBT may be central to 
quantifying how—in terms of theory and practice—ACT differs from this main stream 
approach (Ost, 2008). Finally, this review has aimed to highlight one area of research 
that seems particularly worthy of attention; that is, the possibility that ACT may be 
useful for patients who have been resistant to, or relapsed following, standard 
psychological treatment. This is by virtue of the fact that, according to ACT, the range 
of symptoms that this group present with are commonly maintained by excessive 
experiential avoidance.  In theory, therefore, ACT should be effective for this 
heterogeneous cohort even when delivered as a group based treatment. Such an 
investigation would provide a good test of ACT’s generic applicability, while also 
evaluating whether it has clinical benefits above and beyond existing techniques.  
Archetypically, treatment resistant patients present with longstanding, chronic and 
co morbid symptomatology. Additionally, they will often engage in a range of 
maladaptive behaviours which, according to ACT, are motivated by experiential 
avoidance (Hayes et al., 1996). Although a decade has passed since Hayes et al.’s 
seminal paper was published, this proposition is yet to be empirically tested. The 
empirical chapters of this thesis will adopt a systematic, theoretical and applied 
programme of research, designed to investigate the role of the experiential avoidance in 
co occurring maladaptive behaviours and to pilot test ACT for treatment resistant 
patients. With these aims in mind, the following chapter discusses methodological 
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CHAPTER III 
Methodological Issues and Statistical Techniques  
 
The previous two chapters identified ACT as a promising intervention for patients with 
a range of clinical disorders and perhaps even for those with more longstanding 
difficulties. Several gaps in knowledge were identified, however, both in terms of ACT 
theorising and outcome research. This thesis aims to address those gaps most relevant to 
ACT for treatment resistant groups. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to provide 
a concise summary of research methods and statistical techniques in common use in 
developing and validating novel clinical treatments. The chapter begins by discussing 
the major varieties of research design and the main techniques for measuring study 
variables. These discussions aim to inform how treatments may be evaluated, but do not 
consider when in the evaluation process particular approaches are most appropriate. 
Latter sections of this chapter thus discuss stages of treatment evaluation and statistical 
techniques. Some, but not all, of the techniques covered in this chapter feature in the 
thesis. Those used receive greater coverage.  
 
3.1 Research Designs in Clinical Research 
Clinical research is usually concerned with evaluating the effects of different treatments 
and/or testing the theoretical assumptions upon which they are based. For example, is 
ACT an effective intervention for treatment resistant patients, and do independent 
variables (IVs; e.g., treatment techniques) affect dependent variables (DVs; e.g., patient 
symptoms) in theory consistent ways? A variety of designs can be used to test these 
types of questions, and these differ mainly with regard to control procedures. 
Experimental research is designed to maximise internal validity; the validity of 
conclusions regarding cause and effect relations. This is achieved using rigorous control 
procedures. Although high internal validity is desirable, it is not always feasible, ethical, 
and/or appropriate in clinical settings. Less controlled approaches, such as quasi  
experimental and non experimental designs are thus frequently used. The following 
section discusses the major types of research design and allocates specific attention to 
Time as an important variable for determining causation.  
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3.1.1. Control Procedures 
Experimental designs manipulate an IV and measure the effect of that manipulation on a 
DV(s). Although many variants of this model exist, the common principle is to hold all 
factors constant except the IV, thus isolating its effect from that of spurious variables.  
The randomised control trial (RCT) is the most highly regarded experimental design 
for outcome research (e.g., Chambless & Hollon, 1998). Participants are randomly 
allocated to either the treatment or a control condition(s), and between group 
comparisons are used to test whether the treatment has a significantly greater effect on 
the DV(s) than the control. Randomisation ensures between group comparability at 
baseline, thus controlling for the possibility that post treatment differences are 
attributable to pre existing group differences. RCTs also typically sample patients with 
homogeneous symptoms, meaning that patients are as similar as possible on dimensions 
such as illness type and symptom severity. This is desirable because large within group 
heterogeneity obscures the detection of small treatment effects by increasing variability 
in treatment response (Donenberg, Lyons, & Howard, 1999). This variability threatens 
statistical conclusion validity; the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is 
false (Shapiro, 1996). Uncontrolled variation in the delivery of treatments also threatens 
statistical conclusion validity. Treatments are thus typically delivered in keeping with 
detailed treatment manuals and adherence is rigorously checked. This helps to ensure 
that treatments are delivered competently and with consistency across clinicians and 
treatment sites. Finally, the potential for experimenter bias is reduced by blinding 
assessors to group allocation. Together, these features provide a tightly controlled 
environment designed to isolate the specific effects of a treatment.   
Although the RCT has good internal validity, it has some limitations. These mostly 
arise from the fact that the persons and settings studied in RCTs often poorly represent 
those of clinical practice (see Westen et al., 2004). This threatens external validity; the 
validity of generalised inferences regarding cause and effect. RCTs compromise 
external validity in several ways. For example, in everyday practice, therapy is seldom 
delivered according to treatment manuals; rather, it tends to be self correcting and 
integrates techniques from different theoretical models (Clarke & Rienecke, 2003; 
Westen et al., 2004). Likewise, homogeneous sampling typically under represents those 
patients usually seen in clinical practice. For example, Westen et al. (2004) found that 
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PD symptoms being the most common justification. In addition to issues of 
generalisability, RCTs can be difficult to conduct in clinical settings. For example, it is 
not always appropriate or ethical to randomise patients to a no treatment control group. 
Furthermore, a greater proportion of participants allocated to control conditions drop 
out of treatment (selective attrition), thus undermining the assumption of group 
equivalences at baseline (see section 3.4).  
There are many alternatives to the RCT, such as patient series, pre post, and quasi 
experimental design. Patient series and pre post design are based on within patient 
comparisons. Patient series is a naturalistic approach in which the clinician delivers 
treatment as they would in usual practice, but uses regular observations to quantify 
effects. This approach aims to maintain a “clear focus on the individual rather than the 
average group member” (Owens, Slade, & Fielding, 1996, p. 231), but uses a series of 
patients to systematically develop techniques over time. Pre post design, on the other 
hand, simultaneously delivers the same treatment to a group of patients and assesses 
change by comparing the groups’ pre treatment scores to their post treatment scores. 
Quasi experiments are a further option. These mimic experimental design but do not use 
randomisation. For example, non equivalent group design compares groups that are 
already intact, such as patients already enrolled on a course of treatment or groups with 
innate differences (e.g., males versus females). Compared to RCTs, these alternative 
designs have two main strengths; they are easier to conduct and provide a more accurate 
reflection of treatment as delivered in clinical practice. The main limitation, however, is 
that they lack internal validity. In all three of the approaches described, a range of 
uncontrolled rival hypotheses make it difficult to ascertain what proportion of an effect 
is attributable to the treatment.   
Non Experimental design is also used in clinical research. This approach does not 
manipulate an IV, nor does it procedurally control for extraneous variables. Instead it 
analyses the relationship between multiple variables to identify structural or functional 
relations. This approach is often used to test the theoretical model underpinning a 
treatment. Epidemiological research is a good example, which not only documents 
population rates of a disorder, but also aims to “detect factors associated with its origin, 
course and outcome” (Leighton, 1979, p. 235, cited in Cooke, 1996). Indeed, although 
non experimental design does not manipulate an IV, it can contribute to knowledge 
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a firm theoretical foundation, the nature of the variables being tested (e.g., IV 
(predictor), DV (criterion)
10, mediator) and their anticipated relations. Multiple 
Regression (MR; section 3.4.2) or Structural Equation Modelling (SEM; section 3.4.3) 
can be used to test for those relations. For example, mediational analysis (section 3.4.3) 
is often used to test whether a predictor (e.g., negative affect intensity) predicts variance 
in a criterion (e.g., BPD symptomatology) indirectly and through the effect of a 
mediator (e.g., thought suppression; Cheavens et al., 2005).  
Non experimental design has several strengths. It is easy to conduct and requires few 
resources, but allows for the collection of large data sets. Furthermore, it is suited to 
testing multiple inter variable relations. This is a common characteristic of models that 
underpin clinical treatments. Its main limitation, however, is that because it does not 
involve the manipulation of an IV, it is less internally valid than experimental design. 
Although it has been argued that finding evidence to support complex patterns of inter 
variable relations, such as mediation, reduces the number of plausible competing 
hypotheses (Anderson & Bushman, 1997), non experimental research is nonetheless 
unable to ascertain whether one variable caused another.  
 
3.1.2 Time as a Variable 
Time, as a variable, is also an important consideration for clinical research. Clinical 
research is typically cross sectional or prospective. Cross sectional research, usually 
non experimental in design, tests the associations between variables that are measured 
at the same point in time. Although measured concurrently, one variable typically has 
antecedent status (i.e., it is conceptualised as the IV). For example, cross sectional 
research has been used to test whether a historic event, such as a negative life event, 
predicts current levels of a criterion, such as depression (see Kessler, 1997). Prospective 
research, on the other hand, takes several measures at different time periods. The RCT 
is thus a typical prospective design because it measures the DV both before and after 
treatment. Although prospective research is usually experimental in design, non 
experimental research can be used to obtain data sets from the same sample on two or 
                                                           
10 Because non experimental research does not involve the manipulation of an IV, the terms IV and DV 
do not correctly apply. Thus, non experimental research use the terms ‘predictor’ and ‘criterion’ 
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more occasions. These prospective non experimental designs thus allow for an 
examination of lagged correlations, potentially identifying causal relationships without 
the direct manipulation of an IV.  
Both approaches have strengths and limitations. Cross sectional research is 
inexpensive, quick, and easy to conduct. It also lends itself to the collection of large 
datasets, which enable detailed and powered multivariate analyses (see section 4.1.3). 
These strengths are offset by some important limitations, however. Because cross 
sectional research invariably measures the IV retrospectively, it is subject to memory 
biases and distortions (e.g., over generalised and mood congruent recall). These sources 
of error are often especially pronounced in clinical samples (e.g., Kuyken & Brewin, 
1995; Russo, Fox, Bellinger, & Nguyen Van Tam, 2001). Additionally, it is impossible 
to obtain any objective baseline measure against which the effect of that IV can be 
compared. Cross sectional research is thus low in internal validity; measuring variables 
concurrently, it is not possible to show that one preceded and caused the other. The 
strengths of prospective research parallel the limitations of cross sectional. Because 
participants are followed over time, inferences regarding cause and effect are typically 
more valid than in cross section research. This is because one can follow the predicted 
temporal path of relations between variables, systematically testing whether changes in 
one preceded and caused changes in the other. A disadvantage to this approach, 
however, is that it is time consuming and resource intensive. Furthermore, periodic 
testing (i.e., repeated measures) can produce reactive changes in measures of a DV that 
are not directly attributable to the IV. 
Given the strengths and weakness of the several designs that have been considered, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that there is no one perfect design in clinical research. 
Rather, it has been described by Shapiro (1996) as a “creative compromise”, which 
involves balancing tensions of validity and practical feasibility. Resolving these 
tensions is influenced by the stage of evaluation that the treatment is in (see section 
3.3.). Before considering these stages, however, the following section discusses the 
various methods that are available for the measurement of study variables.   
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3.2. Measures Used in Clinical Research 
There is a wide range of choice in selecting how to measure study variables. Self report, 
observational, and physiological measures have all been used. Each has relative 
advantages and drawbacks.  
 
3.2.1 Self report 
Self report measures, such as questionnaires or interviews, are a common procedure for 
explicitly measuring variables of interest. Self report is useful for measuring clinical 
phenomena ethically and anonymously. It can also be used to efficiently summarise 
information about broad constructs (e.g., global symptom severity) and to measure 
events retrospectively. Questionnaires are easy, quick, and inexpensive to administer. 
Furthermore, standardised measures facilitate direct comparisons across patients, 
treatments and populations, which can be used to inform treatment decisions. Although 
interviews are more resource intensive than questionnaires, they are often favoured 
because they can provide less constrained information. Indeed, because questionnaires 
force participants to answer in pre defined ways, they may bias findings and/or omit 
important information. Interviews can partly overcome this by using open ended 
techniques, but the loss of anonymity can limit the quality and quantity of data. 
Although self report techniques have many strengths, a key limitation is that people 
seldom have access to full and accurate accounts of past or present experiences. For 
example, people are often unaware of the contingencies that affect behaviour and 
verbally accessible accounts, at best, approximate true relations (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977). These measures can thus have high levels of subjective inference. Furthermore, 
they can be reactive to repeat testing. 
 
3.2.2 Observational 
Observational measures directly observe phenomena of interest. Observations can be 
taken from the natural environment, such as measuring how often, and when, a patient 
with OCD engages in checking behaviour within their own home. Alternatively, 
observations may be made in the clinical or laboratory setting. Observational measures 
are useful because they allow the researcher to quantify behaviour, its antecedents and 
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those relations. Furthermore, observational data are less susceptible to subjective 
inference than self report. For example, operational definitions and blind second ratings 
of observations heighten the objective reliability of these measures. Also, measures can 
be used to quantify activity that is not under voluntary control, such as eye gaze. These 
measures are useful because they are less reactive to repeat testing and demand bias. 
Because this approach uses direct observation, however, it is seldom used to investigate 
harmful behaviours unless through the means of an analogue procedure (see section 
3.2.1). Furthermore, the introduction of observers and/or recording equipment may 
produce reactive change in the behaviour observed.  
 
3.2.3 Physiological 
Physiological measures quantify the activity of biological processes such as heartbeat, 
skin conductance, and cortical activity. These can be used in clinical research by, for 
example, providing a baseline assessment against which intervention effects may be 
measured. For example, the effects of a treatment on stress reactivity can be tested by 
comparing pre post measures of cortisol. These modern methods are unique because 
they have the ability to identify, sometimes in real time, the locus of effects of 
experimental variables on biological functions (Coles, 2003). It is well recognised, 
however, that these parameters have many associated difficulties (Edelmann, 1996). 
They can be difficult to implement and intrusive. This is an important consideration for 
applied research. Additionally, these techniques are resource intensive, expensive, and 
often require specialists for their correct operation. Furthermore, psychophysiological 
measures are usually taken in laboratory settings. The correspondence between the 
behaviour of these processes in this versus naturalistic settings is relatively unknown. 
What is apparent, however, is that psychophysiological readings are often reactive to 
subtle changes in the stimuli and testing environment (Edelmann).  
So far, this chapter has considered the many research designs and measurement 
approaches that are in common use in clinical research. Two other important 
considerations are reviewed in the sections that follow. The first is when in the research 
process particular approaches are more or less appropriate, and the second is the 
statistical techniques available to analyse the data obtained (although analysis is 
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3.3 Stages of Clinical Research 
In recent years, clinical research methodology has been codified on the basis of logic 
and the experience of a number of researchers (e.g., Medical Research Council (MRC); 
Campbell et al., 2000; Tull, Bornovalova, Patterson, Hopko, & Lejuez, 2008). It is now 
widely accepted that there is a four stage research process in the development and 
evaluation of a new clinical intervention. These stages, depicted in Figure 3.1, include 
(usually in this order) analogue research, pilot trials, RCTs, and field effectiveness (FE) 
research. Each stage is discussed below.   
 
3.3.1 Analogue Research 
Treatment evaluation usually begins by testing key theoretical assumptions upon which 
a treatment is based. In the psychological literature, this stage is often called analogue 
research: “research focused on gaining a clear understanding of the processes 
underlying the development and maintenance of psychopathology ... with the goal of 
understanding more basic processes, which may be used to guide additional research 
focused on the generalisability of findings to clinical phenomena” (Tull et al., 2008, p. 
77). According to Tull et al., research can be analogue either with regard to procedures 
or sample characteristics. Analogue procedures artificially simulate clinical phenomena, 
such as experimentally inducing anxiety or fear, and then test theory driven predictions 
about its nature and/or modification. For example, Eifert and Heffner (2003) have used 
the “biological challenge” (inducing hyperventilation through the inhalation of CO2 
enriched air) to compare the effect of acceptance, avoidance, and control techniques on 
anxiety. Analogue sampling refers to the use of non clinical or sub clinical samples to 
investigate clinical phenomena. For example, researchers often recruit asymptomatic 
participants (Cheavens et al., 2005) or those with sub clinical symptoms (e.g., Foa, 
McNally, & Murdock, 1989).  
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Figure 3.1 Phase Based Approach to Developing and Evaluating Complex Treatments 
Adapted from “Framework for Design and Evaluation of Complex Interventions to Improve Health” by 
M. Campbell, R. Fitzpatrick, A. Haines, A. Kinmonth, P. Sandercock, and  D. Spiegelhalter, 2000, British 
Medical Journal, 321, p. 694. Note: Adaptation maps medical terms used by the MRC (“modelling”, 
“exploratory”, “definitive RCT” and “long term implementation”) to corresponding terms used in 
psychological research (“analogue”, “pilot trials”, “efficacy”, “field effectiveness” research, respectively). 
 
It is not hard to discern why clinical research begins with analogue investigations. 
One reason is that laboratory analogues are tractable, offering a level of precision that is 
hard to achieve in clinical settings (Bandura, 1987; Watts, 1996). These conditions thus 
provide a useful means of addressing specific theoretical questions. For example, testing 
the effect of acceptance on naturally occurring anxiety in clinical practice may be 
confounded by variability in treatment implementation, co morbid symptoms of the 
patient, patient therapist interactions, and/or demand characteristics. Analogue research, 
on the other hand, can overcome these confounds by using asymptomatic patients, 
artificially simulating clinical phenomena and standardising procedures.  
Analogue procedures have proved particularly useful for investigating behaviours that 
cannot be investigated ethically in situ, such as risk taking. For example, Lejuez et al. 
(2002) developed a computerised gambling task (the Balloon Analogue Risk Task, 
‘BART’) in which participants have the opportunity to win or lose money, but where 
persistent risk taking increases the probability of losing. The BART thus measures the 
tendency to take risks in a way that is claimed to be analogous to real life risk taking. 
Although procedures of this kind cannot capture the true phenomenology of risk taking, 
this approach can provide an ethical means of measuring, manipulating and better 
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Analogue sampling has also long proved useful in clinical research, primarily 
because non clinical samples do not incur the same ethical risks as clinical counterparts. 
For example, although scientifically desirable, it would be unethical to randomise 
emotionally vulnerable patients to a no treatment control group and then induce anxiety 
(e.g., see Eifert & Heffner, 2003). Similar risks are incurred even when emotions are not 
directly manipulated, such as when investigating emotionally evocative variables (e.g., 
trauma and abuse). Theory testing in clinical samples is thus uncommon, but it is by no 
means impossible; rather, tackling these issues requires specific procedures. For 
example, ethics committees may require that clinical groups participate in a safe 
environment (i.e., a clinic), that they are currently in therapy, and that a therapist is 
available post participation. Of course, this is not always possible and such provisions 
may affect the accuracy of the data collected. For example, disclosure may be 
compromised when patients participate at the clinic where they receive treatment. 
Similarly, responses may be influenced by that treatment. These difficulties are further 
compounded by the fact that clinical samples are notoriously hard to recruit and attrition 
is often high. Theory testing on clinical samples is thus time consuming and often 
suffers from low statistical power.  
Although analogue research has many advantages, the external validity of this 
approach is frequently debated (e.g., Bandura, 1978; Weary, Edwards, & Jacobson, 
1995; Vrendenburg, Flett, & Krams, 1993). The generalisability of analogue procedures 
rests on the extent to which they accurately simulate clinical symptoms. The 
generalisability of analogue samples rests on the extent to which ‘clinical’ samples 
differ quantitatively, but not qualitatively, from ‘non clinical’ samples. Overall, 
research suggests that these approaches exhibit acceptable external validity. For 
example, reviewing the aggression literature, a meta analysis by Anderson, Lindsay, 
and Bushman (1999) found strong congruence (r = .75) between the findings of 
laboratory based and field based studies (see also Anderson & Bushman, 1997). 
Similarly, research on depression and psychosis has shown evidence for 
phenomenological continuity across non clinical, sub clinical, and clinical samples 
(e.g., Enns, Cox, & Borger, 2000; Johns & Van Os, 2001).  
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3.3.2 Pilot Trials 
According to the stage based approach to treatment evaluation, the most logical 
progression from theory testing is to ‘test run’ a treatment (Campbell et al., 2000; 
Lancaster, Dodd, & Williamson, 2002). Pilot trials are designed for this very purpose, 
aiming to obtain preliminary information about the effect of the treatment on small 
clinical samples (approximately 30 participants; Browne, 1995). Pilot trials provide vital 
information regarding the use of a treatment with certain patient groups, and this 
information may in turn be used to justify expensive and rigorous stage three trials (i.e., 
powered RCTs). 
Pilot trials do not adopt one uniform research design. Instead, the design is usually 
guided by (a) the amount of information already available for the treatment and patient 
group in question, (b) the ethical risks associated with the patient group, and (c) 
practical constraints. When the application is novel and the group are considered to be 
high risk, patient series, pre post and/or quasi experiments are typically used (Shapiro, 
1996; Spokas, Rodebaugh, & Heimberg, 2008). These designs are suited to pilot trials 
because they provide some indication of treatment effects in a research context that can 
flexibly adapt to the needs of the patient. For example, if aspects of the treatment prove 
to be ineffective or require modification, the clinician can adapt the protocol 
accordingly. This flexibility is usually not afforded in RCTs, but is vital for developing 
the treatment manuals that they use (Campbell et al., 2000). Pilot RCTs are particularly 
useful (Lancaster et al., 2004). This is not only because they implement more rigorous 
controls than other designs, but also because they more directly inform powered RCTs 
(section 3.3.3). For example, pilot RCTs can test run specific design procedures (e.g., 
randomisation), provide realistic estimates of recruitment duration, pilot measures, and 
explore optimal treatment delivery (e.g., mode of delivery and duration). They are also 
vital for making realistic and informed power calculations.  
Although pilot trials are useful as an early stage of treatment evaluation, they cannot 
determine the efficacy of a treatment. They are usually underpowered, lack sufficient 
control procedures, have limited external validity, and, even when randomisation is 
used, imbalances can exist between groups at baseline (Lancaster et al., 2004). Thus, 
having test run a treatment, stage three of evaluation is concerned with efficacy 
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3.3.3 Efficacy Research 
 Efficacy research is interested in discovering the specific effects of a treatment on an 
outcome (Wells, 1999). This requires optimal control procedures, isolating the treatment 
from non specific treatment effects such as therapist contact and spontaneous remission. 
This stage of research is thus exclusively concerned with powered RCTs. A powered 
RCT recruits sufficient participants to ensure that the probability of detecting a 
significant between group difference, should one exist, is at least 80% (adjusted cell 
size for attrition).  
Although efficacy research is exclusively concerned with powered RCTs, the nature 
of the control group usually increases with rigour throughout this stage. Early RCTs 
typically evaluate the treatment against a wait list control. In this design, control 
participants receive treatment after, rather than during the trial, and effects are evaluated 
relative to the passage of time. If found to be more effective than no treatment, the next 
type of comparison is usually TAU; control patients are assigned to an ecologically 
valid alternative treatment. Although the premise of TAU is to control for non specific 
treatment effects, such as therapist contact and treatment duration, TAU trials are rarely 
sufficiently rigorous. In practice, TAU often refers to a culmination of various different 
treatment approaches with little or no indication of contact hours or the techniques used. 
The most rigorous comparison, therefore, is an active and well structured comparison 
treatment (Ost, 2008). The aim here is to control for all possible confounds, leaving 
only treatment techniques to vary between groups. Because it is unethical for the 
comparison to be inert, this approach usually involves comparing the treatment to one 
that has already been established as effective. This type of trial thus usually aims to test 
whether the new approach offers any additional benefits above and beyond existing 
techniques, such as superior outcomes or a better cost effectiveness ratio.  
As discussed at the start of this chapter, the RCT is an internally valid method for 
testing treatment efficacy in idealised settings. Some of its control procedures, however, 
impinge on external validity. The final stage of investigation, FE research, is thus 
exclusively concerned with the effects of a treatment in usual clinical settings. 
 
 
 Chapter III     66 
 
3.3.4 Field Effectiveness Trials 
 FE research is interested in the applicability, generalisability, and applied impact of 
treatment techniques in practical and non controlled settings (Strosahl, Hayes, Bergan, 
& Romano, 1998). This approach tends to follow powered RCTs, but only for 
pragmatic purposes (RCTs justify dissemination to standard care). Quasi experimental 
and non experimental designs are most suited to this stage, but FE work is better 
characterised by the following features: large, unrestricted and heterogeneous samples, 
active patient driven selection of treatments, non restricted termination of therapy, 
naturally correcting therapeutic procedures, and regular assessment of well being 
(Seligman, 1995). An example, described below, helps to convey the main focus of this 
approach.   
Stroshal et al. (1998) used an effectiveness trial to test whether clinicians trained in 
ACT obtained better outcomes than control clinicians who did not receive training. 
Stroshal et al. offered voluntary ACT training to clinical trainees working in an applied 
setting. Those who volunteered formed the experimental group and those who did not 
formed the control group. Before training occurred, a baseline measure of clinician 
effectiveness was obtained. This was achieved by assessing each patient seen by either 
the experimental or the control clinician before and after (naturally terminating) therapy. 
After volunteering therapists had received one year’s ACT training, baseline procedures 
were repeated; the patients of both groups of clinicians were assessed at intake and re 
assessed five months later. This trial showed that ACT trained clinicians obtained 
significantly better clinical outcomes following training as compared to non trained 
counterparts. Although it is hard to ascertain what affected treatment gains, because of 
confounds such as non randomised assignment to training and non manualised 
treatments, the merit of this study is its ability to document whether ACT actually 
worked in real life conditions.  
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3.4 Statistical Analyses Used in Clinical Research 
This final section now deals specifically with statistical techniques for analysing clinical 
research. Although statistical analysis is closely linked to research design, these topics 
and some of their complications are dealt with separately. Experimental and quasi 
experimental research is a form of hypothesis testing based on between group 
comparisons. These designs usually rely on analysis of variance and covariance 
(ANOVA and ANCOVA, respectively), but calculating individual change (e.g., clinical 
significance of change) is another valued approach. Although useful for quantifying 
change, research is also interested in more detailed information, such as mechanisms of 
change. Regression based analytic techniques are most suited to this, as well as to 
testing complex theoretical models. For example, SEM has been developed to explore 
large and complex multivariate relations. These analytic techniques are described 
below.  
 
3.4.1 Group Comparisons 
ANOVA, a family of statistical techniques, tests for significant differences between two 
or more group means. This is called an analysis of variance (rather than of means) 
because the null hypothesis of equal means is based on the statistical significance of the 
ratio between within group (unexplained) and between group (explained) variability. If 
the null is true, variance estimates based on within group and between group variability 
should be comparable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). ANOVA makes three main 
assumptions: (1) that the variances of each population are the same (homogeneity of 
variance), (2) that scores are normally distributed around their mean (distribution 
normality), and (3) that observations are independent from one another (independence 
of observation). Because clinical trials often take multiple observations from the same 
individual (e.g., at baseline and following treatment), the third of these assumptions is 
often violated. Repeated measures ANOVA is thus a useful variant of the model that 
estimates and removes variance attributable to dependence imposed by repeated 
measures. Other useful variants include ANCOVA and multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) and covariance (MANCOVA). ANCOVA allows one to test for between 
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and MANCOVA mirror ANOVA and ANCOVA, but simultaneously compare groups 
across multiple DVs.  
Complications can arise when using ANOVA to evaluate a treatment. The most 
common complication arises from selective attrition; unequal drop out across 
conditions. This is problematic because analyses based on those participants completing 
treatment (analysis per protocol) cannot assume between group equivalence at baseline 
(nor do sample sizes remain equivalent). Thus, although the most logical way to 
evaluate a treatment is to assess its effects on those patients who received it, an 
alternative intention to treat (ITT) procedure is also commonly used (Altman et al., 
2001). ITT analysis uses the data of all participants initially randomised to the trial 
regardless of whether they subsequently received treatment. This upholds 
randomisation, but because those discontinuing treatment seldom complete post 
treatment measures, this approach is complicated by missing data. Last observation 
carried forward (LOCF) is a common method for dealing with this missing data 
(Spokas et al., 2008). LOCF uses the participant’s last observation as an estimate of 
their missing observation and is thus based on an assumption of no change. This 
assumption is not always true, however. Furthermore, because LOCF artificially inflates 
the degrees of freedom, it increases the probability of Type I error. Other more complex 
approaches such as the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm and the mixed linear 
model (MLM) compute estimates of missing data based on the observed sample data. 
This approach can also be problematic, however, because it assumes that those 
discontinuing treatment are not qualitatively different from those who continue 
treatment. Dealing with selective attrition is thus an important, and often unavoidable, 
complication when evaluating clinical trials. 
 
3.4.2 Clinical Significance of Change 
 The analysis of between group differences is useful for summarising group means and 
how they may differ, but it is often criticised for insensitivity to individual change. The 
clinical significance of change has been developed for this purpose, designed to 
quantify whether the magnitude of change, per individual, is sufficiently large to be 
meaningful and reliable. Thomas and Truax’s (2008; see also Jacobson & Truax, 1991) 
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change is large enough that it is unlikely to be due to measurement error (reliable 
change), and (2) the post treatment level of functioning is closer to the non clinical 
population than the clinical population” (crossing the “cut off point”; p. 319).  
The reliable change index (RCI) tests the first criterion, examining whether the 
magnitude of change is greater than that expected from random error in the 
measurement tool. This value is computed by dividing the pre treatment to post 
treatment difference score by the standard error of the difference score (RCI = X2 – X1 
/Sdiff (Sdiff = √2(SE)
2)). Crossing the cut off point (i.e., criterion 2) can be defined one of 
three ways: (a) two standard deviations from the clinical population mean (in the 
direction of functionality), (b) two standard deviations from the non clinical population 
mean (in the direction of dysfunctionality) or (c) half way between the two means. 
Jacobson and Truax (1991) recommend the third of these options as the least arbitrary. 
Thomas & Truax (2008) and Jacobson, Roberts, Burns, and McGlinchey (1999) have 
proposed four categories of change: (a) recovered, the patient meets both criteria; (b) 
improved, the patient shows a significant RCI without moving into the non clinical 
range; (c) same, the patient does not meet either criteria; and (d) deteriorated, the 
patient shows a reliable worsening of symptoms.  
  
3.4.3 Regression Analyses 
In addition to quantifying change, clinical research is also interested in understanding 
more complex multivariate relations such as mediation and moderation. Regression 
analysis is useful for these purposes (Aiken, West, & Taylor, 2008). Regression is a 
family of statistical techniques that aim to summarise the dependence of one variable 
(the criterion) upon another (the predictor). Simple regression predicts a criterion from 
one predictor and multiple regression (MR) from a set of predictors. Regression analysis 
fits a predictive model to sample data and uses that model to predict values of the 
criterion. In the regression equation, these values are a function of the predictor(s), a 
constant, and an error term (unexplained variance). This process assigns a weight, called 
a partial regression coefficient, to each of the predictors, which can be tested for 
statistical significance. In practical terms, regression coefficients summarise how much 
unique variance in the criterion each predictor accounts for (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
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One common use of MR in treatment evaluation research is to test for mediation. The 
principle of mediation is to test whether a treatment (IV) affects a change in symptoms 
(DV) only indirectly and through its effect on an intervening variable (a mediator; M). 
For example, does ACT effect a change in symptoms because it reduces experiential 
avoidance? Baron and Kenny (1986) proposed four conditions that, when met, would 
strongly support inferences regarding mediation. These conditions, which are typically 
tested using a series of four regressions, state that: (1) IV correlates with DV, (2) IV 
correlates with M, (3) M correlates with DV, and (4) the effect of IV on DV, controlling 
for M, is not significantly different from zero. An important limitation of this traditional 
approach, however, is that the critical mediated (or indirect) path is not itself tested, 
rather the IV to M and M to DV paths are tested separately. Sobel’s (1982) test for 
indirect effects is thus usually added as a fifth step, which tests whether the association 
between the IV and DV is significantly reduced when controlling for M. Full mediation 
is thus implied if, controlling for M, the IV to DV relationship is significantly reduced 
and is not significantly different from 0. Partial mediation is inferred if, controlling for 
M, the IV to DV relationship is significantly reduced but is significantly different from 
0. Although some researchers have advanced this classic model and proposed different 
analysis strategies for testing it (e.g., SEM, bootstrapping), the fundamental premise 
remains. Furthermore, it is currently used in various research designs, such as 
experimental and cross sectional design (Aiken et al., 2008).  
Although MR is a useful tool for testing multivariate relations, it is gradually 
becoming superseded by a more complex yet flexible analysis strategy; structural 
equation modelling (SEM). One of the main reasons for this is that SEM can 
simultaneously test multiple multivariate relations. For example, whereas MR tests for 
mediation using a series of independent tests, SEM is unique in its ability to test all 
paths concurrently (Byrne, 2001).   
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3.4.4 Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
SEM is a family of statistical techniques that test integrated, and often complex, 
multivariate relations. SEM begins with the specification of a theoretical model using 
path diagrams. These visually represent hypothesised relations between variables 
(Figure 3.2). Drawn using computer packages (e.g., AMOS), path diagrams 
electronically synchronise with datasets (e.g., SPSS), thus allowing one to test the 
model using the data. In SEM, variables are latent (depicted using ellipses). This means 
they are not measured directly; rather, they are comprised of the shared variance among 
a set of manifest indicators such as questionnaire items or observations (depicted using 
rectangles). Furthermore, latent variables can be specified either as predictors 
(exogenous) or criterion (endogenous) variables, using single headed arrows to denote 
uni directional paths and double headed arrows to denote bi directional paths. Finally, a 
path can either be fixed to a constant (have a pre assigned value) or be freely estimated. 
To be ‘freely estimated’ means that SEM uses the covariance matrix of the sample to 
determine a regression coefficient for that path.  
Two main models are considered here. Measurement models test theory driven 
relations between manifest indicators, latent variables (often called factors for 
consistency with factor analysis), and inter factor relations. Structural models (e.g., 
Figure 3.2) test theory driven associations between latent variables only. (An example 
of each is provided later in section 3.4.4). Before a model can be tested it must be 
identified. This means that the amount of known information in the sample data must 
exceed unknown information in the model (Byrne, 2001). In order for this criterion to 
be satisfied, one manifest indicator per latent variable must be fixed to a constant. This 
fixed value allows for all other values to be freely estimated. Additionally, all manifest 
indicators must have an associated error term (‘e’) and all endogenous variables an 
associated disturbance term (‘d’). Error and disturbance terms denote residual variances 
(per variable) that are not accounted for by paths in the model.  
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Figure 3.2 Exemplar Structural Model for Hypothesised relations between Affect Intensity 
(Exogenous variable) and Depression (Endogenous variable). 
Note: ‘d’ denotes disturbance term, ‘e’ denotes error terms. Rectangles represent manifest indicators 
(questionnaire items), ellipses represent latent variables.   
 
 
Once a model has been specified, statistical analysis programmes (e.g., AMOS, 
LISREL) are used to evaluate how well relations specified in the model are reflected in 
the sample data. The process of fitting the model begins by computing estimated 
regression values for freely estimated paths. This is done using an iterative process that 
minimises the difference between the implied (model) and observed (data) covariance 
matrix. The final parameters thus represent the most accurate estimates that can be 
made, given the model specified and the sample matrix. Once these values have been 
estimated, an evaluation is made of the extent to which the integrated model is 
reproduced in the observed covariances of the sample matrix.  
The chi square test statistic (χ
2) is the primary indicator of model fit. Because χ
2 has a 
monotonic relationship with sample size, however, Type I error is high in large samples 
(Byrne, 2001). Several additional goodness of fit indices have thus been developed to 
describe model data congruence in less sample size dependent ways. Typically these 
are interpreted collaboratively, but there is little consensus in the literature as to which 
set of indices best discriminates a well fitting model. One set, designed to reduce Type I 
and II error, is proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999). This includes the normed chi square 
(NC), comparative fit index (CFI), and root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA; see Byrne, 2001). The NC is a proxy measure which divides χ
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of freedom (values of 2.00 indicate adequate fit (Bollen, 1989; Tanaka, 1993)). The CFI 
is a normed (zero one) index that compares the specified model to a baseline model that 
assumes no inter variable relations (values of .90   .95 indicate acceptable fit and ≥ .95 
indicate good fit; Bentler, 1990). The RMSEA is also normed and calculates the 
discrepancy between observed and predicted covariances (values of  ≤ .05 indicates 
good fit, .08 .10 average fit, and ≥ .1 inadequate fit; see Byrne, 2001). Finally, 
parsimony is an important goal of any well defined model. The Parsimony Adjusted 
CFI (PCFI) is a non normed index that penalizes models for lack of parsimony.  
If a model obtains inadequate fit statistics it may be rejected, but more often than not 
a model generating approach is adopted (Joreskog, 1993). This aims to ‘discover’ a 
model that exhibits better congruence with the sample matrix and continues to make 
theoretical sense (Byrne, 2001). This involves re specifying the model. This process 
begins by identifying sources of mis specification, indicated by Modification Indices 
(MIs) and regression weights. MIs indicate paths that could be added to the model to 
improve fit, and regression estimates indicate redundant or non significant paths that 
add no predictive value to the model. Re specification is useful because it can guide 
model development. Because it is data driven, however, changes may capitalise on 
chance. Modifications should thus only be made when they are consistent with theory 
and should be re tested in a separate sample. To consolidate this discussion, two 
examples are described below.  
 
3.4.4.1 Example One. The first example involves a type of measurement model called 
the Higher Order Factor (HOF) model. The HOF model is a hierarchical model which 
tests whether the covariation between first order factors (endogenous latent variables) 
can be accounted for by their common association with a single HOF (exogenous latent 
variable). For example, can the relationships between factors in a questionnaire (first 
order factors) be accounted for by their common association with a single underlying 
construct (a HOF)? This is tested by specifying a model that has no direct paths between 
first order factors; rather, these factors are indirectly associated via their common 
relationship with the HOF (Figure 3.3). If adequate fit is found, it can be inferred that a 
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Figure 3.3 Higher Order Factor Model (standardised regression values reported). 
From “Personality and the Predisposition to Engage in Risky or Problem Behaviours During 
Adolescence,” by M. Cooper, P. Wood, H. Orcutt, and A. Albin, 2003, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 84, p. 398. Note: For ease of communication, beta values for paths from manifest indicators 
to latent variables are denoted in the manifest indicator boxes.  
 
Several researchers have used the HOF model to test whether a common factor 
underlies dissimilar risk behaviours (Cooper, Wood, Orcutt, & Albino, 2003; Donovan 
& Jessor, 1985; McGee & Newcombe, 1992). For example, Cooper et al. (see Figure 
3.3) tested whether a single HOF could account for covariation between four delinquent 
behaviours in an adolescent sample. The authors found acceptable fit: although χ² and 
χ²/df values were large (χ² (50) = 373.9, p < .001; χ²/ df = 7.48), other indices were 
acceptable (CFI = .94; RMSEA = .058 (± .052, .063)). Furthermore, all first order 
factors significantly loaded on the HOF and the HOF accounted for between 20% and 
86% of first order factor variance. In an attempt to elucidate the nature of the HOF, 
authors further tested how well four exogenous variables (impulsivity, negative affect, 
sensation seeking and avoidant coping) predicted this covariation. They found that 
avoidant coping was its strongest predictor (β = .34, p < .001). Cooper et al. concluded 
that, despite the apparent dissimilarity of behaviours measured, avoidant coping was a 
shared causal factor. This interpretation should be treated with caution, however, 
because the data were cross sectional. A less assuming interpretation is that behaviour Chapter III     75 
 
covariation was effectively represented by one HOF and that avoidant coping 
significantly predicted a proportion of that covariance.  
 
3.4.4.2 Example Two. The second example uses a structural model to test for mediation. 
In this example, Lynch, Cheavens, Morse, and Rosenthal (2004), using a cross sectional 
design and self report measures, tested whether emotional inhibition mediated the 
relationship between negative affect intensity (predictor) and depression (criterion). To 
test for mediation, two models were statistically compared. The first specified that the 
relationship between predictor and criterion was only indirect (i.e., mediated by 
emotional inhibition), whereas the second included an additional direct path from 
predictor to criterion. The second model thus proposed both direct and indirect effects 
(see Figure 3.4). In this case, mediation was tested by computing a χ² difference test (  
χ²), which subtracts the χ² and df values of one model from the other, and tests whether 
that difference is statistically significant. If the addition of the direct path (i.e., from 
predictor to criterion) does not significantly improve fit, full mediation is implied. If, 
however, the direct path does significantly improve model fit, partial mediation is 
implied. Lynch et al. found evidence for full mediation. Thus, although cross sectional 
in design, the study produced findings that were consistent with the prediction that 
vulnerability towards heightened negative affect is associated with depression because it 
fosters heightened emotional inhibition.  
In summary: this chapter has aimed to provide a thorough but concise review of 
research methods and statistical techniques in common use in developing and validating 
novel clinical treatment. This review has aimed to show that there are a variety of 
techniques available for testing the theoretical underpinning and clinical effects of a 
psychological intervention. Each has several associated strengths and weaknesses and 
thus the process of designing research will often involve a “creative compromise” 
(Shapiro, 1996). The final section will now provide an overview of the application of 
some of these techniques to the aims of the current thesis. 
 Chapter III     76 
 
Affect
Intensity
.67
e4
1
1
.38
e3
1
.73
e2
1
.46
e1
1
Emotional
Inhibition
.60
e6
1
1
.87
e5
1
Depression
.88
e8
1
.74
e7
1
d2 1
d1 1
.10
.68 .67
 
Figure 3.4 Structural Model Proposing that Emotional Inhibition Mediates the 
Relationship between Negative Affect Intensity and Depression (standardised regression 
weights reported).  
From “A Model Predicting Suicidal Ideation And Hopelessness In Depressed Older Adults: The Impact 
of Emotion Inhibition and Affect Intensity,” by T. Lynch, J. Cheavens, J. Morse, and Z. Rosenthal, 2004, 
Aging and Mental Health, 8, p. 486 497. Note: For ease of communication, beta values for paths from 
manifest indicators to latent variables are denoted in the manifest indicator boxes. 
 
 
3.5 The Present Thesis 
Informed by discussions raised in the past three chapters, the empirical work of this 
thesis was designed to pioneer novel investigations into ACT for treatment resistant 
groups. Theoretically orientated and clinically orientated approaches were used. Before 
embarking on the novel application of ACT for this group, it was first important to 
gather empirical evidence, based on ACT theorising, that supported such an application. 
As discussed in chapter 2 (and 6), some research was already available (e.g., Chapman 
et al., 2005; Gratz & Gunderson, 2006). There was a noticeable gap, however, in 
understanding the role of experiential avoidance in co occurring maladaptive 
behaviours (e.g., dysfunctional eating, DSH and substance abuse). Engagement in co 
morbid maladaptive behaviours is common in many, but by no means all, treatment Chapter III     77 
 
resistant patients. Addressing this gap was the primary focus of studies 1 and 2.  Study 1 
employed SEM to test Hayes et al.’s (1996) central theoretical prediction that 
experiential avoidance underlies several topographically dissimilar, maladaptive 
behaviours. To obtain a more detailed understanding of this theoretical proposition, 
study 2 extended the complexity of the model by testing whether known risk factors for 
maladaptive behaviours would affect behavioural engagement only indirectly and 
through experiential avoidance. Such mediation based investigations are central to 
substantiating the theoretical principles underlying applied work. This is because they 
can help to elucidate whether and how the processes addressed in therapy relate to 
surrogate or real outcomes.  
Studies 3 and 4 extended these theoretically orientated investigations by piloting the 
novel, group based application of ACT to a heterogeneous group of treatment resistant 
patients. Because ACT had not previously been delivered to this patient group or trialled 
on a UK clinical sample, a cautious approach was considered most appropriate. Study 3 
recruited a small sample to a pre post uncontrolled trial. Effects of the intervention were 
assessed before and after treatment, and at 6 month and 12 month follow up. Study 4 
was designed to evaluate ACT using more rigorous control procedures. In this study, a 
pilot RCT was used to evaluate the effects of ACT relative to an ecologically valid, 
active comparison; Cognitive Behaviour Therapy based Treatment as Usual (CBT 
TAU). Both trials made preliminary investigations into mechanisms of change and both 
strived to achieve acceptable levels of external and internal validity. Together, this 
systematic and integrated programme of research was designed to advance theoretical 
and applied knowledge regarding ACT for treatment resistant groups.      Chapter IV     78 
 
CHAPTER IV 
Study 1. Experiential avoidance and Maladaptive Behaviours Part I: Developing, 
Validating, and Testing the Structure of a Maladaptive Behaviours Questionnaire 
 
4.1 Introduction 
‘Treatment resistant’ is a term used within the literature to describe patients whose 
symptoms are resistant to standard psychological and/or pharmacological intervention 
(e.g., see Amsterdam et al., 2001; Kenny & Williams, 2007). These patients are 
heterogeneous with regard to symptomatic complainant, but characteristically exhibit a 
range of deficiencies in emotional, interpersonal, cognitive, and behavioural functioning 
(Strosahl, 2005). Trends in the literature suggest that treatment resistant patients have 
higher symptomatology at baseline, co morbid mood and/or personality disordered 
symptoms, and often engage in maladaptive behaviours (MBs). MBs can be defined as 
behaviours that interfere with everyday functioning, that are potentially damaging to the 
self or others, that are socially defined as a problem, and that usually elicit some form of 
social control response
11. These include, for example, substance abuse, deliberate self 
harm (DSH), and dysfunctional eating (e.g., Grant, Stinson, Dawson, Chou, Ruan, et al., 
2004; Grant, Stinson, Dawson, Chou, Dufour, et al. 2004; Nurnberg, Rifkin, & Doddi, 
1993; O’Brien & Vincent, 2003; Sansone, Levitt, & Sansone, 2005; Thomas, Melchert, 
& Banken, 1999; Lacey & Evans, 1986). The primary aim of this study was to test 
whether experiential avoidance predicts the tendency to engage in multiple MBs. 
 
4.1.1 An ACT Conceptualisation of Maladaptive Behaviours 
The syndrome based classification of clinical disorders (e.g., DSM IV TR, 2000), 
currently the most widely used diagnostic system, conceptualises MBs topographically 
and therefore distinct from one another. This has lead to a number of models proposing 
that MBs emanate from separate psychosocial motivations, thus requiring separate 
explanations, measurement tools, and treatment programmes (McGee & Newcombe, 
1990). For example, Anorexia Nervosa (AN) and Substance Dependeny (SD) are 
                                                           
11 This definition is based on Jessor, Donovan, and Costa’s (1991) definition of problem behaviours (p. 
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differentiated diagnostically, resulting in the development of assessment batteries and 
therapeutic interventions that treat these behaviours largely as independent entities.  
In contrast to this syndromic approach, ACT theorists propose a more parsimonious, 
functional interpretation of MBs. From this perspective, despite their formal 
dissimilarity, MBs constitute a functional response class whose shared function is the 
capacity to prevent, escape, or reduce contact with negatively reinforcing private events 
(Blackledge & Hayes 2001; Hayes et al., 1996; Gratz, 2006). Despite their deleterious 
long term consequences, these behaviours are maintained primarily because, in the short 
term, this experiential avoidance function is fulfilled.   
Consistent with this theorising, several MBs have clear avoidance functions. For 
example, substances such as alcohol and cocaine have direct mood altering effects, can 
reduce the awareness and potency of negative cues, increase dopamine activity, and 
alleviate physiological withdrawal (see Sher & Grekin, 2007). Similarly, it has been 
hypothesised that DSH and binge eating may function as focused distracters, able to 
shift attention away from negative affect eliciting cues, reduce physiological arousal, 
and facilitate the regulation of mood (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; Linehan, 1993; 
Chapman, Gratz, & Brown, 2005). Furthermore, researchers have speculated that other 
less obvious behaviours, such as internet addiction, restrictive eating, and impulsive 
spending could also have an experiential avoidance function (Li & Chung, 2006; 
Miltenberger, 2005; Wilson & Roberts, 2002). Although a common experiential 
avoidance hypothesis has not before been tested, numerous independent studies suggest 
that a common cause(s) or function(s) may underlie several formally dissimilar MBs. 
 
4.1.2 Maladaptive Behaviour Commonalities 
One of the most striking findings of research in this area is that MBs commonly co 
occur in both the general population and in clinical samples (e.g., see Christo et al., 
2003; Greenberg, Lewis, & Dodd, 1999; Gossop, 2001). For example, up to 50% of 
DSH hospital admissions abuse alcohol (Haw, Hawton, Casey, Bale, & Shepherd, 2005; 
Merrill, Milker, Owens, & Vale, 1992), approximately 25% of patients diagnosed with 
an eating disorder engage in DSH (Sansome & Levitt, 2002), rates of substance abuse 
are significantly elevated in disordered eating populations (e.g., Holderness, Brooks 
Gunn, & Warren, 1994; Newman & Gold, 1992), and dysfunctional eating is       Chapter IV     80 
 
significantly related to aggression (Thompson, Wonderlich, Crosby, & Mitchel, 1999). 
Moreover, reducing the frequency of one type of MB has been found to co occur with 
increases in the frequency of others (behaviour switching; Donovan, 1988). 
In addition to the functional interpretations outlined above, research has also 
identified similarities on the behavioural, biological, and psychological level of 
analysis. For example, Griffiths (2005) identified common addictive features in 
gambling, exercise, and internet use (salience, tolerance, conflict, mood modification, 
withdrawal and relapse) despite the non pharmacological nature of these behaviours. 
Similarly, altered dopaminergic and serotonergic functions have been observed in 
individuals engaging in substance abuse (Di Chiara, 1995), disordered eating (see Kaye, 
et al., 2005; Kuikka, et al., 2001), and excessive exercise (see Adams & Kirkby, 2002). 
Finally, on the psychological level, MBs appear to share common associations with 
trait based constructs such as impulsivity and avoidant coping (e.g., see Anderson, 
Simmons, Martens, Ferrier, & Sheehy, 2006; Cooper et al., 2003; Dawe & Loxton, 
2004; Grano, Virtanen, Vahtera, Elovainio, & Kivimaki, 2004). These observations 
further suggest that MBs may share a common cause(s) or function(s). 
 
4.1.3 SEM and Maladaptive Behaviours 
Chapter 3 described how SEM could be used to investigate whether common 
mechanisms underlie diverse problem behaviours. Specifically, the HOF model was 
identified as a means of testing whether the covariation between behaviours can be 
accounted for by one single HOF. By employing these methods for the investigation of 
small clusters of adolescent specific risk behaviours, several independent researchers 
have obtained data in support of the ‘common cause’ hypothesis. For example, McGee 
and Newcombe (1992) and Donovan and Jessor (1985) both found good fit statistics for 
a HOF model. The former study measured drug use, academic orientation, social 
conformity and criminal behaviour; the latter measured alcohol use, drug use, 
delinquency and promiscuous sex.  
More recently, Cooper et al. (2003) extended this work in an attempt to identify 
predictors of risk behaviour covariance (see section 3.4.4.1; sexual behaviours, 
substance abuse, delinquency and educational underachievement). They reported that 
Avoidant Coping, a composite of aggressive expression and avoidant coping, was the       Chapter IV     81 
 
strongest predictor of HOF variance. This work was limited on two accounts, however. 
Firstly, the authors adopted an inductive, rather than theory testing approach. Secondly, 
the use of an aggression based avoidance measure may have confounded findings, 
because aggression is known to co vary with other MBs (e.g., Thompson, 1999). The 
present study aimed to extend this work by testing the ACT derived hypothesis that 
experiential avoidance accounts for a significant proportion of MB covariance. A broad 
and clinically relevant range of MBs were considered: DSH, sexual promiscuity, 
excessive exercise, restrictive eating, binge eating, excessive internet use, impulsive 
spending, smoking nicotine, excessive alcohol use, drug use, and aggression. 
 
4.1.4 Methodological Considerations 
MBs are difficult to research ethically in situ, and this is especially the case when 
investigating multiple MBs. Researchers have overcome this by using self report 
methods (e.g., Cooper et al., 2003). These provide an explicit means of measuring 
multiple constructs, ethically and anonymously. Although many inventories exist to 
measure different behavioural topographies in isolation, no truly wide ranging measure 
of MBs currently exists. Because of this, the current study began with the development 
and validation of one such measure (see section 4.2.3.1).  
In terms of study design, a cross sectional approach was selected as most appropriate 
for the validation of a new measure. This is because it offers a resource unintensive 
method of collecting large amounts of data. This is necessary for scale validation 
because factor analysis and SEM are large sample techniques. Furthermore, I also 
considered the recruitment of a large community sample as most appropriate for the 
aims of the study. Large clinical samples are notoriously hard to recruit and, from an 
ethical perspective, they are not suitable for the piloting of new measures. The use of a 
community sample was supported by evidence suggesting phenomenological continuity 
across general population and clinical groups for a range of MBs. For example, the co 
morbidity of dysfunctional eating and substance abuse is strikingly similar in student 
and inpatient samples; 35% of student problem drinkers report dysfunctional eating and 
40% of eating disordered inpatients abuse substances (see Christo et al., 2003). Also, 
many correlates, predictors, and maintenance factors are common to both samples (e.g., 
dysfunctional eating (McFarlane, McCabe, Jarry, Olmsted, & Polivy, 2001), DSH       Chapter IV     82 
 
(Gratz, Conrad, & Roemer, 2002), substance use/misuse (Cooper, et al., 2003; Dawe & 
Loxton, 2004; Moeller & Dougherty, 2002)). Despite having good justification for the 
use of a non clinical sample, efforts were made to obtain preliminary information on the 
scale’s ability to discriminate between self declared clinical and non clinical 
participants (see section 4.2.1).  
 
4.1.5 Synopsis of the Present Study 
A review of existing literature revealed that few validated inventories exist to measure 
MBs concurrently
12. Before investigating patterns of covariation, therefore, it was first 
necessary to develop and validate a composite Maladaptive Behaviours Questionnaire 
(MBQ). On the basis of clinical experience and research evidence, I designed the MBQ 
to measure DSH, sexual promiscuity, excessive exercise, restrictive eating, binge eating, 
excessive internet use, impulsive spending, smoking nicotine, excessive alcohol use, 
drug use, and aggression. In constructing such a scale, I deliberately avoided 
confounding the behavioral measure itself with possible predictor variables, such as 
experiential avoidance and impulsivity. Items thus aimed to measure one’s tendency to 
engage in certain behaviours rather than motivations to act. Having tested the 
psychometric properties of the MBQ (e.g., validity and reliability), confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) SEM was used to test whether a HOF model could adequately account 
for behaviour covariances. If acceptable fit were to be found, a further model would be 
specified to test whether experiential avoidance predicted a significant proportion of 
HOF variance.  
 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Design 
A cross sectional design was used. The construct validity of the MBQ was assessed by 
evaluating its convergence with trait impulsivity (positive correlation predicted), 
satisfaction with life (negative correlation predicted), and Borderline Personality 
                                                           
12 To my knowledge, The PROMIS (Christo, et al., 2003) is the only existing scale that approximates a 
composite measure of maladaptive behaviours. This scale was designed, however, to measure attitudes 
towards and motivations to engage in addictive behaviours. Consequently, many items confounded 
engagement with motivation to engage (e.g., “I have used alcohol as both a comfort and a strength”). 
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Disorder (BPD; positive correlation predicted). The construct validity of MBQ 
subscales was assessed by evaluating their convergence with well validated scales 
designed to measure each of the behaviours in isolation (see section 4.2.2). The MBQ’s 
ability to discriminate between clinical and non clinical samples (concurrent validity) 
was assessed by comparing the scores of participants who had received treatment for a 
psychological disorder versus those who had not (see section 4.2.2). Finally, internal 
consistency and test retest reliability (2 week, 2 4, and 8 14 months) were also assessed. 
 
4.2.2 Participants 
An opportunity sample (N = 722), consisting of University of Southampton students (N 
= 423) and members of general public (N = 299), was recruited using advertisements 
posted on the World Wide Web (www) and on the University’s Psychology Intranet. 
This sample completed all questionnaires (except the measure of BPD, see section 
4.2.3) and their data were used for exploratory factor analysis (EFA), construct and 
concurrent validity, and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). This sample was asked to 
indicate whether they were currently, or had in the past, received therapy for a 
psychological problem (see section 4.2.3). Those indicating ‘yes’ are referred to as the 
‘self declared clinical sample’ (N = 183) and those indicating ‘no’ are referred to as the 
‘non clinical sample’ (N = 539). A second sample (N = 42) was recruited from the 
Dorset Healthcare Foundation Trust (DHFT) waiting list for psychological treatment
13. 
This ‘DHFT clinical sample’ completed the MBQ, the Million III (BPD subscale) and 
the AAQ (see section 4.2.3) as part of baseline assessment for participation in study 4 of 
this thesis. This sample was used to assess the MBQ’s convergent validity with BPD 
symptoms and, in conjunction with the opportunity sample, to assess the MBQ’s 
concurrent validity (that is, the scale’s ability to discriminate between clinical and non 
clinical samples). Table 4.1 reports demographic statistics for these samples.  
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Table 4.1 
Demographics Statistics Split by ‘Clinical Status’ 
  Opportunity Sample    DHFT Clinical  
 
Demographics 
Non clinical 
(N = 539) 
Self Declared Clinical 
(N =183)   
Sample 
(N = 42) 
         
Mean Age (SD)  21.0 (5.0)  25.53 (10.2)    44.1 (14.2) 
Gender (% Female)  78%  88%    60% 
Occupation (%): 
Student Psychology 
Student Other 
Employed 
Unemployed  
 
75% 
16% 
7% 
2% 
 
53% 
26% 
16.5% 
4.5% 
   
0% 
9% 
42% 
49% 
Country of Origin (%):  
England 
USA 
Europe (other) 
Asia 
Other 
 
83% 
6% 
6% 
3% 
2% 
 
67.9% 
21.4% 
6.2% 
2.2% 
2% 
   
86% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
14% 
Mean no. of therapies (range)  0  1.78 (1 8)    2.50 (1 6) 
Mean no. of sessions (range)  0  40.64 (2 385)    36.55 (10 75) 
Note. ‘Non clinical’ refers to those participants who indicated that they had never sought help for a 
psychological problem. ‘Self declared clinical’ refers to members of the opportunity sample who reported 
that they were receiving, or had received, therapy for psychological problem. ‘DHFT clinical’ refers to 
those participants who were recruited from the DHFT waiting list for therapy.  
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A third and final sample was recruited for assessing the MBQ’s test retest reliability 
(N = 53; not in Table 4.1). This sample consisted of psychology students recruited using 
the Psychology Intranet. The mean age was 19 years and 92% were female. The 
Southampton University Psychology Ethics Committee approved recruitment of the 
opportunity and student samples, and the Local Research Ethics Council (LREC) of the 
DHFT approved recruitment of the clinical sample. University of Southampton 
Psychology students were offered course credits for participating. 
 
4.2.3 Materials  
4.2.3.1 The Maladaptive Behaviour Questionnaire: Construction and Description. 
Eleven behaviours were chosen for inclusion in the MBQ (Excessive Alcohol Use, 
Illicit Drug Use, Smoking Nicotine, Excessive Exercise, Aggression, Sexual 
Promiscuity, DSH, Restrictive Eating, Binge Eating, Impulsive Spending and Excessive 
Internet Use
14). This selection was made following an extensive literature review 
(PsychLit search terms: problem behaviour, maladaptive behaviour, at risk behaviour, 
risk taking, antisocial behaviour, dysfunctional behaviour, addictive behaviour, and self 
defeating behaviour) and consultation with a specialist in entrenched psychological 
disorders
15. 
To generate a scale that was valid, reliable, and specific to each behavioral domain, 
the MBQ’s construction was based on a range of well validated inventories. Item 
construction began by aggregating inventories that measured one behavioral topography 
in isolation and these were used to identify features characteristic of the behaviour being 
‘problematic’ or ‘at risk’. Based on this, an initial set of sixty six questionnaire items 
were generated (six items per behaviour, two of which were reverse coded). Where 
possible, and with the permission of all authors, these items were closely derived from 
the validated inventories. Items were discussed and refined in collaboration with 
consultant clinicians and doctoral level researchers, before being piloted on a small 
sample of undergraduate and postgraduate students (N = 30). These students were asked 
to provide written feedback on their experience completing the questionnaire. Based on 
this feedback, and on descriptive statistics, items underwent a final stage of refinement.  
                                                           
14 A Gambling subscale was initially included in the MBQ, but was dropped owing to floor effects. 
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The response format chosen asked participants to rate how characteristic each 
behaviour was of them using a scale ranging from (1) “very like me” to (6) “very unlike 
me”. This scale was chosen to ensure that all participants could respond to all questions, 
even if they had never engaged in the behaviour described. This ensured standardisation 
across procedures, avoided selection bias, and helped to obtain composite scores that 
were comparable across participants. To control for order effects, items were randomly 
distributed throughout the questionnaire. 
4.2.3.2 Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate age, gender, country of 
birth and residence, and occupation. They were also asked to indicate whether (a) they 
had ever attended therapy for a psychological problem (prompts of, “For example 
depression, anxiety, bereavement, an eating disorder” were used), (b) the number of 
different types of psychotherapy they had attended, and (c) the approximate number of 
sessions per type
 16 (see Appendix A). 
4.2.3.3 Construct Validation Questionnaires. The following well validated 
questionnaires were used to test the construct validity of MBQ composite and subscales. 
The Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT: Babor & Grant, 1989). The 
AUDIT is a10 item scale of harmful drinking that measures consumption, dependence, 
and harmful consequences arising from drinking behaviour (e.g., “Have you or someone 
else been injured as an effect of your drinking?”). Although developed in a clinical 
population, psychometric data supports its sensitivity to student drinking. The scale’s 
reliability and validity has been well reported (e.g., α = .80; Fleming, Barry, & 
MacDonald, 1991).  
The Sociosexual Orientation Inventory (SOI; Simpson & Gangestad, 1991). The SOI 
is a 7 item measure of attitudes towards and willingness to engage in casual sex (e.g., 
“With how many partners have you had sex on one and only one occasion?”). This 
measure has been used both in clinical and non clinical populations and has evidenced 
satisfactory psychometric properties (e.g., internal consistency, α = .77 (women) and α 
= .76 (men); test retest reliability, r = .94, 2 month delay; Simpson & Gangestad). 
The Drug Problem Index (DPI; Simons & Carey, 2002). The DPI is a modified 
version of Rutgers Alcohol Problem Index (White & Labouvie, 1989), specifically 
developed to measure illicit drug use in student populations. Items measure the 
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frequency of negative consequences following drug use (e.g., “Neglected your 
responsibilities”), rated on a scale ranging from 0 (never) to 6 (> 50 times). The authors 
reported good psychometric properties in a student population (e.g., α = .88). 
The Internet Addiction Test (IAT; Young, 1996). The IAT is a 20 item measure of 
internet addiction. Items assess the addictive qualities of internet use (e.g., “How often 
do you become defensive or secretive when anyone asks you what you do on line?”) 
and are rated on a scale ranging from 1 (rarely) to 5 (always). The author has reported 
adequate internal consistency in a student sample (α = .78). 
The Impulsive Buying Tendency Scale (IBTS; Verplanken & Herabadi, 2001). The 
IBTS is a 20 item scale measuring cognitive (e.g., absence of deliberation) and affective 
(e.g., emotionally driven purchases) reasons for impulse buying (e.g., “I usually only 
buy things that I intend to buy”). Participants rated their agreement with statements 
using a scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). The authors 
reported good internal consistency in an undergraduate sample (α = .86). 
The Modified Fagerström Tolerance Questionnaire (MFTQ; Prokhorov, Pallonen, 
Fava, Ding, & Niaura, 1996). The MFTQ measures nicotine addiction with specific 
sensitivity to adolescent populations. Items measure patterns of smoking behaviour 
(e.g., “How soon after you wake up do you smoke your first cigarette?”) and 
satisfactory psychometric properties have been reported (e.g., 2 month test retest = .71; 
Prokhorov, Koehly, Pallonen, & Hudmon,  1998). 
The Deliberate Self Harm Inventory (DSHI; Gratz, 2001). The DSHI measures 
whether participants engage in any of 16 predetermined forms of DSH (e.g., “Burned 
myself with a cigarette”) using a ‘yes/no’ response format. Gratz reported good internal 
consistency (α = .82) and adequate test retest reliability (r = .68, 2 4 week delay). 
The Obligatory Exercise Questionnaire (OEQ; Thompson & Pasman, 1988). The 
OEQ is a 20 item questionnaire measuring one’s personal obligation to exercise (e.g., 
“When I don't exercise I feel guilty”). Items are rated on a 4 point scale ranging from 1 
(never) to 4 (always). Authors reported good internal reliability (α = .94) and adequate 
4 week test retest reliability (r = .69). 
The Three Factor Eating Questionnaire (FEQ; Stunkard & Messick, 1985). The 
FEQ measures three forms of dysfunctional eating. Subscales used in this study 
included Restraint (e.g., “I deliberately take small helpings as a means of controlling my       Chapter IV     88 
 
weight”) and Disinhibition. Items are rated using a ‘yes/no’ response format. Authors 
reported good internal reliability in clinical and student samples (e.g., α = .90 and α = 
.87 respectively). 
The Aggression Questionnaire (AG; Buss & Perry, 1992). The AG is a 29 item 
measure of physical and verbal aggression, hostility, and anger (e.g., “I have become so 
mad that I have broken things”). Items are rated on a scale ranging from of 1 (extremely 
characteristic of me) to 5 (extremely uncharacteristic of me). Adequate internal 
consistency (α = .77) and test retest reliability values have been reported (r = .75, 2 
month delay; Harris, 1997). 
The UPPS Impulsivity Scale (UPPS; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). The UPPS 
measures four aspects of Impulsivity (Urgency, Premeditation, Perseverance, and 
Sensation Seeking) using a ‘true/false’ response format. Only the Urgency subscale was 
used in this study. This subscale measures the tendency to engage in impulsive 
behaviours to alleviate negative emotions (e.g., “I have trouble controlling my 
impulses”). Authors reported that this subscale has shown good internal reliability (α = 
.89) and construct validity.  
Satisfaction with Life (SWL; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffins, 1985). The SWL 
is a 5 item measure assessing how satisfied the individual is with their life and their 
desire to change the past (e.g., “So far I have gotten the important things I want in life”). 
Items are rated on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). 
Authors reported good internal consistency (α = .87) and test retest reliability (r = .82, 
2 month delay).  
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes, Stroshal, et al., 2004). The 
AAQ is a 9 item measure of experiential avoidance, with items measuring: the tendency 
to evaluate, the unwillingness to experience, the desire to control, and the inability to 
take action when experiencing private events (e.g., “I rarely worry about getting my 
anxieties, worries and feelings under control”). Items are rated on a scale ranging from 1 
(never true) to 7 (always true). Authors reported adequate internal (α = .77) and test 
retest reliability (r = .64, 4 month period).  
The Millon Mutliaxial Clinical Inventory III (MMCI III; Millon, 1994). The MMCI 
III is a175 item questionnaire that measures 14 personality disorders and 10 Axis I 
syndromes based on DSM IV classification system. Items are rated using a ‘yes/no’       Chapter IV     89 
 
response format. Devised as a diagnostic tool, scores of greater than 85 are indicative of 
clinical levels of symptomatology and scores of greater than 75 are indicative of trait 
tendency. Only the BPD subscale was used in this study and only the ‘DHFT clinical’ 
sample completed it. 
 
4.2.4 Procedure 
Opportunity sample participants either completed the full validation pack on line, or 
they collected paper questionnaires from outside the experimenter’s office and 
completed them in a place of their choosing. Participants were pre warned that 
questions were of a sensitive nature and advised to complete them in private. The order 
of questionnaires was randomised across participants to control for order effects. To 
ensure anonymity, participants returning questionnaires to the experimenter’s office 
were asked to seal them in the envelope provided and to deposit them in a secure box. 
The DHFT clinical sample received questionnaires in the post, completed them in their 
own time, and returned them to the clinic prior to treatment allocation. The test retest 
sample received the MBQ twice via email. To ensure completion at pre specified times, 
they were asked to highlight their answers and return them electronically. ID numbers 
were allocated to all participants to ensure anonymity. Owing to the personal nature of 
the questionnaires, participants were also given the contact details of help organisations 
(e.g., Samaritans) and the author’s email address for questions or comments. 
 
4.2.5 Analysis Strategy 
Following the recommendations of Mulaik and Millsap (2000) Phase One of scale 
analysis employed EFA with Maximum Likelihood (ML) extraction procedures. EFA is 
a data driven analytic technique that allows an iterative assessment of scale structure by 
imposing few theory driven constraints. This is achieved by reproducing observed 
relationships among questionnaire items, (initially) without specifying the number of 
factors to be extracted (Brown, 2005). EFA was thus used to determine, in an unbiased 
way, the number and nature of latent factors (Brown, 2005; Mulaik & Millsap, 2000). 
This analysis used the data of the opportunity sample only. Following this, Phase Two 
of analysis assessed the psychometric properties (construct and concurrent validity, 
internal and test retest reliability) of the composite MBQ and its subscales (factors). 
Analyses in this phase used the data of all samples. Finally, Phase Three used theory       Chapter IV     90 
 
driven measurement modelling (see section 3.4.4) to test the hypothesised structure of 
the scale. Specifically, a HOF model was used to test whether a single HOF could 
efficiently account for MB covariances. If so, a further model was specified to test 
whether the AAQ was significantly predictive of HOF variance (see Cooper et al., 2003; 
section 3.4.4.1). This phase of analysis used the data of the opportunity sample only. 
 
 
4. 3 Results 
4.3.1 Preliminary Statistics 
4.3.1.1 Missing data and outliers. Inspection of the raw data indicated that 22 
participants (3%) had either (a) > 10% data missing for any one inventory or (b) a 
succession of missing cells across different inventories. The data of these individuals 
was excluded from analyses. Following the recommendations of Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2001), all other missing data were replaced by the group mean. Box plots and 
Mahalanobis distance values were used to identify univariate and multivariate outliers, 
following which the data from nine participants were excluded from analyses. This 
resulted in: self declared non clinical sample (N = 521), self declared clinical sample (N 
= 168), DHFT clinical sample (N = 42), and test retest reliability sample (N = 53). 
 
4.3.1.2 Clinical versus Non Clinical Comparisons. Consistent with the proposition that 
the self declared clinical sample were drawn from a clinical population, MANCOVA 
(co varying for country of origin, occupation, and gender) showed that this group scored 
significantly higher than the non clinical group on the AAQ (F(2, 684) = 31.64, p < .001), 
SwL (F(2, 684) = 31.77, p < .001), DSHI (F(2, 684) = 66.48, p < .001), MFTQ (F(2, 684) = 
15.20, p < .001), DPI (F(2, 684) = 11.32, p = .001), SOI (F(2, 684) = 10.80, p = .001), AG 
(F(2, 684) = 8.69, p < .01), and FEQ (Restraint) (F(2, 684) = 5.07, p < .01). The non clinical 
group, however, scored higher on the AUDIT (F(2, 684) = 8.28, p < .01). 
 
4.3.2 Phase One: EFA (opportunity sample data) 
Because behaviour covariation was anticipated, a non orthogonal extraction procedure 
(oblique rotation; Direct Oblimin) was used. Delta was set at ‘0’ to allow for “fairly 
high” inter factor correlations (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Inventories with a large 
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which are likely to provide the same or similar solution (Tabachnick & Fidel, 2001). The 
ML extraction procedure was used for consistency with the CFA. 
The first iteration of EFA included all 66 questionnaire items (see Appendix A for 
the full set of items) and allowed for items to cluster naturally, rather than pre 
specifying the number of factors to be extracted. Following the recommendations of 
Gorsuch (1974), two methods were used to interpret the output. Inspection of the scree 
plot implied a multi component scale with the point of inflection
17 occurring at the 11
th 
factor. These 11 factors accounted for 61.88% of the variance and converged in 20 
iterations. Examining eigenvalues > 1
18, however, implied a 14 factor solution 
accounting for 65.52% of total variance. Inspecting the content of these factors (i.e., 
item clusters) showed that only the first 11 were meaningful. Factor 12 consisted of one 
low loading item (Binge Eating item), factor 13 of a reverse Sexual Promiscuity item, 
and factor 14 of three low loading items (two reverse DSH items and one reverse 
Impulsive Spending item). Based on this information a second EFA was run, excluding 
these items and specifying an 11 factor solution. This converged in 14 iterations and 
accounted for 62.66% of total variance.  
Factors were next refined by removing low loading and cross loading items. Comrey 
and Lee’s (1992) criteria for extracting low loading items (items with eigenvalues < 
0.55) and Osborne and Costello’s (2005) criteria for removing cross loading items 
(items loading on two or more factors with β ≥ .32) were used. This resulted in the 
removal of a further 12 items. The final EFA, run on the remaining 49 items and 
specifying an 11 item solution, converged in nine iterations, accounted for 68.46% of 
total variance, and had a χ
2
(692) = 1482.0. Factors and Eigenvalues (in parenthesis) were 
as follows (see Figure 4.1 for the final scree plot and Table 4.2 for item factor loadings): 
Nicotine Smoking (8.04), DSH (4.29), Excessive Alcohol Use (4.02), Drug Use (3.43), 
Restrictive Eating (2.77), Impulsive Spending (2.24), Excessive Internet Use (2.00), 
Binge Eating (1.97), Excessive Exercise (1.81), Sexual Promiscuity (1.53), and 
Aggression (1.46). Descriptive statistics (Table 4.3) showed that Nicotine Smoking, 
Drug Use, and DSH were not normally distributed. This was corrected using 
logarithmic transformations. 
                                                           
17 The point of inflection is where the slope first deviates from the plateau. 
18 The Kraiser Guttman rule states that eigenvalues > 1 represent nontrivial factors (see Gorsuch, 1974).       Chapter IV     92 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Scree Plot for Third Iteration of EFA using ML Extraction      Chapter IV     93 
 
Table 4.2 
Factor Loadings for MBQ Eleven Factor Solution 
 
MBQ Subscale items  Factor loading 
It’s like me.....:  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
Smoking:                       
(13) ... to smoke tobacco  .92                     
(52) ... to feel the urge to have a cigarette  .90                     
(20) ... to feel irritation/frustration if I am in a non smoking environment  .78                     
(4)   ... to be pre occupied by thoughts about smoking when smoking is prohibited  .77                     
(29) ... to prefer being in places where smoking is prohibited (R)  .58                     
Deliberate Self Harm:                       
(37) … to sometimes cause myself direct bodily harm by, for example, cutting or burning myself    .96                   
(62) ... to feel the urge to intentionally harm myself    .90                   
(11) ... to sometimes intentionally prevent scars or wounds from healing    .71                   
(21) ... to sometimes scratch or bite myself to the point of scarring or bleeding.    .70                   
Excessive Alcohol Use:                       
(5)   ... to sometimes consume more than 6 alcoholic drinks in one evening      .84                 
(24) ... to drink a lot more alcohol than I initially intended      .80                 
(26) ... to feel excitement and/or tension in anticipation of getting drunk      .68                 
(54) ... to go out with friends who are drinking, but opt to stay sober (R)      .66                 
(64) ... to sometimes feel that I need an alcoholic drink      .62                 
Drug Use:                       
(41) ... to be excited by the opportunity of taking drugs, including cannabis        .87               
(19) ... to sometimes actively seek out drugs for personal use, including cannabis        .81               
(3)   ... to say no to drugs, including cannabis (R)        .78               
(53) ... to sometimes feel that I need to take drugs (this includes cannabis)        .76               
(15) ... to generally have no interest in taking drugs, including cannabis (R)        .74               
(58) ... to sometimes think that I might have a drugs problem (this includes cannabis)        .67               
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Restrictive Eating:                       
(32) ... to deliberately take small helpings as a means of controlling my weight          .75             
(59) ... to avoid eating when I am hungry          .74             
(8)   ... to ignore dietary details (e.g., calorie content) when choosing something to eat (R)          .64             
(25) ... to have a long list of things that I dare not eat          .63             
(65) ... to sometimes claim I have already eaten when this is not true          .63             
Impulsive Spending:                       
(50) ... to sometimes feel a strong impulse to buy things that I don’t really need            .90           
(48) ... to sometimes buy things for the sake of it, rather than because I actually need them            .85           
(68) ... to sometimes experience a powerful urge to spend money            .68           
Excessive Internet Use:                       
(22) ... to sometimes feel pre occupied with the internet/computer games              .82         
(17) ... to find that my work performance or productivity suffers because of my internet/video 
game use 
            .78         
(14) ... to surf the net/play computer games before doing something else that needs doing              .70         
(39) ... to unsuccessfully try to cut back my use of the internet/computer games
               .68         
(51) ... to easily limit my use of the internet or video games (R)              .66         
Binge Eating:                       
(28) ... to always stop eating when I feel full (R)                .83       
(38) ... to only eat when I am hungry (R)                .74       
(60) ... to find it difficult to stop eating after certain foods                .62       
(35) ... to sometimes eat to the point of physical discomfort                .62       
Excessive Exercise:                        
(33) ... to exercise more than three times a week                  .79     
(27) ... to be content if I am prevented from exercising for a week (R)                  .72     
(9)   ... to exercise even when I am feeling tired and/or unwell                  .69     
(36) ... to sometimes feel tension and/or excitement in anticipation of doing exercise                  .67     
(23) ... to skip doing exercise for no good reason                  .65     
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Sexual Promiscuity: 
(47) ... to sometimes have more than one sexual partner                    .85   
(16) ... to sometimes engage in sexual activities with someone I have only just met                    .76   
(49) ... to sometimes engage in sexual actives with someone when really I shouldn't                    .72   
Aggression:                       
(31) ... to control my temper (R)                      .70 
(18) ... to never resort to violence (R)                      .63 
(61) ... to be aggressive when sufficiently provoked                      .62 
(43) ... to sometimes get so angry that I beak something                      .58 
Note: All factor loadings of below 0.30 are not reported. DSH = Deliberate Self Harm. Numbers to the right hand side of each item correspond to the version in the Appendix A.         Chapter IV     96 
 
Table 4.3 
Descriptive Statistics for MBQ subscales (full opportunity sample) 
MBQ  Mean (SD)  Skew  Kurtosis 
Composite (49)  2.57 (0.54)  0.58  0.46 
DSH (4)  1.67 (1.16)  2.05  3.53 
Nicotine Smoking (5)  1.99 (1.33)  1.48  1.07 
Excessive Alcohol Use (5)  3.45 (1.32)   0.27   0.92 
Restrictive Eating (5)  2.74 (1.17)  0.53   0.34 
Aggression (4)  2.13 (0.97)  1.00  0.77 
Excessive Internet Use (5)  2.74 (1.22)  0.39   0.72 
Drug Use (6)  1.73 (1.10)  1.81  2.79 
Binge Eating (4)  3.19 (1.16)   0.24   0.69 
Sexual Promiscuity (3)  2.01 (1.21)  1.00   0.35 
Impulsive Spending (3)  3.61 (1.16)  0.19   0.59 
Excessive Exercise (5)  3.11 (1.22)  0.28   0.59 
Note: Bracketed numbers denote number of items per subscale.  
 
4.3.3 Phase Two: Validity and Reliability 
4.3.3.1 Construct validity. Values of convergent validity, reported in Table 4.4, support the 
construct validity of the MBQ and its subscales. Consistent with prediction, composite scores 
were significantly, positively associated with the tendency to engage in impulsive behaviours 
(UPPS Urgency) and significantly negatively correlated with life satisfaction. This latter 
finding suggests the MBQ successfully tapped problematic, rather than recreational, patterns 
of behaviour. Furthermore, in the DHFT clinical sample, composite MBQ scores were 
significantly positively correlated with BPD symptoms (r = .60, p < .001); a disorder 
characterised by the engagement in multiple risk behaviours. Testing associations between 
each subscale and its corresponding inventory further supported the MBQ’s construct validity. 
Eight subscales were multicollinear (r ≥ .70, Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) with their 
corresponding validated scale. This suggests that they measured the same, or similar, 
constructs. The remaining three (Binge Eating, Restrictive Eating and Sexual Promiscuity), 
although not multicollinear, were nonetheless significantly correlated with their 
corresponding inventory.        Chapter IV     97 
   
Table 4.4 
MBQ’s Construct Validity, Internal Reliability, and Test Retest Reliability. 
    VALIDITY              RELIABILITY 
    Construct (r)                   Test retest (r)        Internal (α) 
 
MBQ    Validated  
scale  
UPPS 
(Urgency) 
SwL   AAQ     2 4 wks 
(N = 20) 
2 4 mths 
(N = 15) 
8 14 mths 
(N = 19) 
   
Composite        .43
*   .29
*  .29
*    .97
*  .87
*  .91
*  .87 
DSH†    .80
*  .29
*   .39
*  .40
*    .98
*  .80
*  .92
*  .90 
Nicotine Smoking †    .90
*  .18
*   .18*  .11    .95
*  .89
*  .86
*  .90 
Excessive Alcohol Use    .76
*  .27
*   .04  .06    .89
*  .80
*  .80
*  .85 
Restrictive Eating     .58
*  .09   .07
*  .20
*    .95
*  .91
*  .88
*  .78 
Aggression     75
*  .38
*   .23
*  .26
*    .73
*  .69
*  .85
*  .78 
Excessive Internet Use    .70
*  .17
*   .20
*  .18
*    .73
*  .74
*  .65
*  .85 
Drug Use†     .71
*  .16
*   .19*  .12    .91
*  .73
*  .78
*  .90 
Binge Eating    .50
*  .29
*   .16
*  .18
*    .75
*  .73
*  .81
*  .80 
Sexual Promiscuity     .56
*  .15
*   .06  .02    .95
*  .70
*  .76
*  .83 
Impulsive Spending    .74
*  .39
*   .15
*  .23
*    .90
*  .57
*  .57
*  .86 
Excessive Exercise    .73
*   .08  .14   .09    .95
*  .87
*  .75
*  .84 
* p ≤ .001 (adjusted for multiple comparisons).  † Correlations based on transformed data. Note: Colum entitled “validated inventory” reports correlations 
between MBQ subscales and corresponding validated inventory (see methods section). AAQ = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, UPPS = Impulsivity 
Scale, SWL = Satisfaction with Life; mths = months.  Bracketed values following subscale names denote the number of items per subscale.         Chapter IV     98 
   
Table 4.4 also reports correlations between the AAQ and MBQ, indicating that the 
two were significantly, moderately associated. This suggests that participants higher in 
the tendency to avoid unwanted internal experiences were more likely to engage in 
MBs. Breaking this down into subscales showed differential effects, however. In the full 
opportunity sample, the AAQ was significantly related to many (e.g., DSH, Aggression, 
and Impulsive Spending) but not all (e.g., Excessive Alcohol Use, Sexual Promiscuity, 
and Drug Use) subscales (at the p ≤ .001 level).  
Inter factor correlations are reported in Table 4.5. These show that, consistent with 
previous research, many of the subscales were significantly correlated. These 
correlations were sufficiently low, however, to support subscale specificity. Moreover, 
low correlations between each subscale and non corresponding validated inventories 
(range r = .08 to r = .34) further suggested that subscales measured related, but 
differentiable, behaviours. Unexpectedly, Restrictive Eating and Excessive Exercise 
were not associated with the remaining nine behaviours, however. Furthermore, neither 
of these subscales was related to the Urgency UPPS subscale, and Excessive Exercise 
was positively, rather than negatively, related to life satisfaction (Table 4.4). The 
relationship between these and other subscales was tested in the SEM. 
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Table 4.5 
Inter factor Correlations (opportunity sample) 
                     
MBQ Subscale  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8  9.  10.  11. 
                     
1. DSH†  .22
*  .10
*  .20
*  .30
*  .19
*  .22
*  .20
*  .14
*  .19
*  .06 
2. Nicotine Smoking †    .24
*  .07  .24
*  .04  .39
*  .05  .28
*  .14
*   .13
* 
3. Alcohol Use      .06  .26
*  .20
*  .30
*  .17
*  .40
*  .28
*   .03 
4. Restrictive Eating        .03   .02  .08  .12   .03  .09  .27
* 
5. Aggression          .21
*  .25
*  .18
*  .24
*  .29
*   .04 
6. Internet Use            .01  .23
*  .19
*  .19
*   .02 
7. Drug†              .07  .01  .07  .08 
8. Binge Eating                .10  .28
*  .12 
9. Sexual Promiscuity                  .13
*   .03 
10. Impulsive Spending                    .09 
11. Excessive Exercise                     
* p ≤ .001 (Bonferroni adjustments for 55 tests). † = correlations based on transformed data.  
 
4.3.3.2 Concurrent Validity. Preliminary investigations into the MBQ’s ability to 
discriminate across samples was obtained by comparing the scores of the clinical (self 
declared clinical plus DHFT clinical sample; N = 210) and non clinical (participants 
reporting that they had never received treatment for a psychological disorder; N = 521) 
subgroups. Comparisons were made using MANCOVA, co varying for gender, country 
of origin and occupation. Results, reported in Table 4.6, showed that the clinical sample 
scored significantly higher on total MBQ scores. Decomposing this across subscales 
showed that the clinical subgroup scored significantly higher on DSH, Nicotine 
Smoking, Aggression, and Restrictive Eating subscales. The non clinical group, 
however, scored significantly higher on Excessive Alcohol Use. In order to judge these 
findings relative to a standard benchmark, they can be compared to the between group 
comparisons reported in section 4.3.1.2, which compared these two groups using the 
well validated measures (e.g., the AUDIT). Results from those analyses suggested 
further between group differences for Sexual Promiscuity and Drug Use that were not 
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Table 4.6 
MBQ Descriptive Statistics Split by Clinical Status and MANCOVA of Between Group 
Differences 
 
 
Non clinical 
subgroup (N = 521) 
 
Clinical subgroup 
(N = 210) 
 
Non clinical vs. 
Clinical 
 
MBQ    Mean (SD)    Mean (SD)    MANCOVA (F) 
Composite     2.52 (0.50)    2.65 (0.60)    8.23* 
DSH†   1.43 (0.88)    2.25 (1.52)    80.49* 
Nicotine Smoking†   1.81 (1.16)    2.43 (1.60)    27.00* 
Excessive Alcohol Use   3.59 (1.27)    3.12 (1.40)    19.66* 
Restrictive Eating   2.37 (1.07)    2.80 (1.27)    17.64* 
Aggression  2.06 (0.91)    2.30 (1.09)    9.50* 
Excessive Internet Use  2.80 (1.20)    2.62 (1.26)    3.10 
Drug Use†  1.69 (1.07)    1.82 (1.18)    1.57 
Binge Eating  3.17 (1.08)    3.25 (1.25)    0.88 
Sexual Promiscuity  2.03(1.19)    2.00 (1.07)    0.44 
Impulsive Spending  3.62 (1.28)    3.61 (1.42)    0.01 
Excessive Exercise  3.10 (1.19)    3.10 (1.02)    0.09 
* = p ≤ .01 (adjusted for 12 comparisons). † Variables displayed in non transformed state, but independent t 
tests computed using transformed data. Note: High values indicate greater behavioural engagement. ‘Non 
clinical sample’ = self declared non clinical sample; ‘Clinical sample’ = self declared clinical plus DHFT 
clinical sample. 
 
 
Finally, correlations between the AAQ and MBQ were computed in the clinical and 
the non clinical subgroups (see Table 4.7). Results from this analysis suggested that the 
AAQ was related to a greater range of behaviours in the clinical than the non clinical 
group. Furthermore, the size of those associations tended to be greater in the clinical 
than non clinical group. These trends might suggest that experiential avoidance was a 
greater determinant of MBs in the self declared clinical sample.  
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Table 4.7  
Correlations between the AAQ and MBQ in the Clinical and Non clinical Sample  
   
Non clinical 
subgroup 
(N = 521) 
  Clinical 
subgroup 
(N = 211) 
MBQ    AAQ (r)    AAQ (r) 
Composite (49)    .22
***    .34
*** 
DSH† (4)    .32
***    .40
*** 
Nicotine Smoking † (5)    .04    .11 
Excessive Alcohol Use (5)    .06    .17
* 
Restrictive Eating (5)    .16
*    .16
* 
Aggression (4)    .21
**    .21
** 
Excessive Internet Use (5)    .18
**    .20
** 
Drug Use† (6)    .08    .16
* 
Binge Eating (4)    .14    .24
** 
Sexual Promiscuity (3)    .03    .01 
Impulsive Spending (3)    .26
**    .12 
Excessive Exercise (5)    .06    .16
* 
*p < .05, **p <.01, *** p < .001. Note: Bracketed numbers denote the number of 
items per subscale. ‘Non clinical’ = self declared non clinical sample; ‘clinical’ = 
self declared clinical plus DHFT clinical sample. 
 
4.3.3.3 Reliability. The MBQ also demonstrated good internal and test retest reliability 
(Table 4.4). Internal reliability values were all above the widely accepted benchmark of 
α = 0.7 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), thus suggesting that subscale items strongly 
converged with one another. Furthermore, test retest values, obtained over varying delay 
periods, indicated that subscales were stable over time.  
 
4.3.4 Phase Three: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Allowing for inter factor correlations, and allowing all items to cluster freely, EFA 
analysis suggested an 11 factor solution with all factors evidencing acceptable 
psychometric properties. Phase three of analysis aimed to develop this further by testing 
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covariation of these behaviours could be accounted for by one single HOF. This HOF 
model was tested using SEM with ML Estimates in AMOS Graphics. 
 
4.3.4.1 Evaluating the HOF Model. An example of the HOF model is depicted in Figure 
4.2 (this Figure depicts the final, rather than the first, iteration of the HOF Model and 
thus only depicts nine latent variables). The first HOF model tested specified 11 latent 
variables (first order factors), each represented by between three and six manifest 
indicators (questionnaire items). The manifest indicators used for each subscale were 
questionnaire items selected from the previous EFA. Manifest indicators were restricted 
to load only onto the latent variable they were designed to measure and, for 
identification purposes, one manifest indicator per factor was restricted to ‘1’ (see 
section 3.4.4). As demonstrated in Figure 4.2, an exogenous HOF was specified to 
model common variance among the 11 first order factors. Sample moments, freely 
estimated parameters, and dfs indicated that this model was over identified (i.e., there 
were sufficient dfs to test the model).  
The first evaluation of the model indicated some sources of misspecification (Table 
4.8, ‘Model A1’; see section 3.4.3 (p. 72) for a review of fit statistics). Although 
RMSEA was good, χ² was large relative to dfs and CFI was below the acceptable range. 
Following recommendations of Joreskog (1993) a data driven, model generating 
approach was thus adopted. Inspecting standardised regression weights between first 
order factors and the HOF revealed that Restrictive Eating and Excessive Exercise were 
not significantly related to the HOF (β = .08, p > .05 and β =  .10, p > .05 respectively). 
The model was thus re specified with these paths removed. This significantly improved 
model fit (  χ
2
(423) = 1394.7, p < .001) and parsimony (see Table 4.8, ‘Model A2’).  
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Table 4.8 
Fit Statistics for Initial and Trimmed Measurement Models 
Model Tested  χ²  df  χ²/df  CFI  RMSEA (± 90% CI)  PCFI 
Model A1  3160.0  1116  2.8  0.89  .052 (±.050, .054)  0.84 
Model A2  1765.3  693  2.6  0.93  .046 (± .044, .049)  0.87 
Model A3 (final model)  1594.5  690  2.3  0.94  .044 (± .041, .046)  0.87 
EA → Model A3   2384.0  1067  2.2  0.92  .042 (± .040, .045)  0.87 
Note: ‘Model A1’ = first iteration of the HOF; ‘Model A2’ = second iteration of the HOF model; ‘Model A3’= 
final iteration of the HOF model; ‘EA → Model A3’ = final model with EA predicting HOF variance. 
 
Next, consultation of the modification indices (MI) suggested a further source of 
misspecification. Specifically, three pairs of errors were correlated. This finding suggests 
that three pairs of manifest indicators (questionnaire items) share unique variance that is 
not shared by other indicators for that factor. This often occurs when two questionnaire 
items are particularly similar in content, such as when they are reverse coded (Byrne, 
2001). In this case, the highest MI value (MI = 59.04) identified covariation between two 
Drug Use items that measured more severe drug use than the remaining four (“I sometimes 
feel that I need to take drugs” and “I sometimes think that I might have a drugs problem”). 
Because of the intended clinical use of the MBQ, both items were retained and their error 
terms were free to co vary (see Figure 4.2). This was also the case for two DSH and two 
Nicotine Smoking items (items 37 & 21, and items 20 & 4 respectively, see Table 4.2). 
With these covariances added, acceptable fit was found (Table 4.8, Model A3). All 
manifest indicators loaded significantly on to the respective first order factor (all β ≥ 0.60) 
and all first order factors loaded significantly on the HOF (see Figure 4.2). 
 
4.3.4.2 Predicting HOF Variance. Having evaluated and refined this model, the final stage 
of analysis tested whether the AAQ significantly predicted HOF variance. This model was 
a development of Model A3 in which the AAQ (measured using nine manifest indicators 
(questionnaire items)) was hypothesised to be an exogenous latent variable that was 
causally related to the HOF (see Cooper et al., 2003; section 3.4.4.1). Testing this model 
(see Table 4.7 ‘EA → Model A3’) revealed that the AAQ significantly predicted the HOF 
(β = .35, p < .001), accounting for 12% of its variance.        Chapter IV     104 
   
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Standardised Regression Weights for trimmed HOF Model (i.e., Model A3) 
All paths significant at p < .001. Note: For ease of communication, error and disturbance values are not reported. Also, values for paths from factor to manifest 
indicator are denoted in the manifest indicator box and values from the HOF to latent factors are reported to the right of the path. SMOK = Nicotine Smoking; 
SHOP = Impulsive Spending; INTER = Excessive Internet Use; DRUG = Illicit Drug Use; BINGE = Binge Eating; DSH = Deliberate Self Harm; SEX = Sexual 
Promiscuity; AGG = Aggression; ALCO = Excessive Alcohol Use. Bidirectional arrows linking ‘e’ indicate correlated error terms.        Chapter IV     105 
   
4.4 Discussion 
4.4.1 Study Findings 
Over a decade ago Hayes et al. (1996) proposed that, despite their formal dissimilarity, 
MBs constitute a functional response class whose underlying commonality is the 
capacity to prevent, escape, or reduce contact with negatively reinforcing private events. 
Although previous research has investigated covariation between small clusters of 
adolescent specific risk behaviours (e.g., Cooper et al., 2003), and found evidence to 
support the existence of a shared HOF, this analytic technique has never before been 
used to examine covariation between such a wide range of clinically relevant 
behaviours. Research focused on identifying common factors or functions is important 
not only because problem behaviours commonly co occur, but also because it may 
inform parsimonious treatments. To this end, this study (a) developed an easy to 
administer, simultaneous measure of MBs, (b) tested whether a common HOF could 
account for covariation between those behaviours, and (c) tested whether experiential 
avoidance was significantly predictive of that covariation.   
Evaluation of the MBQ provided evidence to support the aspects of reliability and 
validity that were assessed. Because the measures against which the MBQ was 
evaluated were themselves well validated, it can be concluded that the MBQ exhibited 
good construct validity. Furthermore, adequate to good values of internal consistency 
suggested that items tapped common constructs, and good test retest reliability values 
supported the scale’s stability over time. Preliminary data also suggested that the MBQ 
could discriminate between clinical and non clinical samples. This having been said, 
however, the subscales for Drug Use and Sexual Promiscuity were not as sensitive as 
their validated counterparts. Furthermore, because there was no way of verifying the 
nature of the self declared clinical group, these findings are preliminary and require 
further assessment. Indeed, scale validation is an on going activity, and the data 
reported here represent the first stage of that process. Future research should evaluate 
the scale’s applicability to other samples, particularly those drawn from a clinical 
population. Such work should test whether the MBQ is sufficiently sensitive to 
discriminate between samples with different behavioral problems (e.g., AN versus SD) 
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The second aim of this study was to test structural relations between subscales (or 
behaviours). This analysis showed that, having undergone some modest re 
specifications, the HOF model provided adequate fit statistics. Despite the range of 
behaviours being far broader than in previous research, the fit statistics reported in this 
study were comparable to, if not better than, those reported by Cooper et al. (2003; χ²/df 
= 7.48; CFI = .94; RMSEA = .057 (± .052, .063)). The present findings thus extend 
previous research to suggest that a wide range of clinically relevant behaviours shared a 
common function, or common causal mechanism, of some kind. In an attempt to 
elucidate the nature of this commonality, it was found that the AAQ accounted for a 
significant proportion of HOF variance. This proportion was also comparable to the 
value reported by Cooper et al. for the optimal of the four predictors they investigated 
(Avoidant Coping: β = 0.34). These findings thus suggest that one of the reasons why 
MBs co vary is because they function to alter, distract, avoid or escape from unwanted 
private experiences. Preliminary trends further suggested that associations between the 
AAQ and MBQ were greater and wider ranging in the clinical than the non clinical 
subgroup. The sample size did not permit subgroup HOF modelling, however. This 
trend should thus be explored in future research.  
Although many theory consistent findings were found, results nevertheless also 
indicated that some behaviours were not related to the AAQ. Similarly, in keeping with 
previous work (e.g., Cooper et al., 2003), a significant proportion of HOF variance was 
not explained by the hypothesised predictor (experiential avoidance). Moreover, 
differences emerged in the amount of variability that the HOF explained per behaviour. 
The fact that some behaviours (e.g., binge eating and excessive internet use) were 
under represented relative to others, suggests that unique factors were more important 
determinants of their occurrence. This highlights the importance of establishing the 
relative contributions of both common and unique factors, which may help to elucidate 
how a common cause(s) or function(s) manifests in different behavioral topographies 
(see chapter 8). According to Joreskog (1993), findings such as these should be 
expected; “most often, the independent constructs in the model account for only a 
fraction of the variation and covariation in the dependent constructs, because there are 
many other variables that are associated with the dependent constructs that are not 
included in the model for various reasons” (Joreskog, 1993, p. 296). Future research       Chapter IV     107 
   
should thus build more detailed models investigating how other factors independently or 
interactively account for additional variance (see chapter 5 & 8).  
 
4.4.2 Methodological Limitations 
These findings should be considered in the light of the study’s limitations. Firstly, 
although self report was deemed most appropriate for the measurement of multiple risk 
behaviours, it has significant weaknesses. Several sources of systematic and 
unsystematic error, such as retrospective bias and social desirability, are likely to have 
affected the accuracy of findings (see section 3.2.1). Secondly, the current hypothesis 
was based on the assumption that experiential avoidance precedes behavioural 
engagement, but the use of cross sectional data means that alternative temporal 
hypotheses cannot be disproved. For example, it is possible that individuals become 
increasingly avoidant as a result of engaging in MBs. This is possible considering that 
MBs often lead to aversive consequences. If this were to be the case, a different genesis, 
such as the seeking of positive affect, could play a primary etiological role; whereas 
experiential avoidance may be implicated as a developmental and maintenance factor. It 
is most likely that some feedback loop does exist, whereby individuals become 
increasingly more avoidant as the use of MBs becomes more entrenched. Such 
subtleties could not, however, be detected using cross sectional design. This should be a 
consideration for future research and could be addressed using a longitudinal cross 
sectional approach.  
The third limitation concerns sample characteristics. Although a broad range of 
respondents took part, students were over represented, and clinical and male 
participants were under represented. These demographics are likely to have impacted on 
the findings. For example, preliminary analyses suggested that relations between the 
AAQ and MBQ were greater in participants drawn from a clinical sample; however, the 
sample size was too small to explore this more fully. Another concern regarding 
sampling was that, although the ‘self declared clinical’ versus ‘non clinical’ distinction 
appeared to have some validity, this approach was limited in two main ways. Firstly, a 
problem that is inherent to work that uses the ‘clinical’ versus ‘non clinical’ distinction 
is that many people with ‘clinical symptoms’ do not seek treatment (see Bandura, 
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had sought medicinal, rather than psychological, help for a psychological problem. 
Future research should evaluate the MBQ’s applicability to other samples, especially 
better defined clinical samples. 
The last two considerations relate to the statistical procedures that were used. Firstly, 
this study used the same data set for EFA and CFA analysis, which may prove circular. 
For example, adequate CFA statistics could in part reflect the fact that item clustering 
had been determined using the same sample’s data. Nevertheless, the EFA was not used 
to influence factor factor interrelations in the measurement model; rather, the HOF 
model was determined exclusively by previous research and theory. This crucial aspect 
of the modelling was therefore uninfluenced by results of the EFA. Future research 
should re evaluate this model in a second sample to test its structural reliability (see 
chapter 5). Secondly, the use of SEM to identify underlying factors warrants some 
consideration. This statistical method is based on the analysis of latent constructs, which 
can only be inferred through component manifest indicators. Similarly, the nature and 
function of the HOF can only be investigated indirectly and through the use of predictor 
variables (e.g., experiential avoidance). To avoid unfounded assumptions, therefore, it is 
best to conceptualize the HOF as a factor that models common variance across first 
order factors, but that may or may not cause those first order factors.  
 
4.4.3 Implications 
This study has several implications. Firstly, on a practical level, the data have been 
largely supportive of the MBQ as a measurement tool, which may prove useful for 
monitoring co occurring MBs. For example, it may assist professionals in monitoring 
both target and non target behaviours during treatment, enable pre post change analysis 
(see chapter 7), and help in the identification of phenomena such as behaviour 
switching. Furthermore, the implication that a common factor exists to unite these 
behaviours suggests that they may be usefully considered as related, rather than 
independent constructs. This tool may help future research to obtain a more detailed 
understanding of common factors.  
The current findings also have treatment implications. If findings generalise to 
clinical samples then interventions designed to reduce experiential avoidance, such as 
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independent and co occurring problem behaviours. This is an important treatment 
implication, given that these behaviours are known seldom to occur in isolation and 
given that their co occurrence is known to challenge traditional cognitive interventions 
(see section 1.2.4.1).  To date, early indications suggest that ACT can be therapeutically 
useful for patients with polysubstance abuse (Hayes, Wilson, et al., 2004), DSH (Gratz 
& Gunderson, 2006), and nicotine addiction (Gifford et al., 2004); and mindfulness 
based approaches have utility in the treatment of substance abuse (Marlatt, et al., 2004). 
However, no known research has extended the application of ACT to the treatment of 
co occurring MBs. These findings suggest that the reduction of experiential avoidance 
may be one promising technique for disrupting the process through which these 
behaviours hang together. 
 
4.4.4 Summary 
 This study has presented one feasible and promising method for measuring MBs and 
their co occurrence. Furthermore, evidence was found to suggest that experiential 
avoidance may account for some of the covariation between them. Although this 
provides important information about the relationship between experiential avoidance 
and MBs, it says little about the broader context within which these associations are 
typically embedded. For example, what variables predict heightened levels of 
experiential avoidance and how does experiential avoidance relate to other factors 
known to influence MBs? With these questions in mind, study 2 was designed to obtain 
a more detailed and integrated understanding of the association between experiential 
avoidance and MBs. Study 2 was also designed to re test the structural reliability of the 
HOF, and to explore the implicated differences between clinical and non clinical 
groups. Chapter V     110 
CHAPTER V 
Study 2. Experiential Avoidance and Maladaptive Behaviours Part II:  
Does Experiential Avoidance Mediate the Relationship Between Negative Affect 
Intensity, Childhood Trauma and Maladaptive Behaviours? 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As predicted, study 1 showed that the HOF model provided a parsimonious and 
acceptable account of MB covariance. Furthermore, the AAQ explained a significant 
proportion of that covariance. The current study was intended to develop this work 
further, by gaining a more detailed understanding of how experiential avoidance may be 
implicated in the tendency to engage in these behaviours. In the literature, many risk 
factors have been identified as predisposing individuals for co morbid behaviour 
problems. Of these, intense negative affect and childhood trauma appear to be most 
prominent. The processes through which these factors affect future functioning, 
however, are not well known. According to ACT, experiential avoidance may be crucial 
to elucidating this process. From an ACT perspective, it can be predicted that negative 
affect and childhood trauma predict MBs only indirectly and through the mediating 
effect of experiential avoidance (Figure 5.1). This study aimed to test these predictions.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Simplified Version of Predicted Mediational Models with Experiential 
Avoidance Mediating the Relationship between Negative Affect Intensity, Childhood 
Trauma and Maladaptive Behaviours. 
Note: CT = Childhood Trauma; NAI = Negative Affect Intensity; EA= Experiential Avoidance; MBs = 
Maladaptive Behaviours. Solid lines indicate direct relations; dashed lines indicate indirect (mediated) relations. 
‘A’ ‘B’ and ‘C’ denote labels for the three hypothesised pathways. Chapter V     111 
 
 5.1.1 Pathway A: Risk Factors for Maladaptive Behaviours 
Research suggests that heightened levels of negative affect often precede and predict a 
variety of MBs. These have included, for example, DSH (see Chapman et al., 2006), 
binge eating (Agras & Telch, 1998; Deaver, Miltenberger, Smyth, Meidinger, & 
Crosby, 2003), substance use/abuse (see Baker, Piper, McCarthy, Majeskie, & Fiore, 
2004; Kassal, Stroud, & Paronis, 2003), aggression (Verona, Patrick, & Lang, 2002), 
and excessive internet use (Yen et al., 2008). Based on these findings, it is intuitive to 
predict that the trait based construct of Negative Affect Intensity (NAI) —the 
predisposition to experience intense negative affect (Bryant, Yarnold, & Grimm, 
1996)—may also be significantly predictive of the tendency to engage in MBs. 
Although research on NAI and MBs is sparse, research has shown a significant 
association between NAI and DSH (Gratz & Roemer, 2008), BPD symptoms (Cheavens 
et al., 2005; Rosenthal et al., 2005; Yen, Zlotnick, & Costello, 2002), substance abuse 
(Thorberg & Lyvers, 2006), and suicidality (Lynch et al., 2004).  
Traumatic experiences in one’s childhood (Childhood Trauma (CT); Bernstein et al., 
2003), such as being the victim of abuse (e.g., sexual, physical, emotional) and/or 
neglect (e.g., physical, emotional), is also significantly predictive of the tendency to 
engage in MBs. For example, using a prospective cohort design, Spatz, Marmorstein, 
and Raskin (2006) found that participants reporting CT were significantly more likely to 
abuse substances than matched controls. Similarly, longitudinal research has shown that 
a wide range of traumatic experiences in childhood are significantly predictive of 
disordered eating (Johnson, Cohen, Kasen, & Brook, 2002; see also Smolak & Murnen, 
2002) and suicidality (Johnson, Cohen, Gould et al., 2002). Furthermore, individuals 
reporting CT, relative to non abused counterparts, are more likely to engage in a range 
of health risk activities (e.g., alcohol use, risky sexual practices; Rodgers et al., 2004), 
to be aggressive (e.g., Herrenkohl et al., 2004) and to engage in DSH (Santa Mina & 
Gallop, 1998).  
 
5.1.2 Path B: NAI, CT and Experiential Avoidance 
Is there a relationship between the NAI, CT, and the tendency to avoid unwanted 
experiences? Research suggests so. Individuals high in NAI are more likely to engage in 
avoidant behaviour after an experimental stressor (e.g., Bijttebier & Vertommen, 1999). Chapter V     112 
 
Similarly, cross sectional research has established a link between NAI and different 
indices of avoidance (e.g., emotional inhibition (e.g., Lynch et al., 2004; Lynch et al., 
2001) and thought suppression (Cheavens et al., 2005; Rosenthal et al., 2005)). 
Individuals reporting CT are also likely to develop avoidant attachment styles (e.g., see 
Shapiro & Levendosky, 1999), and to engage in thought suppression (Batten, Follette, 
& Aban, 2001) and avoidant coping (Hyman, Paliwal, & Sinha, 2007; Kuyken & 
Brewin, 1994). Focusing specifically on experiential avoidance, Marx & Sloan (2002) 
have also reported that sexual abuse is significantly predictive of AAQ scores.  
 
5.1.3 Path C: Experiential Avoidance and Maladaptive Behaviours 
Finally, does experiential avoidance predict MBs? Study 1 of this thesis certainly 
suggests so, showing that the AAQ predicted 12% of MB covariance. These data 
converge with previous research, which has found that substance misusers often report 
escape from aversive psychological states as a central motivation for consuming 
addictive substances (e.g., see Baker et al., 2004). Research has also shown that 
individuals who use alcohol to alleviate distress are more likely to develop an abuse 
problem (Cooper et al., 1992). Additionally, current negative reinforcement models of 
non pharmacologically based MBs, such as DSH (Chapman et al., 2006) and 
dysfunctional eating (Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991; Deaver et al., 2003; see also 
Miltenberger, 2005) have received some empirical support (e.g., study 1; Najmi et al., 
2007; McManus & Waller, 1995; Meyer, Waller, & Watson, 2000). 
 
The literature reviewed above suggests that a predisposition towards heightened 
negative arousal and/or a history of childhood trauma increase the probability of 
engaging in MBs. An ACT derived interpretation of these associations, however, would 
suggest that these links are indirect and mediated by the intervening effect of 
experiential avoidance (e.g., Hayes et al., 1996). This interpretation is plausible, given 
that experiential avoidance is predicted by these risk factors and is itself predictive of 
MBs (see Figure 5.1). From this perspective, NAI and CT increase the probability of 
engaging in MBs through the fostering of heightened experiential avoidance. This study 
was designed to test these hypotheses. 
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5.1.4 Methodological Considerations 
The design of the present study was strongly influenced by the techniques available for 
measuring the key constructs of NAI, CT, experiential avoidance and MBs. To date, this 
technique is self report questionnaires (some authors have used interviews for MBs and 
CT). For example, the most comprehensive instrument designed for the measurement of 
CT is the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ SF; Bernstein et al., 2003), which 
provides a means of anonymously measuring five separable facets of trauma (see 
section 5.2.3.2). Although NAI, experiential avoidance, and MBs could be measured 
using behavioural procedures, no validated methods have been established.  
Questionnaire based research lends itself either to the use of longitudinal or cross 
sectional design. Although longitudinal design is a more powerful method for drawing 
inferences of cause and effect, it did not naturally lend itself to the aims of the current 
study. This is because it would be impossible to take any form of baseline measures 
(i.e., experiential avoidance and MB scores before and after an abusive episode). 
Informed by much of the current work in this area of research (e.g., Chapman et al., 
2005; Lynch et al., 2004; Najmi et al., 2007), therefore, a cross sectional design was 
used. In keeping with study 1, a large community sample was recruited with the aim of 
accessing a self identified clinical subgroup. To improve on study 1’s recruitment, 
however, this study was advertised on a broader range of websites. Furthermore, the 
present study included an item to establish whether participants had taken, or were 
currently taking, prescribed medication for a psychological problem. It was reasoned 
that the failure to add this to the last study could have lead to the mis categorisation of 
some participants.   
 
5.1.5 Synopsis of the Present Study 
This study aimed to test the mediational models depicted in Figure 5.1; that is, the 
prediction that experiential avoidance would mediate the relationship between NAI, CT, 
and the tendency to engage in MBs. To obtain a full and detailed understanding of the 
proposed relations, a step wise method of analysis was adopted. First, the models were 
tested using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediational criteria (see section 3.4.2 and 
5.3.2). This stage aimed to test the mediational models when predicting composite 
MBQ scores and also when predicting each behaviour in isolation (e.g., Restrictive Chapter V     114 
 
Eating, DSH etc.). Following this, SEM was used to test whether experiential avoidance 
mediated the effect of NAI and CT on MB covariation (i.e., the HOF).  
 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Design 
A cross sectional, questionnaire based design was employed. Predictor variables 
included childhood trauma and negative affect intensity. The tendency to engage in 
maladaptive behaviours was the criterion variable and the mediator variable was 
experiential avoidance.  
 
5.2.2 Participants 
An opportunity sample of participants was recruited (N = 719). Psychology students 
from the University of Southampton (N = 287), recruited via electronic and paper 
advertisements, received course credits for participation. Participants from outside the 
University (N = 432) were recruited via electronic advertisements on the www. This 
method of recruitment was similar to that of study 1. Thus, although study 2 was 
conducted almost 12 months after study 1, it ran the risk of recruiting some of the same 
participants. Cross referencing student ID numbers across studies revealed that 
approximately 40% of the Southampton student sample (i.e., N = 115) had also 
participated in study 1. Despite this, demographic variables (Table 5.1) suggested that 
the samples of study 1 and 2 were distinguishable from one another.  
 
5.2.3 Materials 
Measures for the measurement of MBs and experiential avoidance are described in 
study 1 (section 4.2.2). Demographic variables were measured in the same way as those 
described in study 1 except participants were additionally asked to indicate whether they 
were currently taking, or had in the past taken, prescribed medication for a 
psychological problem (see Appendix A). The following measures were also used.  Chapter V     115 
Table 5.1 
Demographic Statistics Split by ‘Clinical Status’ 
 
  Opportunity Sample 
   
 
Demographics 
Self Declared Non clinical 
(N = 410) 
 
Self Declared Clinical 
(N =309) 
       
Mean Age (SD)  22.11 (7.0)    26.26 (9.7) 
Gender (% Female)  76.7%    87.2% 
Occupation (%): 
Student Psychology 
Student Other 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Not specified 
 
63.7% 
21.4% 
12% 
2% 
0.9% 
 
 
43.1% 
21.3% 
23.4% 
5.4% 
5.8% 
Country of Origin: 
England 
USA 
Europe (other) 
Asia 
Other 
 
56.4% 
30.2% 
6.2% 
2.4% 
4.8% 
 
 
34.7% 
57.3% 
4.2% 
1.2% 
2.6% 
Mean no. of therapies  0    1.56 
Mean no. of sessions  0    34.34 
Note: ‘Self declared clinical’ were those participants indicating that they were either currently 
receiving, or had in the past received, therapy for a psychological difficulty. The ‘self declared non 
clinical’ sample were those indicating that they had not.  
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5.2.3.1 The Affect Intensity Measure – Negative Intensity subscale (AIM NI; Larsen 
& Diener, 1987; Bryant et al., 1996). The AIM NI is a 6 item subscale of the Affect 
Intensity Measure. This subscale assesses how strongly negative emotions are 
experienced when they occur, in a manner that does not confound intensity with the 
frequency of those emotions (e.g., “My emotions tend to be more intense than those of 
most people”). Items are rated on a 6 point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 6 (always). 
Bryant et al. reported acceptable internal reliability (α = .70) and good test retest 
reliability over a 2 year period (r = .71). This supports a temperamental interpretation of 
the nature of NAI.  
5.2.3.2 The Childhood Trauma Questionnaire Short Form (CTQ SF; Bernstein et al., 
2003). The CTQ SF is a 28 item self report inventory measuring five facets of CT: 
Emotional, Physical, and Sexual Abuse, and Emotional and Physical Neglect. Items 
(e.g., “When I was growing up I felt hated by my family” for Emotional Neglect) are 
rated on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (very often true). Adequate psychometric 
properties have been reported for both clinical and non clinical populations (e.g., α = 
.92; Wright et al., 2001).  
 
5.2.4 Procedure 
This was an online study that required participants to complete a consent form before 
accessing questionnaires. The form pre warned participants that some questionnaires 
were of a personal nature. Questionnaire packs were completed in the participants’ own 
time and they were advised to complete them in private. To control for order effects, the 
sequence in which the questionnaires were presented, and the order of questions per 
questionnaire, was randomised. University of Southampton Psychology students were 
required to indicate their ID number on a separate web page to ensure the allocation of 
course credits. These details were stored in separate data files from questionnaire 
responses. Owing to the potentially upsetting nature of some of the questionnaire items, 
participants were provided with a debriefing statement that included the contact details 
of help organisations (e.g., The Samaritans). They additionally received the researcher’s 
contact details for questions or comments.  
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5.2.5 Analysis Strategy 
Preliminary statistics assessed variable distributions, tested for predicted correlations 
and for between group (i.e., clinical versus non clinical subgroups) differences. Next, 
Phase One of analysis used Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 4 step process to test for 
mediation (see section 3.4.3 and 5.3.2). Sobel’s (1982) test for indirect effects was 
added as a fifth step to test whether the indirect effect was significant. Separate 
mediation analyses were computed for testing the effect of NAI, CT, and experiential 
avoidance on (a) composite MBQ scores and (b) each MBQ subscales in isolation (e.g., 
Restrictive Eating, DSH etc.). Phase Two addressed the same fundamental questions, 
but using the more flexible and integrated approach offered by SEM. First, the structural 
reliability of the HOF model and the predictive value of the AAQ identified in study 1 
was re tested with the new dataset. Following this, a structural model was developed to 
test whether the AAQ mediated the relationship between AIM NI, CTQ SF, and the 
MBQ HOF. Two models were tested and statistically compared. The first model 
proposed indirect effects of AIM NI and CTQ SF on the HOF (i.e., mediated through 
the AAQ), and the second proposed that AIM NI and CTQ SF had both direct and 
indirect effects. Chi square difference tests (  χ
2) were computed to compare the fit of 
the two models (Kline, 2005; see also section 3.4.4).  
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Preliminary Statistics 
5.3.1.1 Missing Data, Outliers, and Distributions. Inspection of the raw data showed that 
13 participants had high levels of missing data (see section 4.3.1). These individuals’ data 
were excluded from further analysis. Small amounts of missing data (i.e., < 10%) were 
replaced with the group mean value for that item. Descriptive statistics (stem and leaf 
graphs) and Mahalanobis distance values further identified four univariate and twelve 
multivariate outlier participants. These individuals’ data were also removed from further 
analysis, resulting in a final N = 690. Finally, measures of skew and kurtosis showed that 
DSH, Nicotine Smoking, Drug Use, and the CTQ SF composite and subscales were 
positively skewed. Logarithmic transformations corrected the skew of all these variables 
except Sexual Abuse, which remained highly skewed. The Sexual Abuse subscale was thus 
excluded from the SEM modelling (items were, however, included in the composite Chapter V     118 
 
measure that was used for regression analysis). All other variables were normally 
distributed (see Table 5.2 for means, standard deviations and internal reliability).  
 
5.3.1.2 Clinical versus Non Clinical Subgroups. Consistent with Study 1, MANCOVA 
(controlling for country of origin, occupation and gender) revealed several significant 
differences between the self declared clinical and non clinical subgroups (see Table 5.2). 
These differences supported the idea that the clinical group was drawn from a clinical 
population. Because sample sizes permitted, analyses were conducted on full sample data, 
followed by the data of clinical and non clinical subgroups.  
 
5.3.1.3 Bivariate Correlations. Bivariate correlations between MBQ subscales showed 
that, consistent with study 1, Excessive Exercise and Restrictive Eating were unrelated to 
most other MBQ subscales. Excessive Exercise was not significantly related to any other 
MBQ subscale and Restrictive Eating only to DSH (r = .32, p < .001). The replication of 
this finding justified their exclusion from the HOF modelling.  
Bivariate correlations between predictor, mediator, and criterion variables (excluding 
Excessive Exercise and Restrictive Eating) are reported in Table 5.3. Consistent with 
prediction, MBQ composite scores were significantly related to AIM NI, CTQ SF, and the 
AAQ. This was the case for the full group and for each subgroup (i.e., clinical and non 
clinical group). Analyses using the MBQ subscales provided a more detailed account of 
these relations. In the full sample, the AAQ was significantly related to all MBQ subscales 
except Sexual Promiscuity; whereas CTQ SF and AIM NI were only related to a subset of 
these subscales. Furthermore, consistent with study 1, some differential trends emerged 
across subgroups. For example, the AAQ was again related to a broader range of 
behaviours in the clinical than the non clinical group (specifically: Sexual Promiscuity, 
Nicotine Smoking, and Excessive Alcohol Use). Conversely, the correlations between 
AIM NI and MBQ subscales were generally higher in the non clinical group than the 
clinical group (e.g., Excessive Alcohol Use and Binge Eating).  Chapter V     119 
Table 5.2 
Means (SD) and Internal Reliability Values for all study Variables in the Full Sample and Clinical/Non Clinical Subgroups. 
 
  Total Sample 
(N = 690) 
  Non Clinical  
(N = 389) 
  Clinical 
(N = 301) 
  Non Clinical vs. 
Clinical 
  Mean  SD  α    Mean  SD  α    Mean  SD  α    MANCOVA (F) 
AAQ  4.00  0.93  .75    3.69  0.76  .70    4.37  0.97  .79    43.26*** 
AIM NI  3.71  1.05  .82    3.43  1.01  .82    4.15  0.95  .75    30.52*** 
CTQ SF  1.61  0.68  .94    1.45  0.58  .94    1.87  0.75  .92    30.43*** 
MBQ Composite   2.62  0.58  .86    2.51  0.51  .85    2.70  0.63  .88    8.65*** 
DSH†   1.81  1.23  .88    1.54  0.97  .84    2.17  1.43  .89    20.32*** 
Nicotine Smoking†   2.22  1.43  .88    2.00  1.23  .86    2.51  1.62  .90    8.82*** 
Restrictive Eating   2.55  1.10  .71    2.40  1.02  .73    2.74  1.14  .74    5.53** 
Excessive Internet Use   2.92  1.22  .81    2.85  1.15  .74    3.01  1.30  .83    3.03* 
Drug Use†   1.93  1.31  .81    1.80  1.13  .88    2.07  1.50  .88    3.00* 
Excessive Exercise   3.07  1.20  .76    3.16  1.14  .78    2.94  1.26  .81    2.57 
Binge Eating   3.09  1.24  .81    2.99  1.12  .77    3.23  1.37  .88    2.17 
Excessive Alcohol Use   3.21  1.33  .87    3.26  1.30  .88    3.14  1.36  .86    1.11 
Aggression  2.30  1.04  .75    2.26  0.97  .73    2.33  1.11  .76    1.10 
Sexual Promiscuity   1.97  1.19  .79    1.95  1.17  .77    2.00  1.21  .72    0.68 
Impulsive Spending   3.46  1.42  .76    3.40  1.34  .83    3.52  1.52  .89    0.34 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
†
 Transformed scores were used in the MANCOVA. AIM NI = Affect Intensity Measure –Negative Intensity Scale; 
CTQ SF = Childhood Trauma Questionnaire; AAQ = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire; MBQ Composite = Maladaptive Behaviour Questionnaire 
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Table 5.3 
Inter variable Correlations for the Full Sample and Clinical/Non Clinical Subgroups 
Predictors/Mediator/Criterion  Total Sample 
(N = 690) 
  Non Clinical  
(N = 389) 
  Clinical 
(N = 301) 
  AAQ  AIM NI  CTQ SF    AAQ  AIM NI  CTQ SF    AAQ  AIM NI  CTQ SF 
AAQ     .55
*  .30
*       .46
*  .22
*       .53
*  .22
* 
MBQ Composite   .35
*  .27
*  .25
*    .29
*  .24
*  .25
*    .34
*  .23
*  .25
* 
DSH†   .38
*  .29
*  .35
*    .36
*  .24
*  .30
*    .37
*  .27
*  .31
* 
Nicotine Smoking†   .14
*  .09  .23
*    .06  .00  .21
*    .14
*  .08  .19
* 
Excessive Alcohol Use   .15
*  .10  .11    .13  .14
*  .11    .24
*  .10  .05 
Restrictive Eating   .23
*  .23
*  .23
*    .20
*  .16
*  .16
*    .18
*  .23
*  .18
* 
Aggression   .24
*  .23
*  .22
*    .30
*  .28
*  .34
*    .20
*  .18
*  .16
* 
Excessive Internet Use   .23
*  .07  .10    .18
*  .03  .19
*    .25
*  .08  .08 
Drug Use†   .12
*  .09  .17
*    .11  .08  .21
*    .07  .05  .16
* 
Binge Eating   .20
*  .21
*  .03    .20
*  .28
*  .02    .17
*  .10  .06 
Sexual Promiscuity   .09  .03  .12
*    .02  .03  .12    .19
*  .10  .12 
Impulsive Spending  .20
*  .22
*  .01    .23
*  .28
*  .03    .17
*  .15
*  .05 
Excessive Exercise   .13
*  .07  .03    .10  .07  .03    .10  .00  .00 
 
*p ≤ .001 (adjusted for multiple comparisons). Note: AIM NI = Affect Intensity Measure – Negative Intensity Scale; CTQ SF = Childhood Trauma Questionnaire 
Short Form; MBQ Composite = Maladaptive Behaviour Questionnaire composite scores. For all scales, high scores denote greater values of that variable. 
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5.3.2 Phase One Mediation Analysis: Step Wise Regression 
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 4 step process was used to test whether the AAQ mediated 
the relationship between predictor variables (CTQ SF and AIM NI) and the criterion 
(e.g., MBQ composite scores). Sobel’s (1982) test for indirect effects was added as a 
fifth step. These steps are summarised below: 
Step 1: predictor significantly correlates with criterion  
Step 2: predictor significantly correlates with mediator 
Step 3: mediator significantly correlates with criterion 
Step 4: the effect of the predictor on the criterion, controlling for the effect of M, is 
not significantly different from 0 
Step 5: the indirect effect is significant 
Partial mediation was inferred when the relationship between the predictor and criterion 
was significantly reduced (i.e., significant Sobel’s test), but remained significantly 
different from 0 (Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004). Because a prerequisite for a mediational 
interpretation is the observation of significant associations between the predictor, 
mediator, and criterion (step 1, 2 & 3), mediational analyses were computed only for 
sets of variables meeting all these requirements (as indicated by correlations in Table 
5.3). The following sets of variables were thus tested:  
Full Sample: AIM NI predicting Binge Eating, Aggression, Impulsive Spending, 
DSH and Restrictive Eating. CTQ SF predicting Drug Use, Nicotine Smoking, 
Aggression, Sexual Promiscuity, DSH, and Restrictive Eating.  
Clinical Subgroup: AIM NI predicting Aggression, Impulsive Spending, Restrictive 
Eating and DSH. CTQ SF predicting Nicotine Smoking, DSH and Restrictive Eating.  
Non clinical Subgroup: AIM NI predicting Binge Eating, Aggression, Impulsive 
Spending, DSH, and Restrictive Eating. CTQ SF predicting Aggression, DSH, 
Excessive Internet Use, and Restrictive Eating.  
 
5.3.2.1 Full Group Analyses. Evidence supporting the first three of Baron and Kenny’s 
(1986) steps are reported in Table 5.3. Step four was tested by regressing the criterion 
(e.g., MBQ composite) onto the predictor (AIM NI or CTQ SF) in block 1 of the Chapter V     122 
 
analysis and onto the AAQ in block 2. Results, reported in Table 5.4, indicated that the 
AAQ fully mediated the effect of AIM NI→MBQ composite scores (β = .27 to β = .11). 
The AAQ also partially mediated the effect of AIM NI→Binge Eating (β = .21 to β = 
.15), Aggression (β = .23 to β = .14), Impulsive Spending (β = .22 to β = .16), DSH (β = 
.31 to β = .12), and Restrictive Eating (β = .23 to β = .15). With regard to the CTQ SF, 
the AAQ partially mediated the effect of CTQ SF→MBQ composite scores (β = .28 to 
β = .19), Aggression (β = .25 to β = .19), DSH (β = .36 to β = .26), and Restrictive 
Eating (β = .21 to β = .16). The AAQ did not, however, predict unique variance in 
Nicotine Smoking. Furthermore, in block 2 of analysis, neither the AAQ nor the CTQ 
SF predicted unique variance in Sexual Promiscuity. 
 
5.3.2.2 Clinical Subgroup Analyses. Evidence supporting mediational steps one to three 
in the clinical subgroup is reported in Table 5.3. Testing step four (see Table 5.4), it was 
found that the AAQ fully mediated the relationship between AIM NI→MBQ composite 
scores (β = .23 to β = .08), Aggression (β = .18 to β = .09), and DSH (β = .27 to β = .13). 
For the case of Restrictive Eating, however, the effect of the AAQ was non significant in 
block 2 of analysis. Testing step four with CTQ SF as the predictor indicated that the 
AAQ partially mediated the effect of CTQ SF→MBQ composite scores (β = .25 to β = 
.18), DSH (β = .31 to β = .24), and Restrictive Eating (β = .18 to β = .15).  
 
5.3.2.3 Non Clinical Group. Evidence supporting the first three steps of mediation in 
the data of the non clinical subgroup is reported in Table 5.3.  Results for step four, 
reported in Table 5.4, indicated that the AAQ partially mediated the effect of AIM 
NI→MBQ composite scores (β. = .24 to β. = .13). Furthermore, the AAQ fully mediated 
the relationship between AIM NI→DSH (β. = .24 to β. = .09) and Restrictive Eating (β. 
= .16 to β. = .09) and partially mediated the effect of AIM NI→Aggression (β = .28 to 
β = .18) and Impulsive Spending (β = .28 to β = .22). The AAQ was not, however, 
predictive of Binge Eating when controlling for the effect of AIM NI. Finally, analyses 
with CTQ SF as the predictor showed that the AAQ partially mediated the effect of 
CTQ SF→MBQ composite scores (β = .25 to β = .19), Aggression (β .34 to β = .29), 
DSH (β. = 30 to β. = .23), Excessive Internet Use (β = .19 to β. =.15), and Restrictive 
Eating (β .16 to β = .13).  Chapter V     123 
 
Table 5.4 
Regression Analysis Testing Step Four of Baron and Kenny’s Mediation Criteria in the Full Sample, and Clinical/ Non Clinical Subgroups.   
Full Sample (N = 690) 
AIM NI                       
Criterion     MBQ Composite    Binge Eating    Aggression    Impulsive Spending    DSH    Restrictive Eating   
                           
 Predictor    Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β 
                           
                           
AIM NI  .27
***  .11  .21
***  .15
**  .23
***  .14
**  .22
***  .16
***  .31
***  .12
*  .23
**  .15
** 
AAQ     .29
***     .12
**     .16
***     .11
*     .34
***     .15
** 
F of step    54.46
***  51.45
***  32.07
***  19.99
**  37.96
***  26.10
***  35.85
***  21.23
**  72.00
***  72.06
***  37.86
**  24.69
** 
Overall R
2    .067  .131  .045  .060  .051  .068  .050  .060  .095  .175  .052  .067 
Sobel  6.25
***  2.73
***  3.61
**  2.47
***  7.56
***  3.25
*** 
                           
CTQ SF                       
Criterion    MBQ Composite    Nicotine Smoking    Aggression    Sexual Promiscuity    DSH    Restrictive Eating   
                           
 Predictor    Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β   Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β 
                           
CTQ SF  .28
***  .19
***  .24
***  .22
***  .25
***  .19
***  .12
*  .09  .36
*  .26
*  .21
*  .16
* 
AAQ     .29
***     .07     .18
*     .06     .33
*     .18
* 
F of step    57.12
***  62.33
***  41.30
***  21.30
***  44.56
***  34.15
***  9.60
*  6.08
*  100.7
***  99.72
***  31.92
*  27.35
** 
Overall R
2    .077  .154  .057  .061  .061  .091  .014  .017  .128  .223  .045  .074 
Sobel  5.66
***  1.69  4.08
***  1.56  6.27
***  4.03
** 
***p = <.001 **p = <.01 *p = < .05.  Chapter V     124 
 
 
 
Clinical Subgroup (N = 301) 
AIM NI             
Criterion     MBQ Composite    Aggression    DSH    Restrictive Eating 
                         
 Predictor    Block 1 β  Block 2 β    Block 1 β  Block 2β    Block 1 β  Block 2 β    Block 1 β  Block 2 β 
 
                 
AIM NI  .23
***  .08  .18
**  .09  .27
***  .13    .23
***  .19
** 
AAQ    .28
***     .15
*     .27
***     .08 
F of step  17.00
***  18.60
***  9.48
***  7.14
***  23.21
***  20.93
***  17.11
***  9.21
*** 
Overall R
2  .054  .112  .031  .046  .073  1.24    .055  .059 
Sobel  4.07
***  2.12*  3.19
***    1.13     
                 
CTQ SF           
Criterion    MBQ Composite    Restrictive Eating    DSH   
                     
 Predictor    Block 1 β  Block 1 β    Block 1 β  Block 2 β    Block 1 β  Block 2 β   
CTQ SF  .25
***  .18
***  .18
**  .15
*  .31
***  .24
***   
AAQ     .29
***    .15
*    .28
***   
F of step  18.89
***  23.82
***  10.34
***  8.43
***  30.89
***  30.35
*** 
Overall R
2  .060  .139  .034  .054  .097  .171   
Sobel  3.06
***  2.09
***  3.05
***   
 
***p = <.001 **p = <.01 *p = < .05 
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***p = <.001 **p = <.01 *p = < .05 
 
 
 
Non Clinical Subgroup (N = 389) 
AIM NI                     
Criterion     MBQ Composite    Binge Eating    Aggression    Impulsive Spending    DSH    Restrictive Eating 
                           
 Predictor    Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β 
                         
AIM NI  .24
***  .13
*  .28
***  .24
***  .28
***  .18
**  .28
*  .22
***  .24
***  .09  .16
***  .09 
AAQ     .27
***     .09     .21
***     .13     .32
***     .16
*** 
F of step  17.00
***  18.60
***  33.03
***  18.01
***  32.00
***  24.15
***  32.60
***  19.14
***  23.62
***  31.00
***  9.96
**  9.06
** 
Overall R
2  .054  .112  .079  .086  .077  .112  .078  .091  .060  .140  .025  .045 
Sobel  4.32
***  1.65  3.65
***  2.24
***  5.13
***  2.73
*** 
                         
CTQ SF               
Criterion    MBQ Composite    Aggression    DSH    Excessive Internet Use    Restrictive  Eating 
                       
 Predictor    Block 1 β  Block 1 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β  Block 1 β  Block 2 β 
CTQ SF  .25
***  .19
***  .34
***  .29
***  .30
***  .23
***  .19
***  .15
**  .16
**  .13
* 
AAQ     .27
***    .23
***    .32
***    .15
**    .21
*** 
F of step  25.52
***  24.43
***  49.53
***  37.98
***  37.89
***  43.10
***  14.50
***  11.58
***  10.63
***  11.10
*** 
Overall R
2  .062  .113  .114  .165  .090  .183  .036  .057  .030  .070 
Sobel  3.44
***  3.26
***  3.69
***  2.42
**  2.67
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In summary: this network of findings suggested that experiential avoidance was an 
important variable for understanding the relationship between AIM, CT and MBs. The 
AAQ tended to fully mediate the effect of AIM NI, and partially mediate the effect of 
CTQ SF, on composite MBQ scores. This was echoed in subscale and subgroup 
analyses. Overall, these analyses showed that the AAQ reduced a substantial proportion 
of the effect of AIM NI, and a slightly more moderate proportion of the effect of CTQ 
SF, on many of the criterion measures (e.g., Aggression, DSH). Having found some 
support for the hypothesised models using the traditional Baron and Kenny (1986) 
approach, SEM was employed as a more integrated and thorough test of whether the 
AAQ mediated the relationship between AIM NI, CTQ SF, and the MBQ HOF. 
 
5.3.3 Phase Two Mediation Analyses: SEM 
Phase two of analysis began by re testing the structural reliability of the HOF model. 
This was tested in the full sample and in clinical and non clinical subgroups, using 
statistical procedures previously described in section 4.3.5.  
Results (see Table 5.5, ‘Model A3’) showed that the HOF model provided an 
adequate fit of the full sample data, but differential effects emerged between subgroups. 
Specifically, the HOF model adequately fitted the correlation/covariation matrix of the 
self declared clinical, but not the non clinical, subgroup. For the non clinical subgroup, 
although χ²/df and RMSEA values were acceptable, CFI was not (see Table 5.5). MI 
values suggested that this mis specification was attributable to two unique first order 
factor relations (Excessive Alcohol Use: Sexual Promiscuity and Nicotine Smoking: 
Drug Use) that were not accounted for by the HOF. This suggests that, in this subgroup, 
these pairs of subscales shared unique variance that was not shared with the remaining 
seven subscales. The model was not re specified to accommodate these factor factor 
relations, because adding paths between first order factors would undermine the 
theoretical proposition of a HOF model (i.e., that all first order factor factor relations 
can be accounted for by a single HOF). No further SEM analyses were computed in the 
non clinical group, therefore, because results could not be reliably interpreted (Byrne, 
2001). Testing whether the AAQ predicted HOF variance in the full and clinical 
subgroup (Table 5.5 ‘Model A3 + EA’) showed that the AAQ predicted 28% (β = 0.53, 
p < .001) and 22% (β = 0.47, p < .001) respectively.  Chapter V     127 
 
Table 5.5 
HOF Model Fit Statistics for the Full Sample and Clinical/Non clinical Subgroups 
 
Model Tested  Sample  χ²  df  χ²/df  CFI  RMSEA (90% CI)  PCFI 
Model A3    Full  1837.2  690  2.66  .92  .049 (±.047, .052)  .86 
Model A3   Clinical  1204.8  690  1.75  .93  .050 (±.045, .055)  .87 
Model A3   Non clinical  1520.1  690  2.20  .89  .056 (±.052, .060)  .83 
Model A3 + EA  Full  2627.1  1067  2.46  .91  .046 (±.044, .048)  .86 
Model A3 + EA  Clinical  1722.2  1067  1.61  .92  .045 (±.041, .049)  .87 
Note: ‘Model A3’ = final HOF model (as tested in Study 1); ‘Model A3 + EA’ = HOF model predicted by 
experiential avoidance (as tested in Study 1). 
 
To test for mediation, the relative fit of two models was compared for each predictor 
(AIM NI and CTQ SF). The first of these models (‘Model FM’ (full mediation)) 
proposed that the effect of the predictor on the criterion was indirect and mediated by 
the AAQ. That is to say, paths relating the predictor to the mediator, and the mediator to 
the HOF were included in the model, but a direct path from predictor to the HOF was 
not. The second model (‘Model PM’ (partial mediation)) evaluated the competing 
hypothesis of partial mediation, in which a direct path from predictor to the HOF was 
added. This second model thus proposed direct and indirect effects. Models were 
statistically compared using a chi square difference test (  χ²), which simply subtracts 
the χ²(df) values of ‘Model PM’ from ‘Model FM’ and tests whether the change in χ²  is 
significant. If the addition of the direct path does not significantly improve model fit, 
mediation is implied (see section 3.4.4).  
In each model, AIM NI was modelled as a latent variable with six manifest 
indicators (AIM NI questionnaire items), CT as a latent variable with four manifest 
indicators (CTQ SF subscales, excluding Sexual Abuse), experiential avoidance as a 
latent variable with nine manifest indicators (AAQ questionnaire items), and MBs as a 
HOF with nine first order factors (MBQ subscales) and 40 manifest indicators (MBQ 
questionnaire items). In all analyses that follow, factor loadings (paths from latent 
variable to manifest indicator) for each of the scales were significant at the p = .01 level. 
Furthermore, a large correlated error continued to be implicated between two AIM NI Chapter V     128 
 
items (“My emotions tend to be more intense than those of most people” and “My 
friends say that I am emotional”). This error was thus freely estimated in all analyses. 
 
5.3.3.1 Full Sample Analyses. Models were first tested using the full sample data. AIM 
NI was the predictor in the first set of models and CTQ SF in the second. The overall fit 
of ‘Model FM’ with AIM NI as the predictor was adequate. Although χ² was large and 
significant (χ²(1362) = 3187, p > .001), its ratio to the dfs was close to the optimal value of 
2.00 (χ²/df = 2.33), CFI was within the acceptable range (CFI = 0.90), RMSEA was 
good (RMSEA = .044 (±.042, .046)) and PCFI was acceptable (PCFI = .86). As 
expected, AIM NI significantly predicted the AAQ (β = .72, p < .001), which 
significantly predicted the HOF (β = .53, p < .001). Adding the direct path from AIM 
NI to the HOF (i.e., Model PM) did not significantly improve χ² (χ²(1361) = 3186.8;   χ² = 
0.2, p > .05) and fit indices were unaltered (CFI = .90, RMSEA = .044 (±.042, .046) 
and PCFI = .86). Moreover, accounting for the indirect effect of the AAQ on the HOF, 
the direct effect of AIM NI→HOF was non significant (Figure 5.2 A). These findings 
suggest that the effect of AIM NI on the HOF was mediated by the AAQ.  
The overall fit of ‘Model FM’ with CTQ SF as the predictor was also adequate: 
although χ² was significant (χ²(1260) = 3151.9), the χ²/df ratio was close to the optimal 
value of 2.00 (χ²/df = 2.50), CFI was within the acceptable range (CFI = .90), RMSEA 
was good (.047 (±.045, .049)), and PCFI acceptable (.86). Beta values indicated that 
CTQ SF significantly predicted the AAQ (β = .38, p < .001), which significantly 
predicted the HOF (β = .55, p < .001). Adding the direct path from CTQ SF to the HOF 
did not alter CFI, RMSEA and PCFI values. This direct path was, however, significant 
(Figure 5.2 A), and χ² was significantly improved (χ²(1259) = 3130.3;   χ² = 21.6, p > 
.05). These results suggest that the AAQ partially mediated the effect of CTQ SF on the 
HOF.  
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  Figure 5.2 Simplified SEM Mediation Models showing Beta Coefficients for Direct and 
Indirect Effects for the Full Sample (A) and Self Declared Clinical (B) Subgroup. 
* p < .05, **p < .001.  
† = Beta coefficient for the direct effect of the predictor (NAI, CT) on the HOF 
when the effect of experiential avoidance is not controlled for. CT = Childhood Trauma, NAI = Negative 
Affect Intensity; HOF = Higher Order factor. 
 
5.3.3.2 Clinical Subgroup Analyses. In the clinical subgroup, the overall fit of ‘Model 
FM’ with AIM NI as the predictor was adequate: although χ² was large and significant 
(χ²(1362) = 2138.3), its ratio to the dfs was good (χ²/df = 1.57) and the CFI value was 
acceptable (CFI = .91). Furthermore, RMSEA (.044 (±.040, .047)) and PCFI values 
were good (.87). Beta values indicated that AIM NI significantly predicted the AAQ (β 
= .72, p < .001), which significantly predicted the HOF (β = .47, p < .001). Adding the 
direct path from AIM NI to the HOF did not significantly improve model fit (χ²(1361) = 
2137.8; χ²   = 0.5, p < .05) and fit indices were unaffected by the addition of this path. 
Furthermore, accounting for mediated effects of the AAQ, the direct path from AIM 
NI→HOF was not significant (Figure 5.2. B).  
The overall fit of ‘Model FM’ with CTQ SF as the predictor was also acceptable 
(χ²(1260) = 2040,  χ²/df = 1.62, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .046 (±.042, .049) and PCFI = .86). Chapter V     130 
 
CTQ SF significantly predicted AAQ (β = .29, p < .001) and the AAQ significantly 
predicted the HOF (β = .48, p < .001). Adding the direct path from CTQ SF to the HOF 
(i.e., ‘Model PM’) did not affect fit indices (CFI = .91, RMSEA = .046 (±.042, .049) 
and PCFI = .86), but again, χ² was significantly improved at the α = 0.05 level of 
significance (χ²(1259) = 2035; χ²   = 5, p > .05). Furthermore, the direct path from CTQ 
SF→HOF was significant (Figure 5.2 B). Results from the clinical subgroup analyses 
thus suggest that the AAQ fully mediated the effect of AIM NI on HOF and partially 
mediated the effect of the CTQ SF.  
 
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Study Findings 
Previous research has shown that intense negative affect and childhood trauma are 
reliably predictive of engaging in MBs. These relationships have been reported by 
studies using both cross sectional and longitudinal designs, and ‘clinical’ and ‘non 
clinical’ samples. These studies have, however, typically focused on the prediction of 
one type of behaviour in isolation (e.g., alcohol abuse or dysfunctional eating). If 
childhood trauma and intense negative affect do increase the risk of engaging in MBs, it 
is important to elucidate the processes through which these factors have their effects. 
This is because the identification of underlying psychological processes can guide 
focused treatments designed to target them. Such research will be especially useful if it 
can identify common processes that underlie a range of clinically relevant behavioural 
problems. This is not only because these problems commonly co occur but also because 
such research may guide parsimonious and focused treatments. With this in mind, this 
study aimed to test an ACT derived conceptualisation of how these variables interrelate. 
It was predicted that individuals who are predisposed to NAI and/or who have 
experienced CT are more likely to engage in MBs in an attempt to prevent, escape, or 
reduce contact with unwanted private experiences. A fully elaborated account of these 
relations was obtained by using two different statistical techniques and by using three 
different variants of the criterion (i.e., MBQ composite scores, MBQ subscales, HOF).  
Before discussing the main mediational analysis in detail, four more general aspects 
of the data will be considered. Firstly, additional support for the MBQ was obtained 
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between the MBQ, CTQ SF and AIM NI were found. Furthermore, the MBQ was again 
able to detect significant differences between the clinical and non clinical subgroups. 
This was obtained using a more refined definition of ‘clinical’, which included the 
measurement of medicinal treatment for a psychological problem. The present findings 
thus replicate and extend the reliability and validity values of the MBQ that were 
reported in study 1.  
Secondly, consistent with study 1, descriptive statistics suggested that the current 
method for accessing a clinical group had some validity. Relative to their non clinical 
counterparts, these participants were more likely to report CT, to experience intense 
negative affect, and to have high levels of experiential avoidance. Thus, although there 
is little detail about the nature of this group’s treatment history, data support the idea 
that they were drawn from a clinical population.  
Thirdly, also consistent with study 1, correlations showed that Restrictive Eating and 
Excessive Exercise tended not to co vary with the other behaviours. One explanation for 
this may be that these two behaviours are associated with other variables such as trait 
perfectionism and the need for control, both of which are undermined by, for example, 
intoxication and drug use. Although Restrictive Eating was not found to be co morbid 
with other behaviours, it was still associated with high AAQ scores. This pattern of 
results may thus be indicative of a more complex mediation/moderation model in which 
other variables, such as perfectionism or impulsivity, moderate the expression of 
experiential avoidance. Further research into the manifestation of different behavioural 
topographies is required (see chapter 8).  
Fourthly, consistent with study 1, the AAQ tended to be correlated with a greater 
range of behaviours in the clinical group than the non clinical group. Although these 
patterns are merely trends, if established reliably, they could support the proposition that 
high levels of experiential avoidance relate to a broader range of behavioural 
topographies. Taking this further, MBs may be more likely to hang together (or co vary) 
in groups where experiential avoidance is high. Although speculative, this interpretation 
is consistent with the SEM analyses, which found that the HOF model adequately fitted 
the correlation/covariation matrix of the clinical, but not the non clinical, group. In the 
non clinical group, several factor factor correlations were found, suggesting that 
covariances could not be accurately modelled by one single factor. Interesting, this was 
not consistent with the results of study 1, which found that in a predominantly non Chapter V     132 
 
clinical group, the HOF model provided a good overall fit of the data. One interpretation 
of this finding is that, if high experiential avoidance is a mechanism through which the 
behaviours hang together, then deliberately sampling a group of individuals with low 
levels of that variable (i.e., the non clinical group) would tend to undermine the 
integrity of the HOF model. This interpretation cannot be verified, however, because 
other between group differences that were not measured may also have produced the 
same outcome.  
Now considering the main findings, support for the proposed mediational models 
was found. AIM NI and CTQ SF were both found to be significantly predictive of AAQ 
and MBQ scores. In keeping with study 1, the AAQ was also significantly predictive of 
the tendency to engage in MBs. In fact, the present study found that, as compared to 
study 1, the AAQ predicted a far greater amount of HOF variance. This may be 
accounted for by demographic differences. For example, relative to study 1, the present 
sample had a greater proportion of ‘clinical’ respondents, a smaller proportion of 
student respondents, and a tendency towards greater experiential avoidance.  
With regard to the mediational role of experiential avoidance, both regression and 
SEM analyses suggested that the AAQ accounted for a meaningful proportion of the 
effect of AIM NI and CTQ SF on most of the behavioural criterion variables (i.e., MBQ 
composite scores, independent subscales and HOF). Broadly speaking, the AAQ tended 
to fully mediate the effect of AIM NI and partially mediate the effect of CTQ SF on 
individual and co occurring behaviours. These findings thus support the conclusion that 
experiential avoidance is an important variable for understanding how MBs become 
established and maintained. Bearing in mind the limitations of the present study’s cross 
sectional design, results are supportive of the suggestion that people who experience 
negative affect intensely are more likely to rely on avoidance strategies to try to escape 
or modify that experience. This tendency to engage in experiential avoidance, rather 
than the experience of intense negative affect per se, appeared to contribute to the 
development of MB patterns. Similarly, for the case of CT, results supported the 
hypothesis that early traumatic experiences affect future risk taking, in part, because 
they foster heightened experiential avoidance. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest 
that, consistent with Hayes et al.’s (1996) theorising, MBs can be usefully understood as 
a behavioural class, which is negatively reinforced by its ability to provide temporary 
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5.4.2 Methodological Limitations 
Several methodological limitations of the present study must be taken into account. 
Most importantly, cross sectional research cannot determine causation. Although the 
constructs on which the predictor measures were based have clear antecedent status, 
cross sectional research cannot unpack the temporal relationships between them and 
mediator/criterion variables. Complementary longitudinal research (e.g., using latent 
growth curve analysis; see Hoyle, 2008) may be a suitable method for confirming 
whether these causal paths hold when tested across time. Although this is a particularly 
challenging task, natural experiments could provide one possible method. For example, 
Rutter and his colleagues have conducted a series of longitudinal studies following a 
cohort of English and Romanian Adoptees (ERA) from early childhood to adolescents 
(e.g., Rutter, 2004). This design has enabled them to track the effect of early childhood 
experiences on later functioning in a manner that exhibits acceptable internal validity.  
A second limitation for consideration is the reliance on self report data. Although 
this measurement approach is methodologically justifiable, it is subject to many sources 
of bias (see section 3.2.1). This is an inevitable limitation shared by most published 
research investigating childhood trauma. The final limitation concerns sample bias. 
These findings were again obtained from a predominantly female sample. Furthermore, 
community sample participants were restricted to those individuals with access to the 
internet. Similarly, the clinical subgroup was ‘self declared’ (although demographically 
it resembled a true clinical sample). Given that the model was supported in this sample, 
future research should now extend it, in a more confirmatory way, to a better defined 
clinical group. This could include, for example, a group currently awaiting treatment 
from the psychological services.  
 
5.4.3 Implications 
The current findings contribute to a growing evidence base that identifies concepts of 
avoidance and escape from private experience as central to the understanding of MBs 
(e.g., Batten et al., 2001; Cooper et al., 2003; Hayes et al., 2001; Hayes et al., 1996). 
These findings are the first, however, to suggest that such a wide range of behavioural 
topographies share a common experiential avoidance function. Moreover, they are the 
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comorbid risk taking. For this reason, the present analogue study has substantial 
implications for clinical practice.  
Personality predispositions and aversive childhood experiences are particularly 
difficult, if not impossible, to modify in treatment. For example, personality 
predispositions are rigid and resistant to change, especially in PD populations (Beck, 
Freeman, & Davis, 2001). Similarly, past experiences cannot be altered. If experiential 
avoidance is one of the vehicles through which these risk factors impact on maladaptive 
behavioural patterns, as the present data suggest, any technique designed to reduce it is, 
at least in theory, likely to reduce MBs. For example, teaching patients to experience 
negative affect without attempts to escape or modify those experiences (e.g., acceptance 
techniques) should in principle reduce the occurrence of MBs. A similar effect should 
also occur if the associative link between idiosyncratic unwanted private experiences 
and behavioural engagement can be extinguished (e.g., mindfulness techniques). 
Because ACT can effectively reduce experiential avoidance, it presents itself as a good 
candidate treatment for reducing co occurring MBs. Similarly, other treatments that aim 
to break down the link between internal experiences and mindless reaction to those 
experiences should also, in principle, have valuable clinical effects. Early data supports 
this proposition. For example, preliminary data suggests that mindfulness based and 
acceptance based techniques are useful for reducing the occurrence of substance misuse 
and DSH (e.g., Hayes, Wilson, et al., 2004; Gratz & Gunderson, 2006; Marlatt et al., 
2004). 
 
5.4.4 Summary 
Results from the present study suggest that experiential avoidance is an important 
variable for understanding how NAI and CT affect the tendency to engage in MBs. 
These finding add to research that has similarly established the avoidance of unwanted 
internal experiences as a key variable for understanding the relationship between 
aversive situational antecedents (e.g., parental criticism, sexual victimisation, adverse 
life event), risky trait like predispositions (e.g., heightened emotionality, impulsivity, 
anxiety sensitivity), and a range of behavioural problems (see section 2.1.5). These 
behavioural problems have included, for example, BPD symptoms (Cheavens et al., 
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motivated drinking (Stewart et al., 2002), PTSD (Marx & Sloan, 2005), and suicidal 
ideation (Lynch et al., 2004). Together, these findings suggest that experiential 
avoidance is an important variable for understanding several psychological problems. It 
thus seems reasonable to propose that ACT may be a useful treatment for a 
heterogeneous group of patients with complex and entrenched disorders (i.e., treatment 
resistant patients). This is by virtue of the fact that excessive experiential avoidance 
should, in theory, underpin the many different psychological difficulties that this group 
present with. A logical next step, based on the 4 stage methodological guidelines 
discussed in chapter 3, could thus be to pilot test ACT (Hayes et al., 1999) for this 
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CHAPTER VI 
Study 3. A Pre-Post Pilot Uncontrolled Trial Investigating ACT for a 
Heterogeneous Group of Treatment Resistant Patients 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Experiential avoidance has been the primary focus of the previous two studies. These 
studies, in conjunction with existing research (see section 2.1.5 and 6.1.1), suggest that 
excessive levels of experiential avoidance may maintain several topographically 
dissimilar psychological problems. It thus logically follows that ACT, which aims to 
reduce experiential avoidance, should be able to produce good outcomes for patients 
with complex, entrenched and co morbid psychological problems. This should be the 
case even when the topography of those problems differs across participants (e.g., the 
group is symptomatically heterogeneous). This is because the heterogeneous symptoms 
of this group should, according to ACT theory, be commonly maintained by high levels 
of experiential avoidance (e.g., Hayes et al., 1996). Based on the methodological 
guidelines discussed in chapter 3, the aim of this study was to pilot test the novel 
application of ACT to a heterogeneous group of treatment resistant patients. That is, 
patients who failed to benefit from, or relapsed following, previous psychological 
treatment. 
 
6.1.1 ACT for Treatment Resistant Patients 
The link between ACT and treatment resistance is not simply a logical one. Rather, 
several studies have implicated an important connection between experiential avoidance 
and treatment resistance. For example, studies on BPD, arguably the most treatment 
resistant of diagnostic groups (e.g., see Lieb et al., 2004), have suggested that 
experiential avoidance may play a primary role in entrenched and hard to treat 
symptoms. For example, Rosenthal et al. (2005) reported that the tendency to suppress 
thoughts fully mediated the relationship between NAI and BPD symptoms. Similarly, in 
a BPD sample, Gratz, Tull, and Gunderson (2008) found that controlling for the effect 
of impulsivity and NAI, experiential avoidance was the only significant predictor of 
BPD symptoms. The results of study 1 and 2 add to this literature, implicating 
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known to commonly co occur in treatment resistant patients (see chapter 1). 
Complementary of these findings, research has also found that excessive avoidance of 
internal experiences is associated with chronic and/or co morbid symptoms (e.g., 
Begotka, Woods, & Wetterneck, 2004; Forsyth et al., 2003; Roemer, Salters, Raffa, & 
Orsillo, 2005), poor treatment outcomes (e.g., Hayes, Beevers, Feldman, Laurenceau, & 
Perlman, 2005; Roemer Litz, Orsillo, & Wagner, 2001) and vulnerability to relapse 
(e.g., Moos & Moos, 2006; Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994). For example, investigating 
the effect of experiential avoidance on relapse in a sample of alcoholics, Westrup (1999; 
cited in Chawla & Ostafin, 2007) reported that the use of avoidance strategies during 
stressful life events was uniquely predictive of relapse, above and beyond the effect of 
the stressor itself. Together, these findings implicate a link between experiential 
avoidance, symptom chronicity, treatment resistance, and relapse vulnerability.  
In keeping with these implied links, a few trials suggest that ACT and ACT like 
techniques may be effective for treatment resistant patients. Firstly, in a treatment 
resistant group of polysubstance abusers, Hayes, Wilson, et al. (2004) found that, 
compared to methadone maintenance and a 12 step facilitation programme, ACT was 
associated with lowest drug use 6 months after therapy ended. Similarly, Gratz & 
Gunderson (2006) conducted a pilot RCT (N = 24), which delivered a hybrid of ACT 
DBT to self harming BPD patients. They reported that, relative to TAU, ACT 
DBT+TAU produced significant reductions in DSH, psychological distress and BPD 
symptoms. These positive findings were found even though the intervention was group 
based and time limited (14 weeks). Thirdly, Dimidjian et al. (2006) conducted an RCT 
comparing CBT to an ACT like intervention (Behavioural Activation (BA), see section 
2.3.3). Although treatment effects were comparable for patients with mild depression, 
patients with more chronic symptoms (N = 61) demonstrated significant improvements 
following BA and medication but not CBT. Ma and Teasdale (2004) have similarly 
reported that the effects of MBCT are moderated by baseline chronicity, finding that 
MBCT obtained better effects for participants with a chronic history of recurrent 
depression compared to those with less chronic histories.  
To summarise: theoretically orientated analyses of experiential avoidance and a 
small number of acceptance based outcome trials converge to suggest that ACT could 
be a promising treatment for treatment resistant patients, even when delivered as a time 
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significantly improve the global psychological functioning of this group, as evidenced 
by improvements in psychological symptoms, quality of life, and the tendency to 
engage in MBs (see section 6.1.2). Furthermore, based on the ACT model, it can be 
predicted that these effects will be mediated by reductions in experiential avoidance and 
cognitive fusion, and increased mindfulness and commitment to valued action (see 
section 2.1). Changes in the mere frequency of unwanted private experience should, 
however, be unrelated to outcome. The methodological considerations for exploring 
these predictions are discussed below.  
 
6.1.2 Methodological Considerations 
The mere fact that ACT has not previously been evaluated for treatment resistant 
patients informs many of the decisions regarding the design of such a trial. Chapter 3 
discussed pilot trials as a recommended method for evaluating novel treatments. Pilot 
trials deliver treatment to a small clinical sample, aiming to establish whether it holds 
promise as a plausible treatment for the target group. This approach is more ethical and 
economic than piloting a treatment on large samples using powered and controlled 
trials. It also provides an opportunity to refine techniques and to develop treatment 
manuals. A variety of designs can be used (see section 3.3.2), of which the pre post 
uncontrolled trial is particularly popular (e.g., Bohus, et al., 2000, N = 24; Dimeff, 
Rizvi, Brown, & Linehan, 2000, N = 12; Telch, Argas, & Linehan, 2000, N = 10). This 
prospective experimental design enables one to explore the effects of an integrated 
treatment package on a number of patients concurrently. It is therefore suited to pilot 
testing group based treatments.  Thus, in keeping with previous research, a pre post 
uncontrolled design was used.  
Pilot trials typically evaluate treatment outcomes using self report measures. These 
are favourable because they are unobtrusive, inexpensive, and easy to administer. They 
also enable direct comparisons with other published trials. Furthermore, the use of well 
validated diagnostic measures helps others to replicate and extend the research (see Ost, 
2008). A particular challenge in piloting ACT for a heterogeneous group of patients is 
obtaining outcome measures that are applicable and sensitive to the variety of symptoms 
this group present with. Furthermore, because ACT aims to construct a new repertoire 
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domains are necessary for obtaining a detailed account of treatment effects. Research on 
ACT mechanisms of change has tended to exclusively focus on experiential avoidance. 
This is partly because no validated measures have been developed for the measurement 
of self as context, valued living, and cognitive fusion. The present study aimed to 
explore these other mechanisms of change, but thus necessarily relied on un validated 
measures.  
Piloting a new treatment raises two further methodological issues. Firstly, treatment 
guides have usually not been developed for the patient group in question. This was 
overcome in the present study by adapting an existing self help manual so as to fit a 
group based and generic treatment approach (see section 6.2.4.2). Secondly, by 
definition, pilot trials are conducted before data exists to suggest that the treatment will 
be effective for the target group. It is therefore prudent to exclude the most ‘at risk’ of 
patients from pilot investigations (see section 6.2.2). 
 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Design 
A pre post, uncontrolled, pilot trial was used.  The independent variable was a 16 week, 
group based ACT intervention, which all participants attended. The dependent variables 
(outcome measures) included a measure of global symptom severity, quality of life, PD 
symptoms, depression, and alcohol misuse. Mediator variables included a measure of 
experiential avoidance, thought frequency and believability, valued living and 
mindfulness. Outcome and process variables were measures at baseline (T1), post 
treatment (T2), 6 month follow up (T3) and 12 month follow up (T4) and repeated 
measures, within group comparisons were made. 
 
6.2.2 Participants 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Local Research Ethics Committee (LREC) 
before any participants were recruited to the trial. The inclusion criterion was: “patients 
who had already received at least one previous episode of psychological treatment, 
lasting for at least 8 sessions, and who were currently being re referred to the adult 
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definition was consistent with current research (e.g., Amsterdam et al., 2001; Kenny & 
Williams, 2007). The exclusion criteria were: (a) a current drug or alcohol dependency 
problem (defined using the DSM IV dependence criteria), (b) schizophrenia or other 
psychotic disorder, (c) Anorexia Nervosa and a BMI of < 16, (d) a learning disability, 
or (e) DSH in the previous 6 months (defined using Kreitman’s (1977) criteria
19).  
Treatment resistant patients were recruited from GP referrals to the General Adult 
Mental Health Services (The Chines) and from the waiting list for treatment at The 
Chines and the Intensive Psychological Therapies Service (IPTS). The IPTS is a 
specialised tertiary service for patients with entrenched problems reaching diagnostic 
criteria for a PD
20. Figure 6.1 depicts the flow of participants through recruitment and 
testing stages of the trial. The details of 118 treatment seeking patients were reviewed 
(see section 6.2.4), of which 24 met the inclusion criteria and 14 consented to the trial. 
Four participants dropped out of the trial leaving a total N = 10 (see Table 6.1 for 
demographic information, Table 6.3 for baseline means and standard deviations and 
Appendix B for more detailed information on each participant). Patient records showed 
that two patients had a history of chronic DSH, three of Anorexia Nervosa, one of 
Bulimia Nervosa, two of illicit drug use, and six reported high levels of alcohol use (not 
reaching dependency criteria). Eight participants described at least one of their previous 
treatments as “Cognitive Therapy” or “Cognitive Behaviour Therapy” in nature.  
 
6.2.3 Materials 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained prior to the completion of study 1 and 2. 
Because the LREC required that all measures used in this trial had been piloted and 
validated, the MBQ (see study 1) could not be used. Patient records were thus used to 
obtain an account of the patient’s tendency to engage in MBs (see section 6.2.2) and the 
Alcohol Dependency subscale of the Millon Mutliaxial Clinical Inventory III (MMCI 
III; Millon, 1994) was used as an outcome measure (described below)
21. 
                                                           
19 “(1)  Nonfatal, intentional self injurious behaviours resulting in actual tissue damage, illness, or risk of 
death; or (2) any ingestion of drugs or other substances not prescribed or in excess of prescription with clear 
intent to cause bodily harm or death.” 
20 It is usual practice for The Chines to refer more chronic patients to the IPTS. 
21 The MCMI III was used to index alcohol use because it is standard practice at the IPTS for all patients to 
complete this measure as part of clinical audit. Chapter VI     141 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Flow Chart of Patient Recruitment to the Trial.  
Note: PEAK is a DHFT database used to review the patients’ history of psychological treatment (see section 
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Table 6.1 
 Demographic and Baseline Statistics of Treatment Completers 
Demographics/Baseline Symptoms     N = 10 
Mean Age (years)  41 
Gender (% female)  90% 
Currently working or in education
*  40% 
Medication (% yes)  80% 
Mean no. previosu therapeutic episodes (range)  3.00 (2 6) 
Mean no. previous sessions (range)  78 (14 300) 
Median no. months since last treatment (range)
 **   24 (2 84) 
Clinical range for depression (%)  90% 
Clinical range for GSI (%):  90% 
Clinical range for 1 SCL 90 domain  30% 
 Clinical range in up to five SCL 90 domains   60% 
Clinical range in six or more SCL 90 domains  10% 
PD Lifetime Criteria (%)  50% 
*At start of ACT groups. **Calculated from end of last treatment to start of ACT group.  
 
 
6.2.3.1 Primary Outcome Measures. The following outcome and process measures were 
completed at all assessment periods (i.e., T1, T2, T3, and T4) except the SCID II, which 
was administered at T1 and T3 only.  
The Revised Symptom Check List  90 (SCL 90; Derogatis, 1993). This 90 item, self 
report inventory measures nine acute psychiatric symptoms (Somatisation, Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder, Interpersonal Sensitivity, Depression, Anxiety, Hostility, Phobic 
Anxiety, Paranoid Ideation, and Psychotocism). Items, rated on a 5 point scale (0 – not 
at all to 4 – extremely), measure levels of distress in each domain over the past 7 days 
(e.g., “How distressed were you by having urges to beat, injure, or harm someone?” for 
Hostility). The Global Severity Index (GSI), used here as a primary outcome measure, is 
the mean score across acute disorders. The psychiatric outpatients’ GSI Mean = 1.26; 
SD = 0.68, and the non psychiatric Mean = 0.31; SD = 0.31 (Detogatis, 1993). The GSI 
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The World Health Organisation Quality of Life (WHOQOL; Skevington, Lofty, & 
O’Connell, 2004). This measure is a 26 item, cross culturally comparable device for 
assessing four domains of quality of life: Physical Health, Psychological Health, Social 
Relationships, and Environment (e.g., “How satisfied are you with yourself” for 
Psychological Health). Each domain includes 3 8 items, rated on a scale ranging from 1 
(not at all/very poor) to 5 (an extreme amount/very good). Scores are transformed for 
compatibility with WHOQOL 100, and high scores indicate good quality of life. 
Respectable psychometric properties have been reported in both clinical and non 
clinical samples (e.g., α = .97; Skevington, Carse, & Williams, 2001). Hawthorne, 
Herrman, and Murphy (2006) reported the following non clinical norms: Physical 
Health (Mean = 73.5; SD = 18.1), Psychological Health (Mean = 70.6; SD = 14), Social 
Relationships (Mean = 71.5; SD = 18.2), Environment (Mean = 74.83; SD = 13.0), and 
total WHOQOL (Mean = 72.61; SD = 15.83). Clinical norms are not yet available. Test 
retest reliability values indicate acceptable stability over a 4 week delay (r = .71 to r = 
.92; Taylor,
 Myers,
 Simpson, McPherson, & Weatherall, 2004; Naumann, & Byrne, 
2004, respectively).  
The Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI II; Beck, Brown, & Steer, 1996). The BDI II 
is a 21 item self report inventory measuring attitudes and symptoms characteristic of 
depression. Each item has four different phrasings of increasing intensity (e.g., “I don’t 
feel I’m being punished” (0) /”I feel I may be punished” (1) /”I expect to be punished” 
(2) /”I feel I am being punished” (3)). Scores thus range from 0 63. Authors reported 
good internal consistency (α = .86) and split half reliability values (α = .93). Dozois, 
Dobson, and Ahnbery (1998) reported a non psychiatric Mean = 8.9; SD = 12.36, and 
Beck et al., (1996) reported a psychiatric Mean = 22.45; SD = 12.75. High test retest 
values have been reported: r = .93 (Beck et al., 1996), r = .96 (Sprinkle et al., 2002).  
The MCMI III Alcohol Dependency Subscale (Millon, 1994). The MCMI II is a 175 
item questionnaire that measures 14 personality disorders and 10 Axis I syndromes 
based on DSM IV classification system. The Alcohol Dependency subscale (ADS) was 
used in this trial as an indicator of alcohol misuse. This subscale is measured using 15 
items (e.g., “I have a great deal of trouble trying to control my impulse to drink in 
excess”) that are rated using a ‘true/false’ response format. Scores of greater than 85 
indicate clinical levels of symptomatology and scores greater than 75 indicate a trait 
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The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM IV Axis II Disorders (SCID II: First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996). The SCID II is a 140 item, semi structured 
interview organised by DSM IV PD diagnosis. It thus measures: Avoidant, Dependent, 
Obsessive Compulsive, Passive Aggressive, Depressive, Paranoid, Schizotypal, 
Schizoid, Histrionic, Narcissistic, Borderline, and Antisocial PD. Items are rated as ‘1’ 
– symptom not present, ‘2’ – threshold, and ‘3’   symptom present. The number of ‘3’ 
ratings per PD indicates its presence or absence. Clinical cut offs differ across 
subscales. The SCID II has shown adequate internal consistency (mean α across 
subscales = .82, range .61 to .97; see Maffei, et al., 1997) and inter rater reliability 
values have varied from kappa .53 to .80 (see First et al., 1996). I was trained by 
reviewing the SCID II manual (Spitzer, Wiliam, Gibbon, & First, 1989), reviewing and 
rating SCID IIs previously administered by IPTS clinicians, and role play. I was trained 
to a level of 80% concordance with IPTS clinicians’ ratings. Moreover, 20% of all 
SCID IIs administered in the course of this research were second rated by two 
independent assessors (using audio recordings). Inter rater reliability for ‘PD present 
versus absent’ was kappa = .72 (92% agreement). Inter rator reliability for ‘3’ ratings 
(i.e., symptom present versus threshold or absent) was kappa = .61 (82% agreement). 
These values are acceptable relative to published research (see First et al., 1996). 
 
6.2.3.2 Process Measures. Four process measures were administered. 
The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003). This 15 
item, self report inventory measures the frequency of daily mindful states (e.g., “I find 
myself doing things without paying attention”). Items are rated on a scale ranging from 
1 (never) to 6 (always) and high scores indicate high mindful awareness. The MAAS 
has shown adequate psychometric properties (α = .86, 4 week test retest reliability r = 
.81) and has been validated in clinical and non clinical samples (Brown & Ryan). 
Authors reported a non clinical Mean = 59.6 (SD = 9.6), and in a mixed group of 
psychiatric outpatients, Ree and Craigie (2007) reported Mean = 49.2 (SD = 17.1). 
The Thought Frequency and Believability Questionnaire (TFQ/TBQ). This 
instrument, adapted from Bach and Hayes (2002), measures the frequency and 
believability of unwanted/intrusive thoughts and feelings. Respondents rated: (a) How 
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(1   never to 7   almost constantly), and (b) How believable and meaningful those 
thoughts/feelings were (0   not at all real and/or meaningful to 10   very real and/or 
meaningful; see Appendix C). No norms are available.  
The AAQ (Hayes, Stroshal, et al., 2004). The AAQ (described fully in study 1) is a 9 
item measure of experiential avoidance. Norms for non clinical populations are reported 
to range from Mean = 3.57 to Mean = 3.90; SD = 0.82 (Hayes, Stroshal, et al., 2004). 
Authors also reported M = 4.66 as an upper quartile score for clinical populations.  
The Valued Living  Questionnaire (VLQ; K. Wilson, unpublished). The VLQ is a 10 
item questionnaire which measures how consistent a participant’s behaviour is with 10 
pre defined valued domains; family, marriage, parenting, friends, work, educational 
training, recreation, spirituality, citizenship, and physical well being. Participants’ rate 
how important each domain is to them (0 not at all important to 2 very important) and 
how frequently, in the last week, they have acted in a way that is consistent with that 
value (0 not at all to 3 more than four times; see Appendix C). Scores are computed by 
subtracting value consistency from value importance, producing a discrepancy score. 
No psychometric data were available for this measure. 
 
6.2.3.2 Get out of Your Mind and into Your Life (Hayes & Smith, 2005). The design of 
the intervention was based on the chapters of this self help work book (see section 
6.2.4.3). Homework activities were also drawn from this resource.  
 
6.2.4 Procedure 
6.2.4.1 Recruitment. A timeline of the study procedure is depicted in Figure 6.2. On a 
weekly basis, over two 4 month periods, I reviewed GP referral letters directed to The 
Chines, followed up referrals from The Chines and IPTS, and reviewed waiting lists 
from both sites. The PEAK database
22 was used to establish whether potential 
participants met the inclusion criterion. Patients meeting this criterion were sent an 
information pack (see Appendix D) that described the aims of the study and invited 
them to an individual assessment at the IPTS. This was conducted by an ACT trained 
                                                           
22 PEAK is a DHFT database that stores patients’ involvement with the psychological services. PEAK 
shows whether a patient has had previous therapy and, if so, when, with whom, and number of sessions 
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clinician and was designed to establish whether the patient fulfilled any exclusion 
criteria. Patients meeting the necessary criteria were invited to join the trial and offered 
a week to consider whether they would like to take part. Consenting participants either 
completed a consent form at this session or at the pre intervention assessment (see 
section 6.2.4.2). The GPs of consenting participants were sent information about the 
trial via post (see Appendix D). 
6.2.4.2 Pre Intervention Assessment. Consenting patients received questionnaire 
packs by post and were booked in for a formal, pre intervention interview (with 
myself). This interview began by obtaining information on the patient’s treatment 
history, and this information was supplemented by details from their file and the PEAK 
database. The SCID II was then administered to assess (a) the patient’s lifetime 
experiences of PD symptoms (diagnostic criterion) and (b) symptoms for the 12 months 
immediately preceding treatment (symptomatic criterion). This distinguished between 
lifetime history and recent PD symptoms, thus providing a baseline against which post 
treatment interviews could be compared.  
6.2.4.3 Intervention. Two ACT treatment groups were run sequentially (see Figure 
6.2). The first group (N = 6) was run by two ACT trained Consultant Clinical 
Psychologists (therapist one and therapist two)
 23 and the second (N = 4) by an ACT 
trained Consultant Clinical Psychologist (therapist one) and an ACT trained 
Occupational Psychologist (therapist three). Clinicians received regular telephone 
supervision from an author of the original treatment manual (Dr. Kelly Wilson), who 
provided feedback on audio recordings of group sessions and verified that the content 
was ACT.  
ACT groups consisted of 16, 2.5 hour group sessions with a 20 minute break. The 
content of weekly/bi weekly sessions was informed by the self help work book ‘Get out 
of Your Mind and into Your Life’ (Hayes & Smith, 2005). A synopsis of the content of 
weekly sessions is depicted in Table 6.2. For a more detailed account and in session 
examples, refer to Appendix E. 
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Figure 6.2 Study Timeline 
Note: T1 = pre treatment, T2 = post treatment, T3 = 6 month follow up, T4 = 12 month follow up. 
 
The first half of all session began with a mindfulness activity followed by a review of 
the exercise and a review of the previous homework tasks. Mindfulness activities 
differed each week. Early sessions aimed to develop mindful awareness of internal 
sensations such as mindfulness of the breath, of sights, and of touch. Latter sessions 
aimed to develop mindful awareness of thoughts, emotions, and memories. Early 
sessions were fully guided by clinicians, but latter sessions were more prompted than 
guided. In reviewing these exercises, participants offered to discuss their experience 
rather than be addressed in turn. The second half of each therapy session focused on a 
weekly theme, involved didactic and experiential learning, and closed with a reflective 
review and homework setting.  
The first stage of treatment was concerned with Creative Hopefulness (see Figure 
2.3, section 2.2.1). The clinicians’ focus in this stage was to explore the patients’ 
psychological difficulties and to help them recognise that they have been relating to 
these difficulties as if they can, and must, be controlled and eliminated (Hayes et al., 
1999). Through a process of Socratic questioning, requiring the participant to reflect on 
the short and long term effectiveness of this approach, this stage was designed to 
undermine the participants’ faith in this ‘control and eliminate’ strategy. For example, 
“suffering inventories” were used to (a) elicit the participants’ key psychological 
difficulties, (b) to explore the strategies they have used to manage those difficulties, (c) 
to identify how much energy and time they have invested in managing them, and (d) to 
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convey the idea that human suffering is ubiquitous and a natural consequence of 
language processes. By socialising participants to a simplified version of the RFT mode, 
clinicians aimed to demonstrate that attempts to problem solve, avoid, or control 
psychological pain is logical, but may not be effective in the long term.  
Stage one led naturally into stage two, which explicitly identified Control as the 
Problem. This stage aimed to expose experiential avoidance as a logical, but 
counterproductive means of dealing with psychological pain. Experiential avoidance 
was explored as a phenomenon that may (a) amplify psychological difficulties and (b) 
inhibit valued living. For example, exercises were used to demonstrate the paradoxical 
effects that can arise from trying to control thoughts and feelings. Group discussions, 
with the aid of suffering inventories, were used to explore how these ideas related to 
participants’ own experiences. This stage of treatment also introduced the idea of 
“letting go” of struggles against private experience and accepting that experience for 
what it is, rather than entanglement with the functions it has acquired.  
Stage three focused exclusively on acceptance and defusion. These sessions aimed to 
help participants to observe their thoughts and feelings as events of the mind that can 
influence, but that do not control, behaviour. Participants were guided through the 
process of treating their thoughts as thoughts, their emotions as emotions, and their 
memories as memories; rather than events to be feared and avoided. In session exercises 
explored how individuals find it difficult to separate themselves from their thoughts and 
feelings. Acceptance and de fusion techniques were used to undermine the perceived 
literality of thoughts and their apparent correspondence with reality. Exercises using 
metaphors such as ‘The Passengers on the Bus’ (see Appendix E) were also deployed to 
convey the possibility that patients could determine the direction of their life, even in 
the presence of psychologically difficult private events. Chapter VI     149 
 
Table 6.2 
Breakdown of Treatment Session Content 
Treatment Stage  Week  Session name  First Half  Second Half 
1  The Ubiquity of 
Human Suffering 
(p. 9) 
Introductions, ground 
rules, group 
commitment 
Focus: Drawing out the “control and eliminate” agenda. Suffering 
Inventories (p. 14): What is psychologically painful for the patient? 
What strategies have they tried to manage this pain? Based on their 
experience, how well have these strategies worked in the short and long 
term? Does it help them to live the life they most want?  
1. Creative 
Hopelessness  
2  Why Language 
Leads to Suffering 
(p. 17) 
Mindful awareness of 
breathing 
Focus: Demonstrate that psychological pain is ‘normal’ not ‘abnormal’; 
a product of natural language processes. Discuss how attempts to avoid, 
eliminate, or control psychological pain makes sense logically but may 
not be effective in the long term. Coping Strategies Inventory 
3  The Pull of 
Avoidance  
(p. 33) 
Mindful awareness of 
sight 
Focus: Undermining investment in avoidance and logic. Demonstrate 
that experiential avoidance paradoxically amplifies psychological pain 
and inhibits valued living. Use the participants experience (e.g., 
suffering inventories) to explore this concept. Describe and discuss 
different ‘rules’ for external and internal events: “if you don’t like it get 
rid of it” versus “If you don’t want it you’ve got it.” Consult with the 
patients’ experiences. Riding the Mind Train, Thought Controlling  
2. Control is the 
Problem 
 
4  Letting Go (p. 43)  Mindful awareness of 
sound 
Focus: Introduce ‘acceptance’ as an alternative to experiential 
avoidance. Discuss what acceptance is and is not. Create exercises to 
test acceptance versus EA (e.g., To Be Willingly Out Of Breath). 
Prompt participants’ awareness to consult with their direct experience. 
What does their experience say and what does their mind say. The Tug-
of-War metaphor (Appendix E). 
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5  The Trouble with 
Thoughts (p. 53) 
Mindful awareness of 
touch 
Focus: Describe cognitive fusion; when thoughts and the events that 
they refer to are treated literally, as if they were the same. Guide 
participants to noticing the act of thinking; catching the process in flight. 
Guide participants in feeling memories as memories, thoughts as 
thoughts etc. Prompt participants to begin to notice the flow of their 
thoughts and to notice those they fuse with. Watching the Mind Train.  
3. Acceptance 
and Defusion 
6 7  Having a Thought 
versus Buying a 
Thought  
(p. 69) 
Mindful awareness of 
taste 
Focus: Looking at our thoughts rather than from our thoughts. Develop 
experiential awareness of cognitive fusion and defusion. Milk, milk, 
milk. Virtues of Saliva. Labelling Your Thoughts: “I’m having the 
thought that_______” “I am noticing the urge to____”. Physicalising 
pain. Must pain be the enemy? Create experiential awareness of the 
longstanding costs of fusion. Passengers on the Bus. Buying 
Thoughts. 
8  If I’m Not My 
Thoughts Then 
Who Am I?  
(p. 87) 
Mindful awareness of 
thoughts 
Focus: Elicit the key self conceptualisations that participants’ typically 
fuse with: “I am the type of person who____”. Discuss how these might 
constrain personal development. Provide metaphors that allow 
participants to distinguish between ‘self as content’ and ‘self as context’: 
the self as the context in which thoughts occur. Practise defusion. 
Describe other senses of self. Provide exercises that allow participants to 
experience all three aspects of the self: the self as an on going process, 
the observing self, and the verbal self. The Chess Metaphor, The Rock 
Metaphor. Practise defusion from self as content. 
4. Defining the 
Self 
9  Mindfulness  
(p. 105) 
The Breathing Space 
and Unguided 
Mindfulness 
Focus: Discuss what mindfulness is and is not and the value of being 
awake to one’s experiences, non judgementally. Discuss the ways that 
the participants could integrate mindfulness into everyday living. Self-
judgements: List your ten favourite judgements – mindfully notice 
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10  Willingness  
(p. 121) 
Unguided Mindfulness  Focus: Learning to say ‘Yes’ even if your mind says ‘No’. Discuss the 
possibility of saying ‘Yes’ to a universe of internal experience when that 
takes you in a valued direction. Help participants identify what there is 
to be accepted? Discuss what willingness is and is not.  
11  Learning to Jump 
(p. 133) 
A Brief Body Scan  Focus: The Willingness Question: Are you willing to feel, think, sense, 
and remember private experiences, fully and without defence, as you 
directly experience them to be, not as what your mind says they are and 
do whatever it takes to move you in the direction that you truly value? 
Discuss: the choice to say yes and to say no. Consider the pro’s and 
con’s of saying yes versus no. What does the participants’ mind have to 
say about willingness? The Willingness Scale 
12  What are Values? 
(p. 153) 
Mindful awareness of 
Movement 
Focus: Core values, what does the participant want their life to be about? 
Discuss values as chosen life directions, a compass to guide action. 
Passengers on the Bus metaphor. Explore differences between choices 
based on values and choices based on reasoned judgements.  
5. Values 
13  Choosing Your 
Values (p. 165) 
The 3 minute Breathing 
Space 
Focus: Arriving at core values. Attending your own funeral exercise- 
What do you want your life to have meant? The ten valued domains.  
6. Committed 
Action  
14  Committing to it 
(p. 177) 
The 3 minute Breathing 
Space 
Focus: Being willing to accept whatever private experiences show up in 
the service of valued action. Provide exercises to practise committed 
action. Help the participants to set goals. Identify and discuss possible 
barriers.  
  15  The Choice to 
Live a Vital Life 
(p. 195). 
Unguided mindfulness   Focus: Actively choosing between the familiar, logical, avoidant path 
and a new, accepting, defused, and valued path. Is the vulnerability and 
risk in the service of treading a new path something the participant is 
willing to experience? Discuss taking responsibility for action and 
change. 
  16  Commitments  Focus: Making a public commitment to life changes in the service of a valued life.  
Note: Text in bold denotes example exercises (see Appendix E). Page numbers refer to chapters in Get out of Your Mind and Into Your Life (Hayes & Smith, 2005). Chapter VI     152 
 
Stage four developed this work into defining the self. These sessions focused on 
developing and strengthening a sense of self that exists alongside, but independent from, 
private internal events. Sessions explored the idea that the ‘I’ that people most often 
verbalise is only one aspect of the self (i.e., self as content). Clinicians explored with 
the participants two other aspects of the self; a self that is grounded in the present 
moment (self as process) and a self that is constant and stable over time and context 
(self as context; see section 2.2.1). For example, patients were invited to recall events 
from their past and identify a self that was consistent throughout those experiences, 
regardless of age or context (self as context). Similarly, metaphors such as ‘The Chess 
Board’ (Appendix E) were used to convey the idea of a stable and consistent sense of 
self that may be witness to many battles or storms (a metaphor for periods of emotional 
distress), but that is not defined by them. Self as process exercises, on the other hand, 
were used to heighten the participants’ awareness of an ongoing sense of self that can 
consistently observe behaviour in the present moment.    
The fifth stage of treatment was concerned with helping the participant to identify 
their core life values. These were explored using experiential exercises and group 
discussions that distinguished core values from tangible goals. These sessions also 
discussed the willingness to act in valued ways despite the short term discomfort that 
such actions may bring, grounding willingness for change in the possibility of moving 
towards a fuller and more meaningful life. For example, a socially anxious patient could 
explore his willingness to feel highly anxious if doing so had the potential to bring him 
closer to the value of intimacy. Stage six naturally extended this work into goal setting 
and committed action. Participants were helped to define behavioural actions (goals) 
that would bring them closer to core values and group discussions were used to address 
barriers to change. Group discussions also considered the difference between pliance 
and meaningful commitment to change and the final session involved public 
commitment to a valued life direction.  
Although the broad structure depicted in Table 6.2 was followed (see also Appendix 
E), it is important to note that clinicians sought to achieve a balance between following 
this structure and being flexible to participants’ needs as they occurred during group 
sessions. For example, if participants showed strong attachment to the “control and 
eliminate agenda” and were not receptive to considering control as the problem, 
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vice versa). It is also important to note that, throughout the 16 weeks, clinicians 
continually engaged in a process of re consenting; that is, they asked for a participant’s 
permission before engaging in any one to one piece of work. This was done to avoid 
coercion that might otherwise have occurred given the vulnerability of the group and the 
evocative nature of ACT.  
6.2.4.4 Post Intervention Assessment. After the treatment phase, all participants 
completed a second questionnaire pack in their own time. They also revisited the IPTS 
for a post intervention interview, which asked about their experiences of the group 
(these data are not presented here). After the interview, patients received a copy of “Get 
out of your Mind and into your Life” (Hayes & Smith, 2005) on 6 month loan and a 
mindfulness meditation CD. Six months after attending the group, participants received 
a third set of questionnaires and were invited to IPTS for a post intervention SCID II. In 
this second administration of the SCID II, I asked participants to report PD symptoms 
in the last 12 months only. After the 6 month follow up assessment, participants were 
invited to a 2.5 hour refresher session. Finally, a fourth questionnaire pack was 
completed 12 months following treatment. 
  
6.2.5 Analysis Strategy 
After the distribution of all study variables had been considered, the first stage of 
analysis focused on change in outcome measures across testing periods (i.e., treatment 
effects). Because current literature advocates the evaluation of group change (e.g., using 
ANOVA) and individual change (e.g., clinical significance), both strategies were used.  
Firstly, to assess group change, a series of within subject, repeated measures 
ANOVA were computed for each outcome and process measure. These tested for a 
significant main effect of Time (T1, T2, T3 and T4). Additional post hoc, paired 
samples t tests were used to follow up main effects. Because the probability of Type II 
error is high in small samples, alphas were not adjusted for multiple comparisons. To 
quantify the magnitude of within group change in a manner comparable with published 
trials, Cohen’s d effect sizes (ES) were also calculated.  
Secondly, to assess individual change, the clinical significance change criteria 
proposed by Jacobson and Truax (1991; see section 3.4.2) were used. Reliable change 
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determined using the least arbitrary of Jacobson & Truax’s proposed methods; 
calculating the value half way between the mean score of the clinical and non clinical 
population (criterion c; also see Thomas & Truax, 2008 and section 3.4.2). Categories 
of change proposed by Thomas & Truax (2008) and Jacobson et al. (1999) were used. 
These are as follows: recovered (reliable change and crosses cut off), improved (reliable 
change without crossing the cut off), same (no change), and deteriorated (reliable 
worsening of symptoms). These analyses were computed for GSI and BDI II scores 
only. This is because WHOQOL clinical norms were not yet available and, owing to 
exclusion criteria, no participants scored in the ADS clinical range. 
Finally, although the sample size prohibited formal mediation analyses, Spearman’s 
Rho correlations were computed to test for lagged associations between process and 
outcome measures. Firstly, correlations were obtained to assess the association between 
T1 to T2 change in process measures (e.g., AAQ) and T3 and T4 outcome measures 
(e.g., GSI, BDI II). These correlations thus assessed whether change in process 
measures during treatment were associated with follow up outcomes. Based on the 
recommendations of Steketee & Chambless (1992), change in process measures were 
transformed into residual gain (RG) scores to adjust for variance dependent on repeat 
testing
24.  Following this, a second set of correlations was computed to assess the 
association between process scores at T2 and T3 and outcomes at T3 and T4 
(respectively). These correlations were thus used to identify whether any post treatment 
processes predicted follow up outcomes.  
 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Preliminary Analysis and Participant Characteristics  
Preliminary analyses indicated that all study variables were normally distributed. Most 
participants scored in the clinical range for depression and global symptom severity (see 
Table 6.1 and Table 6.3 for means and standard deviations). Half met formal diagnostic 
criteria for at least one personality disorder (two of more PDs, N = 3) and most 
presented with co occurring mood disorders (i.e., were in the clinical range for five or 
                                                           
24 This procedure standardises pre  and post treatment means and subtracts the T1 score, multiplied by the 
correlation between T1 and T2 scores, from T2 (i.e., RG = ZT2 – (ZT1 * rT1,T2)). Chapter VI     155 
 
more SCL 90 domains, see Table 6.1). Completers attended an average of 14 therapy 
sessions (range 12 16). 
Observing raw baseline data, it was apparent that one participant (‘Elaine’) presented 
with baseline scores that were lower than expected given her pre treatment interview 
and correspondence with her previous therapist. At interview, Elaine appeared to be 
experiencing entrenched difficulties. She met lifetime diagnostic criteria for avoidant, 
depressive and borderline personality disorder and symptomatic criteria for avoidant PD 
(threshold for depressive and borderline PD). In marked contradiction, however, 
Elaine’s baseline questionnaire data suggested that she was experiencing very low 
levels of psychiatric distress. In fact, her GSI score was below the mean of the non 
clinical population. Similarly, her MCMI III scores were ‘invalid’ on the basis of 
insufficient disclosure
25. These observations suggested that her baseline data were 
falsely low. Rather than excluding Elaine’s scores, analysis of group change are 
reported both with and without her data.   
   
6.3.2 Statistical Significance of Change 
6.3.2.1 Full Sample Data. Changes in outcome measures across the four testing periods 
are depicted in Figure 6.3 (full sample). These graphs suggest that anticipated 
improvements occurred across all outcome measures. Furthermore, trends suggest that 
improvements occurred both from T1 to T2 and during follow up periods (i.e., 
continued gains).  
 
 
                                                           
25 No other participants had “invalid” MCMI III data or showed marked discrepancies between 
questionnaire and interview data. Furthermore, Elaine’s post treatment MCMI III scores were not 
“invalid”, neither were her questionnaire and interview data discordant at any time other than at baseline 
(see section 6.4.2 for a discussion). Chapter VI     156 
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Results of the repeated measures ANOVA and post hoc t tests are reported in Table 
6.3. (SCID II data are presented separately (section 6.3.2) because the SCID II is a 
categorical variable). These analyses showed a significant main effect of Time for all 
outcome measures. Post hoc t tests comparing T1 and T2 scores showed a significant 
reduction in BDI II (t(1, 9) = 2.49, p < .05) and ADS (t(1, 9) =3.03, p < .05), and a 
marginally significant reduction in GSI (t(1, 9) = 1.91, p =.09). From T1 to T3 significant 
improvements in GSI (t(1, 9) = 4.05, p < .01), BDI II (t(1, 9) = 3.14, p = .01), ADS (t(1, 9) = 
2.63, p < .05), and WHOQOL (t(1, 9) = 3.10, p < .01) were observed. From T1 to T4, 
marginally significant change occurred for GSI (t(1, 8) =1.98, p = .08), ADS (t(1, 8) = 
2.23, p = .06), and WHOQOL (t(1, 8)= 1.81, p = .10) scores. Testing for change in 
process measures revealed a marginally significant Time effect for AAQ and MAAS 
scores. Post hoc t tests comparing T1 and T2 showed a significant reduction in the 
AAQ (t(1, 9) = 2.63, p < .05), and a marginally significant increase in MAAS (t(1, 9) = 
1.94, p = .08). From T1 to T3, change was marginally significant for both (AAQ: t(1, 9) = 
1.83, p = .10; MAAS; t(1, 9) = 2.11, p = .06). Neither was significant when comparing T1 
and T4, however. 
Cohen’s d ES statistic was computed to quantify the magnitude of within group 
change (‘uncontrolled effect size’; Feske & Chambless, 1995). This was computed by 
subtracting the group’s T2, T3 and T4 mean from the T1 mean, divided by the pooled 
standard deviation (e.g., MT1 – MT2 / (√[(σ1²+ σ2²) / 2]) (Cohen, 1988)). Using Cohen’s 
(1988) guidelines of ‘small’ (d = 0.2), ‘medium’ (d = 0.5) and ‘large’ (d = 0.8), results 
indicated medium to large effects for all outcomes (Table 6.3).  
 
6.3.2.2 Data Excluding ‘Elaine’. Table 6.4 reports change in outcome and process 
measures with Elaine’s data excluded. It is clear from these analyses that the effects of 
ACT were greater when her data were discounted. For example, significant reductions 
in key outcome measures were found at each time point and all improvements were 
large in terms of effect size. Furthermore, significant reductions in process measures 
were also found. These findings suggest that Elaine’s data were anomalous in 
comparison to the other participants’ data. However, because the exclusion of her data 
from subsequent analyses would be pro hypothesis, it was considered prudent to report 
the findings with her included and to discuss her case in detail in the discussion (see 
section 6.4.2).Chapter VI     158 
 
 
Table 6.3 
Means (SD), Repeated Measures ANOVA and Post Hoc T tests for Outcome and Process Measures Comparing T1 to T2, T3 and T4 Testing 
in the Full Sample.  
Mean (SD)    ANOVA (F) / ES (d) 
  T1 (N = 10)  T2 (N = 10)  T3 (N = 10)  T4 (N = 9)    Time    T1 T2    T1 T3    T1 T4 
 
Measures              F(1, 9)    t(1, 9)  d    t(1, 9)  d    t(1, 8)  d 
Primary                               
ADS    56.36 (23.1)  22.00 (22.0)  35.75 (28.8)  31.88 (25.3)    5.25
**    3.03
*  1.52    2.63
*  0.79    2.23
†  1.00 
GSI    1.27 (0.5)  0.86 (0.7)  0.56 (0.6)  0.58 (0.41)    4.92
**    1.91
†  0.67    4.05
*  1.29    1.98
†  1.50 
BDI II    24.23 (11.2)  15.12 (10.6)  10.40 (10.2)  11.00 (12.2)    4.28
*    2.49
*  0.83    3.14
*  1.30    1.71  1.10 
WHOQOL    50.68 (9.0)  55.76 (12.5)  65.29 (15.0)  66.15 (11.4)    3.63
*    1.68  0.47    3.10
*  1.18    1.81
†  1.50 
Process                               
AAQ    4.72 (0.5)  4.00 (1.0)  4.00 (1.3)  4.11 (1.2)    2.60
†    2.63
*  1.00    1.83
†  0.80    1.10  0.72 
MAAS    59.55 (16.5)  62.85 (13.5)  66.75 (13.5)  73.50 (13.5)    2.67
†    1.94
†  0.22    2.11
†  0.48    1.16  0.93 
TBQ    4.50 (3.5)  2.62 (2.1)  3.25 (2.8)  4.00 (3.6)    0.77                         
TFQ    4.63 (2.1)  4.12 (1.6)  3.25 (1.8)  3.25 (1.5)    1.26                         
VLQ    6.33 (4.30)  3.67 (3.30)  3.77 (3.76)  3.88 (5.15)    2.00                         
† p < .10 *p < .05. ** p < .01. Note: BL = Baseline; M = mean; SD = Standard Deviation; T1 = pre treatment; T2 = post treatment; T3 = 6 month follow up; T4 = 12 
month follow up; GSI = Global Severity Index; QOL = World Health Organisation Quality Of Life; BDI II = Beck’s Depression Inventory II; ADS = Alcohol 
Dependency Subscale; AAQ = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire; MAAS = Mindfulness and Awareness Scale; TFQ = Thought Frequency Questionnaire; TBQ = 
Thought Believability Questionnaire. VLQ = Valued Living Questionnaire.  d = Cohen’s d Effect Size. Note high VQL scores indicate unvalued living.  
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Table 6.4 
Means (SD), Repeated Measures ANOVA and Post Hoc T tests for Outcome and Process Measures Comparing T1 to T2, T3 and T4 Testing 
Excluding Elaine’s Data.  
Mean (SD)    ANOVA (F) / ES (d) 
  T1 (N = 9)  T2 (N = 9)  T3 (N = 9)  T4 (N = 8)    Time    T1 T2    T1 T3    T1 T4 
                                 
Measures              F(1, 8)    t(1, 8)  d    t(1, 8)  d    t(1, 7)  d 
Primary                               
GSI    1.37 (0.6)  0.87 (0.8)  0.55 (0.6)  0.62 (0.7)    7.26
**     2.36
*  0.82    5.50
**  1.33    2.84
*  1.09 
BDI II    25.11 (11.5)  14.55 (11.0)  8.78 (9.9)  10.50 (9.6)    6.47
**    2.81
*   0.92    4.07
**  1.56    2.30
*  1.39 
WHOQOL    48.98 (7.8)  57.96 (11.1)  67.03 (14.9)  67.10 (16.3)    6.55
**    3.51
**  0.95    5.00
**  1.59    2.78
*  1.51 
ADS    55.44 (21.2)  30.88 (27.7)  38.33 (28.0)  27.86 (24.4)    4.57
*    5.58
*  1.00    2.18
†  0.69    2.18
†  1.21 
Process                               
AAQ    4.66 (0.5)  3.83 (0.9)  3.80 (1.2)  4.00 (1.1)    3.11
*    2.81
*  0.84    7.82
*  1.00    1.35  0.83 
MAAS    3.52 (0.7)  4.13 (1.5)  4.45 (1.0)  4.37 (1.0)    3.97
*    2.25
†  0.54    2.59
*  1.08    1.61  0.97 
TBQ    5.78 (3.2)  3.33 (1.2)  3.22 (2.5)  3.28 (3.2)    2.34
†      2.81
*  1.12    2.45
*  0.90    1.18  0.79 
TFQ    5.33 (1.5)  4.11 (1.5)  3.22 (1.5)  2.86 (1.1)     5.01
*    4.40
*  0.80    3.22
*  1.42    3.20
*  1.93 
VLQ    6.37 (4.6)  3.50 (3.5)  3.25 (3.7)  3.13 (4.9)    3.63
†    3.65
*  0.70    2.73
*  .76    2.01
†  0.68 
† p < .10 *p < .05. ** p < .01. Note: BL = Baseline; M = mean; SD = Standard Deviation; T1 = pre treatment; T2 = post treatment; T3 = 6 month follow up; T4 = 12 month 
follow up; GSI = Global Severity Index; QOL = World Health Organisation Quality Of Life; BDI II = Beck’s Depression Inventory II; ADS = Alcohol Dependency Subscale; 
AAQ = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire; MAAS = Mindfulness and Awareness Scale; TFQ = Thought Frequency Questionnaire; TBQ = Thought Believability 
Questionnaire. VLQ = Valued Living Questionnaire.  d = Cohen’s d Effect Size. Note high VQL scores indicate unvalued living. Chapter VI     160 
 
6.3.3 Change in Personality Disorder Symptomatology 
At baseline assessment, half of the group (N = 5) met formal SCID II diagnostic criteria 
for at least one PD. This was rated (a) over the participant’s lifetime (diagnostic 
criterion) and (b) in the immediately preceding 12 months (symptomatic criterion). At 
T3 (i.e., one year later), only two of the five participants continued to meet the 
symptomatic criterion.  
 
6.3.4 Clinical Significance of Change 
The clinical significance of change was computed for GSI and BDI II scores only (see 
section 6.2.5). The values used for change calculations were as follows: GSI non 
clinical Mean = 0.31 (SD = 0.31), clinical Mean = 1.26 (SD = 0.68), test retest 
reliability r = .91 (Derogatis 1993); BDI II non clinical Mean = 8.9 (SD = 12.36; 
Dozois et al., 1998), clinical Mean = 22.45 (SD = 12.75; Beck et al., 1996), and test 
retest reliability r = .93 (Beck et al., 1996). Results (Table 6.5) showed that at T2, 50% 
of participants had either improved or recovered from depression, which rose to 70% at 
T3, and fell back to 50% at T4. For GSI scores, 60% of participants could be classified 
as improved or recovered at T2, 60% as recovered at T3, and 50% as recovered or 
improved at T4.   
 
6.3.5 Re referral 
At 12 month follow up, none of the participants were awaiting, or receiving, treatment 
for a psychological problem from the psychological services. Chapter VI     161 
 
Table 6.5 
Clinical Significance of Change from T1 to T2, T3, and T4 Testing 
 
ID  GSI    BDI II 
  T2  T3  T4    T2  T3  T4 
1  R  R  R    R  R  R 
2  R  R  R    R  R  R 
3  R  R  R    R  R  R 
4  R  R  I    I  R  I 
5  I  R  S    R  R  S 
6  S  I  I    I  R  R 
7  S  S  S    S  S  S 
8  S  I       S  S    
9  S  S  S    S  S  S 
10*  S  S  D    S  S  D 
Totals:               
Recovered  4  5  3    4  6  4 
Improved  1  2  2    2  0  1 
Same  5  3  3    4  4  3 
Deteriorated  0  0  1    0  0  1 
Note: ‘ID’ = participant identification number (this corresponds with information on each participant 
reported in Appendix B. ‘D’ = deteriorated; S = ‘same’; I = ‘improved’; R = ‘recovered’; GSI = 
Global Severity Index; BDI II = Beck’s Depression inventory. * = Elaine’s data.  
 
6.3.6 Exploratory Mechanisms of Change 
Although change in process measures did not reach significance (see Table 6.3), 
exploratory analysis were used to examine the relationship between the observed 
changes and outcome measures. These analyses began by assessing whether changes in 
process measures from T1 to T2 (i.e., change scores) were associated with outcomes at 
T3 and T4. These analyses were conducted using Spearman Rho correlations (owing to 
the small sample) with residual gain (RG) scores indexing T1 to T2 change in process 
measures. Results are reported in Table 6.6. 
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Table 6.6 
Correlations (Spearman Rho) Between T1 T2 Change in Process Measures and T3, T4 
Outcome Measures 
Process   Outcomes  
(T1 T2 change)  GSI  BDI II  WHOQOL  ADS 
  T3  T4  T3  T4  T3  T4  T3  T4 
RG AAQ  .74
*  .60
*  .74
*  .58  .66
*  .48  .19  .49 
RG MAAS  .63
*  .70
*  .43  .59  .43  .68
*  .09  .66
* 
RG VLQ  .16  .71
*  .33  .67
*  .06  .65
*  .32  .50 
RG TBQ  .50  .47  .62
*  .51  .46  .50  .44  .61 
RG TFQ  .15  .10  .39  .22  .21  .10  .51  .22 
*p < .01. Note: RG = Residual Gain; AAQ = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ); MAAS = 
Mindfulness Attention and Awareness Scale; VLQ = Valued living Questionnaire. TBQ = Thought 
Believability Questionnaire; TFQ = Thought Frequency Questionnaire.  
 
Results from this analysis showed that T1 to T2 changes in the AAQ were 
significantly associated with T3 GSI, BDI II, and WHOQOL and T4 GSI and 
WHOQOL scores. Change in MAAS was significantly associated with T3 and T4 GSI 
and T4 WHOQOL and ADS scores. Change in the VLQ was significantly associated 
with T4 GSI, BDI II, and WHOQOL scores. Change in TBQ was significantly 
associated with T3 BDI II scores and change in TFQ was not significantly related to any 
outcomes. 
To assess whether post treatment process scores (rather than change) were associated 
with future outcomes, a second series of correlations were run. These showed that T2 
AAQ scores were significantly associated with T3 and T4 GSI (r = .61, p < .10; r = .81, 
p < .01 respectively), BDI II (r = .83, p < .01; r = .87, p < .01, respectively), and 
WHOQOL (r = .71, p < .05; r = .82, p < .05 respectively). T3 MAAS scores were 
significantly associated with T4 measures of GSI (r = .70, p < .01) and BDI II (r = .71, 
p < .01). T3 TBQ scores were significantly associated with T4 BDI II (r = .73, p < .01) 
and WHOQOL (r = .78, p < .01). Again, consistent with expectation, TFQ was not 
related to any outcomes. 
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6.4. Discussion 
6.4.1 Study Findings 
Previous research has shown that ACT can obtain meaningful clinical effects when 
delivered to patients experiencing acute distress, but little was known about its 
applicability to treatment resistant patients. To develop an application to patients 
meeting this criterion, the present study was designed to ascertain whether ACT had 
possible clinical benefits when delivered to them in a 16 week, group based format. 
Because this application was novel, in keeping with previous research on similarly 
vulnerable groups (e.g., Telch et al., 2000), a pre post, uncontrolled pilot trial was used. 
Overall, results were supportive of the utility of ACT for this group. This occurred 
despite a number of factors that might have mitigated against it. For example, the 
sample size was small and the variability of symptoms was high. Both these factors 
reduce the power of detecting significant effects. The recruitment of participants whose 
symptoms have been resistant to, or relapsed following, previous psychological 
treatment further challenged the probability of obtaining clinically meaningful change. 
Moreover, the group base mode of delivery meant that none of the participants received 
one to one care. Furthermore, the intervention did not explicitly aim to reduce 
symptoms; rather, it dealt more specifically with increasing acceptance of them and 
creating a new repertoire of value consistent action.  
Despite these many factors, clinically meaningful effects were found. Group analysis 
showed significantly fewer self reported psychiatric symptoms (GSI, BDI II), a 
significant reduction in self reported alcohol use, and significant improvements in 
quality of life 6 months following the ACT group as compared to at baseline. Moreover, 
judged against well respected criteria (Cohen 1988), the magnitude of these within 
group effects were found to be medium to large (compared to baseline). Additionally, 
on the individual level, clinically significant and reliable improvements were found in 
50%   70% of the participants (depending on the measure and time of testing). 
Furthermore, only two of five participants continued to meet criteria for PD symptoms 
at 6 months and 0% of the participants had received or were awaiting further 
psychological treatment at 12 months.  
The fact that effects were most noticeable at 6 month follow up is interesting and 
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following treatment termination (e.g., Hayes, Wilson, et al., 2004, see section 2.2.2). 
This pattern may reflect the fact that ACT does not focus on symptom removal per se; 
rather, it aims to help patients construct a new repertoire for behaviour that, when 
successful, allows increasing access to positive reinforcement. Furthermore, this 
behaviour should be guided by personal values and should not be contingent on the 
reinforcement of the therapist. These factors are likely to support long term and durable 
changes. Indeed, in keeping with these speculations, preliminary evidence suggested 
that valued living was related to long term outcomes.  
Using criteria defined by Hollon, Stewart, and Strunk (2006), the continued gains 
that have been found may suggest that ACT does not simply have palliative effects 
(“suppress the expression of the disorder so long as they are applied” Hollon et al., p. 
287); but rather, for some patients, it may have the capacity to produce enduring effects 
(“effects that reverse processes that would otherwise lead to the continuation of the 
disorder”). In support of this proposition, theory consistent changes in process measures 
were found to be associated with follow up outcomes. Similarly, post treatment scores 
on the AAQ, MAAS, and TBQ were significantly associated with outcomes at 6 month 
and 12 months following treatment. Although these trends were based on correlational 
analyses of a small sample, they nevertheless are consistent with the ACT based 
prediction that changing the way a person interacts with unwanted private events 
precedes and facilitates mental health improvements. Findings were not, however, in 
keeping with the CBT based prediction that changes in the frequency of certain 
cognitions affect a change in symptoms. Although changes in thought frequency 
occurred, these changes were unrelated to outcome. This tentative finding suggests 
future work could focus on comparing the effects of these different processes on 
treatment outcomes. This could be more thoroughly explored by, for example, 
comparing the use or ACT versus CBT for this group. 
 
6.4.2 Elaine’s Response to Treatment. Despite the promising findings reported, Elaine’s 
data were anomalous. As previously discussed, she provided low but invalid baseline 
data. Her MCMI III scores were “invalid” on the basis of insufficient disclosure. 
Moreover, there was poor concordance between her baseline questionnaire and 
interview data. This was not observed in any other participants, nor was it observed in 
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deterioration of symptoms across testing periods, she remarked at interview “from my 
point of view nothing seems to have changed ... I am at the point that I was at before 
ACT... this is my life, this is the way it is, and I am resigned to it”.  
At best, therefore, ACT appeared to have had no effect on Elaine’s psychological 
well being. One factor that may have been responsible for the lack of change was the 
recurrence of episodes of dissociation during treatment. Dissociation occurred at least 
once during most sessions and was usually precipitated by exchanges relating to issues 
of interpersonal intimacy. This occurred despite the fact that she reported that her desire 
for intimacy was a key reason for attending the group. The clinicians observed that 
dissociation rendered her psychologically absent from much of the treatment. Indeed, 
Elaine remarked that after attending ACT she had begun to read the self help book and 
found that most of its content was unfamiliar to her: “a lot of it ... I can’t remember 
what we did in the sessions ... a lot of it was like completely new ... so I don’t think I 
was ... I found it very hard to get involved in sessions”. Other factors that could have 
contributed to change resistance included other well developed and deeply engrained 
patterns of avoidance (i.e., in addition to dissociation) and strong attachment to the self 
as content. For example, she remarked that the thought of abandoning avoidance 
strategies was “too scary” to contemplate (“I thought oh my God I can’t do this”) and 
showed strong attachment to self conceptualisations (“I get the feeling of being unsafe 
when people get the idea of who I am or what I am ... of not being good enough”).  
Although it is particularly difficult to speculate about the effect of treatment on Elaine’s 
well being, a possible interpretation of the improved concordance between 
questionnaire and interview data following treatment, and her valid MCMI III scores, is 
that ACT increased her ability or willingness to report honestly on her distress.  
 
6.4.3 Methodological Limitations 
Although, overall, the present findings have been promising, this study was designed as 
a pilot trial. Because of this, the outcomes are tentative and require replication. For 
example, in the design deployed, the lack of a control group means that the effect of 
non specific factors (e.g., therapeutic alliance and expectancy bias) is unknown. It is 
most likely that these factors account for some of the effects observed, but there are 
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example, by definition, this group had already had several exposures to similar non 
treatment specific variables (i.e., therapist contact) to which their symptoms had been 
resistant or subsequently relapsed following. Furthermore, the absence of these non 
therapeutic factors at post test makes it unlikely that they would account for the 
enduring changes that were observed for some participants. Also, theory consistent 
associations between experiential avoidance, thought believability, and mindfulness 
support the interpretation that treatment specific variables played some role in treatment 
outcomes.   
The second main limitation of this study is its reliance on self report data. Obvious 
problems with this include demand bias, self report accuracy and increasing familiarity 
with the measures. Attempts to minimise these effects were made. Participants 
completed questionnaires in their own time at home and used ID numbers as identifiers 
rather than names. Additionally, a third party liaised with them regarding the 
completion and return of their data. Furthermore, carry over effects should have been 
minimised by the long delay between testing periods. The third main limitation 
concerns the use of a small sample from which the most at risk of patients were 
excluded. This makes it difficult to establish whether the effects seen will generalise to 
other clinical groups. Nevertheless, the use of broad inclusion criteria is a strength in 
terms of external validity (see chapter 3).  
 
6.4.4 Implications 
The results from this trial tentatively suggest that ACT can be delivered to a group of 
patients who failed to benefit from, or have relapsed following, previous psychological 
treatment. ACT was associated with meaningful effects for many of the participants 
and, overall, their gains were maintained at follow up. Moreover, the current findings, 
albeit tentative, were in keeping with the prediction that ACT derived processes were 
related to outcomes. The main implication of this study, therefore, is that ACT may 
prove to be a useful intervention for this patient group. Given the limitations that have 
been discussed, however, no firm conclusions about cause and effect, or 
generalisability, can be made. Furthermore, although most patients had already received 
cognitive behavioural treatments in the past, it cannot be inferred that a CBT based 
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Ost’s (2008) suggestion, future research should extend this work, ideally exploring the 
effects of ACT relative to an active comparison group such as a CBT based approach. 
To this end, study 4 used a more scientifically rigorous method to compare the effects of 
ACT and CBT based treatment as usual (CBT TAU) for treatment resistant patients.  Chapter VII     168 
 
CHAPTER VII 
Study 4. A Pilot Randomised Control Trial of Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT) versus Cognitive Behaviour Therapy-Based Treatment as Usual 
(CBT-TAU) for a Heterogeneous Group of Treatment Resistant Patients 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Study 3 tentatively supported the use of ACT for treatment resistant patients. As 
predicted, significant improvements in psychological functioning, quality of life, and 
alcohol use were found and these tended to be sustained at 6  and 12 month follow up. 
Furthermore, preliminary data on mechanisms of change appeared to be consistent with 
the ACT model; changes in experiential avoidance, thought believability, mindfulness, 
and valued living were associated with outcome, but changes in thought frequency were 
not. Although these findings are promising they are nonetheless preliminary. Because 
study 3 was an uncontrolled trial, one of its main limitations was the lack of a control 
group. For example, although many of the patients had previously received CBT, it is 
impossible to say with confidence that ACT was more efficacious than this currently 
available alternative. The present study aimed to address this issue more directly, using 
a randomised control trial (RCT) to compare the effect of ACT relative to Cognitive 
Behaviour Therapy based treatment as usual (CBT TAU) for treatment resistant 
patients. Mechanisms of change were also explored.  
 
7.1.1 ACT versus CBT for Treatment Resistant Patients 
The main distinction between ACT and CBT is their reliance on different processes of 
change. ACT’s primary focus is on altering a patient’s relationship with his/her private 
experiences, whereas CBT’s is on altering the form and/or frequency of those experiences 
(see sections 1.2 and 2.2). Few trials have directly compared these treatments. Of those 
that have, data tentatively suggest that ACT is at least as effective as CBT (e.g., Forman 
et al., 2007; Lappalainen et al., 2007; see section 2.2.3). Both treatments have also 
obtained some empirical evidence to suggest that they can achieve effects in theory 
consistent ways. Nevertheless, perhaps because the CBT literature is more extensive than 
ACT’s, most CBT trials have reported mediation based analyses that are inconsistent 
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suggests that CBT could achieve treatment effects by indirectly cultivating mindful 
awareness of symptoms (e.g., Forman et al., 2007; Teasdale et al., 2002). 
No study to date has compared ACT and CBT for treatment resistant patients. For 
this group, it is reasonable to suspect that different outcomes may occur. This is 
because, as discussed in chapter 1, the effectiveness of cognitive interventions appears 
to be more limited when delivered to patients’ with chronic, co occurring and/or PD 
symptoms (see section 1.2.4). Conversely, some research tentatively suggests that ACT 
and ACT like techniques may hold promise with this type of patient (study 3; Dimidjian 
et al., 2006; Gratz & Gunderson, 2006; Hayes, Wilson, et al., 2004). Based on ACT 
theorising, there are at least two possible reasons why ACT may hold more promise 
than CBT for treatment resistant patients. 
Firstly, different outcomes can be predicted based on the different approaches of the 
two treatments. ACT is designed to alter higher order generic processes that do not 
differ across diagnostic categories (e.g., experiential avoidance). As such, ACT can be 
more easily administered to a heterogeneous group of patients. Although CBT also 
targets underlying processes, such as overgeneralisations and catastophising, this 
approach arguably gives greater credence to processes regarded as specific to particular 
diagnostic groups. That is to say, CBT has relatively fixed methods for modifying 
schemas that are specific to, for example, depression or anxiety. This has at times 
rendered CBT difficult to deliver to dual diagnosis patients (e.g., see Conrad & Stewart, 
2005).  
Secondly, ACT theorising proposes that symptoms of psychological distress arise 
from associative networks that cannot be unlearned (section 2.1). By virtue of the 
persistence and pervasiveness of entrenched disorders, it is reasonable to suspect that 
these networks are especially elaborated in treatment resistant patients. They may, 
therefore, be especially resistant to techniques designed to dismantle or overlay them 
(e.g., cognitive restructuring). Indeed, working with BPD patients, Linehan (1993) 
observed that direct attempts to change thoughts did not work well with this chronic 
patient group, often resulting in early drop out and change resistance. Linehan has 
subsequently presented good evidence to suggest that an acceptance based and 
principle driven approach (i.e., Dialectical Behaviour Therapy) can be effective in 
treating the entrenched and co morbid symptoms of this group (e.g., Linehan et al., 
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treatments for other entrenched disorders (e.g., Dimidjian et al., 2006; Kenny & 
Williams, 2008). Ironically, some CBT research is not inconsistent with ACT’s 
theoretical predictions, suggesting that changing the occurrence of thoughts is not 
actually an active treatment process, but rather that CBT obtains effects through 
indirectly cultivating a mindful perspective to unchanging thoughts (Teasdale et al., 
2002). If this is indeed the case, ACT could be more effective than CBT because its 
techniques are specifically designed to use this change mechanism.  
 
7.1.2 Methodological Considerations 
The most scientifically rigorous method of comparing ACT and CBT would be to 
conduct a powered RCT. As discussed in chapter 3, however, powered RCTs are 
seldom conducted during the pilot phase of investigating a new treatment. Instead, pilot 
RCTs typically precede powered trials, providing vital information that can be used to 
justify and inform them (Campbell et al., 2001, see section 3.3.2). The present trial thus 
used a pilot RCT. Many design features of this RCT concurred with Ost’s (2008) recent 
recommendations for improving the internal validity of ACT outcome research. Other 
aspects, however, were specifically designed to maximise external validity.  
The first way in which the present trial was in keeping with Ost’s (2008) 
recommendations was by comparing ACT to an ecologically valid, well matched, active 
comparison group: CBT TAU. Several procedures were implemented to maximise 
internal validity. For example, in the patient information sheets (see Appendix F), the 
order of information regarding the two treatments was randomised so as to prevent 
implicit bias. Furthermore, both groups received treatment of equal duration, therapists 
had comparable levels of experience delivering the given intervention (i.e., ACT or 
CBT TAU), and all therapists were offered fortnightly supervision. Moreover, to 
control for non specific effects of mindfulness training in the ACT group (i.e., 
relaxation, breathing skills), the CBT TAU group began with a 10 minute deep 
breathing exercise. Finally, the possible confounds of expectancy for change and 
treatment credibility were monitored during the treatment phase.  
Because of the concerns regarding the effectiveness of CBT for this group (see 
section 1.2.4), this active comparison was ethically defended on the following grounds: 
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months (waiting list duration); (b) CBT, either group based or individual, was the most 
probable treatment after the 8 12 month wait; (c) both CBT and ACT were longer in 
duration than standard care (in DHFT, CBT is a 12 week course); and (d) the group 
based delivery, which has therapeutic effects in and of itself, was novel for some 
participants. Moreover, the most at risk of the potential patient group were again 
excluded from the trial because of its exploratory nature.  
The second way in which this trial concurred with Ost’s recommendations was by 
employing an independent researcher to use an unobjectionable randomisation 
procedure, and to conceal the details of this procedure from individuals involved in the 
study (see section 7.2.3). Thirdly, also in keeping with Ost’s recommendations, well 
recognised and validated diagnostic, outcome, and process measures were deployed. 
This study continued to use the outcome measures piloted in study 3, but refined some 
of the process measures. Specifically, a well validated CBT derived measure was used 
to index the frequency and believability of automatic negative thoughts, and a newly 
validated questionnaire was used to measure valued living (see section 7.2.5). Finally, 
also consistent with Ost’s suggestions, data were analysed using three analytic 
procedures: analysis by treatment administered, intention to treat analyses, and clinical 
significance of change.  
Most of the procedures that have been described were designed to maximise internal 
validity. As discussed in chapter 3, however, external validity is an equally important 
goal of outcome research. To maximise external validity, therefore, some aspects of this 
trial were designed to approximate treatment delivery in a real world clinical setting. 
Firstly, samples were heterogeneous and the exclusion criteria were unrestrictive. 
Indeed, patients recruited to this trial would be those typically excluded from most 
RCTs because of the threat they pose to internal validity (Westen et al., 2001). 
Secondly, interventions were not fully manualised. Both followed a broad protocol that 
guided the content of weekly or bi weekly sessions, but that was flexible, self correcting 
and reactive to the participants’ specific in session needs. Related to this, therapists 
delivering both treatments were permitted to see participants on an individual basis if 
deemed essential for ethical reasons. Thirdly, because it was not feasible to obtain 
‘blind’ assessors, allocation concealment was used to ensure non biased assessment 
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internal validity to some extent, they also reflected some important aspects of real life 
treatment settings.  
In addition to issues of internal and external validity, the rate of participant 
recruitment was a concern for the present study.  Although study 3 recruited a sample of 
patients with symptoms characteristic of the treatment resistant population (as indicated 
by the literature), this larger trial required a more rapid rate of recruitment. The trial was 
thus publicised to all The Chines and IPTS clinicians and referrals were taken from a 
larger participant pool than study 3 (section 7.4.2.1). This included patients who had no 
details listed on the PEAK database, but for whom it could be reliably established that 
they had received previous therapy from other NHS regions or privately.  
 
7.1.3 Synopsis of the Present Study 
The aim of this study was to pilot test the relative effects of ACT versus CBT TAU for 
treatment resistant patients and to conduct a preliminary investigation into mechanisms 
of change. Based on previous literature, it was predicted that both interventions would 
obtain effects in the short term (i.e., neither would be inert), but that the degree and 
durability of change would be superior in the ACT group. Thus, between group 
differences were expected to be most pronounced at follow up. Exploratory analyses of 
mechanisms of change were also conducted. Based on the ACT model (see section 2.2), 
it was predicted that ACT would improve psychological functioning by reducing 
experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion, and by increasing mindfulness and valued 
living. Conversely, based on the CBT model (see section 1.2), it was predicted that CBT 
would achieve change through reducing the occurrence of automatic negative thoughts. 
Predictions regarding mindfulness were less clear for CBT. Although the traditional 
CBT model does not consider mindfulness to be critical for change, some research 
suggests that it may play an important role (e.g., Teasdale et al., 2002; Forman et al., 
2007). The current study explored these possibilities.    
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7.2 Methodology 
7.2.1 Design 
This study used a RCT. The independent variable was treatment type: 16 weeks group 
based ACT versus 16 weeks group based CBT TAU. The dependent variables (outcome 
measures) included a global measure of symptom severity, quality of life, PD 
symptoms, depression and the tendency to engage in MBs. Process variables included a 
measure of experiential avoidance, thought frequency and believability, valued living 
and mindfulness. Outcome and process variables were measures at baseline (T1), post 
treatment (T2), and 6 month follow up (T3) and repeated measures, between group 
comparisons were made. The design was thus a 2 x 3 ANOVA in which the between 
subjects factor was group and the within subjects factor was time.  
 
7.2.2 Participants 
After obtaining LREC approval, 40 participants were recruited to the trial. The 
inclusion/exclusion criteria were the same as those described in study 3 (see section 
6.2.2). The routes to recruitment were (a) GP referrals to The Chines, (b) waiting list for 
psychology at the IPTS or The Chines, (c) clinician referrals following an initial 
assessment at the IPTS or The Chines, or (d) clinician referrals following a course of 
therapy during which the patient’s symptoms failed to remit. Participants were 
identified as potentially eligible if the PEAK database or the patient’s file and/or 
previous therapist indicated that they met the inclusion criteria. Figure 7.1 shows the 
flow of participants through recruitment and testing stages of the trial. Sixty three 
patients were identified as meeting the inclusion criteria, of which 42 opted in (see 
section 7.2.6). Two patients met the exclusion criteria, resulting in 20 participants per 
condition. Table 7.1 shows baseline characteristics of the whole sample, split by group.   
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Figure 7.1 Flow Chart of Patient Recruitment to the Trial. Chapter VII     175 
 
Table 7.1 
Demographic and Baseline Statistics for Full Sample Split by Group 
Demographics/Baseline Symptoms    ACT  
(N = 20) 
CBT TAU  
(N = 20) 
     
Age (years)  44.50  44.35 
Gender (% female)  65%  55% 
Currently employed/ in education
* (%)  45%  50% 
Medication (% yes)  85%  80% 
Previous no. therapeutic episodes (Mean)  2.75  2.25 
Previous no. sessions  38.70  34.40 
Median no. months since last therapy (range)
 **   12 (1 54)  24 (1 75) 
Clinical range for depression (%)  95%  85% 
Clinical range for GSI (%)  75%  75% 
Clinical range for 1 SCL 90 domain  15%  5% 
 Clinical range in up to five SCL 90 domains   20%  25% 
Clinical range in six or more SCL 90 domains  55%  55% 
PD Lifetime Criteria (%)   40%  40% 
*At start of ACT/CBT TAU groups. **Calculated from end of last treatment to start of ACT/CBT TAU. 
 
 
7.2.3 Randomisation Procedures 
Randomisation was organised by a third party who had no investment in the study. 
Details of this procedure were concealed from individuals involved in the study until 
after all participants had been randomised. To ensure random allocation, the individual 
used an on line random number generator to block
26 randomise the 40 spaces on the 
trial (www.random.org). This randomisation was done in blocks of two and four. 
Firstly, a virtual dice roll was used to randomise the order of blocks with an odd number 
indicating a block of two and an even number indicating a block of four. Secondly, the 
blocks were numbered (block 1, 2, 3 etc) and half of the cases in each block were 
allocated to either ACT or CBT TAU. Thirdly, to randomise the order of the cases 
                                                           
26 Block randomisation ensures that the number of participants allocated to each intervention is closely 
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within the blocks, each case was allocated a randomly generated 2 digit number. The 
block number was applied as a prefix to the 2 digit number and the cases were ordered 
from smallest to largest. This randomised cases within each block but maintained block 
order. Fourthly, “CBT” or “ACT” was printed onto pieces of paper, which were folded 
and sealed (with staples) in a non transparent envelope. The front of each envelope was 
marked with a number denoting the order in which envelopes should be opened. After a 
participant had consented to the trial and completed baseline assessment (see section 
7.2.6) the next envelope in number sequence was opened. There was no specific order 
in which participants consented to the trial.  
 
7.2.4 Therapists 
ACT groups were run by two ACT trained Consultant Clinical Psychologists (‘therapist 
one’ and ‘therapist two’
27) and CBT groups were run by a Consultant Clinical 
Psychologist (‘therapist four’) and a Consultant Counsellor (‘therapist five’). Therapist 
one worked at the IPTS and the remaining therapists worked in primary care. Although 
both sets of clinicians had comparable experience delivering the given intervention, 
therapist one had greater experience in treating entrenched disorders than the remaining 
three. Each intervention was supervised by a clinical psychologist who was specialised 
in its delivery. ACT groups were supervised by Dr. Kelly Wilson and CBT by a lead 
CBT practitioner in DHFT (Ms. Debbie Lee). Supervision was available on a fortnightly 
basis during the treatment phase of the trial.  
 
7.2.5 Materials 
7.2.5.1 Primary Outcome Measures. Consistent with study 3, primary outcome 
measures included Global Severity Index (GSI; Derogatis, 1993), the World Health 
Organisation Quality of Life Scale (WHOQOL; Skevington et al., 2004), Beck’s 
Depression Inventory II (BDI II; Beck et al., 1996), and the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM III Axis II Disorders (SCID II; First et al., 1996). Rather than using 
the Millon Alcohol Dependency subscale, however, the MBQ (see study 1) was 
available for use in this trial.  
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7.2.5.2 Process Measures. Also consistent with study 3, the AAQ9 (Hayes, Stroshal, et 
al., 2004) and the MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003) were administered. Another two 
process measures were also used.  
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980). This is a 
CBT based process measure which assesses the frequency (ATQ TF) of 30 
depressogenic, self referent thoughts (e.g., “I’m a loser”) using a scale ranging from (1) 
“not at all frequent” to (5) “all the time”. Participants were also asked to rate how 
believable these automatic thoughts were when they occurred, using the scale of (1) 
“not at all believable” to (5) “very believable”. Consistent with previous research (Zettle 
& Hayes, 1989), this was used to index cognitive fusion (ATQ TB). The ATQ has 
evidenced good psychometric properties (e.g., α = .96 and split half reliability = .97; 
Kendall & Hollon, 1980).  
The Revised Valued Living Questionnaire (VLQ R; Wilson, Sandoz, Kitchens, & 
Roberts, in press). This instrument was used to measure (a) how important 10 pre 
defined valued domains (family, marriage, parenting, friends, work, educational 
training, recreation, spirituality, citizenship, and physical well being) were to the 
participant and (b) how consistent, in the past week, their behaviour has been with each 
valued domain. Items were measured using a scale ranging from 1 (“not at all 
important/consistent”) to 10 (“extremely important/consistent”). VLQ R scores are 
computed by calculating the discrepancy between values and valued living (i.e. b – a). 
Authors reported adequate internal consistency (α = .77) and test retest reliability over a 
two week delay (r = .75). 
 
7.2.5.3 Credibility, Expectancy and Therapeutic Alliance. To measure the potential 
confounds of intervention credibility, expectancy for change and therapeutic alliance, an 
additional two questionnaires were used.  
The Credibility/Expectancy Questionnaire (CEQ; Devilly & Borkovec, 2000). This 
is a 6 item measure assessing how credible an intervention appears to a participant (e.g., 
“At this point, how logical does this therapy seem to you?”) and the participants 
expectancy for change (e.g., “How much do you feel that this therapy will help you 
reduce distress in your daily life?). Items were z scored and summed for an overall 
credibility/expectancy score. This measure has shown acceptable internal consistency (α 
= .85, Devilly & Borkovec). Chapter VII     178 
 
The Helping Alliance Questionnaire II Patient Form (HAQ II; Luborsky et al., 
1996). This 19 item instrument measures the strength of the therapist patient 
relationship by asking participants to indicate their agreement with 19 statements (e.g., 
“I feel I can depend on the therapist”). Items are rated using a scale that ranges from (1) 
strongly disagree to (6) strongly agree. Authors reported that the scale showed good 
internal consistency (α = .79). 
 
7.2.6 Procedure 
7.2.6.1 Recruitment. A time line of the study is depicted in Figure 7.2. Potentially 
eligible participants were identified using the routes described in section 7.2.2. These 
patients received an information pack by post (see Appendix F), which introduced them 
to the study and described its aims, objectives, and the methods involved. This pack also 
explained why they were being contacted, reviewed the potential costs and benefits of 
participation, explained that the final selection for the trial would be based on 
inclusion/exclusion criteria, and invited them to the initial assessment. Participants 
opted in to the assessment by contacting the IPTS. Before attending the assessment, 
patients were required to complete a questionnaire pack which they received by post. At 
the assessment, I reviewed the patient’s suitability to the trial with regard to the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria. Those unsuitable for the trial (N = 2)
28 were informed that 
they would remain on the waiting list without their original position having been 
compromised
29. Eligible patients were asked to complete a study consent form, to 
provide a verbal account of previous treatments, and to complete the SCID II interview. 
Randomisation occurred after participants had left the clinic (see section 7.2.2) and they 
were informed of group allocation via post. Similarly, GPs were informed of the 
patients’ involvement in the trial up to 2 weeks before the trial began (see Appendix F).  
 
 
                                                           
28 One had attempted suicide within the last 6 months and the other had a history of Substance 
Dependency and DSH in the last 6 months 
29 The date that the patient joined the waiting list remained the same regardless of the invitation to 
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Figure 7.2 Study Timeline  
 
 
7.2.6.2 Interventions. Interventions were held weekly and lasted 2 hours with a 10 
minute break. Two groups were run per condition with a maximum of 10 participants 
invited to each group. ACT and CBT TAU groups ran concurrently, but on different 
days of the week (ACT – Monday morning, CBT TAU Tuesday afternoon). Cohort one 
treatments (Figure 7.2) were held at different venues (CBT TAU at a GP surgery; ACT 
at the IPTS), but cohort two treatments were both held at IPTS. Treatment content was 
informed by published books on the respective interventions but not fully manualised 
(see below). Before describing each intervention, their shared and unique aspects are 
reviewed.  
Non specific Treatment Elements. Common, non specific elements of both ACT and 
CBT TAU treatments included (non exhaustively) group work, group cohesion, 
therapist contact, active listening, empathy, and feedback. Both interventions also 
necessarily involved theory driven socialisation to the treatment model, in session 
behavioural tasks/exercises, and homework setting and reviewing. Furthermore, to 
match for the non specific relaxation effects of mindfulness training in ACT, CBT TAU 
sessions began with a 10 minute ‘relaxation’ exercise (e.g., deep breathing, light yoga). 
Both the ACT and CBT TAU groups drew resources from self help books: the CBT 
TAU group used “Mind over Mood: Change How You Feel by Changing the Way You 
Think” (Greenberg & Padesky, 1995), and the ACT intervention used “Get Out of Your Chapter VII     180 
 
Mind and into Your Life” (Hayes & Smith, 2005). Each group received handouts at the 
end of treatment sessions to supplement learning and aid homework tasks. Therapists 
also recommended the target book to aid learning. ACT patients were offered a copy on 
6 month loan and CBT TAU members were offered a library loan.  
Specific Treatment Elements. CBT TAU sessions divided time up so as to address 
each patient in turn, whereas ACT sessions tended to address the group more globally, 
at times working with one or two members of the group with others observing. Other 
techniques considered unique to CBT TAU included (a) CBT TAU conceptualisation of 
psychological difficulties, (b) elicitation and discussions of automatic negative thoughts, 
schemas, early life experiences, core beliefs, thinking errors and distortions, (c) 
disputation, challenging and reality hypothesis testing, and (d) patient to patient, 
unguided discussions. Techniques considered unique to ACT included (a) ACT 
conceptualisation of psychological difficulties (e.g., language based problems, creative 
hopelessness), (b) acceptance, willingness and de fusion, (c) mindfulness, and (d) 
elicitation of, and commitment to, core values. More specific details for the CBT TAU 
group are described below (see section 6.2.4.3 and Appendix E for a review of the ACT 
groups).  
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy Based Treatment as Usual. CBT TAU groups were 
permitted to run as they would in usual clinical practice, but were requested not to 
include any mindfulness or acceptance components. Sessions adopted the following 
broad structure. Early sessions began by socialising patients to the CBT model, 
proposing that antecedent situations (A) activate beliefs or interpretations about an 
event (B), which in turn cause certain consequences (C). Pre determined examples 
(from the book) were used to convey that the way in which people think and feel about 
events (their cognitions) determines how they react to those events. Guided discussions 
were used to explore how different thoughts and feelings may result in different 
outcomes. This model was extended to in group guided analysis, using participants’ 
current psychological concerns to explore how the model applied to them. This teaching 
was supplemented with information regarding cognitive processes such as over 
generalised autobiographical recall and selective attention, which were used to explain 
how cognitions may serve to maintain psychological distress. Homework diary cards 
were used to aid the identification of idiosyncratic automatic thoughts and beliefs and 
the role that these had on subsequent behaviour. Where necessary, this was extended Chapter VII     181 
 
into a discussion of core schema, helping patients to recognise how early experiences 
may have formed long standing beliefs that everyday life, in conjunction with cognitive 
biases, might serve to confirm and maintain.  
Later sessions focused on teaching CBT based skills. For example, patients were 
taught to catch automatic dysfunctional thoughts, to write them down, to evaluate the 
objective evidence for and against each thought, and to consider possible alternative 
interpretations. Similarly, behavioural tests and graded task assignments were used both 
in session and as homework as forms of exposure to feared events. For example, using 
reality hypothesis testing, participants were helped to devise experiments that would 
allow then to assess whether anticipated outcomes of feared events were grounded in 
reality, or whether there was any objective evidence for key over generalisations. 
Socratic questioning was used to work through examples of reality hypothesis testing, 
encouraging participants to notice aspects of their experience that may have been 
overlooked, and to discuss why these may have gone unnoticed (i.e., selective 
attention). The last three sessions focused on relapse prevention.  
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy. Although the ACT intervention was 0.5 hours 
shorter than in study 3
30, the content of each session followed the same guidelines 
described in Table 6.2. The first half of every ACT session began with a mindfulness 
exercise followed by a review and a discussion of homework. Unlike CBT TAU, ACT 
participants were invited to volunteer information rather than being addressed in turn. 
The second half of each session were concerned with the following stages: (1) Creative 
Hopelessness, (2) Control as the Problem, (3) Acceptance and Defusion, (4) Defining 
the Self, (5) Values, and (6) Committed Action (Figure 2.3, Table 6.2, and Appendix E).  
 
7.2.6.3 Mid Therapy Assessment. During treatment I monitored patient well being using 
the BDI II at 4 weekly intervals (data not presented here). After the first, eighth, and 
last session participants completed the CEQ. After the mid and last session participants 
completed the HAQ II. All questionnaires were sealed in envelopes and distributed to 
participants at the end of a treatment session by the clinicians. To ensure anonymity, 
                                                           
30 It was not possible for the CBT TAU groups to run for longer than 2 hours per session. ACT sessions 
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participants marked each questionnaire with a memorable ID number before returning 
the data to the IPTS in the stamped addressed envelope provided.  
 
7.2.6.4 Post Therapy Assessment. Therapists distributed questionnaire packs to 
participants at the end of the last therapy session and all participants completed them 
again. The completed packs were brought to the post intervention interview (conducted 
by author), during which they described their experiences in the group and the ways in 
which they felt that the group had or had not been helpful (data not presented here). 
Those who had dropped out of therapy were not invited to an interview (because the 
interview was designed to cover group experiences), but they were sent questionnaire 
packs by post. Six months after attending the last therapy session, all participants were 
sent the final questionnaire pack to complete before attending a second SCID II. After 
all T3 measures had been completed, participants were invited to a 2 hour ACT or 
CBT TAU top up session conducted by the respective clinicians.  
 
7.2.7 Analysis Strategy 
Preliminary analyses tested for the normal distribution of study variables and for 
between group comparability on demographic variables (e.g., age), baseline variables 
(e.g., GSI), and possible confounding variables (e.g., therapeutic alliance). The main 
analyses then compared ACT and CBT TAU on an analysis by treatment administered 
basis (see section 3.4.1). Treatment impact was assessed using a series of repeated 
measures ANOVA (one per outcome measure) to test for the effects of Time, Group and 
Time x Group interactions. Significant effects were further analysed with post hoc 
ANOVAs. The magnitude of the difference between the two groups at T2 and T3 was 
also quantified by calculating Cohen’s d effect size (ES) per outcome measure.  
Owing to the small sample, and the fact that both interventions were expected to 
produce post treatment improvements, it was reasoned that analysis of Time x Group 
interactions might not detect anticipated differential group effects at T3 (i.e., Type II 
error). Thus, for cases where medium or large ES values were reported at T3, but the 
Time x Group interaction did not reach conventional levels of significance, post hoc 
ANOVAs were nevertheless used to test for within group differences. Although this Chapter VII     183 
 
method of analysis would not be acceptable in powered RCTs, it has been employed in 
other pilot trials to obtain a detailed account of the preliminary findings, which may 
prove helpful for informing powered trials (e.g., Lynch, Morse, Mendelson, & Robins, 
2003). To reduce the probability of committing Type I errors, significant differences in 
post hoc analyses were determined using α = 0.01
31. Marginal p values (.01< p <.10) 
are stated where found. 
Three secondary analyses were conducted. Firstly, a series of repeated measures 
ANOVAs were computed on an intention to treat basis (ITT; see section 3.4.1). ITT is 
a useful analysis strategy because, unlike analysis by treatment administered, it upholds 
randomisation. However, it simultaneously introduces the problem of missing data. A 
number of missing value analysis methods were considered (see section 3.4.1), of which 
LOCF was deemed most appropriate for this trial. LOCF is based on the assumption 
that participants who discontinue treatment experienced no change from the point of 
dropping out to post treatment assessment. Owing to the treatment resistant nature of 
this group, the assumption of no change was considered to be conservative. 
Furthermore, most of those dropping out of treatment were re referred to another form 
of treatment, most often individual care (see section 7.3.4.5).  
Secondly, the clinical significance of change was calculated for each participant and 
chi square was used to test whether clinical change differed between groups. Thirdly, 
mechanisms of change were explored. Owing to the small sample size, formal 
mediational analyses were not computed. However, exploratory analyses of 
mechanisms of change were conducted by testing whether theory driven changes in 
process measures occurred in each group and whether these changes preceded and 
predicted outcomes. These mediation based questions have been recommended by 
researchers when full mediation cannot be adequately tested (e.g., Hollon, Evans, & 
DeRubis, 1990). It was predicted that ACT would reduce experiential avoidance and the 
believability of automatic negative thoughts, and increase valued living and 
mindfulness. These changes were hypothesised to predict T3 outcomes in this condition. 
CBT TAU was predicted to significantly reduce the frequency of automatic negative 
thoughts, but not significantly alter experiential avoidance, thought believability or 
                                                           
31 Alpha adjustments, such as Bonferroni, protect against Type I error. When samples are small, however, 
it is equally important not over adjust, because this inflates the probability of Type II error. Owing to this, 
α = .01 was considered to be the most appropriate adjustment.   Chapter VII     184 
 
valued living. No firm prediction was made regarding mindfulness. Change in the 
frequency of automatic negative thoughts was hypothesised to predict treatment gains in 
CBT TAU. Finally, simultaneous regression was used to test whether any post 
treatment process measures predicted T3 outcomes. Owing to the exploratory nature of 
these analyses, an adjusted alpha was again used.  
 
7.3. Results 
7.3.1 Preliminary Analysis 
7.3.1.1 Missing Data and the Distribution of Variables. For each participant, 
questionnaire responses were considered valid if they had less than 10% missing data. 
On the seven occasions that this occurred, participants’ mean scores for that scale were 
substituted for the missing value. For cases where more than 10% was missing, the 
participants’ scores were not included in analysis for that variable (i.e., they were 
included in all other analyses). Four participants had more than 10% data missing for a 
measure. Sample size thus varied slightly across analyses. All study variables were 
normally distributed. 
 
7.3.1.2 Baseline Characteristics and Group Comparability. As indicated in Table 7.1, 
most participants scored in the clinical range for global symptom severity and 
depression and more than a third met the diagnostic and symptomatic criteria for at least 
one PD. Furthermore, most participants scored within the clinical range for six or more 
of the psychiatric domains measured by the SCL 90. Between group comparisons 
suggested groups were comparable at baseline. There were no significant between 
group differences for gender (χ
2
(1, 39) = .417, ns), age (t(1, 39)  = .034, ns) or number of 
previous treatments (χ
2
(1, 39) = 6.80, ns). Similarly, a series of independent t tests 
indicated that there were no significant between group differences on baseline indices 
of psychological distress (GSI (ACT M = 1.63, CBT TAU M = 1.66) t(1, 39) = 0.10, ns; 
BDI (ACT M = 29.65, CBT TAU M = 28.65) t(1, 39) = 0.25, ns; WHOQOL (ACT M = 
48.89, CBT TAU M = 45.79) t(1, 39) = 0.78, ns; and MBQ (ACT M = 2.46, CBT TAU M 
= 2.34) t(1, 39) = 0.84, ns) or process measures (AAQ (ACT M = 5.02, CBT TAU M = 
4.66) t(1, 39) = 1.44, ns; MAAS (ACT M = 49.95, CBT TAU M = 53.00) t(1, 39) = 0.69, 
ns; ATQ TF (ACT M = 96.45, CBT TAU M = 96.70) t(1, 39) = 0.13, ns; ATQ TB (ACT Chapter VII     185 
 
M = 95.45, CBT TAU M = 96.70) t(1, 39) = 0.55, ns). The CBT TAU group did, 
however, show a greater trend towards unvalued living (VLQ discrepancy (ACT M = 
8.7, CBT TAU M = 23.50) t(1, 39) = 1.89, p > .05). No between group differences were 
found for treatment credibility/expectancy for change following the first session (t(1, 30) 
= 0.12, ns), at 8 weeks (t(1, 22) = 1.00, ns), or at T2 (t(1, 25) = 1.01, ns). Similarly, there 
were no significant differences in therapeutic alliance at 8 weeks (t(1, 27) = 0.26, ns), or 
at T2 (t(1, 26) = 0.49, ns).  
 
7.3.1.3 Attrition. Between T1 and T2, eight participants (40%) dropped out of the CBT 
TAU group and three from the ACT group (15%). A further CBT TAU participant 
dropped out from T2 to T3 assessment. No participants sought external treatment during 
the 6 months consolidation period. However, an ACT participant who was considered 
high risk for suicide received 14 individual ACT treatment sessions following the 16 
weeks of group treatment. Because this contingency plan was written into the protocol 
for both conditions (i.e., this was not a deviation from the protocol), his data were 
included in the analyses
32.  
Comparison of completers versus non completers indicated that the latter had higher 
baseline GSI (t(1, 39) 2.02, p = .05) and AAQ scores (t(1, 39) = 2.19, p < .05), and lower 
WHOQOL scores (t(1, 39) = 2.18, p < .05). Furthermore, 64% (N = 7) of those 
discontinuing treatment met diagnostic and symptomatic criteria for a PD.  Because 
attrition was greater in the CBT TAU group, the above analyses were re run on 
completers only. This indicated that those completing ACT had a tendency towards 
greater AAQ scores than those completing CBT TAU (t(1, 27) = 1.90, p = .07). The 
proportion of participants falling into the ‘moderate severe’ depression category (BDI > 
20; Dozois, et al., 1998) was also marginally higher in the ACT than CBT TAU group 
(N = 15/17 versus N = 7/12, respectively; χ
2
(1, 27) = 3.44, p = .06), and the ACT group 
had a greater number of participants meeting PD diagnosis (N = 6 versus N = 3). 
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7.3.2 Main Analysis 
7.3.2.1. Statistical Significance of Change. Figure 7.3 visually depicts change in 
outcome measures, across testing periods, for all participants completing treatment. 
(SCID II data are presented separately (section 7.3.2.2) because the SCID II is a 
categorical variable). Inspection of these graphs suggests that both ACT and CBT TAU 
obtained comparable T2 gains, but differential effects were implied at T3. Specifically, 
trends suggested that while the symptoms of CBT TAU participants tended to relapse 
from T2 to T3, ACT participants either maintained gains (BDI II), or continued to 
improve (GSI and WHOQOL).  
A series of repeated measures ANOVA (Table 7.2) tested these trends. A significant 
Time effect was found for all four outcome measures. Post hoc repeated measures 
ANOVA (adjusted p < .01) revealed a significant reduction in BDI II scores from T1 to 
T2 (F(1, 28) = 43.47, p < .001) and T1 to T3 (F(1, 27) = 18.31, p = .001) and a significant 
increase in WHOQOL scores from T1 to T2 (F(1,28) = 19.31,  p < .001) and T1 to T3 
(F(1,27) = 12.25,  p = .01). GSI was marginally reduced from T1 to T2 (F(1,28)  = 5.51, p = 
.03) and significantly reduced from T1 to T3 (F(1,27)  = 7.37, p = .01). For MBQ scores, 
only a marginally significant reduction was found from T1 to T3 (F(1, 26) = 4.97 p < .05). 
No Group effects were found and only the BDI II Group x Time interaction 
approached significance (p = .06). Post hoc analysis of this marginally significant 
interaction showed significant T1 to T2 reductions in BDI II for both groups (ACT (F(1, 
16) = 25.21, p < .001), CBT TAU (F(1, 11) = 16.82, p < .01)). Change from T1 to T3 was 
significant only for the ACT group: ACT (F(1, 16) = 22.67 p < .001); CBT TAU (F(1, 10) = 
1.56 p > .05). In the CBT TAU group, a marginally significant increase in the BDI II 
occurred from T2 to T3 (F(1, 10) = 3.55 p = .09). 
Between group Cohen’s d ES values were computed for each outcome measure at T2 
and T3 (see Feske & Chambless, 1995). These were calculated by dividing the 
differences of the group means (MACT   MCBT) by the pooled standard deviation (σpooled 
=  √[(σ 1²+ σ 2²) / 2]). Using Cohen’s (1988) guide (see section 6.3.1), T2 differences 
showed small ES values in favour of CBT TAU for WHOQOL (d = 0.21), BDI II (d = 
0.16), and MBQ (d = 0.28) and in favour of ACT for GSI (d = 0.14). At T3, however, 
ES values were found in favour of ACT for GSI (d = 0.48), BDI II (d = 0.50), and 
WHOQOL (d = 0.10). MBQ scores were comparable.  Chapter VII     187 
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Table 7.2  
Mean (SD) and Repeated Measures ANOVA for Outcome and Process Measures Comparing T1, T2 and T3 Testing in Treatment Completers 
 
  Completing Participants (N = 28)     Repeated Measures ANOVA  
  ACT (N = 17)    CBT TAU (N = 11)    Time  Group  Time x 
Group 
Measure  T1     
M (SD) 
T2  
M (SD) 
T3 
M (SD) 
  T1 
M (SD) 
T2 
M (SD) 
T3 
M (SD) 
   
F(1, 26) 
 
F(1, 26) 
 
F(1, 26) 
Outcome                      
BDI II  29.35 (9.98)  14.47 (11.84)  13.71 (11.58)    26.50 (15.16)  12.67 (11.36)  21.20 (17.97)    17.61
***  .01  2.97
† 
WHOQOL  49.28 (8.80)  56.34 (13.48)  59.44 (14.91)    52.76 (16.13)  59.25 (13.36)  57.58 (16.22)    7.04
**  .15  .92 
GSI  1.50 (0.48)  1.16 (0.66)  0.90 (0.51)    1.52 (0.86)  1.27 (0.86)  1.30 (1.04)    4.23
*  .55  1.80 
MBQ  2.40 (0.37)  2.34 (0.37)  2.20 (0.38)    2.41 (0.46)  2.27 (0.13)  2.21 (0.31)    4.26
*  .13  .41 
Process                     
ATQ TF  92.20 (29.39)  67.73 (27.30)  62.00 (31.14)    90.63 (34.51)  64.81 (22.84)  70.63 (30.48)    11.47
***  .02  .54 
AAQ  4.90 (0.73)  4.10 (0.84)  3.91 (0.72)    4.33 (0.82)  4.30 (0.79)  4.20 (0.83)    8.88
**  .02  5.22
** 
VLQ R   10.57 (25.22)   2.00 (21.26)  0.64 (23.67)     15.22 (20.47)  2.78 (22.74)  2.88 (28.87)    4.08
*  .01  .37 
ATQ TB  92.46 (28.27)  74.80 (30.64)  62.67 (32.40)    91.18 (34.58)  73.63 (32.25)  83.36 (33.57)    3.53
*  .49  1.27 
MAAS  51.38 (11.15)  57.43 (8.05)  57.81 (13.27)    54.23 (17.80)  57.63 (12.49)  60.27 (15.59)    2.93
†  .26  .17 
† p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 ***p < .001. Note: GSI = Global Severity Index; WHOQOL = Quality of Life; BDI II = Beck’s Depression Inventory; MBQ = Maladaptive Behaviours 
Questionnaire; ATQ TF = Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire   Thought Frequency; AAQ = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire; VLQ = Valued Living Questionnaire; AQT TB = 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire   Thought believability; MAAS = Mindfulness Attention and Awareness Scale. T1 = baseline; T2 = post treatment; T3 = 6 month follow up Chapter VII     189 
 
Although the Time x Group interaction for GSI scores was not significant, the 
medium ES in favour of ACT at T3 suggested meaningful between group differences. 
Post hoc analyses were therefore computed for the non significant Time x Group effect. 
For ACT, this revealed a marginally significant reduction from T1 to T2 (F(1,16) = 4.16, 
p = .05), a significant reduction from T1 to T3 (F(1,16) = 14.07, p < .01), and a marginally 
significant reduction from T2 to T3 (F(1,16) = 4.78, p = .04). Within group changes for 
CBT TAU were non significant, however.  
 
7.3.2.2 Change in Personality Disorder Symptomatology. Six of the participants 
completing the ACT group met SCID II diagnostic and symptomatic criteria for at least 
one personality disorder at baseline. Of these, 2 remained symptomatic at 6 month 
follow up. Three participants completing the CBT TAU group met criteria for a 
personality disorder at baseline. Of these, one no longer met the symptomatic criterion 
at follow up, one continued to meet the symptomatic criterion and one dropped out of 
follow up assessment.   
 
7.3.3 Secondary Analysis 
7.3.3.1 ITT Analysis. Because attrition was selective, ANOVAs were re run on an ITT 
basis. The results from these analyses were comparable to those in section 7.2.1. A 
significant Time effect was found for all outcome measures (GSI (F(1,39) = 6.50, p < 
.01), WHOQOL (F(1,39) = 9.45, p < .001), BDI II (F(1, 39) = 20.87, p < .001) and MBQ 
(F(1, 39) = 4.61, p < .05). Post hoc analysis revealed a marginally significant reduction in 
symptom severity (GSI) from T1 to T2 (F(1,39) = 5.28, p < .05) and a significant 
reduction from T1 to T3 (F(1,39) = 8.20, p < .01). WHOQOL scores significantly 
improved from T1 to T2 (F(1,39) = 16.07, p < .01) and T1 to T3 (F(1,39) = 12.55, p < .01), 
and BDI II scores significantly improved from T1 to T2 (F(1,39) = 33.58, p < .001) and 
T1 to T3 (F(1,39) = 18.75, p < .001). Furthermore, there was a significant reduction in 
MBQ scores from T1 to T3 (F(1,39) = 6.40, p =.01). No Group effects were found, and 
only the BDI II Group x Time interaction neared significance (F(1,39) = 2.63, p = .08). 
Post hoc analysis were used to explore this effect, revealing a significant reduction in 
depression from T1 to T2 for both groups (ACT (F(1,19) = 21.03, p < .001) CBT TAU 
(F(1,19) = 12.77, p < .01)). Only the ACT group, however, showed a significant reduction Chapter VII     190 
 
from T1 to T3 (F(1,19) = 19.26 p < .001). The CBT TAU group, on the other hand, 
showed a marginally significant increase in depression from T2 to T3 (F(1, 19) = 3.47, p 
= .09). 
 
7.3.3.2 Clinical Significance of Change. Jacobson and Truax’s (1991) criteria for 
clinically meaningful and reliable change were computed for GSI and BDI II scores 
(treatment completers only). This analysis compared T1 to T2 and T1 to T3 scores using 
the same classification system outlined in section 3.4.2 and 6.2.5. Results are shown in 
Table 7.3 and Figure 7.4. GSI scores at T2 showed that a greater proportion of ACT 
than CBT TAU participants had recovered or improved following treatment (41% (N = 
7) and 24% (N = 3) respectively). Similarly, fewer ACT than CBT TAU participants 
stayed the same or deteriorated (59% (N = 10) and 76% (N = 9) respectively). The 
distribution of change across conditions comparing ‘same or deteriorated’ and 
‘recovered or improved’ was not, however, significant (χ
2
(1,28)
 = 1.10, p > .05, see Figure 
7.4). At T3, a greater proportion of ACT than CBT TAU participants had recovered or 
improved (59% (N = 10) and 18% (N = 2) respectively), and fewer ACT than CBT 
TAU participants stayed the same or deteriorated (41% (N = 7) and 82% (N = 9) 
respectively). These between group differences were significant (χ
2
(1,27)
 = 3.84, p < .05, 
see Figure 7.4). 
The same analysis, conducted on BDI II scores, showed that at T2 most ACT 
participants had recovered (65%, N = 11); five stayed the same and one worsened. 
Conversely, for CBT TAU, a minority had recovered or improved (33%, N = 4) and the 
rest stayed the same (67%, N = 8). The distribution of change was not significantly 
different between conditions (χ
2
(1, 28)
 = 4.22, p > .05). At T3 most ACT participants had 
recovered (65%; N = 11), five stayed the same and one deteriorated, whereas most 
CBT TAU participants stayed the same or had deteriorated (82%, N = 10). Analysis 
showed a significant between group difference in the distribution of change when 
comparing ‘same or deteriorated’ with ‘recovered or improved’ (χ
2
(1, 27)
  = 8.59, p = .01, 
see Figure 7.4). These analyses thus indicate that at T3, a greater number of ACT than 
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Table 7.3 
Percentage of Clinically Significant Change Split by Group  
  GSI    BDI II 
  T2  T3    T2  T3 
  ACT  CBT 
TAU  ACT  CBT 
TAU    ACT  CBT 
TAU  ACT  CBT 
TAU 
Recovered (%)  35  8  41  18    65  25  65  9 
Improved (%)  6  16  17  0    0  8  0  0 
Same (%)  47  68  35  72    29  67  29  81 
Deteriorated (%)  12  8  6  8    6  0  6  9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Percentage of Participants ‘Recovered/Improved’ (R/I) and ‘Same/Detereorated’ 
(S/D) for ACT vs. CBT TAU on GSI and BDI II scores at T2 and T3. 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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7.3.3.3 Exploratory Mechanisms of Change. Based on ACT theory (see section 2.2), it 
was predicted that ACT would reduce AAQ and ATQ TB and increase MAAS and 
VLQ R scores. For CBT TAU, only a reduction in ATQ TF was expected (see section 
1.2). As reported in Table 7.2, a significant Time effect was found for all process 
measures. Further analysis of Time effects showed a significant T1 to T2 reduction in 
AAQ (F(1, 28) = 9.19, p < .01), and ATQ TF (F(1,28) = 26.29, p < .001), a marginally 
significant reduction in ATQ TB (F(1,28) = 5.23, p = .03) and MAAS (F(1,28) = 3.37, p = 
.07) and no change for VLQ R. Comparing T1 to T3 scores, a significant reduction 
occurred in AAQ (F(1,27) = 16.04, p < .001), ATQ TF (F(1,26) = 15.37, p = .001) and 
ATQ TB (F(1,26) = 8.63, p < .01), and a marginally significant reduction (adjusted p ≤ 
.01) was observed for VLQ R (F(1,26) = 5.56, p = .03) and MAAS (F(1,27) = 4.73, p = .04). 
The only significant Time x Group interaction observed was for the AAQ. Post hoc 
comparisons indicated significant reductions in AAQ scores only for the ACT group: T1 
to T2 (F(1, 16) = 12.32, p < .01), T1 to T3 (F(1,16) = 22.48, p < .001).  
To assess whether change in processes measures during treatment predicted T3 
outcomes, multiple regressions were computed for those measures showing significant 
T1 to T2 change (i.e., AAQ and ATQ TF). These analyses controlled for baseline 
measures of the outcome variable in block 1 of the regression (i.e., T1 GSI, QOL, BDI 
II, MBQ), and regressed T3 values of the outcome variable (i.e., T3 GSI, QOL, BDI II, 
MBQ) on to the residual gain (RG)
33 of AAQ/ATQ TF in block 2. Because differential 
treatment mechanisms were predicted, separate regressions were computed for each 
condition. For ACT, regression analyses used AAQ RG and ATQ TF RG as the 
predictors (one regression per predictor); for CBT TAU, ATQ TF RG was the predictor 
(because AAQ scores did not change in the CBT TAU condition). 
Results for the ACT group showed that AAQ RG scores were significantly predictive 
of T3 GSI (β = .787, p = .001), T3 BDI II (β = .662, p < .01) and marginally predictive 
of T3 WHOQOL (β = .467, p = .03), and MBQ (β = .386, p = .09) scores. ATQ TF RG 
scores were predictive of T3 GSI only (β = .686, p < .01). Because AAQ and ATQ TF 
RG scores both significantly predicted T3 GSI, a simultaneous multiple regression was 
computed in which T3 GSI was regressed on to both predictors simultaneously in block 
2 of the analysis. Results showed that AAQ RG scores were marginally predictive of T3 
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GSI (β = .629, p = .03), but ATQ TF RG scores were not (β = .253, p > .05). In the 
CBT TAU group, ATQ TF RG scores did not significantly predict any T3 outcomes 
(GSI (β = .140), QOL (β = .124), MBQ (β = .04), or BDI II (β = .318; all p > .10). 
These findings thus suggest that changes in the AAQ were predictive of T3 outcomes 
for the ACT condition, but changes in ATQ TF were not predictive of T3 outcomes in 
the CBT TAU condition.  
Finally, to test whether any T2 process measures could predict T3 outcomes, a series 
of simultaneous regression analyses were computed, one per outcome. These analyses 
simultaneously regressed each T3 outcome measure on to all T2 process measures. 
Using the data of both groups, results (Table 7.4) showed that only T2 AAQ scores 
predicted T3 outcomes. 
 
7.3.3.5. Reduced Re referrals? The treatment of individuals with a long history of re 
referral was central to this trial. For this reason, the proportion of patients either 
awaiting or receiving psychological treatment at the end of the trial (i.e., after T3 
assessment) was obtained. This indicated that of the 17 participants completing ACT, 
one continued to receive individual ACT sessions from ‘therapist one’ after treatment 
had ended. Of the three that discontinued treatment, one was awaiting further 
psychological treatment from DHFT. Of the 12 participants completing CBT TAU, 
three were receiving individual psychology 1 month after T3 assessment. Another one 
was awaiting treatment. Of the eight who discontinued treatment, five were awaiting or 
already receiving alternative treatment. Thus, 2/20 ACT allocated participants and 9/20 
CBT TAU allocated participants were awaiting or receiving treatment following this 
trial. This difference was significant (χ
2
(1,39) = 6.14, p < .05). 
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Table 7.4 
Simultaneous Regressions Predicting T3 Outcomes from T2 Process Measures  
Outcome     T3 GSI    T3 WHOQOL    T3 MBQ    T3 BDI II 
Predictor    B  SE B  β    B  SE B  β    B  SE B  β    B  SE B  β 
T2 AAQ    .044  .024  .425
†    1.18  .554  .538
*    .002  .015  .036    1.18  .396  .663
** 
T2 ATQ TF    .007  .007  .256    .097  .151  .165    .001  .004  .074    .035  .108  .072 
T2 ATQ TB    .003  .005  .120    .039  .105  .079    .000  .003  .006    .027  .075  .081 
T2 MAAS    .002  .015  .021    .149  .343  .094    .010  .009  .280    .044  .245  .181 
T2 VLQ R    .009  .007  .279    .031  .136  .044    .000  .004  .023    .097  .097  .172 
Overall R
2    .460
*    .362    .107    .501
* 
† p < .10; *p < .05 **p < .001 
Note: T2 = Post test; T3 = Follow up; GSI = Global Severity Index; QOL = Quality of Life; MBQ = Maladaptive Behaviours Questionnaire; BDI = Beck’s 
Depression Inventory; AAQ = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire; ATQ TF = Automatic Thought Questionnaire   Thought Frequency; AQT TB = 
Automatic Thought Questionnaire  Thought Believability; MAAS = Mindfulness Attention and Awareness scale; VLQ R = Revised Valued Living 
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7.4 Discussion 
7.4.1 Study Findings 
Previous research suggests that cognitive interventions are not an effective means of 
treating all adult mental health patients, with approximately 30 50% either showing no 
change or relapsing after treatment (see section 1.2.4). It is important, therefore, to 
refine existing techniques and to establish new ones for this diagnostically 
heterogeneous group. With this in mind, the primary aim of this study was to pilot test 
ACT versus CBT TAU for patients whose symptoms have been resistant to, or re 
occurred following, previous psychological treatment. Based on previous literature, it 
was predicted that ACT would obtain larger and more durable effects than CBT TAU. 
The secondary aim of this study was to test whether theory driven mechanisms of 
change could differentially account for treatment gains in each group. Based on the 
theoretical models discussed in chapter 1 and 2, it was predicted that experiential 
avoidance, mindfulness, cognitive defusion, and valued living would predict change in 
the ACT group. Conversely, reductions in thought frequency were expected to predict 
change in the CBT TAU group.  
These predictions were tested using a methodology that was sensitive to issues of 
both internal and external validity. For example, the sample presented with a range of 
psychological problems and many reported co comorbid and/or PD symptoms. It can 
thus be argued that, compared to the ‘pure’ homogeneous samples typically recruited to 
RCTs (Westen et al., 2004), this heterogeneous group better approximated the 
characteristics of patients usually seen in clinical settings. Treatments were also 
delivered in a manner that aimed to reflect real life treatment conditions. Sessions were 
guided by broad treatment protocols, retaining some flexibility to meet individual 
patient needs. Similarly, clinicians were able to provide participants with additional 
one to one treatment if deemed necessary. Although these features of the trial tend to 
challenge internal validity, the design included important features to increase 
confidence in the findings. For example, participants were randomised to treatments and 
many confounds were controlled or monitored, such as treatment duration, therapeutic 
alliance, and treatment credibility.  
The main findings of this trial suggested that both interventions reduced mean levels 
of psychological distress, reduced the tendency to engage in MBs, and improved quality Chapter VII     196 
 
of life scores. These Time effects remained significant even when evaluated using a 
more conservative ITT analysis strategy. This suggested, somewhat contrary to 
expectation, that both interventions produced significant treatment effects. Trends in the 
data, however, suggested that the effects of these two interventions were not fully 
comparable over time. Although the power of the study was not sufficient to detect any 
significant Time x Group interactions, group means strongly suggested that change was 
more durable for the ACT condition. This implication was supported by several 
findings. Firstly, follow up scores indicated medium effect sizes in key outcome 
measures that were in favour of ACT. Secondly, a greater proportion of ACT than CBT 
TAU participants had follow up scores that were within the ‘normal’ range and that 
were reliably better than at baseline. Thirdly, within group analyses showed that ACT 
obtained significant baseline to follow up changes that were not observed in the CBT 
TAU condition.  
Together, these findings suggest that while the symptoms of the CBT TAU group 
tended to relapse following treatment, ACT members either maintained gains (BDI II) 
or continued to improve (GSI, WHOQOL). This occurred despite the fact that, 
compared to CBT TAU, ACT clinicians treated larger groups that tended to be more 
symptomatic at baseline. Owing to the design of the study, these differences were 
unlikely to be attributable to expectancy for change, intervention credibility, and/or 
therapeutic alliance. These findings support the conclusion that both interventions 
produced short term benefits, but that ACT achieved more enduring change seemingly 
by preventing relapse. MBQ scores were an exception to this trend, however. Although 
the MBQ proved sensitive to detecting changes over time, no between group differences 
were found. This finding was anomalous in relation to the other outcome measures and 
requires further investigation. It is possible that the null effect observed was related to 
the fact that patients selected for this trial were not engaging in high levels of risk 
behaviours. This is speculative, however, and should be addressed in future work.  
In addition to investigating symptom change, exploratory analyses of mechanisms of 
change were also carried out. Consistent with prediction, ACT produced significant T1 
to T2 reductions in the AAQ that were significantly predictive of T3 outcomes. Because 
change in experiential avoidance during treatment preceded and predicted outcomes at 
T3, the associations observed are supportive of a cause and effect model. Furthermore, 
post treatment AAQ scores were uniquely predictive of follow up outcomes (GSI, Chapter VII     197 
 
QOL, BDI II), suggesting that participants with a high AAQ score at post treatment 
were more symptomatic at 6 months. An unexpected finding was that ACT also 
significantly reduced thought frequency and this reduction appeared predictive of 
symptom severity at follow up. However, further analysis indicated that a change in the 
frequency of negative thoughts was not predictive of symptom severity after accounting 
for the effect of change in the AAQ. Consistent with ACT theorising, therefore, these 
findings suggested that accepting unwanted private events, rather than merely 
experiencing or not experiencing those events, was the main agent of change. 
Exploratory analysis of change in the CBT TAU group showed that although 
anticipated reductions in thought frequency occurred, this change was unrelated to 
outcome.  
To summarise: these results suggest that in keeping with study 3, ACT had the 
capacity to achieve enduring change in patients who might otherwise had been classed 
as treatment resistant. Although some participants did not experience significant mental 
health improvements, ACT appeared to have greater potential for change than CBT 
TAU. Furthermore, preliminary data suggests that ACT achieved these gains in theory 
consistent ways. In contrast, CBT TAU tended to obtain short term gains that were not 
sustained and that were not predicted by reductions in the frequency of negative 
thoughts.  
 
7.4.2 Methodological Limitations 
Although the present study produced promising results it must be evaluated in the light 
of some limitations. Firstly, it is most probable that the sample size prohibited the 
detection of anticipated Group x Time interactions, especially given the high within 
group variability. Although within group analyses provided some insight into the 
differential effects of the two treatments, these analyses were based on non significant 
interactions. These findings should thus be considered as tentative; providing a firm 
basis for replication and extension. Power calculations based on the present data suggest 
that the anticipated Group x Time interaction could be detected with a sample of 65 
participants per group (calculations based on a medium between group ES, 2 group 
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The second limitation concerns the fidelity of the two treatments to their respective 
models and techniques. Although all sessions were recorded and a collection were 
informally checked for treatment integrity, it was simply not feasible for a non biased 
member of the clinical team to rate the content of these recordings. (For ethical reasons, 
only members of this team were allowed access to the tapes). No evidence can therefore 
be offered to prove that treatments were delivered in keeping with ACT and CBT 
models. Internal evidence suggesting treatment fidelity was, however, implied by (a) 
theory consistent shifts in process measures and (b) the use of resources drawn from 
ACT and CBT treatment books.  
Another concern regarding the treatments is their comparability across factors that 
were not measured. One ACT therapist, but neither CBT TAU therapist, had personal 
involvement in the trial. Similarly, CBT was TAU, but ACT was a novel treatment. 
Non measured, non treatment specific factors, such as greater enthusiasm or 
organisation on the part of ACT therapists, may thus have contributed to change. 
Counter to this rival hypothesis, however, is the fact that groups were comparable in 
their expectancy for change and differential effects arose long after the end point of 
treatment.   
 
7.4.3 Implications  
This trial has provided evidence to suggest that ACT could be an acceptable and 
beneficial intervention for treatment resistant patients. This was shown by its ability to 
obtain more durable and clinically significant effects than its ecologically valid 
counterpart within the DHFT. Moreover, in keeping with the ACT model, results 
suggested that failure to address experiential avoidance during treatment could be 
prognostic of poor future outcomes. Although it is necessary to test whether these 
findings hold in a trial that addresses some of the limitations raised (see section 8.2), the 
present study suggests that the treatment of repeat service users could be greatly 
improved by using ACT. From the perspective of the service provider (i.e., DHFT), 
ACT appears to have made a greater contribution to the reduction of re referral rates 
than CBT TAU. From the perspective of the consumer, low attrition in the ACT group 
suggested this treatment was a more acceptable option than CBT TAU, especially for 
those patients with high experiential avoidance and meeting PD diagnostic and Chapter VII     199 
 
symptomatic criteria (characteristics of drop out participants). Furthermore, ACT 
achieved more durable and clinically meaningful change than CBT TAU. ACT thus 
presents itself as an economically feasible and promising treatment for this group. Ideas 
for future research are discussed in chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
For many decades, psychologists have worked to understand how clinical disorders are 
established and maintained, with the ultimate aim of developing effective treatment 
programmes. Traditionally, this has involved discriminating disorders topographically 
(e.g., DSM IV, 2000) and developing disorder specific treatments. This has been based 
on the understanding that disorder specific treatments are integral to successful 
outcomes. I began this thesis by identifying a trans diagnostic group of patients whose 
resistance to standard care treatment continues to challenge the strained resources of the 
National Health System (NHS). The main aim of this thesis, therefore, was to develop 
and test a novel and economically feasible treatment for this ‘treatment resistant’ cohort. 
Based on existing literature, ACT was proposed as a promising candidate therapy. This 
was by virtue of the fact that, according to ACT theorising, the formally dissimilar 
symptoms that this group present with are commonly maintained by excessive levels of 
experiential avoidance. Because this application was novel, the work presented in this 
thesis focused on the first two stages of treatment evaluation described in chapter 3. 
First, based on the observation that treatment resistant patients often engage in 
maladaptive behaviours, analogue research was designed to test the ACT assumption of 
their common experiential avoidance function. Second, pilot trials were carried out to 
test run ACT for treatment resistant patients. This chapter aims to summarise the main 
findings, discuss possible implications, and make suggestions for future research. 
 
8.1 Main Findings  
8.1.1 Analogue Research 
Although theorists have for many years discussed the negative reinforcement properties 
of addictive substances (e.g., Baker et al., 2004; Wikler, 1948), few have provided a 
wide ranging account of maladaptive behaviours. ACT theorising offers a parsimonious 
and integrated model, which proposes that these behaviours co vary because of a shared 
experiential avoidance function. As reviewed in chapter 2 and 4, however, this is a long 
held assumption that was in need of investigation. In fact, although this is a key tenet of 
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experiential avoidance have mostly been inferred using data on experiential avoidance 
like constructs, such as avoidant coping and thought suppression (see section 2.1.4).  
Using the AAQ to index experiential avoidance, some evidence was presented to 
support the ‘common experiential avoidance hypothesis’ of maladaptive behaviours 
(studies 1 and 2). Extending previous research (e.g., Cooper et al., 2003), study 1 used 
structural equation modelling techniques to show that a wide range of clinically relevant 
behaviours could be conceptualised as sharing a common cause or function of some 
kind. Aiming to elucidate the nature of this shared commonality, it was found that the 
AAQ accounted for a significant proportion of maladaptive behaviour covariance. This 
finding, which was replicated in study 2, suggested that one of the reasons maladaptive 
behaviours co vary is because of their shared experiential avoidance function.  
After the isolated bivariate relationship between experiential avoidance and 
maladaptive behaviours had been identified, research designed to understand this 
relationship more fully could be developed. Specifically, study 2 tested whether 
experiential avoidance  was one of the reasons why negative affect intensity and 
childhood trauma increase the probability of engaging in maladaptive behaviours. 
Overall, results were supportive of the hypothesised mediational models; experiential 
avoidance reduced a substantial proportion of the effect of negative affect intensity, and 
a slightly more moderate proportion of the effect of childhood trauma, on the tendency 
to engage in these behaviours. These findings were consistent with the hypothesis that 
people who experience negative affect intensely and/or who have experienced 
childhood trauma are more likely to engage in maladaptive behaviours in an attempt to 
escape, avoid, or reduce contact with unwanted private experiences. Owing to the cross 
sectional design that was used, however, rival hypotheses regarding the direction of 
causation could not be ruled out. 
In addition to these main findings, both studies also suggested a differential 
association between experiential avoidance and maladaptive behaviours in the self 
declared clinical as compared to the non clinical group. In particular, both studies 
suggested that experiential avoidance was related to a greater range of behaviours in the 
clinical sample. Furthermore, associations tended to be of greater magnitude in this 
subgroup. This suggests that experiential avoidance is especially implicated in 
maladaptive behaviours exhibited by treatment seeking samples. It is possible that this 
occurs because this group present with higher levels of experiential avoidance. This Chapter VIII     202 
 
could not be ascertained with certainty, however, because other non measured between 
group differences could have produced similar findings.   
Overall, this theory testing phase of research supported three main conclusions: (1) 
experiential avoidance is one of the reasons why dissimilar maladaptive behaviours co 
vary; (2) individuals who are high in emotionality and/or who have experienced 
childhood trauma are more likely to engage in problem behaviours, in part, because of 
heightened levels of experiential avoidance; (3) maladaptive behaviours are more likely 
to serve an experiential avoidance function in treatment seeking samples. I argued that 
the findings of these two studies, in conjunction with existing research (e.g., Gratz & 
Gunderson, 2007; Gratz et al., 2008; Hayes, Wilson, et al., 2004), provided sufficiently 
compelling evidence to embark on the novel application of ACT to treatment resistant 
patients. 
 
8.1.2 Applied Research 
Although previous research had shown promising effects for ACT with acute 
psychiatric disorders, little was known about its applicability to treatment resistant 
patients. A pilot phase of investigation was thus considered prudent.  
Study 3 used a pre post uncontrolled trial to test run ACT for this group. Despite 
many factors that might have mitigated against it, significant effects were found. ACT 
was associated with medium to large effect sizes, and significant improvements were 
reported for several indices of psychological distress, the use of alcohol, and quality of 
life. Furthermore, 50% 70% of participants achieved significant improvements on key 
outcome measures and none were awaiting or receiving further psychological treatment 
at 12 month follow up. Although investigations into mechanisms of change could be no 
more than exploratory, they were nonetheless consistent with ACT based predictions. 
Reductions in experiential avoidance and thought believability, and increments in 
mindfulness and valued living during treatment were associated with several 6 month 
and 12 month outcomes. Therefore, although no firm conclusions could be made 
regarding cause and effect relations or the generalisability of findings, study 3 provided 
good evidence to support the continuation of this research.  
Study 4 was designed to evaluate ACT more rigorously by comparing it to an active 
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obtained comparable post treatment effects, only ACT was associated with durable 
gains. For example, at follow up, ACT was associated with significantly greater rates of 
clinical improvement than CBT TAU. Additionally, medium effect sizes were found in 
favour of ACT. Moreover, ACT, but not CBT TAU, obtained significant pre treatment 
to follow up changes. In an attempt to elucidate these differential effects, exploratory 
mediational analyses were conducted. These analyses suggested that reductions in 
experiential avoidance during ACT predicted follow up outcomes. In the CBT TAU 
group, however, reductions in the frequency of automatic negative thoughts were 
unrelated to outcome. Furthermore, regardless of group, post treatment levels of 
experiential avoidance were uniquely predictive of follow up outcomes, even when 
controlling for the frequency of automatic negative thoughts. This tentatively suggests 
that levels of experiential avoidance at post test influenced psychological functioning at 
6 months.  
In addition to these main findings, both trials also indicated that ACT group attrition 
rates (23%) were substantially lower than average rates in published RCTs (50%; 
Hansen, Lamber, & Forman, 2002) and those of the comparison group in study 4 (CBT 
TAU; 45%). Unlike CBT TAU, which tended to lose participants with PD symptoms, 
higher baseline severity, and excessive experiential avoidance, ACT retained 
participants with these characteristics. Overall, therefore, a time limited, group based 
delivery of ACT appears to have been acceptable for treatment resistant patients. 
Although these two pilot trials have some limitations, and the generalisability of their 
findings is unknown, they nonetheless support several tentative conclusions: (1) ACT 
can meaningfully improve the psychological functioning of treatment resistant patients; 
(2) ACT could offer a means of obtaining more long term change than standard care for 
this group; (3) ACT can achieve change in theory consistent ways; (4) experiential 
avoidance is implicated in the durability of treatment outcomes; and (5) a group based, 
time limited delivery of ACT is a viable and acceptable option for treatment resistant 
patients. Overall, the findings presented in this thesis have thus been largely supportive 
of the theoretical underpinnings of ACT and its applicability to treatment resistant 
patients. They must be considered in the light of several strengths and limitations, 
however.  
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8.1.3 Main Strengths and Limitations 
8.1.3.1 Strengths. Reflecting on the programme of research as a whole, it appears to 
have had some strengths. Firstly, a number of gaps in current knowledge were identified 
and theoretically grounded principles were used to try to enhance understanding in those 
areas. Secondly, the research was conducted in a systematic manner, embedded within a 
recommended stage based approach to evaluating novel treatments. Thirdly, the 
integration of analogue and applied research provided a broad assessment of ACT’s 
theoretical applicability to diverse samples and different clinical phenomena. Fourthly, 
the multi method approach (e.g., cross sectional non experimental design, prospective 
experimental design) provided convergent evidence in support of the ACT model. 
Because findings from different methods converged, support for this model is less likely 
to have been confounded by any one methodological weakness. Similarly, replicating 
the main findings across separate and diverse samples reduces the probability that the 
findings are attributable to idiosyncrasies of a certain sample, such as undergraduates. 
Finally, the use of advanced statistical techniques offered a modern and flexible means 
of testing ACT predictions. Although this type of hypothesis testing is in stark contrast 
to traditional behavioural approaches, it has provided a parsimonious means of testing 
ACT’s broad predictions.  
 
8.1.3.2 Limitations. These strengths are offset by some unavoidable limitations. Firstly, 
although the research was designed to flow neatly from analogue to applied 
investigations, this flow was partially disrupted by the need to exclude patients who 
were engaging in ‘at risk’ behaviours (studies 3 and 4). Because maladaptive 
behaviours are an important element of treatment resistance, this limits the 
generalisability of findings to the treatment resistant population. Nevertheless, the work 
has provided a broad analysis of the common experiential avoidance hypothesis using a 
range of dependent variables that have specific relevance to this group.  
A second main limitation was that all work relied on self report measures. Although 
this was ethically defendable, self report is subject to several sources of inaccuracy, 
such as demand bias and memory distortions (see section 3.2.1). Several efforts were 
made to reduce the effect of known confounds. For example, in each study, participants 
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the order of questionnaires so as to prevent systematic carry over effects. Furthermore, 
associations between variables were consistently based on statistical analyses rather 
than self reported associations. Also, efforts were made to reduce the possibility of 
artificially inflated associations. For example, the MBQ was designed to measure the 
tendency to engage in maladaptive behaviours in a manner not confounded by 
motivations to engage.  
A third limitation is that, although all studies had broad and unrestrictive inclusion 
criteria, some groups were nevertheless underrepresented. Specifically, the findings of 
studies 1 and 2 may not generalise to males and the findings of studies 3 and 4 may not 
generalise to patients with more entrenched disorders (e.g., Borderline Personality 
Disorder, see section 8.3.1.3). Finally, by virtue of investigating the novel application of 
a modern treatment, the sample sizes of the applied work have been small. The findings 
in this thesis thus, quite naturally, only tell part of an unfolding story. 
 
8.2 Implications and Suggestions for Future Research 
Having reviewed the main findings of this thesis, the second aim of this chapter is to 
consider their possible implications and to discuss fruitful areas for future investigation. 
This will begin by discussing maladaptive behaviours, followed by the treatment of 
treatment resistant patients, and will finish by considering the broader field of ACT 
literature as a whole.  
 
8.2.1 Understanding Maladaptive Behaviours 
Studies 1 and 2 tested, and found some evidence to support, the common experiential 
avoidance hypothesis of maladaptive behaviours. Despite the formal dissimilarity of the 
many behaviours investigated, the higher order factor model provided a parsimonious 
account of behaviour covariances. Furthermore, experiential avoidance accounted for a 
significant proportion of that covariance. The possible implications of these findings are 
discussed below.  
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8.2.1.1 Implications of Commonality of Functions for Symptomatic Treatments and 
Syndromal Classifications. One implication of the functional equivalence of 
maladaptive behaviours is that they could be treated using principle based approaches 
designed to undermine common causes or functions, such as experiential avoidance. 
This can be contrasted to the more syndrome specific and protocol based treatment 
approach, which focuses on understanding the topographical form of the core 
presentation and aims to effect a change in that syndrome directly. The functional 
approach has several strengths. It provides key principles that can efficiently guide the 
treatment of co occurring behaviour problems, focusing on their functional similarities 
(e.g., experiential avoidance, rule governed behaviour) rather than formal dissimilarities 
(e.g., binge eating, substance abuse, and so on). Indeed, the co occurrence of problem 
behaviours has traditionally challenged syndrome specific treatment programmes, 
because it is often unclear which behaviour to treat and when (see Conrad & Stewart, 
2005; Westen et al., 2004). Although the functional approach seems to be particularly 
suited to the treatment of co occurring behaviour problems, it could also be useful for 
individuals who present with a singular or core maladaptive behaviour. This is because 
reducing the occurrence of that core behaviour can increase the probability of engaging 
in others (i.e., behaviour switching; Donovan, 1988). In theory, functional treatment 
approaches could have the capacity to prevent this phenomenon from occurring.  
Commonality of function also has implications for how maladaptive behaviours are 
conceptualised. Contemporary psychiatry, which strongly influences psychological 
treatments and their evaluation, understands clinical phenomena in terms of formal 
symptoms. Consequently, maladaptive behaviours are defined mainly on the basis of 
features that make them dissimilar from one another. Although this approach is 
particularly useful for communicating and generalising findings across settings, it has 
several weaknesses. Most importantly, at least from the perspective of this thesis, it de 
emphasises their commonalities and their high co occurrence (see section 4.1). Studies 
1 and 2 suggested that a functional diagnostic system, such as understanding dissimilar 
clinical phenomena in terms of their common experiential avoidance function (Hayes et 
al., 1996), could offer a more parsimonious approach. Nevertheless, this model requires 
a more fine grained level of detail than is currently available. For example, further 
research is required to understand more fully the learning histories or predispositional 
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Similarly, research could be designed to elucidate additional factors that account for 
unexplained variance that maladaptive behaviours share. 
 
8.2.1.2 Additional Mediators and Moderators of Maladaptive Behaviours. Although the 
higher order factor model adequately accounted for maladaptive behaviour covariation, 
unique factors also appeared to play an important role for many of the behaviours under 
investigation. Similarly, a large proportion of covariance was not accounted for by 
experiential avoidance. Impulsivity is one factor that could help to unpack the 
relationship between experiential avoidance and maladaptive behaviours more fully. 
Impulsivity is a multi component concept that refers to the tendency to give in to 
urges and impulses, to act hastily without forward planning, and to show poor task 
perseverance (see Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). Impulsivity is reliably related to risk 
taking (e.g., Grano et al., 2004), but its relation to experiential avoidance is not well 
understood. Cooper et al. (2003) cast some interesting light upon the possible ways in 
which these two variables might interact. Investigating avoidant coping, they reported 
that individuals high in both avoidance and impulsivity were particularly vulnerable to 
problem behaviours. This finding makes intuitive sense; individuals predisposed to act 
without forethought who are also motivated to alleviate distress may be less likely than 
others to consider adaptive, low risk means of affect regulation. It is also possible that 
interactions between experiential avoidance and impulsivity could determine which of 
the range of behaviours becomes predominant. For example, high experiential 
avoidance plus high impulsivity could be predictive of behaviours that, through some 
action, provide immediate relief or gratification (e.g., drug or alcohol use). Conversely, 
high experiential avoidance coupled with low impulsivity could lead to more passive 
forms of risk taking such as restrictive eating. Exploring multivariate relations between 
experiential avoidance and other variables, such as impulsivity, could help to 
understand maladaptive behaviours and to develop a functional diagnostic system more 
broadly.  
 
8.2.1.3 Treating Maladaptive Behaviours. Although experiential avoidance only 
accounted for a proportion of maladaptive behaviours covariance, the present findings 
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for treating these behaviours. Although this suggestion seems to be at odds with study 4, 
which showed that the AAQ was unrelated to MBQ scores, it is possible that this 
occurred because patients who were actively engaging in high risk behaviours were 
excluded from the trial. Certainly the theoretical implications of studies 1 and 2 are 
consistent with recent research on the efficacy of acceptance based and mindfulness 
based techniques for several risk behaviours. These have included, for example, 
recovery from polysubstance abuse (Hayes, Wilson, et al., 2004), nicotine addiction 
(Gifford et al., 2004), DSH (Gratz & Gunderson, 2006; Low, Jones Duggan, Power, & 
MacLeod, 2001), binge eating (e.g., Telch et al., 2000) and alcoholism (Marlatt et al., 
2004).  
A possible extension of the present findings into clinical practice could involve using 
acceptance based and mindfulness based techniques in a preventative, early 
intervention scheme, designed for individuals at risk for developing behaviour 
problems. This could include, for example, individuals who have experienced childhood 
trauma, individuals who experience negative affect intensely, or perhaps those with low 
social economic status (another known risk factor). Such an intervention could be 
designed to target these individuals before experiential avoidance manifests in 
maladaptive behaviour patterns. This could involve, for example, helping individuals to 
make undefended contact with unwanted private experiences and helping them to 
identify valued domains. Acceptance based and mindfulness based techniques could 
also prove useful for achieving and maintaining abstinence in patients who have already 
developed entrenched patterns of maladaptive behaviour. For example, ACT could help 
patients to mindfully observe stimuli that cue self destructive patterns of behaviour; 
rather than mindlessly reacting to them. Heightened awareness of these stimuli, and 
mindful exposure to them, should in principle help to disrupt the link that has been 
established between their occurrence and engaging in maladaptive behaviours. 
Furthermore, the values component of ACT could be especially important in leveraging, 
supporting, and augmenting change.   
 
8.2.2 Understanding and Treating Treatment Resistant Patients 
The current findings could also hold substantial and direct implications for 
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following, previous standard care treatments. The following section discusses the care 
of treatment resistant patients and possible directions for future work.  
 
8.2.2.1 Understanding Treatment Resistance. Although resistance to treatment is 
common, and the symptoms that predict it are well documented, little was known about 
the processes that might maintain it. Based on ACT theorising, it was predicted that 
excessive experiential avoidance would commonly maintain the dissimilar symptoms 
that treatment resistant patients tend to display. In support of this prediction, the 
samples who participated in studies 3 and 4 presented with high levels of experiential 
avoidance and, on the whole, showed successful long term gains after this process had 
been effectively targeted. Furthermore, findings also indicated that reductions in 
experiential avoidance during treatment were significantly predictive of outcomes above 
and beyond the effect of other plausible maintenance factors, such as the frequency of 
negative thoughts. Thus, although it is impossible to identify factors that predicted these 
samples’ resistance to treatment in the past, it is clear that experiential avoidance was 
uniquely implicated in terms of future psychological functioning. Although these 
findings are preliminary and in need of replication, they certainly converge with 
existing research, which has found that experiential avoidance, avoidant coping, and 
thought suppression precipitate relapse (e.g., Moos & Moos, 2006; Salkovskis & 
Reynolds, 1994; Westruff, 2001, cited in Chawla & Ostafin, 2008). Likewise, they are 
also consistent with Ma and Teasdale’s (2004) research which has shown that 
mindfulness helps to maintain remission in patients with major depression (another 
highly relapse prone group). These findings tentatively suggest that ACT could be a 
useful treatment for treatment resistant patients and that experiential avoidance could be 
important for understanding relapse and relapse prevention. Possible directions for 
future research are discussed below.  
 
8.3.1.2 ACT for Treatment Resistant Patients. Although the current findings have 
supported the use of ACT for treatment resistant patients, they are nonetheless 
preliminary and in need of replication. To establish ACT as an empirically supported 
treatment for this group (Chambless & Hollon, 1999), it must be evaluated using 
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of testing. In the current trials, these limitations mainly included the use of small 
samples, reliance on self report measures, and the use of a TAU comparison to compare 
ACT and CBT.  
The most obvious extension of this work is to conduct RCTs that recruit samples 
sufficiently large to detect the Group x Time interactions that were expected in study 4 
(cell sizes adjusted for attrition). This would not only help to confirm/disconfirm the 
effectiveness of ACT for this group, but could also provide a more thorough assessment 
of the implied link between experiential avoidance and relapse (see section 8.3.1.3). 
Future RCTs could also be improved by adding a wait list group as an additional 
control condition (i.e., ACT, CBT, WLC). This would allow for formal mediation 
analyses and the estimation of treatment effects relative to a no treatment control. The 
use of behavioural and psychophysiological measures in addition to self report 
measures could also be valuable, offering more detailed and objective information 
regarding treatment effects. Additionally, the collaboration of ACT and CBT specialists 
would help to ensure that both interventions were appropriately represented and that 
equally suitable process and outcome measures were selected. Independent ratings of 
treatment content could not only help to ensure treatment fidelity, but could also provide 
a means of objectively quantifying the key similarities and differences of these two 
interventions in practice.  
Heterogeneous sampling is uncommon in well controlled RCTs because variability 
in treatment response increases the probability of Type II error and makes it difficult to 
replicate findings. This sampling approach is essential, however, if the aim is to obtain a 
representative sample of treatment resistant patients. To balance these tensions, the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria could be refined so as to access a representative sample that 
has less within group variability than the samples in studies 3 and 4. For example, the 
inclusion criteria could be refined to patients with at least 2 previous treatment episodes 
and who had finished their previous treatment within a specific time frame, such as 
within the last two years. These refinements could help to target a more treatment 
resistant cohort. Inclusion criteria could also be more prescriptive about the type of 
treatments the patient has previously received and their responsiveness to them. Such 
information could be obtained, for example, from the patients’ clinical files and/or 
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statistical within group variability without impairing the recruitment of a representative 
sample of symptomatically heterogeneous patients.  
The RCT has been recommended primarily because tightly controlled experimental 
trials are necessary for establishing empirical support for a novel treatment (Chambless 
& Hollon, 1999). Nevertheless, these trials could also show some sensitivity to issues of 
external validity. For example, it would be possible to compare ACT and CBT delivered 
by standard care therapists, rather than specialist clinical teams. In this design, standard 
care therapists with a range of experience and preferred treatment orientations could be 
randomly allocated to either ACT or CBT training. Treatment session recordings could 
allow one to ascertain the degree of fidelity to the respective interventions and also to 
assess how successfully these techniques were taken up. Furthermore, a design of this 
kind could also include an assessment of training effects and cost effectiveness analysis. 
Thus, although neither treatment would be optimally delivered, this approach would 
provide a good approximation to real life clinical settings and allow for ACT and CBT 
to be compared along many important dimensions. One limitation of this type of 
approach, however, is that the dominance of CBT within current clinical training and 
practice could introduce non specific treatment confounds. For example, even newly 
trained clinicians would have had previous experience delivering CBT but not ACT.    
A final recommendation is that future work is designed to understand the factors that 
predict poor outcomes following ACT. Indeed, although the current findings showed 
promising changes on the group level, a minority of patients either stayed the same or 
worsened following treatment. Because this cluster of patients was so small, it was 
impossible to statistically identify factors that were predictive of poor outcomes. 
Nevertheless, informal observations during treatment suggested that patients with a 
strong attachment to the self as defined by the content of verbal behaviour (i.e., self as 
content) were less likely to show change (e.g., Elaine: “I get the feeling of being unsafe 
when people get the idea of who I am or what I am ... of not being good enough”). 
These participants also tended to struggle with identifying and committing to core 
values (e.g., Elaine: “I have these ideas that I am going to be very different with 
people... but when it comes down to it I’m like “no, I am the same old person, it’s not 
going to work””). This could have occurred because their continued attachment to self 
as content provided them with good ‘reasons’ why they could not pursue valued 
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greatly enhance our understanding of when ACT is most likely to produce beneficial 
effects. Furthermore, knowledge of moderators could also guide the development of 
treatment protocols for this group and help clinicians to adapt protocols given certain 
baseline profiles. For example, if excessive attachment to self as content does predict 
poor outcomes in treatment resistant patients, greater clinical time could be allocated to 
this component. Similarly, it could be helpful to expose patients to the concept of values 
earlier in treatment so as to gradually develop their ability to make undefended contact 
with them.  
 
8.2.2.3 Understanding and Preventing Relapse. The clinical trials in this thesis could 
also hold some clues regarding relapse prevention. Specifically, in keeping with existing 
research (e.g., Marlatt et al., 2004; Teasdale et al., 2000), findings have suggested that 
cultivating awareness and acceptance of symptoms could help to foster resilience in this 
relapse prone group.  
  How might ACT and mindfulness based techniques achieve this? One possibility is 
that they disrupt the link between residual or re occurring symptoms and subsequent 
relapse. For example, many ACT techniques encourage exposure to unwanted internal 
experiences in conjunction with inaction, defusion, and/or mindful observation. These 
learning episodes could help to weaken the motivation to engage in negatively 
reinforced operant behaviour. In turn, this could provide a window of opportunity for 
new patterns of responding, such as value consistent responding, to be established. New 
patterns of behaviour could initially occur only when prompted by the therapist 
(“Would you be willing to have these feelings if it brought you closer to your value of 
intimacy?”), but if ACT is successful, value orientated action should begin to occur 
independent of social prompts (i.e., after treatment has ended). Effectively using one’s 
values to guide behaviour could lead to long term changes in psychological well being 
by enabling a new repertoire to emerge that allows increasing access to positive 
reinforcement. Indeed, something of this kind could account for the continued gains that 
were found on some of the key outcome measures. Although this account is in need of 
further development and at present lacks empirical support, it provides a direction for 
further ACT research.  Chapter VIII     213 
 
To explore these implications further, future research could aim to pin down some of 
the factors that mediate or moderate relapse prevention and continued gains. For 
example, a longitudinal questionnaire based design could be used to monitor patients at 
regular intervals following treatment. This could allow for an analysis of whether the 
relationship between re occurring symptoms at ‘time 1’ and a relapse episode at ‘time 
2’ is mediated by changes in experiential avoidance and/or increased valued living. 
Alternatively, interviews (before and after treatment) could be used to establish whether 
ACT trained participants report qualitative change in the way they relate to unwanted 
internal experiences and whether this impacts on valued action. For example, interviews 
could be used to obtain detailed retrospective accounts of the patients’ most recent 
responses to a real life stressor or a dysphoric mood. Content analysis could then be 
used to test for change in response to that event both within subjects and/or relative to a 
control group. A further option could be to use a laboratory based design to model the 
way in which patients respond to emotional challenges before and after treatment. For 
example, a mood or stress induction task could be use to induce temporary emotional 
arousal. Psychophysiological measures could then be used to test whether ACT 
uniquely affects the patient’s level of arousal and/or rate of recovery (e.g., using the 
measurement of cortisol). A method such as this could provide an objective assessment 
of whether ACT can affect a change in biological responses to distress and/or whether it 
affects the ability to regulate that distress when it is experienced.   
 
8.2.2.4 Borderline Personality Disorder. Although the present thesis did not focus on 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) specifically, there are several reasons to allocate 
attention to this diagnostic group. Firstly, BPD has long been recognised as one of the 
most treatment resistant of the clinical diagnoses; with patients consuming 
disproportionate amounts of clinical resources (see Lieb et al., 2004). Secondly, patients 
with BPD typically are involved in a wide range of maladaptive behaviours, experience 
intense and unstable levels of affect, and engage in excessive levels of emotional and 
cognitive avoidance (e.g., see Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, Lejuez, & Gunderson, 2006; 
Linehan, 1993). Furthermore, a reliable link has also been established between BPD and 
childhood maltreatment (e.g., Herman, Perry & Kolk, 1989). Thus, the variables under 
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ACT based theorising could prove helpful both in conceptualising and treating BPD. 
In terms of conceptualisation, ACT suggests that many of the symptoms constituting a 
BPD diagnosis can be understood as chronic forms of experiential avoidance (e.g., 
Hayes et al., 1996). Dissociation, for example, which is triggered by intense negative 
affect, provides immediate escape from unwanted internal events. Similarly, the co 
occurrence of maladaptive behaviours that characterise this group, such as co morbid 
substance abuse and DSH, were found to relate to BPD risk factors (childhood trauma 
and negative affect intensity), in part, through high experiential avoidance (study 2). 
Although this research did not use a BPD sample, the findings are complemented by the 
work of Gratz et al. (2008). In a BPD sample, these authors found that experiential 
avoidance was a large, significant and unique predictor of BPD symptoms even when 
controlling for the effect of emotional vulnerability, impulsivity, and anxiety sensitivity. 
Moreover, having accounted for the effect of experiential avoidance, none of the other 
variables were significantly predictive of BPD symptoms (see also Cheavens et al., 
2005). Thus, although work in this area is limited, preliminary findings suggest that 
experiential avoidance could be useful for understanding BPD.  
In terms of treatment, there are some very clear conceptual similarities between ACT 
and DBT (Linehan, 1993), which is currently the most empirically validated treatment 
for this diagnosis. For example, both treatments adopt a learning perspective that 
underscores the function of BPD symptoms. Both also aim to treat ‘core’ and ‘co 
morbid’ disorders and use acceptance based techniques to this end. Furthermore, both 
are based on a flexible and principle based model of change (Miller & Rathus, 2000). 
Although it is too early to tell whether ACT could be valuable for BPD patients as a 
stand alone intervention, especially considering its emotionally evocative nature, the 
theoretical continuity between these two treatments makes their synthesis a possibility. 
One approach already developed has been to synthesise components from both these 
treatments into a time limited and group based format (e.g., Gratz & Gunderson, 2006). 
Although the evidence for this approach is limited, it has nonetheless shown promising 
effects; significantly impacting on a rage of BPD specific (e.g., DSH) and non specific 
(e.g., global psychiatric functioning) outcomes.  
Another possibility, especially for more entrenched BPD individuals, could be to 
integrate components of ACT into later stages of the DBT programme. Linehan (1993) 
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empirical attention (Dimeff & Linehan, 2001). Stage one is effective for stabilising self 
destructive behaviours; however, at the end of this stage patients are often described as 
being in a state of “quiet desperation” (Dimeff & Linehan, p. 2). That is, their 
behaviours are typically under control, but they continue to feel unhappy, incomplete, 
and unfulfilled. Stage 2 therefore aims to increase appropriate experiencing of emotions. 
This stage, which is described as exposure based in approach, helps patients to 
experience emotions non traumatically (Dimeff & Linehan). It is possible that ACT 
techniques could usefully contribute at this point. For example, ACT could build on the 
patients’ mindfulness skills acquired in stage 1 of DBT, helping them to experience 
their emotions from a defused observer perspective. Similarly, ACT could use values to 
motivate and augment change, helping to bring the patient’s life into contact with 
natural reinforcers. Furthermore, ACT’s focus on identifying and defining the self, 
which is not part of the DBT programme, could be especially useful for this group. This 
is because identity disturbance, such as incoherence and inconsistency in the sense of 
self, is a key component of this disorder (Wilkinson Ryan & Westen, 2000).  
Synthesising ACT and DBT would involve addressing some tensions, however. For 
example, DBT advocates distraction and avoidance of certain experiences as a way of 
down regulating emotional arousal. This could be made harmonious with ACT if 
patients could be successfully taught to discriminate situations where experiential 
avoidance is more or less likely to be effective. Specifically, patients could learn to use 
avoidance strategies flexibly and mindfully, rather than rigidly and excessively, and 
only when this does not lead to value inconsistent patterns of action.  
So far, the discussions in this chapter have focused on the most direct implications of 
the work in this thesis. The final section, however, is designed to address some more 
global considerations for ACT research in general.  
 
8.2.3 Future Developments in the Field of ACT Research 
8.2.3.1 Future Outcome Trials. Although ACT outcome research has obtained many 
promising findings over the last ten years, I have argued that much of this research 
remains in the pilot stage of investigation. In fact, the limitations of the clinical trials in 
this thesis are also relevant to many of the published ACT outcome trials. Although 
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evaluation (Ost, 2008; see section 3.3), future research should begin to push forward 
into the next stage. This would involve evaluating ACT in well controlled and powered 
clinical trials, with the aim of obtaining an objective assessment of its true impact by 
subjecting it to the same level of scrutiny that CBT has received over the years. These 
investigations would greatly profit from: (1) comparing ACT to active comparison 
conditions, (2) testing for mediation, (3) using different measurement methods to assess 
process and outcomes (e.g., self report plus behavioural measures), and (4) conducting 
at least a 1 year follow up. I agree with Ost’s (2008) suggestion that empirically 
comparing ACT and CBT, both in terms of process and outcome, could be particularly 
insightful. This is for three main reasons. Firstly, it could help to discriminate which 
approach is most appropriate and when. Secondly, it could help to discover how these 
treatments differ in real life practice. Thirdly, it would address the fundamental question 
of whether ACT offers anything above and beyond already widely available techniques. 
This question is especially important when considering the treatment of acute 
psychiatric disorders, for which CBT has a good evidence base (see section 1.2).  
  
8.3.2 Understanding Mechanisms of Change. Current knowledge could also be 
enhanced by testing the relative contribution, and differential effects, of ACT’s many 
techniques. Dismantling research is a common method for investigating these types of 
questions. For example, holding extraneous variables constant, do different 
combinations of techniques (e.g., defusion, acceptance, and valued living versus 
acceptance and valued living) result in different outcomes? Similarly, does the utility of 
certain combinations differ according to group chronicity and/or the order of delivery? 
Although the dismantling approach is valuable, it has some limitations. For example, 
the full potential of some ACT techniques, such as self as context, may rest on the 
successful reception of other techniques, such as acceptance. Similarly, because ACT 
techniques affect a change in more than one process, it could prove difficult to divide 
them up unambiguously.  
Another means of addressing similar questions, therefore, could be to monitor 
process and symptom changes regularly during treatment (e.g., using process measures). 
This approach could be used to assess how and when processes are affected, allowing a 
detailed assessment of how those changes correspond with symptom changes. Sample 
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this type of data, allowing one to test whether each process has unique, interactive, or 
moderated effects on outcome. This could, for example, be used to assess whether the 
successful development of self as context facilitates valued living, or whether 
acceptance and defusion differentially affect outcome. Similarly, it could help to clarify 
whether defusion, acceptance, mindfulness, and self as context together constitute a 
higher order factor of ‘undermining verbal governance’ techniques (see Figure 2.2). 
These more fine grained analyses could greatly enhance our understanding of precisely 
how ACT affects change. However, a current barrier to conducting analyses such as 
these is the availability of valid ACT process measures.  
 
8.3.3 Improving Process Measures. To date, a noticeable area of weakness within the 
ACT literature is that measurement tools are simply not available and/or mature enough 
to assess its processes of change. For example, although ACT is described in terms of 6 
processes, the AAQ is the only validated measurement tool currently available. 
Recently, even this measure has become the topic of debate, with authors 
retrospectively reconsidering whether it is a measure of experiential avoidance alone, 
experiential avoidance and psychological flexibility, or just psychological flexibility 
(see section 2.1; Hayes et al., 2006). An examination of the AAQ’s content suggests that 
this measure is most concerned with (a) negative appraisal of internal events, (b) 
attempts to control and eliminate those events, and (c) inhibited action as a result of 
both (a) and (b). This is consistent with the early definitions of experiential avoidance 
(e.g., Hayes et al., 1996), but includes items that could arguably be described as 
measuring cognitive fusion (e.g., “When I evaluate something negatively, I usually 
recognize that this is just a reaction, not an objective fact”) and the capacity for valued 
living action (e.g., “When I feel depressed or anxious, I am unable to take care of my 
responsibilities”), thus obscuring the boundaries between these processes. It is not hard 
to discern why this has occurred; ACT theory suggests that experiential avoidance is the 
result of excessive fusion and the antecedent of unvalued living. 
A further complication with using the AAQ to measure experiential avoidance is 
that, by virtue of being a questionnaire, it measures this construct in a trait based 
manner. As acknowledged by the authors (Hayes, Stroshal, et al., 2004, p. 572), this is 
not entirely harmonious with the idea that experiential avoidance is a contextually 
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occurs when fusion with private experiences is high and the motivation to escape those 
experiences predominate in the repertoire. Although this will occur more frequently for 
some individuals than others, from a theoretical perspective, experiential avoidance is 
regarded as a situational action and not an underlying trait. Thus, although in keeping 
with most of the work in this field, the reliance of this thesis on the AAQ to measure 
experiential avoidance is not without its problems. Developing process measure that are 
more sensitive to this contextual process is challenging, but some suggestions seem 
worthy of consideration.   
In the laboratory, measures that have been developed to monitor physical 
engagement/disengagement from aversive experiences, such as exposure to emotionally 
evocative stimuli (e.g., International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang, Bradley & 
Cuthbert, 1999), could be used as pre and post treatment measures of experiential 
avoidance. For example, eye tracking apparatus could be used to monitor the tendency 
to approach or avoid aversive visual stimuli (e.g., IAPS). Alternatively, an operant 
procedure could be used to measure the delay before participants terminate exposure to 
those stimuli (see Cochrane et al., 2006). The ‘approach avoidance’ task is another 
possibility for measuring experiential avoidance. In this task, participants are presented 
with stimuli (e.g., words or pictures) of varied valance and are required to ‘approach’ or 
‘avoid’ them by moving a joystick. Because instructions are either congruent or 
incongruent with valance (e.g., approach negative, avoid positive), delay latencies for 
cursor movement can be used as an index of pre conscious approach or avoid 
tendencies (e.g., see Lange, Keijsers, Becker & Rinck, 2008). A strength of behavioural 
approaches of this kind is that they can be individualised by selecting stimuli that are 
salient to the individual participants. For example, the stimuli for a spider phobic could 
include pictures of spiders, whereas those for a patient with social phobia would include 
pictures of feared social events (e.g., Lange et al., 2008). Behavioural tasks such as 
these would help to recapture the essence of contextually determined process variables. 
 
8.3.4 Testing Theoretical Links with RGB and RFT. A final recommendation is that 
future research begins to test the link between ACT techniques and theoretical accounts 
of those techniques. In chapter 2, I argued that the link between ACT and theoretical 
accounts of RFT and RGB is at present, tentative. The existing evidence for this link is 
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better understanding of these links could help to refine and develop ACT based 
interventions. Below are two suggestions for addressing these links.  
Firstly, the contingency sensitivity paradigm (see section 2.1) could be used to test 
whether ACT increases sensitivity to subtle changes in the environment. Early 
indications from unpublished work by F. Bond and colleagues (personal 
communication, 19
th August 2006) certainly support the hypothesised relationship 
between experiential avoidance and contingency sensitivity. These authors reported that 
the AAQ was significantly predictive of the ability to detect unsignalled changes in 
reinforcement contingencies in a simple operant task. Individuals high in experiential 
avoidance were less sensitive to such changes than less avoidant counterparts. 
Extending this work to clinical samples, perhaps by using a behavioural pre post 
measure, could help to elucidate the relationship between ACT and verbal governance.  
A second approach, which arguably has greater ecological validity, could be to 
conduct logical functional analysis during treatment (LFA; see Ghaderi, 2007). LFA is 
an extension of functional analysis that uses a logical structure to identify the variables 
that maintain a disorder. Specifically, this approach guides the clinician to identify 
inadequate verbal and non verbal stimulus control. An example of inadequate 
antecedent control, for example, is excessive or improper regulation of behaviour by 
verbal rules (see Ghaderi, 2007). Ghaderi (2006) has used this approach in patients with 
eating disorders, and identified excessive RGB as a defining characteristic of those 
patients who failed to improve following CBT. Extending this line of work could thus 
help to explain the link between RGB and treatment resistance more fully. One 
possibility could be to use a multiple baseline design across participants to establish 
whether excessive RGB diminishes when CBT is replaced with ACT. 
In summary, this section has aimed to provide some suggestions for extending the 
work presented in this thesis, discussing the application of ACT to treatment resistant 
patients specifically and considering future ACT research more globally. The present 
research has provided some of the necessary foundations for investigating ACT for 
treatment resistant patients and strongly justifies the continuation of work in this area.  
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8.4 Concluding Comments 
This thesis aimed to test the theoretical and clinical applicability of ACT for treatment 
resistant patients. Although its findings are tentative, and the story is still unfolding, 
ACT offers a promising and acceptable method of treatment for this group. 
Furthermore, it appears to have effected change in theory consistent ways. To conclude, 
I would like to reiterate a few main points. Firstly, throughout the history of clinical 
research, the correspondence between theoretically orientated and clinically orientated 
research endeavours has been weaker than originally claimed. It remains important to 
narrow this gap. Treatments should evolve concurrently with theoretical models and 
vice versa so that each can inform the other. Secondly, despite their different theoretical 
allegiances, several modern psychological treatments appear to have many qualities in 
common. Most notable is the use of process driven techniques to alter the way in which 
patients interact with private experiences, rather than attempting to change those 
experiences directly. These techniques appear to have specific benefits for the treatment 
of treatment resistant patients. Openness to collaboration between researchers with 
different theoretical orientations could prove pivotal to the progression of clinical 
research.   
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APPENDIX A 
Unpublished Materials of Study I and II 
 
Demographics Questionnaire 
 
Please indicate answers in the spaces provided 
1. Are you male or female?  ________________ 
2. How old are you?  ________________ 
3. What country were you born in?  ________________ 
4. What country do you live in?  ________________ 
5. What is your current occupation?  ________________ 
6. If you are a student, what subject have you been studying?  ________________ 
7. If you are a student, how many years have you been studying?  ________________ 
8. Have you ever sought treatment for a psychological problem 
(e.g., depression, anxiety, bereavement)? 
________________ 
9. If yes to qu. 8, did you take any medication for this problem?*  ________________ 
10.  If yes to qu. 8, did you receive any psychological treatment 
for this problem (e.g., ‘counselling’, ‘psychotherapy’, 
‘cognitive behaviour therapy’)? 
________________ 
11.  If you have received psychological treatment, how many 
types of therapy have you tried?  
________________ 
12.  Approximately how many sessions did you attend for the first 
type of therapy? 
________________ 
13.  Approximately how many sessions did you attend for the 
second type of therapy? 
________________ 
14.  Approximately how many sessions did you attend for the 
third type of therapy? 
________________ 
 
* Item included in study 2 only. Appendix A     222 
 
Maladaptive behaviours Questionnaire 
This questionnaire is designed to ask you about a range of behaviours that you may, or 
may not, engage in. It includes 49 statements and you are required to rate the extent to 
which each statement characterises you, using the scale below  
1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6 
   Very unlike      Quite unlike        A little             A little           Quite like       Very Like  
         me              me        unlike me           like me              me             me 
For example, if you read a statement and think “it’s very unlike me to do X” you would 
write a “1” next to the statement.  If you think “that’s only very slightly like me” write 
‘4’, or if you think “it’s very like me to do that”, write ‘6’. 
Before completing the questionnaire, please take note of the following points:  
Where questions refer to internet use, this means non work related use such as chat 
rooms, surfing the net etc. Where questions refer to sexual behaviours, this includes 
both foreplay and all forms of sexual intercourse. Where questions refer to drugs, this 
means the use of illegal drugs. This would include, for example, Cannabis, Cocaine, 
Ecstasy etc. Where questions refer to smoking, this means tobacco.  
 
Please read each statement carefully and answer as honestly as possible. All 
answers are anonymous.  Please do not leave any answers blank.  
 
It's like me ....   
 
1  to eat anything I want anytime I want to  1  2  3  4  5  6 
2  to avoid cigarette smoke if I am unwell  1  2  3  4  5  6 
3
*  to say no to drugs, including cannabis  1  2  3  4  5  6 
4
*  to be pre occupied by thoughts about smoking when smoking is 
prohibited  1  2  3  4  5  6 
5
*  to sometimes consume more than 6 alcoholic drinks in one 
evening  1  2  3  4  5  6 
6  to eat large amounts of food in secret  1  2  3  4  5  6 
7  to feel contented if I am prevented from surfing the net/playing 
video games for a prolonged amount of time   
8
*  to ignore dietary details (e.g., calorie content) when choosing 
something to eat  1  2  3  4  5  6 
9
*  to exercise even when I am feeling tired and/or unwell  1  2  3  4  5  6 
10  to physically threaten or hurt someone  1  2  3  4  5  6 
11
*  to sometimes intentionally prevent scars or wounds from healing  1  2  3  4  5  6 
12  to plan significant purchases (e.g., clothes, electronic goods) in 
advance  1  2  3  4  5  6 
13
*  to smoke tobacco  1  2  3  4  5  6 Appendix A     223 
 
14
*  to surf the net/play computer games before doing something else 
that needs doing  1  2  3  4  5  6 
15
*  to generally have no interest in taking drugs, including cannabis  1  2  3  4  5  6 
16
*  to sometimes engage in sexual activities with someone I have 
only just met.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
17
*  to find that my work performance or productivity suffers because 
of my internet/video game use.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
18
*  to never resort to violence.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
19
*  to sometimes actively seek out drugs for personal use, including 
cannabis.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
20
*  to feel irritation/frustration if I am in a non smoking 
environment.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
21
*  to sometimes scratch or bite myself to the point of scarring or 
bleeding.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
22
*  to sometimes feel pre occupied with the internet/computer 
games.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
23
*  to skip doing exercise for no good reason.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
24
*  to drink a lot more alcohol than I initially intended.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
25
*  to have a long list of things that I dare not eat.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
26
*  to feel excitement and/or tension in anticipation of getting drunk.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
27
*  to be content if I am prevented from exercising for a week.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
28
*  to always stop eating when I feel full.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
29
*  to prefer being in places where smoking is prohibited.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
30  to use a condom throughout sexual intercourse with a new 
partner  1  2  3  4  5  6 
31
*  to control my temper.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
32
*  to deliberately take small helpings as a means of controlling my 
weight.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
33
*  to exercise more than three times a week.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
34  to sometimes conceal the full extent of my purchases to friends 
and family  1  2  3  4  5  6 
35
*  to sometimes eat to the point of physical discomfort.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
36
*  to sometimes feel tension and/or excitement in anticipation of 
doing exercise.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
37
*  to sometimes cause myself direct bodily harm by, for example, 
cutting or burning myself.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
38
*  to only eat when I am hungry.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
39
*  to unsuccessfully try to cut back my use of the internet/computer 
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40  to always take steps to protect myself against pregnancy and 
sexually transmitted diseases  1  2  3  4  5  6 
41
*  to be excited by the opportunity of taking drugs, including 
cannabis  1  2  3  4  5  6 
42  to prefer evenings that do not involve drinking alcohol  1  2  3  4  5  6 
43
*  to sometimes get so angry that I beak something  1  2  3  4  5  6 
44  to sometimes use laxatives, diuretics or abuse diet pills to control 
my weight  1  2  3  4  5  6 
45  to avoid objects or activities that could cause me physical pain  1  2  3  4  5  6 
46  to always pass up opportunities for causal or illicit sex  1  2  3  4  5  6 
47*  to sometimes have more than one sexual partner.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
48*  to sometimes buy things for the sake of it, rather than because I 
actually need them  1  2  3  4  5  6 
49
*  to sometimes engage in sexual actives with someone when really 
I shouldn't  1  2  3  4  5  6 
50
*  to sometimes feel a strong impulse to buy things that I don’t 
really need  1  2  3  4  5  6 
51
*  to easily limit my use of the internet or video games  1  2  3  4  5  6 
52
*  to feel the urge to have a cigarette.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
53
*  to sometimes feel that I need to take drugs (this includes 
cannabis)  1  2  3  4  5  6 
54
*  to go out with friends who are drinking, but opt to stay sober  1  2  3  4  5  6 
55  to easily get into arguments when someone disagrees with me  1  2  3  4  5  6 
56  to think carefully before I buy something  1  2  3  4  5  6 
57  to avoid objects or activities that could harm my body  1  2  3  4  5  6 
58
*  to sometimes think that I might have a drugs problem (this 
includes cannabis).  1  2  3  4  5  6 
59
*  to avoid eating when I am hungry  1  2  3  4  5  6 
60
*  to find it difficult to stop eating after certain foods  1  2  3  4  5  6 
61
*  to be aggressive when sufficiently provoked  1  2  3  4  5  6 
62
*  to feel the urge to intentionally harm myself  1  2  3  4  5  6 
63  to experience guilt if I do not exercise   1  2  3  4  5  6 
64
*  to sometimes feel that I need an alcoholic drink  1  2  3  4  5  6 
65
*  to sometimes claim I have already eaten when this is not true  1  2  3  4  5  6 
66
*  to sometimes experience a powerful urge to spend money  1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
*Items that were in the final version (see Chapter 4 for exclusion process). Appendix B     225 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Description of Study III Participants 
 
Information about patients participating in Study 3 is described below. Please note that 
some aspects of this information have been altered (e.g., age, gender) so as to ensure 
patient confidentiality.   
 
Participant 1 was a 24 year old male presenting with sever and recurrent depression and 
clinical levels of anxiety. He also reported clinical levels of passive aggressive 
personality traits. At intake, he was signed off from work due to his psychological 
difficulties. He had received the following psychological treatment before attending the 
ACT groups: 3 months of individual psychotherapy, and a brief period (4 sessions) of 
individual CBT based counselling.  
 
Participant 2 was a 37 year old single female presenting with sever and recurrent 
depression, panic attacks and clinical levels of anxiety. At intake, she described 
experiencing several panic attacks a day and described these as preventing her from most 
‘normal’ daily activities such as taking the children out. Her presenting problem at intake 
was incapacitating recurrent anxiety and panic attacks. Previous therapeutic care 
included: 2 months of individual counselling, 3 months individual psychologist, 4 months 
cognitive therapy and 2 anxiety groups.  
 
Participant 3 was a 46 year old divorced woman with two children. At intake she 
presented with significant distress related to the break down of an intimate relationship. 
She had persistent intrusive and obsessive thoughts and engaged in repetitive reassurance 
behaviours such as phoning the GP, family and friends up to 30 times a day. She also 
voiced persistent suicidal thoughts, had experienced recurrent episodes of depression and 
had clinical levels of anxiety. Although she had no history of BPD, she was exhibiting 
several BPD symptoms in her most current relationship. Previous therapeutic care 
included: two episodes, equating to 8 months of individual psychotherapy (CBT in 
orientation), and 3 ½ months of CBT. 
 
Participant 4 was a 41 year old female. She was also currently signed off work due to 
her mental health concerns. At intake she presented with Avoidant Personality Disorder, 
compulsive personality traits, moderate to severe depression and clinical levels of 
anxiety. Previous therapeutic care: two episodes of individual counselling.  
 
Participant 5 was a 43 year old female experiencing recurrent depression and significant 
problems with perfectionism. She also met lifetime diagnostic criteria for Obsessive 
Compulsive Personality Disorder, Depressive Personality Disorder and Borderline 
Personality Disorder (symptomatic for the first two at intake). In addition to her 
psychological difficulties, she was also presented with sever migraines, IBS and ME. She 
further explained that her father had committed suicide when she was 20 years old, which 
contributed to several severe episodes of Anorexia Nervosa, also presented by her 
siblings. This individual first presented to the services in 1991, and had tried four 
different types of individual psychology (including CBT) prior to attending the ACT 
group (40 sessions in total).  
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Participant 6 was a 58 year old female presenting with an intense fear of death. 
Psychometric measures indicated that she met criteria for Somatoform disorder, sever and 
recurrent depression and clinical levels of anxiety and phobic anxiety. Previous 
therapeutic care included; individual psychiatrist, individual counsellor and 
psychotherapy (19 individual sessions).  
 
Participant 7 was a 34 year old woman presenting to the psychological services with 
recurrent pain attacks and agoraphobia that began to occur after a road traffic accident. 
Additionally, during her teenage years, this patient was diagnosed with anorexia nervosa; 
however, she was not symptomatic at intake. Prior to attending the group, she had tried 
several interventions including; group therapy, individual psychotherapy, hypnosis and 
meditation. At the time of assessment, she was experiencing several panic attacks a day, 
which precipitated symptoms of agoraphobia.  
  
Participant 8 was a 38 year old female who had been sexually abused by her grandfather 
and brother in childhood and raped in late adolescents. Six years prior to the current 
group she was diagnosed with PTSD, recurrent depression, and met the SCID II 
diagnostic criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder, Obsessive Compulsive Personality 
disorder and Avoidant Personality Disorder. Psychiatric records indicated a history of 
suicidal behaviour dating back to a first suicide attempt at 12 years old. She also has a 
history of DSH, which she had been abstinent from for 1 year 9 months prior to attending 
the group. She also had a history of substance abuse. Previous therapeutic care included; 
individual consultant psychotherapist for psychodynamic therapy (2 years); DBT (2 
years); relaxation group (6 months); and a CBT based Childhood Sexual Abuse survivors 
group (3 months). These interventions spanned back to back for 5 years (2001 2006). 
Assessment using the SCID II indicated that at intake, this patient was presenting with 
Avoidant PD, Obsessive Compulsive PD, sub threshold BPD (4/5 criteria), sub threshold 
depressive PD (4/5 criteria), and clinical levels of anxiety and severe depression.  
 
Participant 9 was a 46 year old female suffering from recurrent depression, high levels 
of anxiety and avoidant personality disorder. She described having formed very few 
friendships during her life because of intense feelings of inadequacy. During her 
childhood, she described being physically and verbally abused by her stepfather. For the 
10 years prior to attending the ACT group, she had tried four different therapies including 
individual and group therapy (CBT in orientation). This treatment totalled over 140 
treatment sessions.   
 
Participant 10 (Elaine) was a 36 year old female with a long history of psychiatric care 
for BPD, which dated back over 10 years. During this time, this participant had received 
many structured intervention, including; Cognitive Analytic Therapy, CBT, the full DBT 
treatment program, Gestalt therapy and Psychodynamic therapy. This individual had a 
history of chronic self harm (abstinent for 3 years prior to attending the group), alcohol 
and drug abuse (abstinent for at least 6 months prior to the group), impulsive spending 
that resulted in high levels of debt. She also had several inpatient admissions for suicide 
attempts. She also experienced high levels of depression, met diagnostic criteria for co 
morbid personality disorder, and experienced recurrent episodes of dissociation when 
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Appendix C 
Valued Directions Questionnaire 
 
Below are areas of life that some people value. We are concerned with your quality of 
life in each of these areas. One aspect of quality of life involves the importance that you 
put on different areas of living. First rate the importance of each area by circling a 
number on the scale of 0 2. Not everyone will value all of these areas, or valued all of 
these areas the same. Rate each according to your own sense of importance. If you rate 
an area as unimportant (0), move right on to rate the next area. If you rated an area as 
moderately or very important (1, 2) make a rating of how satisfied you are with the 
quality and depth of your experience in this area of life. Then rate how often you have 
done something to move you forward in this area in the last week.  
 
Questions and rating scale for each domain 
How important is this area to you? 
0 = not at all      1 = moderately     2 = very important 
Overall, how satisfied are you with the quality and depth of your experience in this area 
of life? 
0 = not at all      1 = moderately     2 = very satisfied 
How frequently have you done something to move you forward in this area during the 
last week? 
0 = no action      1 = once or twice     2 = three or four times  
3 = more than four times. 
 
1) Family (other than marriage of parenting): how do you want to interact with your 
family members? What type of sister or brother do you want to be? What type of son 
or daughter do you want to be? 
 
2) Intimate Relationship (e.g., marriage, couples): What is your ideal relationship 
like? What type of relationship would you like to have? What kind of partner would 
you want to be in an intimate relationship with? How would you treat your partner 
3) Parenting: What type of parent do you want to be? How do you want to interact with 
your children? 
4) Friends/social Life: What type of friend do you want to be? What does it mean to be 
a good friend? How would you behave towards your best friend? Why is your 
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5) Work/career: What do you value about your work? Financial security? Intellectual 
challenge? Independence? Prestige? Getting to interact with others? Helping 
people? 
6) Education/training: Why is learning important to you? Are there any skills you’d 
like to learn? 
7) Recreation/fun: What type of activities do you enjoy? What type of activities would 
you really like to engage in? Why do your enjoy them? 
8) Spirituality: This domain is about faith and spirituality rather than a specific 
religion. Why is faith important to you? If this is important to your life, what is it that 
makes it so important? 
9) Citizenship/community life: What can you do to make the world a brighter place? 
Are community activities (e.g., volunteering, voting, recycling) important to you? 
Why? 
10) Health/ physical self-care: What issues related to health and physical well being 
do you care about (e.g., sleep, diet, exercise)? Why and how do you take care of 
yourself? 
 
 
 
Cognitive Fusion 
 
Please answer the following questions, basing your answers on the last two weeks.  
 
1) On average, how often have you experienced unwanted or instructive 
thoughts/feelings? 
 
1                    2                    3                    4                    5                    6                    7 
never      less than      about once        several            daily          more than           almost 
  once a week       a week       times a week                       once a week      constant 
 
 
2) On a scale of 1 10, how much do you believe these unwanted/intrusive thoughts and 
feelings are real and meaningful? 
 
1             2             3             4             5             6             7             8             9             10 
Not at all real                      very real and/ 
and/or meaningful                                or  meaningfulAppendix D     229 
 
Appendix D 
 
Study III Patient Information Sheet and Information for General Practitioners 
 
 
Patient information sheet 
 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide on whether you 
would like to participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being 
done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully, 
and to talk to others about the study if you so wish.  
 
•  Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you take part.   
•  Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study.  
 
If there is anything that is not clear, or if you would like more information, please do not 
hesitate to contact Sue Clarke on (contact details) or Jess Kingston (a member of the 
research team) on (contact details).   
 
We ask that you inform Sue Clarke or Jess Kingston of your decision within one week. 
 
 
Part 1 
What is the Purpose of this Study? 
The purpose of this study is to provide patients with a 16 week, group based delivery of 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). The aim of the research component is to 
evaluate how effective this therapy is. We will do this by comparing pre intervention data 
to post intervention data. Below you will find some information about ACT. 
 
ACT is a therapy currently being used in America for patients with a range of mental 
health problems. ACT proposes that many mental health problems arise from, and can be 
made worse by, the avoidance of thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations. The main focus 
of ACT is to increase one’s willingness and acceptance for distressing thoughts and 
feelings, and to help patients live in a way that is consistent with their life values. Previous 
research has found ACT to be an effective intervention for a range of psychological 
disorders (e.g., depression, anxiety, post traumatic stress disorder, anorexia).  
 
Why Have I Been Chosen? 
We are contacting patients who are currently on the Dorset HealthCare NHS Trust waiting 
list for general adult mental health, and who have had at least one form of therapy in the 
past.  
 
Do I Have to Take Part? 
No. It is completely up to you whether you decide to take part or not.  If you do decide to 
take part, you will be asked to sign a consent form. You are still free to withdraw at any 
time and without giving a reason. A decision to withdraw, or a decision not to take part, 
will not affect the standard of care you receive.  
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What will happen to me if I take part; what will I have to do? 
 
Assessment Phase 
We are initially inviting you to an assessment at the Intensive Psychological Therapies 
Service (IPTS) in Poole. At this assessment session, the therapist will describe Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy to you, and assess whether you meet our inclusion criteria for 
this trial. If you do not meet the inclusion criteria, you will remain on the general adult 
mental health waiting list. If you do meet the inclusion criteria, you will be given a week 
to decide whether you would like to participate. If you would like to participate, you will 
be asked to sign a consent form.  
 
Research Phase 1: 
Having provided consent, you will be sent a questionnaire pack to fill out in your own time 
and return to the clinic before starting therapy. This pack should take you about 90 minutes 
to complete. A member of the research team will be available if you have any difficulties 
completing these forms (either over the phone or in person if necessary). You will also be 
booked in for a 90 minute session at the Intensive Psychological Therapies Service (IPTS) 
in Poole. This will be arranged for a time that is convenient for you. During this session 
you will be interviewed by a member of the research team about your current 
psychological difficulties and about the therapy that you have had in the past.  
 
Intervention: 
You will then be invited to attend 16 weeks of group therapy. Sessions will be weekly, and 
will last for approximately 2 ½ hours (with a 20 minute break) per week. There will be a 
total of 10 patients attending each group session and two clinicians. These sessions will be 
held at (time) at the IPTS. As with many forms of therapy, the clinicians will often set 
tasks for you to complete between therapy sessions.  
 
We hope to audio tape all therapy sessions and interviews. Therapy sessions will be taped 
to ensure that the therapy is delivered as anticipated, and to help the therapists develop 
their skills. Only members of the research team will have access to these tapes. Tapes will 
be securely stored in a locked cabinet. 
 
Research Phase 2: 
After these 16 weeks of therapy, you will be asked to complete a second set of 
questionnaires (in your own time) and attend another interview at the IPTS. This 
interview will ask about your experiences of the therapy. Six months after therapy 
we will ask you to attend a final interview and complete a final set of questionnaires.  
 
All interviews and questionnaire components are part of the research, allowing us to 
evaluate how effective the group was.  
 
Top Up Session 
You will be invited to a 1 day “top up” therapy session after the 6 month assessment. 
 
All components of the trial are displayed in the flowchart overleaf. 
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During this trial, you will be able to continue taking any medication that you are 
currently taking. We will ask that you refrain from attending any other form of 
psychotherapy for 6 months after therapy. This is routine practice and is referred to as a 
consolidation phase. This allows us to assess how effective the therapy is 6 months after 
the intervention. Once we have collected your follow up data you will be able to opt in 
for standard care if you so choose. 
 
We ask that you attend all scheduled visits and therapy sessions, and that you complete 
all the questionnaires. If you fail to attend four therapy sessions in a row, you will no 
longer be able to participate in the trial. The reason for this is that it helps you from 
unintentionally drifting out of therapy, and it facilitates group moral. If you stop coming 
to sessions without informing the clinic, the clinician will contact you. If you have 
changed your mind and decided that you would no longer like to attend the sessions, the 
clinician can help you arrange alternative care.  
 
Unfortunately we will be unable to provide you with any compensation for your travel 
expenses to the clinic. 
 
Pre intervention assessment phase 
Before you begin the 16 weeks of therapy, we will ask you to: 
(1) Fill out a questionnaire pack. This pack will consist of 8 questionnaires and can be 
completed in your own time at home. This pack takes approximately 90 minutes to complete. 
(2) Attend the clinic for an interview. This will last approximately 90 minutes. 
 
Follow up 
6 months after therapy, we will ask you to: 
(1) Fill out a questionnaire pack. This pack will consist of 8 questionnaires and can be 
completed in your own time at home. This pack takes approximately 90 minutes to complete. 
(2) Attend a 60 minute interview at the clinic. 
Top up Session 
You will be offered a one day ACT workshop. This is optional and will be held after the 
follow up phase is complete. 
Intervention 
Group therapy sessions will be held weekly for 16 weeks at the IPTS, Poole. Sessions will be 
held on Tuesday mornings from 9.30 – 12.00, and will last 2 ½ hours (with 20 minutes 
break).  
Post intervention assessment phase 
Having finished the 16 weeks of therapy, we will ask you to: 
(1) Fill out a questionnaire pack. This pack will consist of 8 questionnaires and can be 
completed in your own time at home. This pack takes approximately 90 minutes to complete. 
(2) Attend the clinic for an interview lasting approximately 60 minutes. Appendix D     232 
 
What Stage of Development is ACT at? 
The first trial delivering ACT was in 1986 to a group of patients with depression. Both 
this trial and many subsequent trials have indicated that ACT is a successful therapy for 
a range of psychological difficulties, such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder and addictions. This is the first trial to bring the 
intervention over to England, and to deliver the therapy to a group of individuals who 
have a range of different (as opposed to the same) psychological difficulties. The 
therapy sessions will be based on the ACT self help workbook; Get Out of Your Mind 
and into your Life (Hayes & Smith, 2005). 
 
What are the Alternatives for Treatment? 
The alternative treatment on offer is standard care. This is usually individual 
psychological therapy or counselling. The benefits of receiving standard care as 
opposed to participating in this trial are that standard care will (1) have more flexibility 
in when the therapy ends and (2) will be more likely to offer you individual therapy 
(although this is not always the case). The benefits of participating in this therapy as 
opposed to standard care are that (1) you will receive therapy sooner, (2) you will be 
receiving an intervention that has a history of good outcomes across many types of 
mental health problems, and (3) you are likely to acquire positive outcomes from 
participating in a group based intervention. If you decide to participate in this trial, you 
will be able to opt in for standard care after the 6 month follow up assessment if you so 
choose. 
 
What are the Possible Risks or Disadvantages of Taking Part? 
Like any psychotherapeutic intervention, you may feel emotional distress during the 
course of therapy. Your well being will be monitored by clinicians during every session, 
and they will ensure that no patient leaves the session significantly distressed. Patients 
who struggle with problems that cannot be addressed adequately in the group setting 
will be provided with an individual therapy session with one of the clinicians. Both 
clinicians are ACT trained, and have extensive experience in delivering therapy. One of 
the founders of this therapy will also be providing the clinicians with consultation 
throughout the trial.  
 
A possible disadvantage of participating in this trial is the inconvenience of the research 
components. These have been kept to a minimum and will be conducted in a way that is 
as convenient to you as possible. These aspects are necessary for us to see how effective 
the therapy has been and we will provide you with a letter detailing all research 
findings.    
 
What are the Potential Benefits of Taking Part? 
Based on the evaluation of previous clinical trials, ACT has potential benefits for a wide 
range of psychological disorders. For example, ACT reduced rehospitalisation of 
patients suffering from psychotic symptoms by up to 50%; reduced rates of drug use in 
opiate addicts significantly more than methadone treatment; and decreased feelings of 
anxiety in socially anxious individuals. There is also evidence to suggest that ACT is 
effective for treating depression, post traumatic stress disorder and panic disorder. 
Although we cannot promise health improvements, we anticipate that this treatment will 
decrease psychological distress, increase quality of life and teach you skills to help 
during everyday living. The group delivery is also aimed at helping to develop social 
skills and provide validation (e.g., “I am not the only one who feels like this”).  Appendix D     233 
 
 
The trial will also help us to learn more about the effective delivery of this therapy. The 
interviews after the intervention are designed so that you can tell us exactly what was 
and was not good about the therapy. In this way, you will be helping us learn more 
about the intervention and better ways to deliver it in the future.   
 
What Happens when the Research Study Stops? 
You will be provided with a mindfulness meditation CD to help you practice skills 
learnt in the group. You will also be offered a one day ACT “top up” session 
approximately 6 7 months after therapy. After the 6 month follow up assessment phase, 
you are free to opt in for standard care if you so choose. 
 
What if there is a Problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any possible 
harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on this is given in 
Part 2. 
 
Confidentiality –Who will know that I am taking part in this study? 
All the information about your participation in this study will be kept confidential.  The 
details are included in Part 2. 
 
 
For Further Information 
If you would like any further information about ACT or the trial, please do not hesitate 
to contact Professor Sue Clarke (contact details), or Miss Jess Kingston (contact 
details). 
 
This completes Part 1 of the Information Sheet. 
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are considering 
participation, please continue to read the additional information in Part 2 before 
making any decision 
 
Part 2 
 
What if relevant new information becomes available?   
Members of Sue Clarke’s research team are currently monitoring and will continue to 
monitor the ACT internet server and discussion forum. If any evidence comes to light 
that there are any adverse effects to ACT, your clinician will inform you of these details 
and ask you whether you would like to continue with the trial. If you decide to continue 
in the study you will be asked to sign an updated consent form. If you decide not to 
continue with the trial your continuing care will be arranged. It is also possible that, on 
receiving new information, the clinician feels that it is in your best interests to withdraw 
from the study. In the unlikely event that this happens, she will explain the reasons and 
facilitate the continuation of your care. If the study is stopped for any other reason, you 
will be told why and your continuing care will be arranged. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
You are free to withdraw from treatment at any stage. If you withdraw, we will need to 
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members of the research team and will not be stored with information that can identify 
you. If you withdraw, we will try and contact you. This is only for us to check whether 
you have experienced any adverse effects of the therapy. If this is the case, we will 
arrange individual care for you. 
What if something goes wrong? 
It is unlikely that this therapy will cause you any harm. Trained clinicians will be 
available at every stage of the intervention and assessment. If any research comes to 
light which suggests ACT may have negative consequences, patients will be informed 
immediately. We would like to reassure you that to date, patients have not suffered any 
adverse effects from this intervention that we are aware of.  
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should phone Sue Clarke 
(contact details). If you remain unhappy, you have the right to complain to the NHS 
about any aspects of the way you have been approached or treated during the course of 
this clinical trial. In the event that something does go wrong and you are harmed during 
the research study there are no special compensation arrangements.  If you are harmed 
and this is due to someone’s negligence then you may have grounds for a legal action 
for compensation against Dorset NHS, but you may have to pay your legal costs.  
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be 
kept strictly confidential and will only be looked at by members of the research team. 
This includes both clinicians, members of the Dorset NHS HealthCare team, and two 
co investigators at the University of Southampton. Data will be assessed at both of these 
sites. To ensure that confidentiality is maintained, your data will not be stored with any 
personally identifying information, and will be stored in securely locked cabinets and 
password protected computers. You will be asked at the beginning of the trial to choose 
a participant number. This will be stored with the data. Your personal details (e.g., name 
and address) will not be made available to anyone other than members of the research 
team and will be communicated between members of the research team in person. 
 
Please be aware that if a member of the team is given reason to believe that you may 
harm yourself or others, confidentiality may be breached. 
 
Healthcare professional involvement 
If you decide to participate in this trial, we will inform any healthcare professionals 
(e.g., GP’s) currently involved in you care, and provide them with some brief 
information on the therapy. If the clinician feels that it is necessary to share any 
information acquired during the trial with members of your healthcare team, you will be 
asked first. If this is of concern to you please contact Professor Sue Clarke. 
 
What will happen to the results of this study? 
The results of this study will form a report that will be available to Dorset HealthCare 
Trust staff. The results will also be published and made available to other patients on the 
service user’s forum. The year of publishing will be around 2008. A copy of the report 
will be made available to you on your request. We would like to assure you that results 
made available to people outside the research team will not include any 
information that makes you identifiable. 
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The study has been organised by Professor Sue Clarke and her research team. Sue is a 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist and is the Head of the Intensive Psychological 
Therapies Service in Poole. The intervention will be run by two experienced clinicians 
and a research team will be evaluating how effective this therapy is for the individuals 
involved. 
 
LREC Approval 
This study has been approved by the Dorset Research Ethics Committee and by the 
University of Southampton Ethics Committee.  
 
 
Finally, we would like to reassure again of the following main points: 
 
•  Participation is voluntary. You have the right to choose not to participate, 
or to stop participating in the trial at any point and without consequence. 
•  All the information you provide throughout the trial will be completely 
confidential. If a member of the team is given reason to believe that you 
may harm yourself or others, confidentiality may be breached.  
•  This information sheet is for you to keep. If you decide to participate, you 
will also be provided with a copy of the signed consent form. 
•  For any further information, please contact Jess Kingston (contact details). 
 
Thank you for taking time to read this information pack. 
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Information sheet for GPs, Consultants and other HealthCare Professionals 
 
Research Background. ACT is a psychotherapy currently being used in the USA for 
patients with a range of mental health problems. ACT proposes that many mental health 
problems arise from, and can be made worse by, the avoidance of thoughts, feelings and 
bodily sensations. ACT aims to increase acceptance and willingness for distressing 
thoughts and feelings, and to motivate change through valued living. Research suggests 
that ACT is an effective therapy for a wide range of psychological difficulties, including; 
Opiate addiction (Hayes, Stroshal, et al., 2004); alcohol dependence (Heffner et al., 2004); 
psychosis (Bach & Hayes, 2002); anorexia (Heffner, 2002); depression (Zettle & Hayes, 
1986); and PTSD (Orsillo & Batten, 2005) 
 
Research Aims. To evaluate the effectiveness of ACT for treatment resistant patients; 
patients currently on the Dorset NHS, general adult mental health waiting list, who have 
received at least one form of psychotherapy in the past.  The secondary aim is to 
investigate whether predicted mechanisms of change significantly increase from pre to post 
testing (e.g., acceptance) 
 
Design. Therapy will run for 16 weeks and will be held by two ACT trained clinicians.  
Ten patients will be recruited for each group (two groups will be run sequentially).  Groups 
will last approximately 2 ½ hours (with a 20 minutes break).  Clinicians will monitor 
patients’ progress throughout therapy and will be available after each session in case any 
patient is distressed.  If any patient becomes stuck by barriers that cannot be adequately 
addressed in the group session, the patient will be offered an individual ACT session with 
one of the clinicians.  For pre, post and 6 month follow up assessment, patients will be 
asked to attend an interview at the IPTS (lasting between 60 and 90 minutes) and to 
complete a questionnaire pack in their own time (lasting approximately 90 minutes).  A 
one day top up session will be offered after this final assessment phase 
 
Ethical considerations 
1)  All psychotherapeutic interventions can be experienced as distressing at times.  For 
this reason, two clinicians will run each session, allowing for one to closely 
monitor the progress of each patient.  Clinicians will be available during the break 
and after each session, and will ensure that no patient leaves the group significantly 
distressed.  
2)  Any patient who struggles with barriers that cannot be adequately addressed within 
the group setting will be offered an individual ACT session with one of the two 
clinicians running the group.  
3)  A clinician will be available during the collection of all pre and post data. 
4)  Participants will be asked to give full written informed consent before participating.  
Patients will also be provided with an information sheet explaining the aims of the 
study, detailing issues of confidentiality, and explicitly stating the right to withdraw at 
any time without effecting current or future rights to treatment.  
5)  All data collected will be treated in strict confidence and clients will be given 
anonymity. 
 
Thank you for taking your time to read this information. 
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Appendix E 
Protocol of ACT Treatment Sessions 
 
Broad Structure: 
•  Mindfulness exercise (3 15 minutes) 
•  Mindfulness review 
•  Review Homework 
BREAK 
•  Weekly Topic 
•  Final Summary 
•  Assign Homework  
•  Mindful Review. 
 
Below is a review of each treatment session. The broad aims for each session are 
described, followed by possible exercises that could be useful to achieve those aims. In 
session examples are also provided to illustrate how clinicians addressed some of these 
aims in the treatment sessions of study 3.  Techniques (e.g., metaphors, exercises) are 
referenced from Hayes et al. (1999) and Smith & Hayes (2005). 
 
 
Creative Hopelessness 
Session 1 
Main Focus: 
   Introduction, establish ground rules, commitment, and confidentiality. 
BREAK 
   To fully understand the nature of the difficulties the group present with and to take 
an inventory of their previous attempts to “control and eliminate this problem”  
   To evoke a state of “creative hopelessness” by focusing on the relative failure of 
past attempts to control and eliminate their problems and the possibility that this 
is an “unworkable” system. 
   To discuss human suffering as a ubiquitous and ‘normal’; rather than ‘abnormal’  
   To expose participants to the possibility that there are other ways to relate to 
private events.   
 
Possible exercises/metaphors: 
   Suffering inventories 
   Steering the car metaphor 
   Digging out of the Hole metaphor 
 
Steering the car metaphor. It's as if you got into your car and took off down the highway.  
Unfortunately, whoever taught you how to drive told you that the way to steer the car is 
by holding onto and turning the rear view mirror. Now, you might be able to go a long 
way once you start driving, depending upon whether the road you're on is straight, or 
whether there is much oncoming traffic, etc. Eventually, however, the car is going to 
crash. The problem isn't with the car, or with the driver; the problem is that you can't steer 
a car with the rear view mirror. This kind of therapy is not about how to turn the rear 
view mirror, even though you may be convinced that that is what you need to learn. It's 
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Homework: to fill out the suffering inventory during the following week. 
 
In session example of creative hopelessness: 
 
Patient: I find my main problem is that I am too aware of what is going on in my body ... 
to try and make me more aware (of it), I think is absurd at the moment. Because I find I 
can’t even lie down at night because of what’s going on, and I don’t want to keep on 
hearing all that... is that right or wrong?  
 
Therapist: if I’m hearing you right – if it’s absurd to make you more aware, then actually 
your goal is to make yourself less aware … well how’s that going for you? 
 
Patient: Umm, umm, yeah, I know what you are saying (PAUSE) it’s not working very 
well really. 
 
 
Session 2 
Main Focus:  
   Mindful awareness of breathing (5 minutes) 
   Review of mindfulness exercise – what did participants notice? What did their 
minds have to say?  
   Review thoughts and feelings about last week.  
BREAK 
   To socialise participants to a simplified version of the RFT model, aiming to show 
that minds have been trained to relate, evaluate, compare, judge, avoid (etc). 
   Aim to undermine faith in the “control and eliminate agenda” by exploring further 
the possibility that avoidance, although natural and logical, may not be effective, 
because the struggle itself activates further similar processing. 
   Consult the participants experience 
   Mindful Review 
   Homework setting 
 
Possible exercises/metaphors: 
   Gub gub woo woo 
   See what our minds can relate 
   Don’t think about .... (yellow jeeps, thought X) 
   Tug of war metaphor 
   Chinese handcuffs 
 
Homework: Coping strategies inventory  
 
Chinese handcuffs: The situation here is something like those “Chinese handcuffs”. Have 
you ever seen one before? It is a tube of woven straw about as big as your index finger. 
You push both index fingers in and as you pull them out the straw tightens and the harder 
you pull the tighter it gets and it traps your fingers. Once they’re caught, you’d pull your 
fingers out their sockets trying to tug your way out. Maybe your situation is a little bit like 
that. Maybe the tubes are like life itself. There is no healthy way to get out of your life 
and the more you try the narrower your life becomes, the room gets restricted and you 
can’t move. With this tube, the only way to free your fingers is to push them in, which 
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this problem in terms of “in and out” not “tighter and looser”. Maybe you need to come at 
this situation from a different perspective from your logical mind perspective.  
 
Tug of War: The situating you are in is like a tug of war with a monster. It is big and ugly 
and very strong. In between you and this monster is a pit, and so far as you can tell it is 
bottomless. If you lose this tug of war, you will fall into this pit and you will be destroyed. 
So you pull and pull and keep on pulling and the harder you pull, the harder the monster 
pulls, and you get closer and closer to the pit. Whilst you are struggling in this tug of war, 
the hardest thing for you to see is that your job isn’t to win the tug of war...... it is to put 
down the rope. 
 
 
Coping Strategies Diary 
Difficult Private Experience  
(thought, feeling memory) 
 
Distress/Disturbance Level        1          2           3           4             5     
Not distressing                                       very distressing 
Coping Strategy 
(my response) 
 
Short term Effectiveness        1          2           3           4             5     
Not effective                                         very effective 
Long Term Effectiveness        1          2           3           4             5     
Not effective                                         very effective 
 
 
In session example of avoidance: 
 
Patient: I am going to go home and ring ‘Mandy’ because I can’t cope with these thoughts 
going on in my head. 
 
Therapist: and what’s going to happen? What does your experience tell you is going to 
happen?  
 
Patient: she will speak to me and for about 5 minutes and I’ll feel calmer  
 
Therapist: Great! Problem solved? 
 
Patient: problem solved until 5 or 10 minutes later  
 
Therapist: Yeah? 
 
Patient: And I still feel bad and she hasn’t made it go away.  
 
Therapist: And then ..? 
 
Patient: it’s going to come back again 
 
Therapist: see … it’s a bit like going for a walk and if you always tread the same path, what 
happens? If you just keep walking in the same direction? Two things happen I think. One is 
that as the path gets deeper and deeper it just gets more and more engraved... If you always 
do what you have always done, then you’ll always get what you’ve always got. Maybe there 
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Control is the problem 
 
Session 3 
Main Focus:  
   Mindful awareness of sight (5 7 minutes) 
   Review mindfulness exercise  
   Review thoughts and feelings about last week.  
   Review Coping Inventories  
BREAK 
   Explicitly name experiential avoidance as the problem 
   Discuss the pain of presence (the pain of the private events that the participant 
has but does not want) and the pain of absence (the pain of what their struggling 
prevents them from doing in life). 
   Why do we do what doesn’t work? The sheer logic of control and eliminate 
agenda.   
   Rules for the ‘outside of your skin’ (‘if you don’t like it, work out how to get rid 
of it, and then get rid of it’) rules for the ‘inside of your skin’ (‘if you aren’t 
willing to have it, you’ve got it’) 
   Use experiential exercises, suffering inventories and group discussion to explore 
EA 
   Mindful review 
   Homework setting 
 
Possible exercises/metaphors: 
   Polygraph machine metaphor 
   Riding the mind train 
   Thought controlling exercises 
 
 
Homework: What have I given up for X?  
 
Polygraph machine. Suppose I had you hooked up to the best polygraph machine that's 
ever been built, and I tell you, all you have to do here is stay relaxed.  This is a perfect 
machine, the most sensitive ever made, so there's no way that you can be anxious and I 
won't know it.  But I want to give you a little motivation.  I happen to have a hand gun 
which I'll hold to your head.  So I tell you, if you just stay relaxed I won't shoot you, but if 
you get nervous (and I'll know it because you're wired up to this perfect machine), I'm 
going to have to kill you.  So, just relax!  What do you think would happen: It's pretty 
clear, but notice this:  If I told you, vacuum up the floor or I'll shoot you, you'd vacuum 
the floor.  If I said paint the house or else, you'd be painting.  But if I simply say, Relax, 
not only will it not work, but it's the other way around.  The very fact that I ask you to do 
this under such circumstances would produce anxiety.  But this isn't just a funny story.  
You have the perfect polygraph machine already hooked up to you: it’s you own nervous 
system.  And you've got something pointed at you that is more powerful and more 
threatening than any gun   your own self esteem and success in life.  It's like the gun, 
saying, Relax!  Don't be anxious!  And it's not working.  If it's really, really important for 
you not to have a panic attack, guess what you get? 
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Riding The Mind Train: Living in your mind is like riding a mind train. A train has its 
own tracks and it goes where they lead. That’s fine when the tracks lead where you 
want to go, but if you were going in the direction that you wanted to be going then you 
probably wouldn’t be coming to this group. If the life that you want to live is off these 
tracks then you only have one option, you need to get off the train.... at least sometimes. 
Riding the mind train has become an automatic process. You believe the thoughts that 
you mind presents to you. Getting the train going in the first place happened innocently 
enough: you learned language, you learned how to speak, reason and problem solve. 
Once you did that, the mind train set up permanent residence in your life. There is no 
way that you can stop thinking and generating thoughts, you’re mind will keep on 
running and language is very useful. But just because the mind keeps on running, 
doesn’t mean that you always have to ride the train. On a real train, you can choose to 
ride when you want. When you take your thoughts literally, rather than merely a process 
of relating, you are riding the mind train. Would you like to have the choice of when to 
ride and when to get off? 
 
In session example of control as the problem:  
Patient: I’ll say to my friend “Do you think I’m bored with my life?” and she’ll say “No, 
of course not”. (starting to cry) 
 
Therapist: OK and that welling up happens?  
 
Patient: she’ll say “of course you’re not, it’s just one of those silly thoughts that you get”. 
And the anxiety starts to come down. And I can walk away and then 2 seconds later it 
comes back and I feel the need to have to ask again and what if I am, and what if that 
thought is true?  
 
Therapist: OK, and what happens to that panic? 
 
Patient: it will go one notch higher. Higher than it was the first time 
 
Therapist: So it’s as if there’s a tiger demanding to be fed.  And when you’re asking for 
reassurance, you’re feeding the tiger.  But he’s so hungry that rather than creeping off he 
comes back and asks for more and more food. Is that right? 
 
Patient: Yeah, that’s exactly right.  
 
Therapist: So the tiger gets fatter and bigger? 
 
Patient: Exactly ... I go to try and get on with something, and then I think well what if 
they were wrong, and what if ... 
 
Therapist: and then you have to ask someone else ... who is more credible? 
 
Patient: and all that’s happening is my anxiety level is just rising and rising and rising 
 
Therapist: OK. So in the long term this tiger’s getting bigger and bigger until your whole 
life is about feeding him to keep him at bay. 
 
Patient: yes, that’s right. 
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Therapist: So your experience tells you that this tiger is insatiable. What does your mind 
say? 
 
Patient: I might just find the answer if I can find the right person 
 
Therapist: Right.  And I bet you thought that (therapist 2) and I might have the right 
answer?  
 
Patient: yes 
 
Therapist: (PAUSE). So the hungry tiger is always close demanding to be fed. (PAUSE). 
So what is, if anything, is it that he’s keeping you from? 
 
Patient: My life 
 
 
Session 4 
Main Focus: 
   Mindful awareness of sound (5 7 minutes) 
   Review of mindfulness exercise – what did participants minds do? What did they 
notice? What judgements, preconceptions, thoughts etc came up?  
   Homework review 
BREAK 
   Acceptance as the alternative: what acceptance is and is not. 
   Testing “If you’re not willing to have it then you have got it”   Willingness to be 
out of breath. 
   To be gentle, loving and caring towards yourself and your history 
   Prompt participants awareness to direct experience 
   What does your mind say about acceptance? 
   Mindful review 
   Homework setting 
 
Possible exercises/metaphors: 
   Willingness to be out of breath 
   Thought controlling exercises 
   Joe the Bum metaphor 
 
 
Homework: Suppose it was the case that in order to feel a live a healthy, vital, meaningful 
and satisfying life you needed to give up trying to control your internal thoughts and 
feelings, before you could move in the direction you want to go. Would you be willing to 
do that? 
 
Mindfulness exercise: Use the back of the chair for back support and notice the contact 
between the chair and your body, and rest your hands… Take your attention to the 
sounds that you can hear and notice the noises inside and outside the room… maybe the 
noises inside your own body…… every time your mind has something to say about 
those noises, judging – “this is good”, “this is bad”, just notice that that is what your 
mind is up to. Just come back to noticing the tiny details of the noises. And every time 
your attention wonders off… feelings thoughts and emotions… just notice and come 
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has wondered, bring the attention back to sounds….just see if you can notice this 
process of wondering off in your mind and then just coming back to the sounds 
 
Willingness to be out of Breath Take a deep breath and hold it as long as you can. When 
you are finished, write down how long you held your breath for. I held my breath for. 
Later in session: We are going to hold our breath again. This time, I want you to: (1) 
Notice where the urge to breath begins and ends. (2) Just feel the feeling and see it as an 
opportunity to practise letting go. (3) Notice thoughts and thank your mind for that 
thought, without being controlled by it. (4) Notice and make room for your emotions. 
(5) In addition to your urge to breath, notice your bodily sensations and that your body 
continues to function. (6) Imagine that you are creating your urge to breathe. (7) Try to 
shift from seeing your urge as something unwelcome to something you have created 
deliberately, for the sake of the experience.  
 
In session example of discussing acceptance: 
 
Patient 1: I don’t want to accept what I have got 
 
Patient 2: That’s what I was thinking 
 
Therapist: Ok, “I don’t want to do it”. 
 
Patient 1: If I umm, give in and accept what I have got I’ll get worse, I really will. 
 
Patient 2: But I have tried fighting and it didn’t work. 
 
Therapist: So suppose it were true ‘patient 1’, just for a moment, that the more you don’t 
want something the more you have got it... the more unwilling you are to have it, the 
more you have got it. I‘m not asking you to believe it, but just for a moment, suppose it 
was true. What would the implications be? 
 
Patient 1: I feel if I try and accept it I will get worse and I will end up staying in hospital 
more … and when I to do things to avoid getting that way I feel that I am controlling it ...  
 
S: ok, so you keep fighting 
 
Patient 1: Doing the things I do throughout the day, I think I would just get worse.  
 
Therapist: Ok, so that’s what your mind tells you that you   it will end up getting worse 
 
Patient 1: Yeah, that I will end up with people caring for me again. I really do.  
 
Therapist: OK. And so all your investment goes into fighting it, fighting it…  
 
Patient 1: Yep 
 
Therapist: Not accepting it  
 
Patient 1: Nope 
 
Therapist: Fighting it. I‘ve had some experience of doing that too, so I know what you are 
talking about. I don’t think there s a person in this room that doesn’t know what you are 
talking about. And does fighting it bring you closer to or further from the life you want?  Appendix E     244 
 
Acceptance and Defusion  
 
Session 5 
Main Focus: 
   Mindful awareness of touch (7 10 minutes) 
   Review of mindfulness exercise  
   Homework review 
BREAK 
   Noticing the process of thinking  
   What are you thinking right now? 
   Guide participants in feeling memories as memories, thoughts as thoughts etc 
   Create exercises for the participant to experience fusion and defusion  
   Watching the mind train: watching where you mind goes rather than riding in 
mindlessly 
   Mindful review 
   Homework setting 
 
Possible exercises/metaphors: 
   Watching the mind train 
   What am I thinking right now?  
   The virtues of saliva 
   Milk, Milk, Milk 
 
Homework: Bring a painful event to mind, keep a week’s account of what you notice in your 
body and your mind when this shows up for you. 
 
The Virtues of saliva: Saliva has many virtues   helps us swallow, digest food, protects 
gums etc. Imagine a spotless, beautiful crystal glass. Each time you have little extra 
saliva, release it into the glass, until the glass is full. Now really imagine drinking from 
this glass of saliva until it’s empty. For most of us the idea of doing this is disgusting. A 
wonderful substance becomes a disgusting substance, just through thought  
 
What are you thinking? Sit quietly for a few minutes and try writing down your thoughts 
as they run through your mind right now? What did you find? How many thoughts could 
you describe? Did thoughts about thoughts pop up? 
 
Watching the Mind Train: Imagine you are standing on a railway bridge gazing down on 
three train tracks, with a slow, seemingly endless coal train on each track. On the left are 
things you notice in the present moment   bodily sensations, emotions, perceptions. On 
the right are urges to act   your pull to avoid, look away. In the middle are your thoughts, 
evaluations, predictions, self conceptualizations. Looking down on these three tracks can 
be seen as a metaphor for looking at your mind. Start by thinking of something that’s 
been troubling you lately, then close your eyes and picture the 3 tracks. Your job is to stay 
on the bridge, looking. If you find your mind has gone elsewhere, or you’re in one of the 
cars, moving down the track, struggling with the content, notice what just hooked you and 
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Session 6 and 7 
Main Focus: 
   Mindful awareness of taste (7 10 minutes) 
   Review of mindfulness exercise  
   Homework review 
BREAK 
   Looking at thoughts rather than through thoughts  
   Explore the aims and goals of defusion; continue to create novel exercises 
allowing the participant multiple examples of experiencing both and their 
differences.  
   For example: Labelling thoughts “I am having the thought that...” Leaves on a 
stream exercise. The pain creature: Describing thoughts and feelings in physical 
terms – what is its colour, size and character? Is there anything about the pain 
creature that the participant cannot bear to be present with? 
   Mindful review 
   Homework setting 
 
Possible exercises/metaphors: 
   Passengers on the bus 
   Noticing thoughts in flight 
   My mobile phone from hell 
   “I am having the thought that...” 
   What are my most favourite judgements about myself? 
   Leaves on a stream exercise 
 
Homework: Devise your own defusion exercises  
 
Leaves on a stream: Imagine a beautiful and slow moving river. The water flows over 
rocks and trees and descends down hills and through valleys. Once in a while a big leaf 
drops into the stream and floats away down the river. Imagine you are sitting beside the 
stream on a warm, sunny day, watching the leaves float by. Now bring some awareness to 
your thoughts. Each time that a thought pops into your head, imagine that it is written on a 
leaf. If you think in words, then put the words onto the leaf. If you think in pictures, put 
pictures on the leaf. The goal is to stay beside the stream and to allow the leaves to keep 
flowing by. Don’t try to make the stream go faster or slower and don’t try to change what 
shows up on the leaves. If the leaves disappear, or if you mentally go elsewhere, or if you 
find that you are in the stream or on a leaf, just stop and notice that what has happened. 
File that knowledge away and then once again return to the stream, watch a thought come 
into your mind, write it onto the leaf and then let it float away downstream. You can think 
of the moments when the stream would not flow as moments of fusion, and those when 
the river did flow as moments as defusion.  
 
In session mindfulness example:  
Therapist: Mindfulness is a practise of noticing where your attention is and noticing 
where your mind wonders to and then bringing it back to the here and now. It just so 
happens that in the ‘here and now’ toady is a raspberry or a raisin. In the same way as 
looking at pictures in detail, at the textures and shape, what we will do today is eating in 
great detail, eating very slowly so that you have the chance to notice the detail of how 
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Because naturally we eat quickly, or we’re also nattering or watching the telly, we don’t 
actually notice a great deal about what we are eating. This is a fun way of doing 
mindfulness in a different kind of way. I am going to talk us thought the experiencing the 
first raspberry or raison, and then you can then do it by yourselves for the second one.  
Make a decision which you are going to eat first. I want you to really focus your attention 
on it, the weight on your hand. I am shaking a little so I notice the raspberry is shaking 
slightly. Notice colour, the way the light shines on it if that is happening. And then if you 
pick up, and very slowly start lifting it towards your mouth and just notice what happens, 
if your eyes have to refocus, what happens in your mouth and your hand. Bring it right up 
to your face and then breathe and see if you can notice any smell.  
And at this point you might want to close your eyes – sometimes we can tune into smell if 
we don’t have the visual data coming in. And if your mind wanders then that is fine 
because that’s what they do. Just notice where it has wondered to and then come back to 
the real physical sensations – the smell and the touch.  
And in your own time put it in your mouth but don’t bite it straight away, have the first 
sensation of having this raspberry or raisin in your mouth and notice what happens, 
sharpness or sweetness, and then slowly chew and in your own time chew and swallow. 
And you are trying to notice every detail. 
In session defusion exercise: 
Therapist: in the presence of this thought “maybe it’s a heart attack”... it’s like narrowing 
down, you get ridged and stuck in the face of this thought. So what I am wondering is 
whether it is possible for us to hang out with this thought and have some different 
experiences with it. Because you are only having the stuck one. And I am making this up 
as I go, so if you think I’m off course by all means intervene! So this thought; if it had a 
shape what would that be? 
 
Patient: crumbs! A circle. 
 
Therapist: Shown me with your hands –what kind of size? And if it had a colour? 
 
Patient: Red 
 
Therapist: no hesitation. If it spoke with a foreign accent what would it be? 
 
Patient: German 
 
Therapist: So this is red circle with a German accent. So could you just say the thought 
for me  it doesn’t have to be in a German accent.  
 
Patient: The thought? 
 
Therapist: Can you say the words “Maybe this time it’s a heart attack” 
 
Patient: Maybe this time it’s a heart attack. 
 
Therapist: OK this will get weirder and you can say no. Are you willing to get up and 
walk round with me with that thought? ...  
 
Patient: Yes 
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Therapist: OK so I’m willing to do daft things with you. We are going to walk round and 
say “Maybe this time it’s a heart attack!”   
 
(Both walk around saying it) 
 
Therapist: You can change the emphasis, play with it…… Would you be willing to do it 
in a German accent! (they do it in a German accent) 
  
Therapist: So this is about playing with a set of words, a set of words that has the power 
to narrow down your willingness and flexibility to do what you want to be doing in life... 
 
 
Defining the Self 
Session 8 
Main Focus: 
   Mindful awareness of thoughts (10 minutes) 
   Review of mindfulness exercise  
   Homework review 
BREAK 
   Elicit key self conceptualisations  
   Practise defusion techniques with those self  conceptualisations 
   Introduce the idea that this is just one type of ‘self’ 
   Describe and provide participants with exercises to experience: Self as context, Self 
as process 
   Mindful review 
   Homework setting 
 
Possible exercises/metaphors: 
   The observing self 
   The Chessboard 
   The Rock Metaphor 
 
Homework: Write down the key fact about yourself, for example, I have two parents, I am 
shy, I get depressed... etc. Then write a story about these facts in a way that is different 
from your life story. When this has been completed, write another possible story about the 
historic facts of your life. 
 
Chessboard. Imagine a chess board that goes out infinitely in all directions.  It's covered 
with different coloured pieces, black pieces and white pieces.  They work together in 
teams, like in chess the white pieces fight against the black pieces.  You can think of your 
thoughts and feelings and beliefs as these pieces; they sort of hang out together in teams 
too.  For example, "bad" feelings (like anxiety, depression, resentment) hang out with 
"bad" thoughts and "bad" memories.  Same thing with the "good" ones.  So it seems that 
the way the game is played is that we select which side we want to win.  We put the 
"good" pieces (like thoughts that are self confident, feelings of being in control, etc.) on 
one side, and the "bad" pieces on the other.  Then we get up on the back of the white 
queen ad ride to battle, fighting to win the war against anxiety, depression, fear, sadness, 
whatever.  It's a war game.  The idea is that you knock enough of them off the board that 
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can't ever be won, because the black pieces can't ever be knocked off the board.  So the 
battle goes on, every day, for years.  You feel hopeless, you have a sense that you can't 
win, and yet you can't stop fighting.  If you're on the back of that white horse, fighting is 
the only choice you have.  But there's a logical problem here, and that is that from this 
posture, huge portions of yourself are your own enemy.  And it appears that you're on the 
same level as them, and sometimes, that they are even bigger than you, that they're 
winning the war.  But now suppose I were to say that, within the metaphor, those pieces 
aren't you anyway?  Can you see, in that metaphor, who you would be?  (Respond to all 
client's answers; ultimate answer is, "You are the board") Within this metaphor, if there 
were no board, what would happen to all the pieces?  They'd just go away.  Notice that if 
you're the pieces, the game is very important; you've got to win, your life depends on it.  
But if you're the board, it doesn't matter if the war stops or not.  The game may go on, but 
it doesn't make any difference to the board.  As the board, you can see all the pieces, you 
can hold them, have them played out on you, but it doesn't matter.  It takes no effort. 
 
In session example of distinguishing the different selves: 
Therapist: I’m just thinking that our minds hate this stuff. We are the dominant species and 
our mind hates the idea that this (avoidance) doesn’t work. Luckily, there is more to us than 
our minds. It doesn’t always feel this way, but… when you were having the thoughts like 
“I’ll have to ask my friend for more reassurance” … who was it that noticed that thought? 
Pause…  
 
Patient silent but engaged and reflective 
 
Therapist:... Could it be possible that there is a “you” that notices where your mind is going 
...?  (PAUSE). Might it just be the case that even if your mind can’t accept this possibility (of 
willingness and valued living), that you can? (PAUSE) 
 
Even with that chatter “…if I stop fighting I’ll get worse” could it be that the person that 
notices this could be willing; even if your mind is not? 
 
Session 9  
Main Focus: 
   Breathing Space and unguided mindfulness (10 minutes) 
   Review of mindfulness exercise  
   Homework review 
BREAK 
   Mindfulness: What and Why? The point isn’t to relax, but to be aware of what is 
going on for you, without avoidance or fusion; to be able to flexibly respond and 
behave when your thoughts are dominating your experience 
   The aim of mindfulness: To develop and deepen experience by paying attention to 
different aspects of experience.  
   Mindfulness as a challenge: How to integrate mindfulness into your life 
   Prompt participants to be aware of aware of direct experience rather than codified 
experience 
   Mindful review 
   Homework setting 
 
Possible exercises/metaphors: 
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   Sitting meditation 
   Body Scan 
Homework: practise mindfulness for 15 – 20 minutes every day and jot down your 
experiences.  
In session mindfulness exercise:  
Therapist: If you put your feet on the ground, sit back in your chair, trying to find a fairly 
upright position and rest your hands where ever is most comfortable. Try to settle yourself in 
a fairy upright and dignified way which shows your intent to be mindful and aware.  
So if you just be aware of the points of contact in the chair and just notice your feelings of 
your feet against the floor and of your hands. This week we are going to focus on breathing. 
So if you take your attention inwardly and just notice the fact that you are breathing and try 
to notice any physical sensation of air going in and out. Not trying to breath in any particular 
way, bringing a kind curiosity to your breathing.  
And if you notice that you are having thoughts and feelings about the breathing then that’s 
fine, that’s just what our minds do, so just notice where your attention has gone, just gently 
but firmly bring yourself back to the physical sensations of breathing in and out again.  
Sometimes when we take our attention to breathing we can unintentionally change the way 
that we are breathing by speeding it up … and this can feel uncomfortable. If you notice that, 
that’s fine, that’s what we do, and you can choose to keep your awareness with your 
breathing in a curious and non judgemental way or you could choose to change your 
breathing slightly, but do that in a mindful way ...  
And now if you take either your left or right hand, up to you, and place it down on your 
abdomen and just lightly place it so it is comfortable. Notice the physical feelings of any 
movement of breathing against where your hand is resting on your abdomen.... And if your 
mind tries to contribute and say things, that’s fine, just thank your mind and bring your 
attention back down to the feelings of movement against your hand as you breath in and out.  
And if you can’t feel much movement then that’s also fine, just notice what that’s like, 
whatever is there for you is absolutely fine....  
Now broaden out your awareness to include the whole of your body in this chair so again 
just notice the feet on the ground, fitness of the ground, notice where your body rest, head 
down to toes. And in your own time open your eyes. 
 
Session 10 
Main Focus: 
   Breathing Space and unguided mindfulness (20 minutes) 
   Review of mindfulness exercise  
   Homework review 
BREAK 
   Willingness: Saying ‘yes’ to the universe of private experience in the moment. The 
flexibility and freedom to choose action. 
   Asking the participant to consider whether this is the right time for them to say yes 
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   Mindful review 
   Homework setting 
 
Possible exercises/metaphors: 
   The willingness scales 
   What needs to be accepted? 
 
Homework: What needs to be accepted? What would you be willing to have in the service 
of a richer life? 
 
Willingness Scale. Imagine there are two scales, like the volume and balance knobs on a 
stereo, One is called "Anxiety" (or depression, or unpleasantness, etc).  It can go from 0 to 
10.  The other is called "Willingness," and it can also go from 0 to 10.  See what you 
think, but it is my hunch that what brought you in here is this: “My anxiety is too high. It's 
way up here and I want it down here and I want you [the therapist] to help me do that”.  
But now there's also this other scale; it's been hidden but the past couple weeks we've 
been bringing it around to look at.  This other scale, the Willingness scale, is really the 
more important of the two, because this is the one that makes the difference.  When 
anxiety is up here at 10, and the willingness scale is down at 0, when you're trying hard to 
control this anxiety, make it go down, and you're unwilling to feel this anxiety, then by 
definition this means that anxiety is something to be anxious about.  It's as if when anxiety 
is high, the willingness dial goes right down and this locks the anxiety into place.  It's like 
trying to use a wrench when the ratchet is turned the wrong way.  You turn the ratchet the 
wrong way and no matter what you do with that tool, it drives it in tighter.  So, what we 
need to do in this therapy is shift our focus from the anxiety to the willingness scale.  
You've been trying to control anxiety for a long time, and it just doesn't work.  It's not that 
you weren't clever enough; it simply doesn't work.  Instead of doing that, if we turn our 
focus to the willingness scale, and let it go up, stop trying to control the anxiety, I 
guarantee you that your anxiety will be low...  or it will be high!  I promise you!  It will be 
either low or it will be high.  When it's low, it will be low...  until it's high again!  And it 
will be high, until it's not high, and then it will be low.  We're not talking about going 
from `control' to `no control', because that's really just doing the same thing, but at 
opposite ends of the continuum.  The problem is that you're on this continuum at all.  
What is needed is a totally new context from which to operate. 
 
Values 
 
Session 11 
Main Focus: 
   Unguided mindfulness (15 minutes) 
   Review of mindfulness exercise  
   Homework review 
BREAK 
   The Life Question: Are you willing to feel, think, sense, and remember all your 
private experiences, fully and without defence, as you directly experience them to 
be, not as what your mind says they are and do whatever it takes to move you in 
the direction that you truly value? Yes or No – it is a real question. 
   Learning to jump and the willingness scale. What psychological barriers stand 
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   What does the participants mind say about willingness? Defusing from (e.g., 
physicalising) the difficulties their mind throws up. 
   Mindful review 
   Homework Setting  
 
Possible exercises/metaphors: 
   The willingness scales 
   Physicalising 
   Taking the problem apart; breaking the problem down.  
   Creating a situation to test your willingness dial 
 
Homework: Acceptance in real time. Write down ten scenarios that would bring up the 
negative content that you have been struggling with. Rate them from 1 – 10 and start with 
the first one this following week. The key here is to set your willingness high and your 
avoidance at 0. Decide when, where and how long you will do the action for and make a 
commitment to yourself to do it.  
 
In session example of values and willingness: 
 
Therapist: I’ll start with a quote:  
“Security is mostly superstitious. It doesn’t exist in nature, nor do the children of human kind 
as a whole experience it. Avoiding danger is no safer in the long run than out right exposure. 
Like is either a daring adventure or it is nothing at all”.  (Helen Keller) 
And this is very pertinent for what we are talking about today. So we are going to be 
working on this theme of values and learning how to jump. Having said yes to your internal 
experiences, how then do you being to make that move into a valued direction? ...  (PAUSE) 
I want you to settle into your chair, adopt a position of mindfulness and get present in the 
moment. So starting from the place in which there’s a distinction between you as a conscious 
human being on the one hand, and all the private experiences that you are conscious of   and 
that sometimes struggle with   on the other hand, I’m going to ask you a question for you to 
sit with rather than answer here today. Pause Are you willing to feel, think, sense and 
remember all those private experience fully and without defence, as you directly experience 
them, as they are and not what you mind says they are? And do whatever it takes you to 
move in the direction of that which you truly value at this particular moment in this 
particular situation. And I want you just to sit within that question. Yes or no? 
Now answering “yes” to that question is an example of jumping. It’s not about getting rid of 
or managing your private experiences and history. It’s about embracing them, picking them 
up and carrying them with you in a direction that you truly value. It’s a jump in which you 
let go of the struggle with your history and become more concerned with being alive than 
with being right.  
Importantly, you don’t have to say yes, it’s a real question. The other therapist, I, this group, 
life, will accept a yes or a no. Probably you know that your life has already accepted a no, 
but knowing that there are costs to silence and saying no, knowing that there is serious 
costs:… Pause and another quote: “Most men lead lives of quiet desperation and go to the 
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Session 12 
Main Focus: 
   Unguided mindfulness (15 20 minutes) 
   Review of mindfulness exercise  
   Homework review 
BREAK 
   Discuss what values are and help the participant to consider their  key values 
   Return to “passengers on the bus metaphor”. The sign on the front of your life bus 
says “Values”: these are your chosen life direction. Values are vitalising and 
empowering: not another mental club to beat yourself with 
   Describe values as a compass set to go ‘east’, an intangible destination that you 
cannot arrive at but that makes following a particular path meaningful; 
   What values are not (reasoned judgements, outcomes, feelings...) 
   Values and pain, values and failing 
   Choosing values 
   Mindful review 
   Homework setting 
 
Possible exercises/metaphors: 
   Skiing metaphor 
   Making valued choices versus reasoned judgements 
   Making a choice based on something other than logic: choosing between A and Z 
 
Homework: what do you really want your life to be about? What matters to you? Work 
your way up your top painful scenarios (from session 11 homework task). 
 
The Skiing Metaphor: Suppose you are skiing. You take a lift to the top of the mountain 
and you are just about to head down the slopes when a man comes along and he asks you 
where you are going? “I’m going to the lodge at the bottom” you reply. So he says: “I can 
help you with that” and he grabs your arm and he flings you into a helicopter and takes 
you to the bottom of the mountain. You are dazed, so you head back up, but just as you 
are about to head down, he comes back and does it again. You’d be upset – no? Skiing 
isn’t just about getting to the lodge, it’s about the journey. The lodge is your goal, but the 
skiing is your value. Of course, we need goals, but we must hold them lightly, so that the 
real point of living can emerge.  
In session example (Passengers on the Bus): 
Therapist: Values underpin the direction that you choose for your life; like to be a loving 
parent or to be present for your children. So if you think about life being like a bus 
journey. Imagine yourself as the bus driver and as you go thought life, various passengers 
get on your bus …. So you pick up some experiences, some memories and some rules 
that you have acquired along the way…. Some of these passengers are welcome, you are 
glad to have them as passengers on your bus. Others, however, are unwelcome. These 
ones you’d prefer not have on your bus. But the thing about this bus is that passengers 
can only get on, they can’t get off. Once you have picked up these passengers, they will 
be with you until the end of the journey... (PAUSE) 
 
So you might try to strike deals with them: “I don’t want you on my bus, but if you could 
just slouch back I might not notice you so much and I’ll be more comfortable in my bus” 
or “If I don’t go down this road, or go to this party, or let myself fall in love, will you 
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choose the direction that your bus can take. Even though you are in the driving seat, the 
deals that you strike with the passengers ultimately determine the direction your bus is 
heading in... (PAUSE) 
 
The alternative is acceptance – accepting the passengers are on your bus for the entire trip, 
and choosing a direction you want your life to head; taking them with you. So at the front of 
the bus is a sign that says where you are going, and we are encouraging you, as a first step, to 
think about that direction; a chosen direction that comes from your values.  (PAUSE) 
 
In order to do this, we need to work out what values are. Well, one way to describe them 
is like a compass that guides the direction of your life but that you can never obtain in the 
literal sense. So, one way to understand values and goals is that values are like going east 
whereas goals are like going to London. If you head for London you’ll get there but if 
you are travelling east you will always be on a journey. It’s like being a loving parent – 
you never get there, but you can always act in ways that serve that value ...  
 
 
Session 13 
Main Focus: 
   Unguided mindfulness (15 20 minutes) 
   Review of mindfulness exercise  
   Homework review 
BREAK 
   What do you want your life to serve? 
   Attending your own funeral 
   Exploring the ten top valued domains 
   Mindful review 
   Homework setting 
 
Possible exercises/metaphors: 
   Attending your own funeral 
 
Homework: Ranking your values. Working your way up your top painful scenarios (from 
session 11). 
 
In session exercise (Attending your own funeral): 
 
Therapist: If you could live your life so that it’s actually about what you would choose it to 
be about, from here until it’s over, what would be evident? That is, what would be clear 
about the sort of life you have led? This is not a prediction, guess or description. The 
question is not about what you have done or expect to do. It’s not a question about social 
approval. The question is: “what would people be able to see if you could freely choose what 
your life stood for”. I am asking you to open yourself up to your own yearning to be about 
something. If it were just between you and your heart, if no one would laugh and say it was 
impossible, if you were bold about your inner most aspiration, what would your life be 
about. And for it to be so powerful that it was evident to those people around you.  (PAUSE) 
So this is not about facing your death, it’s about facing your life. But any value carries with 
it knowledge about how finite and limited our lives are. So this exercise is about imagining 
attending your own funeral, which obviously is an odd thing to do!  Appendix E     254 
 
It may stir up strong feelings and thoughts, so just be kind and gentle with yourself. And if 
you find that you are getting very full of difficult thoughts and feelings then you know some 
of the steadying exercises we have done that you can bring to bear.  
So what I am going to ask of you now is to close your eyes and take a few deep breaths. And 
then imagine that you have died, but that by some miracle you are able to witness your own 
funeral in a spirit form. So think about where it would be and what it would look like. Take a 
few moments visualising the picture of your future funeral service. And then imagine that a 
family member or friend, someone who knew you well, was there and that they had been 
asked to stand at your funeral to say a few words about what your life stood for. About what 
you cared about and the path you took. And you are going to write this eulogy in two ways.  
First: I want you to write down what you are afraid might be said, if the struggle you are 
engaged in continued to dominate your life or even if it grew. So suppose you back off from 
what you really want to stand for, and you go for one of avoidance and mental entanglement 
and emotional control and back off from what you really stand for. I won’t ask you to share 
this if you don’t want to, so do not censoring what you say. And this, I imagine will be 
painful....  
Secondly I want you to imagine from here forward you live your life to that which you 
most value. It doesn’t mean that all your goals will be magically attained, it means the 
direction you are taking in life is evident and clear and manifest. Now imagine who is at 
your funeral, certainly loved ones, children, closest friends, people who care about you, 
people from work, people you studied with, people from other organisations, church … 
anyone you like can come to this funeral. Look at their faces; watch them watching your 
funeral. So now you choose one of them again to stand up and say a few words about 
you, if your life had been true to your inner most values, imagine what you would most 
want to have manifest in your life. You won’t be judged on this and you may choose 
never to share this with anyone. And this isn't a prediction, and this isn't self praise, let 
these words reflect the meaning you would most like to create. 
 
Committed Action  
Session 14 
Main Focus: 
   Unguided mindfulness (15 20 minutes) 
   Review of mindfulness 
   Homework review 
BREAK  
   Is the participant willing to accept whatever discomfort their mind provides AND 
commit to the values they have explored AND to the behaviour changes they 
imply? 
   Creating a road map by setting goals 
   Short term goals and long term goals 
   Making goals happen through commitment to action 
   Psychological barriers 
   Building patterns of effective action: old behaviour =____ new behaviour =___ 
   Breaking up old patterns by staying mindful of values.  
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   Homework setting 
 
Possible exercises/metaphors: 
   Goal setting 
   Climbing mountains metaphor 
   Practising making commitment 
 
Homework: Keep a weekly record of how important each of the ten valued domains is to 
you and consistent your behaviours were with each value. Note down barriers to change.  
 
Session 15 
Main Focus: 
   Unguided mindfulness (20 minutes) 
   Review of mindfulness 
   Homework review 
BREAK  
   The crucial fork in the road. The participants’ opportunity to choose a direction; 
the well trodden and familiar path of avoidance or following values? 
   Discuss that following values can be vulnerable and ‘risky’. It can and will be 
painful. The participant has the ability to choose for themselves.  
   The avoidance cycle or the acceptance cycle: which will it be? 
   The real choice is not whether or not to have pain, but whether or not to live a 
valued and meaningful life 
   Mindful review 
   Homework setting 
 
Homework: Commit to a valued goal towards the top of your “top ten” scenarios from 
session 11.  
 
Session 16 
Main Focus: Whole session allocated to participants commitment to a valued action 
(however small). Chairs faced forward in the room and each participant stands in front of 
the group, one at a time, and makes a commitment to a valued change in their life.  
 
In session example of the commitment exercise:  
We are going to ask you to come up in front of the group in turn, and get present to each 
other. Get present to the fact that there are eight human beings here, people who have been 
here with you for the past 16 weeks. So, if you can, we invite you to settle in to this moment 
and appreciate these other people here today. And in your own time, in your own way, we 
invite you to express to the other members of the group what’s important to you in your life, 
what really matters to you. And then say something about what you’ve noticed you’ve been 
doing, for however long it has been, and what the costs have been for you.  And if you can, 
and if you’re willing, we invite you to say something about what you may commit to doing 
differently, in the service of what matters to you: your values. We know that it won’t always 
be possible to tread this valued path, for example you may not always be available for your 
kids. So, your commitment may be that when you notice that you’re not going in a valued 
direction, you turn back in the direction of your chosen path....  Appendix F     256 
 
Appendix F 
 
Study IV Patient Information Sheet and Information for General Practitioners 
 
In the following information sheet, all references to ACT and CBT (i.e., in titles and text) 
were randomised so as to prevent implicit bias. 
 
 
A Pilot Randomised Trial Investigating the Effectiveness of Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT) and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). 
 
Patient information sheet 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether you 
would like to take part, you need to understand why the research is being done and what 
it would involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Talk to 
others about the study if you so wish.  
 
•  Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will happen to you if you take 
part.   
•  Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the conduct of the study.  
 
If there is anything that is not clear, or if you would like more information, please do 
not hesitate to contact Sue Clark on (contact details) or Debbie Lee (contact details). 
Please could we ask that you contact the Intensive Psychological Therapies Services 
(IPTS: contact details) within one week of receiving this information sheet to let us 
know whether you would like to participate. 
 
Part 1 
What is the purpose of this study? 
This is a small scale pilot trial, which is designed to make some preliminary 
investigations about the effectiveness of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) and 
Acceptance and commitment Therapy (ACT) for patients who have already received 
psychological care in the past. This study has been designed by a senior clinical (Prof. 
Susan Clarke) and a senior academic (Prof. Bob Remington) researcher; and some of 
the information collected from this trial will contribute to the completion of a PhD 
thesis. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
We are recruiting patients who are currently on the Dorset HealthCare NHS Trust 
waiting list for general adult mental health, and who have received at least one form of 
therapy in the past that lasted at least 8 sessions. You were identified as currently 
awaiting therapy at The Chines. Our records indicate that you meet these criteria and we 
would therefore like to offer you a place on the trial. We aim to recruit a maximum of 
40 patients; 20 patients for therapy groups that are due to run from April to July, and 20 
patients for groups due to run from September to December.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you whether you take part. If you do decide to take part, you will be asked to 
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Having signed the consent form, you are still free to withdraw at any time and 
without giving a reason.  A decision to withdraw, or a decision not to take part, will 
not affect the standard of care you receive.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part; what will I have to do? 
Sometimes we don’t know which way of treating patients is best. To find out, we need 
to compare different therapies. In order to compare different therapies, we collect 
information about patients both before therapy and after therapy. We then put patients 
into groups and give each group a different therapy. To make sure the groups are the 
same to start with, each patient is put into a group by chance (randomly). Patients then 
complete the same questionnaires and attend an interview a few weeks after therapy and 
6 months after therapy. This allows us to see whether there have been any changes 
before and after therapy, and whether these changes last over time. Because this is a 
pilot trial we will not be able to test whether one is better than the other, but we will 
gather information about how helpful they both are.  
 
Before therapy. If you decide to take part, you will be sent a questionnaire pack and 
invited to an interview. The questionnaires take about 60 90 minutes to complete. These 
are for you to complete in your own time, but assistance is available if you would like. 
The interview will be held at the IPTS and will last about 60 90 minutes. This interview 
will ask about the therapy you have had in the past and about your psychological 
difficulties. 
 
Therapy. You will then be randomly assigned to either ACT or CBT. You have 50% 
chance of receiving 16 weeks of group ACT and 50% chance of receiving 16 weeks of 
group CBT. We will write to you within a week of the interview to let you know which 
group you have been allocated to. 
 
After therapy. After the 16 weeks of therapy you will be asked to complete another set 
of questionnaires and come to second, shorter interview. In this interview we will ask 
you how you found the group. Six months after therapy you will be asked to complete a 
final set of questionnaires and attend a final interview. After therapy you will also be 
provided with a CD to help practise skills learnt in the group. 
 
Data and audio taping. To make sure the interviews and group sessions are delivered 
correctly, we ask your permission to audiotape them. We will also ask your permission 
for members of the research team to have access to your questionnaire responses. All of 
your completed questionnaire responses will be stored anonymously in a secure cabinet 
either at the University of Southampton or at the IPTS.  
 
Restrictions during and after therapy. If you take part, you can continue taking any 
medication. We ask that for 6 months after ACT/CBT you don’t attend any other form 
of therapy. This is routine practice and is referred to as a consolidation phase. After we 
have collected the 6 month follow up data you can opt in for standard care if you so 
choose. 
 
Attendance. We ask you to come to all scheduled visits and to complete all the 
questionnaires. If you are going to miss a group, we ask you to let the clinic know 
beforehand. If you don’t come to four therapy sessions in a row, you will not be able to Appendix F     258 
 
continue coming to the group. This is to help you from unintentionally drifting out of 
therapy. It also helps group morale.  
 
This information has been put into a summary flow chart found on the back page. 
What are the therapies that are being tested?  
ACT is a therapy being used in America for patients with a range of psychological 
difficulties. ACT suggests that when people try to avoid distressing thoughts and 
feelings, they get entangled in a mental battle against themselves. ACT uses exercises 
such as mindfulness meditation to help people accept these thoughts and feelings as 
events of the mind that can be observed and then let go of. The effectiveness of ACT 
was first assessed in 1986 with a group of depressed patients. Both this trial and many 
subsequent trials have indicated that ACT can be successful for patients with various 
psychological difficulties. A group has recently been run at the IPTS in Poole, and this 
found that ACT helped to reduce patients’ levels of depression and anxiety, and increase 
quality of life. Before therapy 100% of the group had clinical depression. After therapy, 
5/6 patients had clinically reliable reductions in depression and 50% finished therapy 
with non clinical levels of depression. 
 
CBT takes a different perspective. CBT suggests that certain thoughts and feelings 
cause emotional distress. CBT identifies what these thoughts and feelings are and uses 
exercises to challenge how true they are. CBT helps patients by trying to change these 
thoughts and feelings. The first manual for CBT was published in 1979 for patients with 
depression. Since then, a lot of research has suggested that CBT is effective for patients 
with a range of psychological problems. CBT groups are currently being offered on the 
NHS as a 10 week program. This 16 week group has been designed to address the needs 
of a group who have already received some form of psychological care in the past. We 
are only offering these 16 week CBT groups to patients in this study. 
 
What are the alternatives for treatment? 
You have the choice not to participate in this research trial. If you don’t want to take 
part in this trial, your name will stay on the waiting list for therapy at the Chines.  
If you don’t want to participate in this study, please let us know by phoning the 
number provided.  
 
What are the possible risks or disadvantages of taking part? 
As with any therapy, you may sometimes feel emotionally distressed. Your well being 
will be monitored by the clinicians during every session, and they will make sure that no 
one leaves the group significantly distressed. Patients who struggle with problems that 
cannot be addressed adequately in the group will be provided with an individual therapy 
session. The clinicians are all trained and have experience at delivering the relevant 
therapies. They will also receive supervision whilst the groups are running.   
A possible disadvantage is the inconvenience of questionnaires and interviews. These 
have been kept to a minimum and will be done in a way that is as convenient as 
possible. We will offer you feedback on the questionnaires and interviews at the end of 
the 16 weeks. A second possible disadvantage is that you will be randomised to one of 
the two conditions (CBT or ACT) rather than choosing which therapy you would like.   
 
What are the potential benefits of taking part? 
If you take part you are guaranteed 16 weeks of therapy. If you are in the CBT group 
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addition to this, you will be attending a CBT group that has been designed to meet the 
needs of patients who have already had psychological care in the past.  If you are in the 
ACT group, you will get a new and promising therapy that is not currently offered by 
the NHS. 
Although group based therapy can seem daunting, it has many benefits. For example, 
you can develop both from active participation and from observation; you have the 
opportunity to give and receive immediate feedback; and you have the opportunity for 
support from people who are experiencing similar difficulties. Group based work can 
also help people to understand concepts discussed in therapy. For example, sometimes it 
is difficult to apply concepts or skills to one’s own life, but seeing them worked out in 
another can help us come to grips with them. Many patients find that group based 
delivery can actually enhance their experience during therapy.  Participation in group 
therapy does not require you to share personal information.  
 
Whilst we expect these groups to be of benefit to you, we cannot guarantee this. 
 
What happens when the research study stops? 
Immediately after the 16 weeks, and 6 months after the 16 weeks we will ask you to 
complete a questionnaire pack. Six months after therapy we will also ask you to attend 
an interview.   
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any possible 
harm you might suffer will be addressed. The detailed information on this is given in 
Part 2. 
 
Confidentiality –who will know that I am taking part in this study? 
All the information about your participation in this study will be kept confidential.  The 
details are included in Part 2. 
 
For further information 
If you would like any further information about the trial, please do not hesitate to 
contact Professor Sue Clarke (contact details), or Miss Jess Kingston (contact details). 
 
This completes Part 1 of the Information Sheet. If the information in Part 1 has 
interested you and you are considering participation, please continue to read the 
additional information in Part 2 before making any decision 
 
Part 2 
 
What if relevant new information becomes available?   
Members of Sue Clarke’s research team are currently monitoring and will continue to 
monitor the relevant internet servers and discussion forums. If any evidence comes to 
light that there are any adverse effects to either intervention, your clinician will inform 
you of these details and ask you whether you would like to continue with the trial. If 
you decide to continue in the study you will be asked to sign an updated consent form. 
If you decide not to continue with the trial your continuing care will be arranged. It is 
also possible that, on receiving new information, the clinician feels that it is in your best 
interests to withdraw from the study. In the unlikely event that this happens, she will Appendix F     260 
 
explain the reasons and facilitate the continuation of your care. If the study is stopped 
for any other reason, you will be told why and your continuing care will be arranged. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
You are free to withdraw from treatment at any stage. If you withdraw, we will need to 
use the data collected up to your point of withdrawal, but this will only be available to 
members of the research team and will not be stored with information that can identify 
you. With your permission, we would also like you to complete post intervention 
questionnaires and attend the interview despite you not completing the group. However, 
you will retain the right not to do this if you so choose. 
 
What if something goes wrong? 
It is unlikely that this therapy will cause you any harm. Trained clinicians will be 
available at every stage of your involvement.  
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should phone Sue Clarke 
(contact details). If you remain unhappy, you have the right to complain to the NHS 
about any aspects of the way you have been approached or treated during the course of 
this clinical trial. In the event that something does go wrong and you are harmed during 
the research study there are no special compensation arrangements.  If you are harmed 
and this is due to someone’s negligence then you may have grounds for a legal action 
for compensation against Dorset NHS, but you may have to pay your legal costs.  
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information collected about you during this study will be kept strictly confidential 
and any information about you that leaves the clinic’s will have your name and 
addressed removed so that you cannot be recognized. Your data will not be stored with 
any personally identifying information, and will be stored in securely locked cabinets 
and password protected computers. You will be asked at the beginning of the trial to 
choose a participant number. This will be stored with the data. Your personal details 
(e.g., name and address) will not be made available to anyone other than members of the 
research team and they will be held in a secured office at either The Chines or The 
IPTS. 
 
Please be aware that if a member of the team is given reason to believe that you may 
harm yourself or others, confidentiality may be breached. 
 
Healthcare professional involvement. 
If you decide to take part, we will inform any healthcare professionals (e.g., GP’s) 
currently involved in you care, and provide them with some brief information about the 
therapy. If the clinician feels that it is necessary to share any information acquired 
during the trial with members of your healthcare team, you will be asked first. If this is 
of concern to you please contact Professor Sue Clarke. 
 
What will happen to the results of this study? 
The results of this study will form a report that will be available to Dorset HealthCare 
Trust staff. The results will also form part of a PhD thesis. We intend to publish our 
findings and to also make them available to other patients. The year of publishing will 
be around 2008. A copy of the report will be made available to you on your request. We Appendix F     261 
 
would like to assure you that results made available to people outside the research 
team will not include any information that makes you identifiable. 
 
Who is organising the study? 
The study has been organised by Professor Sue Clarke and her research team. Sue is a 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist and is the Head of the Intensive Psychological 
Therapies Service in Poole. The sponsors of this study will pay members of the research 
team for evaluating your participation in this study.  
 
LREC Approval 
This study has been approved by the Dorset Research Ethics Committee and by the 
University of Southampton Ethics Committee. If you have questions about your rights 
as a participant in this research, or if you feel that you have been placed at risk, you can 
contact the Chair of the Ethics Committee, Department of Psychology (contact details). 
 
Thank you for taking time to read this information pack. 
 
 
Summary  
•  Participation is voluntary. You have the right to choose not to participate, 
or to stop participating in the trial at any point and without consequence. 
•  All the information you provide throughout the trial will be completely 
confidential. If a member of the team is given reason to believe that you 
may harm yourself or others, confidentiality may be breached.  
•  This information sheet is for you to keep. If you decide to participate, you 
will also be provided with a copy of the signed consent form. 
•  For any further information, please contact The IPTS (contact details). 
 
The following flowchart outlines what you will be asked of you if you decide to take 
part. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before you start therapy we ask you to: 
(1) fill out a set of questionnaires. This takes about 60 90 minutes to complete. 
(2) come to an interview at the IPTS. This also takes about 60 90 minutes. 
(3) You will receive a letter within a week of completing part (1) and (2) telling 
you which therapy you have been allocated to  
Therapy 
Group therapy sessions will be held weekly for 16 weeks and will last up to 2 ½ 
hours (with a break).  
After the 16 weeks of therapy, we will ask you to: 
(1) fill out a set of questionnaires (the same questionnaires as before therapy) 
(2) attend a 20 minute interview on your experiences of the group 
6-months after therapy, we will ask you to: 
(1) fill out a final set of questionnaires (same questionnaires as before therapy). 
(2) attend a 60 minute interview at the clinic to see how you are 6 months after 
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General Practitioner Information 
A Pilot Randomised Trial Investigating the Effectiveness of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT) and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT): Information 
sheet for GPs, Consultants and other HealthCare Professionals 
 
Research Background. ACT is a new psychotherapy currently being used in the USA 
for patients with a range of mental health problems. ACT proposes that many mental 
health problems arise from, and can be made worse by, the avoidance of thoughts, 
feelings and bodily sensations. ACT aims to increase acceptance and willingness for 
distressing thoughts and feelings, and to motivate change through valued living. 
Research suggests that ACT is an effective therapy for a wide range of psychological 
difficulties, including; Opiate addiction (Hayes, Stroshal, et al., 2004); alcohol 
dependence (Heffner et al., 2004); psychosis (Bach & Hayes, 2002) and depression 
(Zettle & Hayes, 1986). An ongoing, uncontrolled, pre post trial at the Intensive 
Psychological Therapies Service (IPTS) has suggested ACT can decrease depression 
and anxiety in patients who have been resistant to other therapy in the past (“treatment 
resistant patients”).  
Research Aims. This trial aims to make preliminary investigation into how effective 
ACT is compared to Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). Both CBT and ACT will 
be offered as group therapy and will last 16 week. Treatment resistant patients have 
been defined as those patients currently on the Dorset NHS, general adult mental health 
waiting list, who have received a psychotherapeutic intervention at least once in the 
past, which lasted for at least 8 sessions.  
 
Design 
This is a randomised comparison trial with pre post assessment. Patients will be 
randomly allocated to either ACT or CBT. The trial aims to recruit 8 10 patients per 
group. Both ACT and CBT will be run by two experienced and trained clinicians. 
Groups will run for 16 weeks. Clinicians will monitor patients’ progress throughout 
therapy and will be available after each session in case any patient is distressed. If any 
patient becomes stuck by barriers that cannot be adequately addressed in the group 
session, the patient will be offered an individual session with one of the clinicians.  
 
Methodology 
Patients will attend one pre intervention interview (the SCID II and an assessment of 
previous therapy) and will be asked to complete a set of questionnaires in their own 
time. Interviews will be held at the Intensive Psychological Therapies Services (IPTS) 
and will last approximately 90 minutes. A similar assessment phase will also be held 
after the intervention. Six months after the intervention, patients will be asked to attend 
another interview and complete a final pack of questionnaires.  
 
Ethical considerations. 
1)  All psychotherapeutic interventions can be experienced as distressing at times. For 
this reason, two clinicians will run each session. This allows for one clinician to 
closely monitor the progress of each patient. The clinicians will be available both Appendix F     263 
 
during the break and after each session, and will ensure that no patient leaves the 
group significantly distressed.  
2)  Any patient who struggles with barriers that cannot be adequately addressed within 
the group setting will be offered an individual session with one of the two clinicians 
running the group.  
3)  The researcher collecting pre and post assessment will be closely supervised by the 
Chief Investigator (Prof Susan Clarke) and a clinician will be on site during the 
collection of all pre post assessment. 
4)  Participants will be asked to give full written informed consent before participating 
in the study. This consent will be accompanied by an information sheet explaining 
the aims of the study, detailing issues of confidentiality and randomisation, and 
explicitly stating the right to withdraw at any time without effecting current or 
future rights to treatment.  
5)  All data collected will be treated in strict confidence and clients will be given 
anonymity. 
 
This study is funded by an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) CASE grant 
that has been awarded to Prof. Bob Remington and Prof. Susan Clarke. Miss J Kingston 
has been appointed as a PhD studentship to collect the pre and post assessments which, 
in addition to providing data for the proposed research, will contribute to her thesis. 
This trial has been approved by the Dorset Ethics Committee and by the University of 
Southampton Ethics Committee.  
Thank you for taking your time to read this information. 
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